Russia-India-China Trilateral Grouping: More Than Hype? - The Diplomat, 5 July 2019

In my column for The Diplomat last week, I wrote on the Russia-India-China grouping, looking at the rhetoric and reality of it.

During the G-20 Summit in Osaka, Russia, India, and China (RIC) held the latest iteration of a trilateral meeting between them. While the grouping itself is nothing new – the notion of meeting on the sidelines of the G-20 meeting began last year and many other meetings were held during the G-20 meeting this year as well – the RIC nonetheless stole the headlines this year.

For the full post, click here.



RIC as a strategic grouping first took shape in the late 1990s under the leadership of Yevgeny Primakov as “a counterbalance to the Western alliance.” Primakov, a Russian politician and diplomat who was also the prime minister of Russia from 1998 to 1999, is credited with the idea for RIC. The group was founded on the basis of “end[ing] its subservient foreign policy guided by the U.S.,” and “renewing old ties with India and fostering the newly discovered friendship with China.”

But the idea of meeting at the leader’s level on a more sustained basis has only surfaced over the past couple of years. The three sides had done so last year at the G-20 meeting in Argentina, where there was also a focus on the trilateral summit between the United States, India and Japan, called JAI (Japan, America, India). And on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) meeting in Kyrgyzstan, the leaders agreed to meet again in Osaka during the G-20 Summit.

The RIC meeting this year is only the third heads of state meeting of the group in 12 years, which speaks to the state of the play among the three countries in nurturing this strategic grouping. Nonetheless, in the current period of geopolitical transition, there is an effort to renew and rebuild some of these old initiatives as a way to counter the U.S.-led world order.

These efforts started in Bishkek, when Russian President Vladimir Putin, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, and Chinese President Xi Jinping held separate bilateral meetings on the sidelines of the SCO Summit. Reports speak of great “personal chemistry between Putin, Xi and Modi” that has “worked wonders.” While the Russia-China leg of the triangle has been fairly strong in the last few years, Modi has also had reasons in recent times to cozy up to Russia and China in the wake of U.S. President Donald Trump’s tariff war with India, especially since the Trump administration has withdrawn India’s Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) and imposed tariffs on Indian goods.

To be sure, India has remained a key partner in the United States’ Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy, and Modi too has sought a close strategic partnership with the United States in an effort to address China’s rising power. But the recent trade and tariff war may cast a negative shadow on the broader U.S.-India strategic ties, which stands to advantage China and Russia. It is no coincidence that the RIC meeting and the strengthened bonhomie among the three leaders has come amid these difficulties between the United States and India. While U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo was in India in late June to assuage some of the growing difficulties in the India-U.S. bilateral ties, the trip, as well as Pompeo’s statement “Modi hai toh Mumkin Hai” (“Modi makes it possible”), did very little to change the broader strategic dynamics with New Delhi.

In this respect, how the RIC meeting was perceived and portrayed at G-20 in Osaka came as no surprise. Unlike the second edition of the JAI Summit, which did not get much attention, the RIC meeting was trumpeted as a major success for developing economies, emphasizing the need for free and open markets, and opposing any efforts at protectionism, all clearly targeting Trump’s America. Clearly, Xi and Putin pitched this at the ideal moment, when New Delhi is the latest of many who have come under Trump’s tariff war.

Modi, in his opening remarks to the RIC meeting in Osaka, underlined the importance of the RIC grouping and the exchange among the three on the global economic, political, and security situation. He highlighted the usefulness of the exchange of views at the earlier meeting of the RIC foreign ministers in China in February. Modi said that the foreign ministers had discussed all important issues including “promotion of counterterrorism, international hot-spot issues, reformed multilateralism, climate change and cooperation under RIC.”

Xi, for his part, is reported to have emphasized the importance of the three countries in the context of upholding multilateralism. He urged the leaders of Russia and India to assume “global responsibility” to defend their national interests while pushing for a multilateral world order. Xi went on to add that “the rise of protectionism and unilateralism has severely affected global stability and economic growth, as well as the existing international order which emerging economies and developing countries have relied on.” Clearly, Xi was trying to muster greater support amidst the ongoing U.S.-China trade war.

It is not clear how Modi will weather the tariffs issue, and New Delhi may not find much relief by going with the RIC to address this issue. While Modi has to be mindful of the charm offensive by Xi and Putin, which obviously works to their own self-interest because of their own difficulties with the United States, Washington must also play its cards carefully and not let New Delhi fall into Beijing’s lap. The United States and India must ensure their current trade and tariff issues do not lead to serious strategic disagreement. The two cannot afford to miss the emerging geopolitical realities driven by China’s growing power. So far, the United States and India have been able to more or less maintain the momentum in the relationship and it has been mutually beneficial. It is too early to say if the calculations are changing.

Will the Masood Azhar Listing Improve Sino-Indian Relations? - The Diplomat, May 7, 2019

In this week's column for The Diplomat, Rajesh and I wrote a joint article, "Will the Masood Azhar Listing Improve Sino-Indian Relations?," examining if China's decision on Masood Azhar is likely to have any positive impact on India-China relations. But we believe there are reasons to be skeptical.

Masood Azhar, a Pakistani national who heads the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) terrorist group, has now been placed in the United Nations Security Council 1267 Sanctions List. This was long sought by India, who blamed Azhar and the JeM for various terror attacks in India. The issue was also a major irritant in Sino-Indian relations because China had for several years placed a “technical hold” that prevented the listing.

The Indian government was jubilant, and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who is fighting national parliamentary elections, immediately claimed credit. Though the Indian government welcomed China’s decision, they have been cautious about whether this by itself would move the relationship forward, stating that there are “many things” which have contributed to the “Wuhan Spirit” and “it is difficult to point out one single incident or instance which will contribute to a better India-China relationship.”

The caution is well-founded. Sino-Indian relations have improved since the Doklam confrontation in 2017. The Wuhan “spirit,” the supposed positive outcome of the informal summit at Wuhan between Modi and Chinese leader Xi Jinping, is credited with improving relations between the two countries. A follow-up informal summit is slated for later this year. China’s move on Azhar should add to the positive spirit. Still, fundamental problems remain in the relationship and they are unlikely to be easy to resolve.

For the full essay, click here.



The most important is the consequence of the changing balance of power between the two countries. From rough parity in the 1980s, China’s economy has pulled away from India at a dizzying speed, and it is now about five times as large. This has created a gross imbalance between the two sides that is likely to persist for some time to come, even if India’s marginally faster economic growth rate of the last couple of years continues into the future. This imbalance also leads to a military imbalance, as China’s military budget grows along with its wealth. Though China’s military spending as proportion of its GDP is still quite low, that should be of little comfort because in absolute terms, it is almost four times that of India’s.

More importantly, the effect of this imbalance is likely to be felt more in the political clout that it brings to China than in a test of arms. Over the last decade, China has become bolder in wielding its economic clout, as Evan Feigenbaum has pointed out. But even without such direct exhibitions of its power, China’s clout gives it political capacities in international settings that will be difficult to ignore. New Delhi will find that when it comes to many issues where its interest conflicts with that of China’s, China will be able to garner greater international political support than India. This is already very visible among India’s neighbors in South Asia, and its effect is possibly much more diffuse but far more potent than New Delhi yet realizes. This represents a pressure on India that will not yield in the near future, and it will limit the possibilities of Sino-Indian ties.

Of course, the older problem of the disputed border also remains, despite decades of negotiations. Neither side can compromise very much on this. The best that can be hoped for is that neither side will attempt to settle it by force, but misperceptions and local misunderstandings are likely to periodically recur. The Doklam confrontation was possibly the result of something along these lines; the next time, it could become more serious.

But one consequence that can be dismissed is any effect of the current general elections on the future course of Sino-Indian relations, even though China’s move comes in the midst of a hot campaign. As Vipin Narang and Paul Staniland have noted, foreign policy has fairly low electoral salience in India. Though the ruling BJP’s campaign is pushing strategic issues in an unusually heavy manner, it is unclear what effect this will have. But even if this has some limited effect (and it will be difficult to decide this even after the election results are announced, though exit polls may give at least some clues) on the elections, its effect on subsequent Indian foreign policy may be limited. Whoever wins these elections will still have to deal with the context of China’s power and its effects on India’s options, and these are fairly limited.

New Delhi is thus correct to be cautious about the effects of the Masood Azhar listings. And while it is at it, India should equally cautious about the so-called “Wuhan spirit” because it is not likely to last very much longer either.