Iran Successfully Launches Military Satellite - The Diplomat, 23 April 2020

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I wrote on the Iranian military satellite launch. I believe the launch this week is likely to increase not just regional tensions but deepen existing difficulties with the United States.

On Wednesday, Iran successfully launched a military satellite into space. Though it enhances Iran’s space and rocketry capabilities, it is also likely to increase competition between Iran and its neighbors, as well as between Iran and the United States. Coming on top of existing tensions in the region, it is likely that this launch will only further increase anxieties in the region.

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Although Iran has been one of the worst-hit countries by the coronavirus pandemic, Tehran’s behavior in the region has increased tensions in the Middle East. A number of military activities undertaken by Iran in recent days suggest that Tehran is relentless in upping the ante and creating strategic frictions with the U.S. as well as others in the region. These developments come against the backdrop of growing tensions between Iran and the United States after Washington walked out of the 2015 nuclear agreement between Iran and the P5+1. As tensions with the U.S. increase, Iran has been growing closer to China and Russia.

Just this past week, the U.S. criticized Iran for its “provocative maneuvers” in the Persian Gulf. A press release from U.S. Naval Forces Central Command said 11 small vessels of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy engaged in “dangerous and harassing approaches” on American ships including the USS Lewis B. Puller (ESB 3), USS Paul Hamilton (DDG 60), USS Firebolt (PC 10), USS Sirocco (PC 6), USCGC Wrangell (WPB 1332) and USCGC Maui (WPB 1304) during their joint integration exercises with U.S. Army AH-64E Apache attack helicopters in the north Arabian Gulf. It should be noted that the U.S. forces claim that they were conducting their military exercise in international waters.

The statement added that the Iranian vessels “repeatedly crossed the bows and sterns of the US vessels at extremely close range and high speeds, including multiple crossings of the Puller with a 50 yard closest point of approach (CPA) and within 10 yards of Maui’s bow.”

U.S. Naval Forces Central Command also said that this is not in line with the internationally acclaimed Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGS) or other international customary practices that obligate states to act with due regard for the safety of other vessels operating in the area.

Earlier in March, Gen. Kenneth F. McKenzie, Jr., the commander of U.S. Central Command, stated that “tensions with Tehran have not come down and may be exacerbated” due to the large number of infections and casualty in Iran from the coronavirus. This could very well be the case but U.S. President Trump has responded to Iran’s aggressive moves by saying that “I have instructed the United States Navy to shoot down and destroy any and all Iranian gunboats if they harass our ships at sea.”

All of this makes the situation quite precarious in the Persian Gulf. These kinds of naval incidents could turn quickly into major mishaps. Iran’s behavior also calls into question its adherence to internationally recognized rules of the road in the naval domain.

It was in the middle of these tensions that the IRGC announced that Iran launched its first military satellite, the Nour 1, into orbit at an altitude of 425 kilometers (264 miles). Iran has had a number of failures prior to this week’s successful launch. Most recently in February, its launch of the Zafar 1, a communications satellite, failed. Similarly, in 2019, Iran saw two launch failures, a launchpad rocket explosion and a separate fire incident at the Imam Khomeini Space Center, which killed three researchers. Thus, the success of this week’s launch is a big moment for Iran’s scientific community and the political and military leadership.

The launch was timed well – the fact that Iran has been able to undertake a successful launch of a military satellite on the 41st anniversary of the establishment of the IRGC is politically and militarily an important milestone for the country and, of course, Tehran is using the opportunity to send a strategic message to other powers in the region and beyond. IRGC Commander Major General Hossein Salami congratulated the Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, and lauded the “new dimensions of the defence power of the Islamic Republic of Iran,” citing it as a “strategic achievement” for Tehran.

Given the growing reliance on outer space by a large number of developed and developing countries, Tehran’s launch is no surprise. In fact, Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajizadeh, the commander of the IRGC Aerospace Force, stated that “access to the space is not a choice but an inevitable necessity and we should find our place in the space.”

Boasting about the rocket, Brigadier General Hajizadeh said that Iran is now part of the club of superpowers that have rockets combining solid and liquid fuel. He added that the rocket – Qassed – that was used for today’s launch “is different from the previous ones as its propulsion system is a combination of liquid and solid fuel. The propulsion system has the same non-metal and composite body which was unveiled a while ago.”

Iran was also proud of the fact that all components of the satellite and the rocket were indigenously developed by Iranian scientists and consider it a proud achievement, especially since Tehran has been under sanctions.

This week’s satellite launch will prompt both regional and global responses. At the regional level, it could trigger reactions from Israel and major Persian Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia. The UAE has had a focused approach to its space program and is far ahead of other regional players; their plans include a Mars mission in 2020. But Iran’s military satellite launch could open some exciting tie-ups and collaborations in the region that may not have been foreseen otherwise. But in the immediate term, it is likely to do little to reduce tensions in the region.

My Perspective On US Space Resources Executive Order: Raji Rajagopalan On The EO’s First Mover Advantage - SpaceWatch Global, April 15, 2020

Recently, I did a Q&A with the SpaceWatch Global on the US Space Resources Executive Order.

On 6 April 2020, US President Donald J. Trump signed an Executive Order (EO) on Encouraging International Support for the Recovery and Use of Space Resources. This order addresses US policy regarding the recovery and use of resources in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies. Over the next few weeks, SpaceWatch.Global will publish a range of perspectives supporting and opposing the EO from experts around the world. Today’s two expert perspectives come from Rajeswari Rajagopalan of India (below) and Professor Guoyu Wang of China.

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In your opinion, what is the underlying strategic and economic rationale for President Trump’s Executive Order?

The possible underlying economic and strategic rationale is to gain the first mover advantage. While the US and other western space players talk about space mining and resource extraction, China has been making progress. Whether the resource is being extracted for bringing it back to Earth or for making the Moon as the base for more ambitious plans to go to Mars, the technological benefits through spinoffs from such activities are significant. The US clearly does not want to let China gain any unilateral advantage.

The Executive Order explicitly rejects the 1979 Moon Agreement. How do you think this will be received by other countries, particularly other major space powers?

Rejection of the 1979 Moon Agreement is not a surprise because very few countries have signed and ratified it. What is surprising in the Executive Order is the explicit rejection of the idea of outer space as a global commons. Even though the suspicion was that this was how the United States (and others) viewed it, openly saying so in the EO is unusual. For that matter, even other spacefaring powers have had similar attitudes towards space because if space is truly a ‘global commons’, it would prevent other states also from activities such as resource mining in space. And this is possibly the reason why all the major spacefaring powers including the US, Russia, China, Japan and many in Europe have not signed the Moon Treaty. India is among the handful of space powers that is a signatory to it although it has not ratified it.

Similarly, the Executive Order explicitly rejects the view that space is a Global Commons. What, in your opinion, is the policy rationale behind this claim and, again, how do you think this will be received by other countries?

It is correct that this is not the first US administration to hold this view. But equally, other countries also hold such views, though they have not been as explicit about it. Trump’s action, however, might be indicator that competition for resources in space is likely to accelerate because others countries are likely to see this as reason to speed up their programs.

In your view, how likely will this Executive Order “encourage international support for the public and private recovery and use of resources in outer space…?”

Trump’s approach on setting up a base camp on the Moon has already seen many countries supporting it. I would assume these players including the UAE, Luxembourg and Canada, Australia, would find a way of supporting this idea as well.

Hypothetically assuming that this Executive Order leads to international support, will it make the prospect of commercial space resource extraction closer to reality?

It might lead to international collaboration. But I wrote an Op-Ed where I raised some of the complications of this. For example, how would national courts arbitrate any disputes unless these are subject to national sovereignty? If this is beyond national courts, how can disputes between parties engaging in such activities be resolved? Unless these legal issues are resolved, technical advances cannot by itself ensure resource extraction from space.

India’s ASAT test: Further steps - ORF March 28, 2019

SO, India finally conducted an anti-satellite (ASAT) test on March 27, 2019. And there I was in Geneva for the UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) Meeting on Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS). The timing was interesting and strange in many ways. But amidst all the GGE work, I managed to write a few OpEds on the ASAT test, the strategic implications of it and what needs to be done now that it has a demonstrated ASAT capability.

For the ORF, I wrote a piece examining the next steps following the ASAT test. India’s ASAT test is not surprising although the timing of the test is. India started developing its ASAT capabilities in the last decade after the first successful Chinese ASAT test in 2007. It goes without saying that other countries could follow suit and build ASATs. But China made the first move with regard to ASATs and it took India a dozen years to decide whether it wanted to demonstrate this capability or not.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced yesterday that India has conducted an anti-satellite (ASAT) missile test, hitting a live satellite at an altitude of 300 kms. This makes India only the fourth country after the US, Russia and China to demonstrate such a capability. The only other country that is thought to have this capability is Israel, although it has not demonstrated it as yet.

India’s ASAT test could raise some questions given that it is likely to be perceived as a path to weaponisation but Modi argued that this was a “defensive” move meant to secure India’s own assets. He said, “Our aim is to maintain peace over war mongering. The space programme’s aim is peace, India’s economic and technological progress.” Highlighting the salience of space to India, Modi asserted, “Today, we are using space and satellites for all sorts of purposes, including agriculture, defence, disaster management, communication, entertainment, weather, navigation, education, medical uses, and other things. In such a situation, the security of these satellites is extremely important.”

In fact, the former DRDO chief Dr. VK Saraswat has claimed several times that India is developing the necessary technologies in order to destroy an enemy satellite. In fact, the successful testing of India’s anti-ballistic missile on March 6, 2011 was seen as taking a step closer to India’s development of an ASAT capability.

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Many will question the need for India to develop and test such capabilities when it is mired in a number of developmental challenges but the fact is that India is not located in a benign neighbourhood and cannot afford to ignore the new realities within the region and globally within the space domain. Therefore, even though India’s space programme is largely civilian oriented, it has acquired a slightly greater focus on national security concerns. While India still wants to ensure that outer space remains free of weapons and continues as a domain of peace and stability, it is of course not up to New Delhi alone to ensure that. India cannot avoid the increasing militarization of outer space and ignoring this reality will only hurt India’s security interests. Moreover, these developments are taking place at a time when there is a larger power transition within Asia and beyond. India’s difficulties with an aggressive China have also been pushing India down this path.

India has come a long way as far as the ASATs are concerned. From fierce opposition to the US and Soviet ASAT tests in the 1970s and 1980s, India has come to appreciate the strategic utility of these capabilities and demonstrations. While India’s approach to non-proliferation issues and the global regimes has been changing since the early 2000s, a clearer articulation on space began to appear after the Chinese ASAT test in January 2007. The Chinese test was a wake-up call for Indian policymakers who called for breaking down some of the bureaucratic and inter-departmental barriers within the Indian government to better address this threat. Then DRDO Chief Dr. M Natarajan suggested that there must be greater integration between institutions such as Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO). Similar statements were echoed by former ISRO chiefs like Dr. K Kasturirangan, who said that India has spent huge amount of resources to develop and place assets in space and therefore there is responsibility “to protect them from adversaries.”

India did not have knee-jerk reaction to China’s tests but given the worsening security competition, New Delhi had little choice but to make this decision in the interest of ensuring deterrence. But all sides will lose in such an unbridled competition because all are dependent on space.

Now that India has crossed the rubicon and has a demonstrated ASAT capability, New Delhi must make earnest efforts to help develop rules of the road that will bring about certain restraint in outer space activities. Under the current international political climate, it is unrealistic to assume that the major spacefaring powers will develop a consensus for a global treaty but India must not lose opportunities in making those efforts. At the very least, India must coordinate with all the key players in producing some consensus language about those global governance arrangements that can be taken up in multiple foras including the Conference on Disarmament, UN First Committee, and UN Disarmament Commission.