India-China Talks on the Standoff: Cautious Optimism? - The Diplomat, 12 November 2020

In my column for The Diplomat last month, I looked at the India-China talks on the continuing stand-off in Ladakh and if there was any room for optimism.  Reports vary about the details of the latest talks, but there seems to be some optimism for an agreement.  

Indian and Chinese military forces have been engaged in a military standoff in Ladakh for more than six months now. Several rounds of military and diplomatic talks had yielded no progress. But there was cautious optimism in New Delhi after the eighth round of corps commander-level talks between India and China, held on November 6. There are increasing hints that some agreement may be reached. According to one report in the Indian media, the two sides reportedly “agreed to restoring status quo ante” on the Line of Actual Control (LAC). According to sources quoted in the report, “all that remains is for both sides to formalize the sequencing of steps required to achieve the objective.”  

But this is the most optimistic of the reports, though earlier reports about the November 6 meeting also claimed that progress had been made. On the same day that these more optimistic reports appeared, Indian Army Chief General M.M. Naravane, speaking at a public event in Delhi, said, “We are hopeful of reaching an agreement which is mutually acceptable and is really beneficial in keeping with the overarching policy guidelines.” There remains understandable caution, as he also added that the border troops are fully equipped with appropriate clothing and weapons and that the forces face “no shortages whatsoever.”  

For the full post, click here.  

In earlier reports on the November 6 meeting, an official said that India “want[s] complete de-escalation. Reduction of troops from some areas and de-induction of weapons is not a viable option and is not what we have proposed.” Chief of Defense Staff General Bipin Rawat also maintained that the any change in the status quo “is not acceptable to India” and that one cannot rule out the “situation getting out of hand and spiralling into a larger conflict.”  

India’s official statement was also along the same lines and did not mention “restoring status quo ante.” The statement simply said that “the two sides had a candid, in-depth and constructive exchange of views on disengagement along the Line of Actual Control in the Western Sector.” The statement further added that the two sides would “earnestly implement the important consensus reached by the leaders of the two countries, ensure their frontline troops to exercise restraint and avoid misunderstanding and miscalculation.” 

Other Indian media reports also suggested some progress, though not that the two sides had agreed to restore the status quo ante. According to one of these reports, an Indian Army officer said that “China’s latest proposal is better than their previous proposals.”  

There is also disagreement in the reports about the sequencing of steps for a withdrawal of forces. Some media reports said that India and China have agreed to a three-point disengagement agenda which included pulling back of tanks and anti-personnel carriers within a day as the first step. A second step would involve the withdrawal of 30 percent of troops on both sides every day for three days around the northern bank on the Pangong Tso.  This reportedly would push the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) east of Finger 8. The third step would include withdrawal of frontline troops on both sides in the southern bank of Pangong Tso, as well as areas around Chushul and Rezang La  The three-step disengagement process is to be enforced through a joint verification mechanism, which includes both delegation meetings as well as the use of drones.  

Another report, however, suggested that China would pull back from the Pangong Tso area first. China “has apparently agreed to go back to Finger 8 and remove all temporary structures and deployments the PLA had put up between Finger 4 and Finger 8 since May,” according to this report. The area between Finger 4 and 8 could be kept as a “no-patrolling” area, with neither side permitted to patrol.  But there is no agreement to this effect, yet. The second step would be disengagement of heavy armor and artillery. Currently, the deployment of tanks in close proximity, T-72 Indias on the Indian side and Type-99s on the Chinese side, in the Chushul sector, is seen by both sides as risky. Other reports have said that these are all still proposals, which will be taken up in the next round of talks. It should be noted too that only one report has talked about both sides agreeing to restoring the status quo ante.  

Even if the current tensions were to be resolved in the near term, India’s security perceptions about China are forcing India to undertake some force restructuring to maintain constant vigilance along the LAC, especially in the western sector. In addition to the 3 Infantry Division that is responsible for the LAC in eastern Ladakh, the Northern Command has decided to deploy another division of around 10,000 troops in Ladakh on a longer-term basis.  

Whether these optimistic reports will be borne out remains to be seen. On both sides, there are likely to be worries about the risks involved in withdrawing from positions that they now hold, which carries with it the risk that the other side may renege and attempt to occupy these positions. Trusting each other may still be the biggest hurdle.  

Business Now Asia Pacific (BNAP) Today Interview on India-China relations post-Galwan and other developments including Quad- July 15, 2020

On July 15, I did an interview with Australia-based Business Now Asia Pacific (BNAP) Today on the India-China Galwan clash, where I argued that the Galwan clash is pushing a major shift in India’s security and foreign policies and how the changing Sino-Indian relationship is influencing India’s relations with QUAD and QUAD Plus countries.

For the full interview, click here.



Some of the major points I made include:

1. Difficult to imagine that it will be business as usual after Galwan.

2. India has shown growing commitment to groupings such as the Quad, which has now been upgraded to ministerial level engagements; Quad Plus in the Covid context; Australia could be invited to the Malabar naval exercises.

3. India is yet to make a decision on the 5G but in all likelihood, Huawei will be blocked. Even prior to the Galwan clash, India had its apprehensions but after the last month clash, signing up with China is extremely unlikely.

4. India’s pharma industry will be affected for instance because we still buy a lot of the chemicals from China. Like I said, India will need to bite the bullet and go through some hard times because the economic impact will be significant.

5. Here is the need for the Indo-Pacific powers to come together to take decisions to consciously diversify their over-dependence on China and engage with each other even in the face of some difficulties.

Is India Ready to Play the ‘Tibet Card’ in Its Battle With China? - The Diplomat, 16 July 2020

I am a bit behind in updating my blog but here is the column I did for The Diplomat a couple of weeks ago, looking at the 'Tibet Card' in India's battle with China. While the talk of a “Tibet card” in India’s hands is not new, the key question is if New Delhi is likely to play it?

In the month since 20 Indian Army personnel were killed as a result of the clash at Galwan on the Sino-Indian border, public anger at China is palpable. There have been growing calls for a strong response from the Indian government, including a strengthened partnership with Taiwan. There have also been similar calls for enhanced support for Tibet and the Dalai Lama.

For the full essay, click here.



About 10 days after the Galwan clash, Pema Khandu, chief minister of Arunachal Pradesh, referred to the Line of Actual Control dividing India and China as the India-Tibet border. Several points are noteworthy here: He was speaking at an Indian Army meeting at the Bumla border post; he is from the BJP, the party that also holds power in New Delhi; and his state is entirely claimed by China, which calls it “southern Tibet.”

Coming against the backdrop of the Galwan clash, this could appear to be an attempt at rekindling the Tibet issue, which India has done every now and then when there is a conflict with China. This was of course music to the ears of Tibet activists, who have been seeking active Indian support for a long time. Tenzin Tsundue, a Tibetan writer and activist, during a recent media interview, echoed Khandu and said that the border must be called “the Tibet border and not the China border.” Not surprisingly, Chinese media has commented on such Indian views and opposed them.

There is ongoing debate about how India should respond to the Tibet question in the light of China’s increased pressure. Some Indian public commentators support playing the Tibet card while others are somewhat cautious. Well before the current conflict, in 2018, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), the Hindu nationalist organization out of which the BJP emerged, had argued for a reappraisal of India’s Tibet policy. Prominent BJP ideologues have supported reopening the Tibet issue, even supporting the right of Tibetans to live “as a free nation.”

Such voices have become louder. A retired senior Army officer wrote about the strategic importance of Tibet, and argued that time has come “to challenge the very legitimacy of the Chinese claim over Tibet.” In another opinion piece in Business World, Krishan Varma, a former head of India’s foreign secret service, made a case for a fresh assessment of India’s Tibet policy. He argued that a new Indian policy approach on Tibet “has the real potential of causing major turbulence in China’s underbelly.” He added that India might do well to “align its policy on the issue with the U.S. and support the ‘Tibet Policy and Support Act (2019)’ that has been passed by the U.S. Congress and is pending U.S. Senate approval before being promulgated into law through due process.”

Similarly, an editorial in Hindustan Times, a national newspaper, called for a rethink of India’s Tibet policy. Stating that India has had an inconsistent approach to Tibet, it said, “Delhi now needs to shed its hesitation, not just because Tibet is a ‘card’, but is intertwined with the values of freedom and peace central to the vision to resist China.” The editorial added that although India has continued to respect to China’s core interests, Beijing has not reciprocated. The editorial argued for honoring the Dalai Lama with the Bharat Ratna, India’s highest civilian honor, and for India to take up the rights of Tibetans in international platforms and build deeper links with the younger generation of Tibetan activists who are the face of the new resistance. Finally, it also recommended that India make a statement on the Dalai Lama’s successor indicating that India will respect the Dalai Lama’s wishes on the succession issue. Others have argued that China’s paranoia about the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan presence in India ensures that India continues to have a Tibet card to play at all.

The idea of the “Tibet card” is not new, of course. And various Indian commentators have previously warned against such a strategy. For example, Suhasini Haidar, a prominent foreign policy correspondent, had argued in 2018 that the idea of the Tibet card is “out of step” with shifting ground realities in Tibet and cautioned the Indian establishment against using “the Tibetan population in India as a strategic tool,” a point others have also made.

Similarly, Sudha Ramachandran, writing also in 2018, asserted that India never did have a Tibet card, considering that India and the even the Tibetans have accepted the One China formulation and India’s efforts to keep the Tibet card has only angered China, “without yielding tangible dividends.” Echoing Ramachandran’s sentiments, P. Stobdan, a China analyst who had previously argued that the idea of a Tibet card is a folly, declares in a recent book that China’s slow invasion tactic has been successful in dealing with India whereas New Delhi, even after 60 years, has made no significant gains in its China policy. Instead, he argues that India is now “worryingly and helplessly entangled in a Tibetan quagmire with serious implications for the stability of its frontier region.” What is noteworthy is that arguments against using the so-called Tibet card have been rare during the current crisis.

Part of the problem is the inconsistency in the Indian approach to Tibet under the Modi government. In December 2016, the Dalai Lama was invited to the Rashtrapati Bahavan, India’s presidential palace in New Delhi, for an event in honor of Nobel Peace prize winners, which raised objections from China. In March 2017, the Dalai Lama was also allowed to travel to Tawang, which was again questioned by China. In July that year, in the middle of the Doklam conflict, Lobsang Sangay of the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA), the Tibetan government-in-exile, was allowed to unfurl the Tibetan flag at Pangong Tso in Ladakh, one of the points of the current stand-off. But since the 2017 Doklam confrontation, New Delhi has attempted to play down the Tibetan presence in India, even preventing government officials from attending the 60th anniversary of the Dalai Lama’s exile.

Ultimately, it is unlikely that the Modi government will really play any “Tibet card,” despite the frequency and prominence of those arguing for it in the Indian debate. Even these opinions are more likely a reflection of the general anger toward China, rather than carefully thought out policy proposals.

Darkening Mood in Delhi Over China - The Diplomat, 3 July 2020

In my column for The Diplomat last week, I look at the changing moods and perceptions on China in Delhi. I note that opinions in New Delhi are hardening, even among sections of elite opinion-makers who are not seen as hyper-nationalists.

The Sino-Indian border confrontation may fundamentally alter Sino-Indian relations, if the darkening mood in New Delhi is any indication. Diplomatic and military negotiations have been ongoing since the June 15 clash at the Galwan River, but they do not appear to be yielding much progress. Not only has there been no troop disengagement on the border, both India and China appear to be sending more troops to the border.

For the full essay, click here.



China is also reported to be building up forces opposite the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, hundreds of kilometers to the east of the current confrontation. Adding to an already complex situation, Pakistan is sending almost 20,000 troops to territories it controls on India’s western flank opposite Ladakh, confronting India with a possible two-front problem. Pakistani radars are also reported to be active. Citing military sources, reports say that the Skardu air base in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) has been active as well. China is reportedly in talks with cadres of terrorist groups such as Al Badr to possibly stir-up violence in Jammu and Kashmir. The Indian Air Force and the Navy are also reportedly on high alert.

The so-called areas of “friction” under discussions include the north bank of Pangong Tso, Galwan Valley and the Gogra Post-Hot Springs pockets. Meanwhile, there has also been the meeting of the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination (WMCC) on June 24 and according to news reports, this will be done on a more regular basis. At the 15th meeting held on June 24, it was reportedly decided that the WMCC will be active in finding terms of disengagement, non-violation of the current but differing perceptions of the LAC, and adherence of the existing border mechanisms such as the 1993 and 1996 agreements.

Reports quoting Indian Army sources say that the “Army is preparing for the long haul and the standoff is expected to continue well into the winter.” Commenting on the last meeting of the military officials on June 30, the Indian Army Public Affairs Directorate is reported to have said that both sides “have emphasised the need for an expeditious, phased and step wise de-escalation as a priority.” With the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) and the Ministry of Defense (MoD) making no formal statements, “army sources” paint a rather a gloomy picture of the meeting.

The crisis has impacted the broader Sino-Indian relationship. Several Indian infrastructure projects in which China won the contract have been revoked or cancelled. Examples include the Shanghai Tunnel Engineering Company of China which received a contract to build the underground portion of the rapid rail project between New Delhi and Meerut, a city about 60 kilometers away. Similarly, the Bihar government cancelled a deal for the construction of a new mega bridge because two out of the four contractors had Chinese partners, China Harbour Engineering Company and Shaanxi Road Bridge Group Company (JV), even though they had earlier been cleared by the Central Cabinet Committee on Economic Affairs. There are also calls by the Maharashtra government to boycott Chinese investment. For instance, memorandum of understanding (MoU) worth 50.2 billion Indian rupees (INR) ($670 million) signed with three Chinese firms, Hengli Group (2.5 billion INR), Great Wall Motors (37.7 billion INR), and PMI Electro Mobility Solutions, a joint venture with Foton (10 billion INR) is already on hold.

Opinions in New Delhi are hardening, even among sections of elite opinion-makers who are not seen as hyper-nationalists. Ajai Shukla, a prominent defense analysts usually critical of the Modi government, tweeted that “India’s military has to fight this out, or New Delhi becomes vassal to Beijing and the Middle Kingdom.” Another moderate voice, Lt. Gen. H.S. Panag argues that with diplomacy reaching a dead end, “it is logical that India may have to exercise the military option to restore status quo ante April 2020.”

Similarly, Shivshankar Menon, National Security Adviser under the previous Congress party-led government of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, noted that China’s behavior today is different, something that has not been seen in a very long time. As he put it, this crisis “is serious . . . And it is even more serious because it is a part of a broader Chinese behaviour, not just vis a vis us, but with other people as well.” India’s deterrence appears not to be working, he suggests. The question then becomes “how do you then deal with it politically because this is more than just a military problem, this is diplomatic, political, it’s a much broader challenge.”

Gautam Bambawale, former Indian Ambassador to China, also argues that the current PLA offensive is different because China has come in large numbers up to areas of their perceived Line of Actual Control (LAC). He charges that China’s PLA has violated “all the principles, norms, standard procedures which have evolved over the past 25 years to maintain peace and tranquility in the border areas. They have displayed how little store it sets by agreements signed by its own government.” In an earlier interview, he said that “For minor tactical gains on the ground, China has strategically lost India.” More pertinently, he makes a clear call for “India as a country, as a people, including, of course, the government in the lead” to do “a fundamental reassessment of its China policy, make changes in it, and then implement it at the earliest.”

What is important is that these are voices that had usually supported stronger, mutually beneficial even if clear-eyed, relations with China. Whether these opinions will necessarily lead to changes in India’s long-term policy remains to be seen. C. Raja Mohan, one of India’s most important foreign policy commentators, has suggested that “the potential direction of the Sino-Indian relationship is likely to depend on how the current military confrontation in Ladakh is resolved.” But there is little doubt that, much like the Sino-Indian war of 1962, fundamental questions are being asked in New Delhi of India’s China relations.

The Sino-Indian Clash: Russia in the Middle - The Diplomat, 25 June 2020

Once again, I am lagging with my blog updates. A couple of weeks ago, I wrote a piece for The Diplomat on the Sino-Indian border clash and how Russia has positioned itself on the same. Clearly, the Sino-Indian clash puts Russia in an awkward position.

In the midst of a border crisis with China, Indian Defense Minister Rajnath Singh is away in Moscow. At the same time, India’s foreign minister joined his Russian and Chinese counterparts online for an Russia-India-China (RIC) meeting. The Sino-Indian crisis potentially puts Russia in a difficult position, having to choose between its traditional partners in India, which also represents a lucrative arms market, and its new but much more powerful friend in the east, China.

For the full essay, click here.



The ostensible reason for Singh’s visit to Russia was to attend the rescheduled Victory Day Parade. The annual parade commemorating the end of World War II was supposed to be held on May 9, but was postponed due to the pandemic. A 75-member tri-service Indian military contingent participated in the parade.

The Chinese defense minister was also in Moscow to attend the same parade. However, the Indian side made it clear that there would be no meeting between the two ministers. All negotiations between India and China on the border crisis are taking place bilaterally either through diplomatic channels or through local military commanders. The fact that the RIC meeting was an online affair also helps to ensure that Russia is not forced to mediate between the two sides.

Indian anger at China is palpable. In fact, Indian Foreign Minister Dr. S. Jaishankar in his speech at the RIC pointedly stated that “the challenge today is not just one of concepts and norms, but equally of their practice. The leading voices of the world must be exemplars in every way.”

India’s interests in Russia are obvious. A significant part of Indian military equipment comes from Russia. In the midst of the crisis with China, the Indian Air Force has asked for 33 new fighter aircraft including 21 MiG-29s and 12 Su-30 MKIs from Russia. This is an old acquisition plan, but it has been pushed for accelerated delivery. The deal is worth over 60 billion Indian rupees ($793 million) and is expected to be approved by the Ministry of Defense in the coming days. In addition, India had already ordered 272 Su-30 MKIs spread over a 10 to 15-year time frame.

Meanwhile, India has also asked Russia for the expedited delivery of the S-400 anti-missile system. The two sides signed a contract for the S-400s in 2019. The original delivery was scheduled for 2021. There were reports that because of COVID-19, the delivery would be delayed. Singh was expected to seek an expedited delivery of the system.

Singh was also seeking assurances that the spare parts supply for Russian equipment that India already has in its arsenal will not be delayed during any crisis with China. Specifically, he was referring to the issue of spare parts for Russian-origin fighter aircraft (including the Su-30MKIs and MiG-29s of the Air Force and the MiG29Ks of the Indian Navy), the T-90 battle tanks for the Army, and the Navy’s Kilo-class submarines.

The Sino-Indian clash puts Russia in an awkward position as a recent analysis in The Wall Street Journal by Yaroslav Trofimov and Thomas Grove pointed out. There is growing recognition in Moscow about pressure from Beijing. But as the report pointed out, Russia is also stuck with China because of pressure from the West. Russia’s difficulties in improving relations with Europe have left Moscow with few options.

In the current crisis, Russia appears to have little interest in mediating between China and India. As Konstantin Kosachev, a senior lawmaker and chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Russian Federation Council, told the Indian media that Russia should not interfere in the India-China dispute and that these should be dealt with through bilateral channels.

At the recent RIC meeting, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov also maintained that India and China do not need any help in resolving their bilateral issues. Although Russia might want to keep its head down in the current crisis, Russian reactions are also being closely watched by the Indian public. Russia has a reservoir of support in India because of its traditional support, including during the 1971 India-Pakistan War. This support glosses over the fact that Russia was neutral during the 1962 Sino-Indian War because it occurred simultaneously with the Cuban missile crisis. Russia’s relations with China had become increasingly rocky – in fact, closer Soviet relations with India were one factor in the Sino-Soviet rift – but the need for Beijing’s support during the Cuban missile crisis forced Moscow to be neutral. That removed an important leg of India’s diplomatic strategy at the time. Almost 60 years later, New Delhi is probably worried that history will repeat and Russia might lean toward China simply by staying neutral.

The Galwan Valley India-China Skirmish Is a Gamechanger for New Delhi - The Diplomat, 18 June 2020

In my column for The Diplomat last week, I looked at the continuing border crisis between India and China in Galwaan, in Ladakh in the western sector of the border. Given the significant violence and brutality of the clash in Galwan including the killing of 20 Indian army personnel, I argue that this time around, it is probably fair to say that no “Wuhan spirit” can salvage bilateral relations.

The killing of 20 Indian army men at the Galwan river confrontation on June 16 is a gamechanger in India’s national security and foreign policy strategy. For more than a month now, Indian and Chinese military forces have been engaged in a border stand-off in Ladakh on the western sector of the Sino-Indian border. For 45 years, India and China took pride in the fact that there had been no fatalities on the Line of Actual Control (LAC), and that there had been peace and tranquility to a reasonable extent, despite occasional flare ups. That changed with this violent clash in which the dead included the commanding officer of the battalion. This changes the dynamics in India-China relations for the worse. As Ashley Tellis commented perceptively: “Sino-Indian relations can never go back to the old normal. They will reset with greater competitiveness and in ways that neither country had actually intended at the beginning of this crisis.”

There will be pressure on the Indian government to not go back to business as usual after this. New Delhi may also not be able to afford to continue its ambivalent and uncommitted foreign policy approach, generally characterized as “hedging.” India’s attempts at straddling multiple camps is likely to come under pressure. India has shown growing commitment to groupings such as the Quad, which has now been upgraded to ministerial level engagements. At the same time though, Prime Minister Narendra Modi has also made efforts to engage again with the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM), attending a virtual summit in early May. This was the first time he attended a NAM summit, a group he has largely ignored for years. Although India has emphasized its role in the Russia-India-China (RIC) and the Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa (BRICS) groupings, there are likely to be questions raised about the utility of groups that are largely run according to Beijing’s wishes and which are unlikely to contribute much value to New Delhi.

For the full essay, click here.



On the clashes itself, there is still confusion about what happened over the last couple of days, except about the fatalities on the Indian side. There is an even a bigger question about the rationale behind China’s provocative actions. Both the Indian Army and the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) have issued statements. The MEA stated that subsequent to “a productive meeting on 6th June 2020” wherein a process for de-escalation was agreed upon by the two sides, there were additional meetings of ground commanders “to implement consensus to respect the Line of Actual Control in the Galwan Valley.” The MEA spokesperson also added that “our expectation [was] that this [the de-escalation process] would unfold smoothly, [but] the Chinese side departed from the consensus to respect the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the Galwan Valley.” On a phone call with the Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi this afternoon, India’s External Affairs Minister Dr. S Jaishankar claimed to have categorically stated that “this unprecedented development will have a serious impact on the bilateral relationship.” He further called on China “to reassess its actions and take corrective steps.”

The Chinese readout was very different, with Wang reportedly telling Jaishankar that India must investigate and “severely” punish those responsible and ensure that such incidents do not happen again. “The Indian side must not misjudge the current situation and must not underestimate China’s firm will to safeguard territorial sovereignty.”

India-China flare ups have seen an uptick since Xi Jinping came into office in 2012. Repeated border incidents – Depsang (2013), Chumar (2014), and Doklam (2017) – had already strained the relationship, but they pale in comparison to the current border crisis. Following the downturn after the Doklam, the two sides attempted to build greater confidence in each other and build a certain amount of predictability in order to manage crises through informal summits like the ones in Wuhan and Mamallapuram. This time around, it is probably fair to say that no “Wuhan spirit” can salvage bilateral relations.

There has not been much cooperation in bilateral security relations to start with (except for some limited-scale military-to-military exercises) but economic relations between India and China are deep. Driven by market factors, China had made some gains in the power, infrastructure and telecom sector but that could come to a grinding halt. However, the biggest loser is possibly China’s Huawei in its efforts to enter the Indian 5G market. Even as there was skepticism about the company and its links to Chinese intelligence, there was a chance that China would be given a fair opportunity in the Indian 5G market, but Beijing has most likely dashed that hope. India could also impose additional economic costs that will further limit China’s entry into the Indian market, though this will hurt both sides.

There will be pressure on India to recalibrate its strategic engagements. If China thought that putting pressure on India for building closer ties with the United States, Australia and Japan was going to work, it has rebounded badly. The Galwan crisis will likely push India to build much closer strategic ties with the Quad and the Quad Plus and with the US and its allies in the Indo-Pacific.