India’s emerging space assets and nuclear-weapons capabilities - my essay in the latest Nonproliferation Review

In the latest issue of The Nonproliferation Review (Volume 26, 2019 - Issue 5-6), I published an essay examining the linkages between India’s emerging space assets and nuclear-weapons capabilities. This is a special issue on South Asia, The Shifting South Asian Nuclear Landscape, put together by Prof. Sumit Ganguly and has several other interesting essays including one on future of deterrence in South Asia, Pakistan's nuclear future and the Sino-Indian nuclear dynamics.

In this essay, I argue that the relationship between India’s nuclear and space programmes has waxed and waned. Three phases can be identified that the relationship went through. There was a period in the early days of both the programmes when the relationship was close, signified by the fact that they were even headed by the same leadership, Dr. Vikram Sarabhai. For a variety of reasons that included growing maturity of both programmes but also political decisions about the need to separate the two programmes to reduce international concerns, the programmes became autonomous of each other for a period of time. More recently, over the last two decades, there has been greater collaboration between the two programmes though the nature of the cooperation is very different from what it was in the first phase. In this essay, I outline these three stages chronologically and conclude with some thoughts about how the relationship is likely to evolve.

For the full essay, click here.



It is a long essay and I concluded with the following:

Evolution of the relationship between India’s nuclear and space sectors has gone through multiple stages, partly as a consequence of domestic factors such as bureaucratic politics, technology development as well as due to international conditions such as the state of India’s relations with the global nuclear regime. In the current space, both the maturing of India’s technological capabilities in both the nuclear and space sectors and the evolution of India’s nuclear weapons programmes as well as the changed relationship between India and the global regime has led to a synergistic relationship in which India’s space programme provides significant support to India’s nuclear weapons programme. This is likely to continue for a period of time because India’s nuclear programme is still growing and it has not reached completion. For example, India still does not have a fully developed deterrence capability against China because it does not have any delivery system that can cover all of China. Moreover, the growing Chinese nuclear and space capabilities will require India to undertake further efforts before India can have a satisfactory deterrence relationship with China.

At the same time, the evolution of India’s nuclear weapons programme has changed the relationship between the nuclear and space programmes in at least two ways. First, the development of India’s missile systems outside the ISRO means that the Indian nuclear programme no longer has to depend on the space programme for this particular requirement. The DRDO has come a long way from its early efforts and is now fully capable of developing the delivery vehicles that India’s nuclear weapons programme needs. Second, the growth and complexity of India’s nuclear weapons establishment means that it needs other service support to fully exploit the delivery capability that India has developed. For example, it makes little sense to have delivery capabilities without advanced command and control systems to manage the delivery capability and ensure that it is used appropriately, which requires support from space-based communication and command systems. Similar reasons apply for intelligence and target acquisition, which are also space-based. Therefore, as the Indian nuclear weapons programme becomes more sophisticated, it also requires additional support from India’s space capabilities. What this suggests is that as India’s nuclear weapons programme continues to develop, we should expect a closer and more synergistic relationship between India’s nuclear and space programmes.

What’s Behind the Rising India-France Maritime Activity in the Indo-Pacific? - The Diplomat, 26 March 2020

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I wrote on the rising India-France maritime activity in the Indo-Pacific. A recent engagement spotlighted the broader strategic collaboration between the two countries in this realm.

Despite growing fears of the global coronavirus pandemic, India and France held a joint exercise in the Indian Ocean. While dealing with this and other challenges, both countries understand that they share broader strategic interests including the implications China’s rise in the Indo-Pacific and beyond.

For the full essay, click here.



In a first, the two navies conducted joint patrols from Reunion Island, the French naval base in the Indian Ocean. The Commander of the Indian Navy P-8I, which was part of the joint patrols, is reported to have said that that such joint security operations “make it possible to maintain the security of international maritime routes for trade and communications.”

These engagements are not without significance. India has so far generally conducted Coordinated Patrols (CORPAT) only with its maritime neighbors. Currently, the Indian Navy has Joint Exclusive Economic Zone surveillance exercises with the Maldives, Seychelles and Mauritius and CORPAT series are undertaken with the navies of Bangladesh, Myanmar, Thailand and Indonesia. The United States had earlier made an offer to India to carry out CORPAT but India rejected it.

But India’s own comfort level in engaging in CORPAT-like exercises is growing because New Delhi seems to be realizing that it is in India’s own interests to expand the number of countries with which its does such engagements. Thus, India in the last five years has shown greater inclination to engage with like-minded countries to expand its presence in the Indian Ocean. The current engagement is also a clear acknowledgement of the growing strategic importance of the areas between the East African coastline and the Malacca Straits.

Speaking to an Indian newspaper on the latest India-France interactions more specifically, Indian defense ministry sources said that while both India and France are on the same page when it comes to the challenges and concerns in the region, both also have capacity limitations. These constraints have in fact become an imperative for the two to join hands and undertake more coordinated and joint naval maneuvers. The sources were careful to add that these “patrols will be periodical” and that “there is no set pattern” to these engagements. Nevertheless, it remains an important indicator of India’s greater willingness for expanding its own footprint in the region as also for strengthening capacity-building by partnering with navies of like-minded nations.

India and France discussed CORPAT-like engagements in November 2019 during the visit of the French Navy Chief Admiral Christophe Prazuck. He had then emphasized the importance of “organizing joint patrols with the Indian Navy” and stated that the two sides are working on “the very precise objectives” of such maneuvers. He added that “if a zone [Exclusive Economic Zones] is not controlled, then it is bound to be pillaged, and if it is pillaged, then it is bound to be occupied. And if it is occupied, it will be contested.” As for the areas of engagements, he said it could be “North Western Indian Ocean or Southern Indian Ocean around the islands that are part of France.” Earlier in October 2019, the French President Emmanuel Macron had mentioned that a patrol aircraft from the Indian Navy will be deployed at Le Reunion to participate in surveillance missions in the first quarter of 2020.

Speaking about the growing Chinese presence in western Indian Ocean and the threat it poses, Admiral Prazuk noted that before piracy issues flared up in Somalia in 2008, there were no Chinese vessels. But clearly piracy has become an excuse for China to send its ships and they are still sending them even though the threat from piracy has diminished significantly. In addition to ships, China has also been sending Nuclear Attack submarines (SSNs) into the western Indian Ocean. As the Admiral noted, SSNs are “not the most effective tool to fight against pirates.”

The closer strategic engagement between the different arms of the governments including the militaries is a sign of the comfort and confidence that exist between India and France. This comfort level is demonstrated by the comments of an Indian official, who said that “France is a safe country for us, there will be no concerns in conducting joint patrols with them.” Thus, it is no surprise that France became the first country to have a Liaison Officer at the Indian Navy’s Information Fusion Centre (IFC-IOR).

France is one of the oldest, most trusted of India’s partners, possibly second only to Russia. But today with Russia having established an uncomfortably close relationship with China, India’s reliance on France has become that much greater. Even though India has traditionally remained uneasy with terms like alliance, Modi used the term to describe the relations with France at his speech at UNESCO in Paris, where he said, “Today in the 21st century, we talk of INFRA. I would like to say that for me it is IN+FRA, which means the alliance between India and France.”

This is a significant recognition of how much closer New Delhi and Paris have become even in the last few years. Some in the Indian strategic community discounted this as word play, but the reality is that the two countries’ strategic engagements have expanded and deepened in significant ways. The manner in which France backed India at the UN Security Council discussion on Jammu and Kashmir in 2019 is the latest indication of France’s strategic commitment to India. Russia used to be that reliable partner in the UN Security Council in the past but increasingly that spot is occupied by France (and of course, the United States).

While India and France have collaboration across a number of important sectors such as space, nuclear and defense, the particular focus on Indian Ocean and maritime security is significant. This is in line with India’s own changed vision for the Indian Ocean. In 2014, Prime Minister Modi made a pitch to India’s friends and strategic partners, saying “collective action and cooperation will best advance peace and security in our maritime region,” wherein India looks to key partners such as France and the United States in guaranteeing a stable maritime order in the Indian Ocean. This is a big shift from India’s earlier approach of criticizing the presence of any extra-regional powers in the Indian Ocean.

The recent CORPAT between Indian and French navies in Reunion Island became possible only because India and France signed an agreement in 2018 that would give reciprocal access to each other’s military facilities. This is similar to the logistics agreement, LEMOA, that India signed with the US. The agreement with France has expanded the presence and the type of naval operations that the Indian Navy is able to undertake in the western Indian Ocean. France has military facilities in the island of La Réunion, Mayotte, and the French Southern and Atlantic Lands. India’s pragmatic approach to Indian Ocean will go a long way in strengthening its operational maneuverability and creating more strategic options as it prepares to address a more muscular Chinese presence in the maritime spaces in India’s vicinity.

Confronting India’s Nuclear Regulation Challenge - The Diplomat, 23 March 2020

In my last week's column for The Diplomat, I focused on India's continuing nuclear regulation challenge, where I argue that New Delhi needs to pay more attention to this aspect of its nuclear policy.

India plans to increase the share of nuclear power in the overall energy mix by more than three times from the current share by 2021. While India has impressive plans to expand its nuclear sector, it also needs to pay more attention to issues such as regulation of the industry.

For the full essay, click here.



Earlier in March, India’s Minister of State for Personnel, Public Grievances, and Pensions and Prime Minister’s Office, Dr. Jitendra Singh, publicized this while responding to a question in the Lok Sabha (lower house) of the Indian Parliament. Dr. Singh said that the current installed nuclear power capacity is 6,780 MW, which makes up around 1.84 percent of the total installed capacity of 368,690 MW. He said that the existing capacity of 6,780 MW will be augmented to 22,480 MW by 2031 by undertaking “progressive completion of projects under construction and accorded sanction.”

He added that there will be a capacity addition of 5,300 MW in the next five years, including a 500 MW Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR) being constructed at the Madras Atomic Power Station in Kalpakkam, India and implemented by Bharatiya Nabhikiya Vidyut Nigam Ltd. (BHAVINI). In an earlier debate in the Lok Sabha in June 2019, Singh had said that the installed nuclear power capacity would reach 13,480 MW by 2024-25 with the completion of certain projects.

In a November 2019 debate in the Lok Sabha on India’s nuclear energy target, the government stated that it has instituted several measures for increasing the share of nuclear power in its overall energy matrix, including the “administrative approval and financial sanction” of 10 indigenous 700 MW Pressurized Heavy Water Reactors (PHWRs), with a further two Light Water Reactors (LWRs) to be set up in cooperation with Russia. In addition, India had also set up the nuclear insurance pool (INIP) to deal with private sector concerns about India’s nuclear liability bill. India’s Atomic Energy Commission has approved 10 additional uranium mining projects, and further two related projects will come up in Jharkhand.

While these are important steps, the Modi government has been silent about a related issue: that of nuclear security-related legislation or institutional measures. Nuclear safety and security are particularly important for India given the political instability and security environment that prevails in the region. India rightly acknowledged this even before global attention on the issue following the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States.

India has also streamlined much of its legislative and institutional practices based on the international guidelines and standards set by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). India’s nuclear safety measures have been periodically updated to reflect the changing security concerns. In February 2020, in a statement in the Indian Parliament, Singh reiterated that India “ensures safety of Nuclear Power Plants according to International Standards.”

Nevertheless, India has come under international scrutiny when it comes to its nuclear security standards. This has been the case primarily because India has shied away from openly spelling out its nuclear security policies and practices. Excessive secrecy has actually damaged India’s reputation on this score. Even more importantly, India should take the issue seriously because of its own plans to expand nuclear power generation capacity. This could at some stage also involve private sector participation and it would be better for the government to spell out the rules and regulatory mechanisms.

This is not just a concern expressed by the global nuclear community but also by India’s Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG), which has been critical of the relationship between India’s current nuclear regulator, the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB), and the Indian Department of Atomic Energy (DAE). There have been several studies that highlight the need for India to address this is in a more effective manner, so as to strengthen its own security practices but also to improve its international standing.

The government of India has acknowledged the need to address this issue as well. In September 2011, the Manmohan Singh government introduced the Nuclear Safety Regulatory Authority (NSRA) Bill in an effort to establish a more independent nuclear regulator. However, it was not taken up over the next three years and the bill lapsed. There was expectation that the Modi government would reintroduce the bill and kick-start a debate in the Parliament but there is no sign yet of this happening.

The NSRA Bill is important because it would be a significant improvement over the current AERB regulatory architecture. It would establish a Council of Nuclear Safety (CNS) under the leadership of the prime minister himself. While there are critics of this as well, it is still an important demonstration of the government’s resolve to have a truly independent nuclear regulator. It is important in operational terms as well, in bringing about more stringent auditing practices. In terms of the optics, it would be good that the promoter and regulator of nuclear energy are separated.

This is not difficult for India to do because it has operationalized many of the essential components in ensuring this separation, be it in addressing physical protection, nuclear transportation, or insider threats. But India needs to formalize these changes in a new nuclear legislation in the Parliament so as to strengthen its own credibility and operational practices. India should also take its international reputation seriously in order to strengthen its case with global nonproliferation platforms such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).

Lastly, India should recognize that no country has a completely fool-proof mechanism and it should not get excessively defensive about its nuclear security policies and practices. More importantly, India has a good record to promote, and a number of developing countries look at India as a model to emulate.

But India’s apparent discomfort in acknowledging its own nuclear security successes and challenges and engaging with the larger global nuclear community can be stifling for New Delhi in beefing up global nuclear security approaches. India must start the NSRA debate in the Parliament as a first step to improve itself. But it also provides a new opportunity for enhancing India’s status now that the Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) process has come to an end.

Growing Russia-India-China Tensions: Splits in the RIC Strategic Triangle? - The Diplomat, 17 March 2020

In one of my earlier columns for The Diplomat, I looked at the growing tensions within the Russia-India-China strategic triangle. I argue that there are growing tensions in New Delhi’s engagement within this arrangement and its other alignments.

India’s Minister of External Affairs Dr. S Jaishankar will be heading to Russia later in the month for a ministerial-level trilateral meeting among three Eurasian powers of the RIC group: Russia, India and China (RIC). The meeting, to be held in Sochi on March 22-24, is meant to take stock of major geopolitical developments affecting the Indo-Pacific region.

For the full essay, click here.



According to reports, the meeting will possibly discuss the recently-concluded Afghanistan peace deal, the return of the Quad (quadrilateral security dialogue involving Australia, India, Japan and the United States), the Indo-Pacific concept and the implications of the end of the INF (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces) Treaty for the region. The last RIC leaders meeting took place on the sidelines of the G-20 Summit in Osaka in July 2019, just after another trilateral between three democracies – Japan, America, and India (JAI).

RIC came together as a strategic triangle in the late 1990s under the mentorship of Yevgeny Primakov as “a counterbalance to the Western alliance.” The Russian goal was the “end[ing] its foreign policy guided by the US,” and rebuilding old partnerships with countries like India nurturing relatively newer friendships such as with China.

While this may have fitted at least partially with India’s goals in those years, it is unclear if this fits with Indian objectives now as New Delhi increases its strategic engagements with the United States and American allies. Indeed, India’s growing strategic partnership with the United States, Japan, and Australia conflicts with the RIC’s goals and objectives of seeking to undermine Washington’s role in the Indo-Pacific. Washington’s support to India on a number of critical issues, demonstrated most recently when China attempted to raise the Kashmir issue at the UN Security Council, is important. In fact, it is the rise of China that is at the front and center of many of India’s strategic engagements.

India has traditionally avoided taking sides in international politics, especially between the great powers, preferring its traditional nonalignment. But China’s rather hostile attitude towards India in recent years is increasingly forcing Indian decisionmakers to confront what China’s growing power has come to mean for India. The 72-day long Doklam crisis, China’s repeated actions at the United Nations, and other forums appears to demonstrate that China is aggressive and unfriendly towards India. This makes it difficult to see how engagements through platforms such as RIC, the Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa (BRICS), or the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) are going to alter the basic conflictual nature of relations between India and China.

Even though Russia has remained an old friend for India, New Delhi seems to realize that Moscow is increasingly under stress to follow China’s dictates. In January this year, Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov was openly opposing the Indo-Pacific concept, that too at the Raisina Dialogue, a major geopolitical conference organized by the Indian Ministry of External Affairs and the Observer Research Foundation (ORF), a prominent Indian think-tank (full disclosure: the author works at the ORF).

Responding to a question on the Russian perspective and role in the Indo-Pacific, he said it is nothing but an initiative “to contain China,” and is divisive in nature. He went on to ask: “Why do you need to call Asia-Pacific as Indo-Pacific? The answer is evident… to exclude China. Terminology should be unifying, not divisive. Neither Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) nor the Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) grouping is exclusionary.”

Even on issues such as the Jammu and Kashmir, which China raised at the UN Security Council, Russia preferred taking a middle position, not supporting India’s stand entirely for fear of offending China. It seems that while relations with India are important but for Moscow, its ties with Beijing are far more important and takes precedence over every other relationship.

Russia’s position at the closed-door session of the UN Security Council was revealing. After the meeting, the Russian representative at the UN said, “Russia continues to consistently promote normalization of India – Pakistan ties. We hope that existing divergences around Kashmir will be settled bilaterally by political and diplomatic means only.. .. on the basis of Simla Agreement of 1972 and Lahore declaration of 1999, in accordance with UN Charter, relevant UN resolutions and bilateral agreements between India and Pakistan.” Highlighting the UN resolutions to resolve the bilateral disputes between India and Pakistan “marked a sharp variance from Russia’s traditional position on Kashmir.” The two tweets by the Russian Representative in New York were further retweeted by the Russian foreign ministry Twitter account, which served to confirm the Russian position on the Jammu and Kashmir issue.

Overall, India’s strategic goals appear to be increasingly incongruent with that of Russia and China. As another case in point, even as the three foreign ministers will be meeting to discuss the Afghan peace deal, Moscow did not invite India to the recent meeting it hosted on Afghanistan. For all the rhetoric on finding a regional solution to Afghanistan, India has been kept out of such deliberations at the behest possibly of China and Pakistan. While there is merit to India engaging both Russia and China, it cannot mask the fact that there are growing tensions within the RIC grouping.

The Rising Domestic Danger to India’s Foreign Policy Under Modi - The Diplomat, 6 March 2020

In this week's essay for The Diplomat, I looked at the growing international attention and criticism to some of the recent internal developments in India. Whether New Delhi likes it or not, it is becoming increasingly clear that domestic issues are affecting ties with its neighbors and partners and that the costs of this are increasing.

Over the past few months, it has become increasingly clear that India’s domestic issues are increasingly threatening to impact India’s foreign policy. Issues such as the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) and India’s actions in Kashmir are beginning to affect India’s relations with its neighbors, major Islamic countries such as Iran and Indonesia, and strategic partners such as the United States. Last week’s violence in Delhi, in particular, is drawing negative attention to India’s internal matters and could possibly affect its reputation.

For the full essay, click here.



In an exceptional move, and a first for India, the Geneva-based Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) has said that it was planning to file an application on the CAA in the Indian Supreme Court. The UN Higher Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet subsequently filed an Intervention Application against the CAA. The MEA responded to this by saying that the CAA is an internal issue of India and “no foreign party has any locus standi on issues pertaining to India’s sovereignty.”

Iran is another recent critic, and another surprising one too, and it was vocal in condemning the communal violence in Delhi, especially the targeting of India’s Muslim citizens. Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif had a tough tweet on the Delhi violence, saying, “Iran condemns the wave of organized violence against Indian Muslims. For centuries, Iran has been a friend of India. We urge Indian authorities to ensure the well-being of ALL Indians & not let senseless thuggery prevail. Path forward lies in peaceful dialogue and rule of law.”

New Delhi did not respond kindly to the foreign minister’s comments. Responding to a question on the Iranian foreign minister’s tweet, the MEA spokesperson stated that India had summoned Iranian Ambassador Ali Chegeni and “a strong protest was lodged against the unwarranted remarks made by the Iranian Foreign Minister. It was conveyed that his selective and tendentious characterization of recent events in Delhi are not acceptable. We do not expect such comments from a country like Iran.” Apparently, it was made clear to the Iranian ambassador that this was an internal issue of India and that Iranian comments were not appreciated.

It is strange that the Iranian foreign minister’s particularly harsh tweet came just a few days after India joined hands with Iran to speed up the Chabahar port development. While Iran is known to champion the rights of Muslim minorities in other countries, it was a bit incongruous considering that Iran has said little about China’s behavior towards its Muslim Uyghur minority, large numbers of whom have been placed in concentration camps simply because of their Islamic faith. Of course, nations are not always consistent in their policies, and Iran fears China far more than it fears India.

While Iran is not a particularly strategic partner for India and can possibly be ignored, others are more difficult to dismiss. Indonesia, an important partner in India’s Act East and Indo-Pacific strategy, has also voiced serious concerns about the violence in Delhi. Muhammadiyah, Indonesia’s second largest Muslim group, expressed disquiet about the violent clashes between Hindus and Muslims on account of the CAA. Muhammadiyah secretary-general Abdul Mu’thi while denouncing the violence, said that the violence was “clearly against human rights principles.” A day after the violence, hashtag #ShameOnYouIndia was among the top trending topics on Twitter in Indonesia, and as many as 46,000 tweets were related to the Delhi violence, many condemning the violence.

This was mirrored by some of the government reactions as well. There was an unusually strong statement issued by the Indonesian Religious Affairs Ministry condemning the religious violence in Delhi. Within hours of this statement, the Indonesian foreign ministry made a statement saying that “The Government of Indonesia has complete confidence that the Government of India will be able to manage the situation and ensure the harmonious relations among its religious communities. Moreover, both countries share similar characteristics, as pluralistic countries that uphold democratic values and tolerance.” The Indonesian foreign ministry also called in the Indian Ambassador to Jakarta, Pradeep Rawat, seeking details on the Delhi violence.

Of course, this pales in comparison to any damage that may be caused to India’s ties to the United States, its most important strategic partner. Despite the successful Trump visit to India, this bears watching. India’s foreign minister and its diplomats have done a good job explaining its position in the United States after the revoking Article 370 in Jammu and Kashmir, but India’s approach after the CAA has been quite poor. For instance, Indian Foreign Minister Jaishankar’s cancellation of meetings with U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC) because Pramila Jayapal was part of the delegation possibly did not help. In fact, the resolution in the Congress, seeking a return to normalcy in Kashmir, sponsored by Jayapal found 10 additional legislators ready to co-sponsor it right after the cancellation of the meeting.

Last week’s violence in the capital sparked new concerns in the United States with several leading names from the House Foreign Affairs Committee, the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) and others, including Democrat presidential candidate Bernie Sanders, expressing serious concerns. Once again, the MEA spokesperson called these statements “irresponsible.” Raveesh Kumar, the MEA spokesperson went on to state that “Our law enforcement agencies are working on the ground to prevent violence and ensure restoration of confidence and normalcy. Senior representatives of the government have been involved in that process. Prime Minister has publicly appealed for peace and brotherhood.” A lot of India’s diplomatic bandwidth now has to be used for fighting these fires than for improving a vital relationship.

India can continue to dismiss these criticisms and concerns as unnecessary interference in its internal affairs, but it is unlikely this would help much. Even India’s well-wishers are beginning to worry. This will eventually be expensive if these problems are not resolved, especially because New Delhi will be wasting effort in explaining itself and creating unnecessary tensions and discomfort in critical relationships. Of course, the most important reason for resolving these problems is that India should be a society in which no section feels persecuted and differences are resolved peacefully, which it is difficult to say right now.

Why China’s Growing Military Might in Tibet Should Worry India - The Diplomat, 3 March 2020

Earlier in the week, I had a short essay for The Diplomat looking at the implications of China's growing military might in Tibet. I have tried to locate the importance of the PLA military exercise in Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) in January but the essay is also a shorter version of an Occasional Paper I co-authored with Pulkit Mohan, my colleague, for the ORF in February 2020. In this essay, I argue that the rising tempo of Chinese deployments in Tibet should be of concern to New Delhi.

Last month, China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) engaged in a major military exercise in the Tibet region. The engagement showcased some of the latest weapons in the Chinese military inventory and also spotlighted its deployments in the region more generally.

According to reports, the exercise last month in Tibet witnessed the deployment of several key aspects of Chinese military capabilities, including the Type 15 light battle tank and the new 155 mm vehicle-mounted howitzer. A Chinese military analyst speaking to the Global Times said that both “had powerful engines, allowing them to maneuver efficiently in Tibet’s terrain.” The same Global Times report also stated that the PLA Tibet Military Command had deployed helicopters, armored vehicles, heavy artillery, and anti-aircraft missiles across the region, from Lhasa, which has an elevation of around 3,700 meters, to border defense frontlines at an altitude higher than 4,000 meters.

For the full essay, click here.



These developments were by no means surprising. Indeed, the PLA has been beefing up its overall combat proficiency in the last few years by engaging in training and joint exercises, especially in high-altitude regions, with implications for how China’s military operates and how other actors in the Indo-Pacific region respond in kind.

With respect to Tibet in particular, the PLA has been doing a number of exercises in Tibet, and the frequency seems to be increasing. Close to a decade ago, in 2011, the PLA conducted two joint exercises at the group army level in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), with the goal of practicing employing a division-size force in a truly integrated manner, involving armor, artillery, and the PLA Air Force (PLAAF). There were also reportedly network-centric operations in a high-intensity electromagnetic environment practiced during this exercise. A J-11 regiment was sighted engaging in night-combat training in Tibet in August 2015.

Beyond individual exercises and more broadly, these developments demonstrate the growing air infrastructure in the TAR, including civilian airports, many of which are used by the PLAAF. These exercises have continued to grow bigger and more sophisticated. Even amidst the Doklam crisis in 2017, the PLA was engaged in a joint military exercise on the Tibetan plateau to test agility and combat proficiency in tasks such as assaults on enemy positions.

China’s engagements are part of an effort to step up their combat proficiencies in Tibet. More specifically, they address a significant lacuna of the PLA – lack of recent operational experience. These exercises have also focused on bringing about true jointness and integration in military operations. In addition to these exercises, there are other indicators of increased PLA activity in the TAR. For example, from 2013 onwards, PLAAF aircraft and helicopters have been sighted doing increased patrolling. Since 2013, troops coming to sectors opposite the Ladakh sector have been instructed to only travel by air and not by road, though the implications of this is unclear. Since April 2015, there have been increasing PLAAF activities, with J-11 and Su-27 aircraft of the PLAAF engaged in periodic exercises in the TAR.

From an Indian perspective in particular, China’s military efforts in the TAR are of grave concern. Even though this was the first major exercise of the PLA in 2020, there has been a significant increase in PLA engagements in terms of military training and exercises in the TAR over the last decade. The fact that Beijing has established all-weather physical border infrastructure in these areas has enhanced its ability to project military power in the region.

Additionally, the PLA is also known to have set up many military camps close to the border areas with periodic deployment of forces in these camps. This would imply that the PLA remains relatively acclimatized to the high-altitude conditions prevalent in the region, whereas on the Indian side, most forces responsible for the Sino-Indian border areas are in the plains of Assam.

This is a challenge in itself, but the bigger worry for New Delhi should be the growing number of Chinese military exercises in the TAR. The PLA has been engaged in many single-service and joint military exercises to validate several operational concepts.

The increase in the frequency and complexity of the PLA exercises in the TAR could also be an indicator of things to come. The fact that the Chinese state-run media are publicizing these exercises in Tibet is possibly an effort to send a signal to India and a demonstration of the overall better combat proficiency of the PLA. New Delhi cannot afford to ignore them.

Clearly, the tempo of China’s military activities in the TAR is growing, and it is likely to lead to even greater efforts on the Indian side. Though the Doklam confrontation ended peacefully, the preparations being undertaken by both sides suggest that the next one may have a different outcome.

Sino-Indian Competition in Myanmar in the Spotlight With Indian Navy Chief Visit - The Diplomat, February 24, 2020

I have been lagging with my blog posts but I am trying to get it back on track. Here's a short essay on the Sino-Indian competition in Myanmar, I did for The Diplomat in February. The Indian Navy Chief who was on a visit to Myanmar a couple of weeks ago again focused attention on the role of India and China in the Southeast Asian state, even though New Delhi’s weakness lies more in non-security realms.

Last week, India’s Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Karambir Singh visited Myanmar in a trip lasting from February 17 to 20. The trip, which came just weeks after Chinese President Xi Jinping’s trip to the country, spotlighted the tussle between China and India for influence in the Southeast Asian state.

Myanmar has long factored into India’s strategic calculations: Delhi considers relations with Myanmar to be very important, particularly in the context of evolving Indo-Pacific strategic dynamics, and Myanmar is also a key link in furthering India’s ‘Act East’ Policy. For China, which has a bigger political and economic footprint in Myanmar, its inroads into Myanmar have geostrategic implications because it gives Beijing proximity to the Bay of Bengal and the Andaman Sea, maritime space that is crucial to Indian security.

For the full essay, click here.



But India nonetheless continues to compete and consolidate its ties with Myanmar for its own interests. As the statement from the Indian Ministry of Defense said, Admiral Singh’s “visit is intended to consolidate and enhance the bilateral maritime relations between India and Myanmar.”

That was seen in aspects of the visit itself as well. During his visit, Admiral Singh called on a range of top officials, including Admiral Tin Aung San, commander in chief of the Myanmar Navy, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, the Commander in Chief of Defense Services, and other senior government officials, including Aung San Suu Kyi, the State Counselor and Minister of Foreign Affairs.

During his meeting with Admiral Tin Aung San, Adm. Singh offered increased training assistance for the Myanmar Navy. The Indian Navy chief is reported to have briefed the officials on the state of cooperation between the two navies. The navy chief also held interactions with trainees of the National Defense College in Naypyidaw and visited the Naval Dockyard and Training Command of the Myanmar Navy in Yangon.

These gains were notable but not necessarily surprising. The defense aspect of the relationship has been built on by both sides over the past few years, including not just regular exercises, visits, and training, but also defense equipment, with a case in point being when India handed over a diesel-electric Kilo-class submarine, INS Sindhuvir, which India refurbished after procuring from Russia in the 1980s.

Furthermore, the challenge for India in competing with China in Myanmar lies less in the naval domain and more in other aspects. In the economic domain, for instance, India’s lack of capacity to reach out and address many of Myanmar’s requirements is stark, especially when pitted against China and its Belt and Road initiative. Key projects, such as the trilateral India-Myanmar-Thailand highway project and the multi-modal Kaladhan Transit Transport project, are behind schedule.

Myanmar’s importance to India cannot emphasized enough. Given India’s push for the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), Myanmar remains a critical pillar for closer engagement with the southeast Asian region. But New Delhi is still to resolve its problem with delivering on its promises.

Beyond Rajapaksa’s Visit, Are India and Sri Lanka Really on the Same Page? - The Diplomat, 13 February 2020

Once again, I am running behind in updating my blog. In February, on the occasion of the Sri Lankan Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa's visit, I examined the relationship in detail to see if India and Sri Lanka are really on the same page, for The Diplomat. While the trip offered a chance to build on cooperation, it also reinforced existing differences between the two countries.

For the full essay, click here.



Sri Lankan Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa just completed a five-day trip to India, making it his first foreign trip since his appointment as prime minister in late November 2019. While the trip highlighted some areas for collaboration between the two sides, it also left broader questions lingering about the future direction of ties.

By all accounts, Rajapaksa’s visit appears to have been a successful one. For instance, Mahinda touched the right cords in New Delhi even on sensitive issues by stating that developments relating to Jammu and Kashmir and Article 370 were India’s internal affairs. Prime Minister Narendra Modi, for his part, said in his press statement that he appreciated Sri Lanka’s importance not only to India but to the entire Indian Ocean Region. He added that “stability, security and prosperity in Sri Lanka” is an essential element in ushering peace and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region.

In line with the “Neighborhood First” approach and the “Sagar” doctrine, Modi went on to say that New Delhi attaches “a special priority” to its relations with Colombo, which will no doubt be welcome. Sri Lanka also appears to be satisfied with the comfort level that exists between Modi and Rajapaksa and the pace of the relationship.

But there may be some disagreements that remain. For instance, according to reports citing diplomatic sources, Sri Lanka wants to see “cooperation and progress in SAARC,” whereas India believes that all efforts to strengthen regional cooperation should be channeled to the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC). Even though Rajapaksa is not thought to have raised the SAARC issue with Modi, he made a case for the regional body in an interview with The Hindu, saying “we have already gone a considerable distance with building SAARC and that should be continued.”

Sri Lanka pushing the SAARC is understandable – a Sri Lankan diplomat, Esala Weerakoon, has been appointed to be the next Secretary General of the SAARC Secretariat, and Sri Lanka would like to show some progress in the association. On March 1, 2020, Weerakoon will be taking charge of SAARC from Amjad Hussain B. Sial, his Pakistani predecessor, who has held the post since 2017. Given this development, Sri Lanka is believed to have urged the Indian leadership to “at least restart the process of discussion on SAARC” but clearly it will be difficult getting India on board.

In addition to official meetings, Rajapaksa also reached out to the media and aired the Sri Lankan interest in some of the infrastructure projects on the bilateral agenda. Rajapaksa was categorical that Sri Lanka will no longer grant important projects such as the Mattala airport to other countries. Mahinda added that projects already approved by former Prime Minister Ranil Wickremasinghe will be stopped. He also said that “his government has a firm policy on not allowing any national resources to be given to foreign control.” However, at the same time, Rajapaksa seemed upbeat about the LNG project as well as the Eastern Container Terminal in Colombo, which will see joint investment by India and Japan.

On the debt repayment issue with China, Rajapaksa defended the Chinese by saying Beijing helped Colombo in Sri Lanka’s post-war reconstruction and development efforts. He went on to note that the debt toward China is only 12 percent of the overall external debt and that the funds from China were used for developing infrastructure. He faulted the previous government for giving away strategic real estate in the Indian Ocean such as Hambantota port to ease the debt. Defending China of course probably earned Rajapaksa some brownie points with Beijing and gave some balance to Sri Lanka’s external alignments.

To be sure, Rajapaksa also stated India is a “relation” whereas others are friends. But he was uncomfortable with concepts like the “Indo-Pacific,” which he did not use though it was used by Modi, as well as with groupings like the Quad. Colombo clearly does not want to takes sides against China.

Of course, the thorny Tamil issue was also highlighted during Rajapaksa’s visit. In fact, Modi in his press statement said, “I am confident that the Government of Sri Lanka will realize the expectations of the Tamil people for equality, justice, peace, and respect within a united Sri Lanka. For this, it will be necessary to carry forward the process of reconciliation with the implementation of the 13th Amendment to the Constitution of Sri Lanka.”

However, during the media interview with the Hindu, Rajapaksa made no commitment on how the 13th amendment will be implemented, except to say no solution to the problem will happen without it being acceptable to the majority community. He elaborated on the point, saying, “We want to go forward, but we need to have someone to discuss, who can take responsibility for the [Tamil] areas. So the best thing is to hold elections, and then ask for their representatives to come and discuss the future with us.” Rajapaksa is hoping for a win in the upcoming parliamentary elections in April and thereafter to hold provincial elections that could pave the way for greater engagement with the Tamil population.

While the Rajapaksa visit has ended successfully, among the tricky issues, one that New Delhi needs to focus on is to find a balance between Sri Lanka’s interest in SAARC and the Indian preference for BIMSTEC. Given India’s larger strategic footprint across the Indo-Pacific and India’s Act East policy, BIMSTEC makes sense. But Sri Lanka is not keen. India needs to work on building support for it in other capitals in South Asia. Also, New Delhi has to be able to offer economic opportunities for these countries to make BIMSTEC attractive. Otherwise it will be seen as just empty anti-Pakistan rhetoric with no real worth for the small countries in the region. More generally, India should also be careful not to alienate the smaller countries who might not want to antagonize China.