#SpaceWatchGL Op’ed: My 2019 in a review – Great Power Politics and Global Governance - SpaceWatch Global, 30 December 2019

I contributed an OpEd to SpaceWatch Global - My 2019 in a review – Great Power Politics and Global Governance, where I focused on two major developments - the Indian ASAT test and the end of the INF Treaty. SpaceWatch.Global had reached out to its staff and contributors to review 2019 and provide an outlook into 2020.

This has been an exciting year for me in a number of ways but also an increasingly worrying one, especially when we consider the growing threats to peace and the difficulties in getting the world’s nations to deal with them cooperatively.

Developments in the space domain and in the broader strategic realm have kept me engaged through the year. The latter provided the setting, in many ways, for many of the developments in the former, but has also been important by itself.

For the full OpEd, click here.



The developments in the broader strategic setting essentially refers to developments in the Indo-Pacific region, especially politics between the US, China, Japan and India. The region is also home to some of the fastest growing economies, which has translated to acquisition of major hard power capabilities. Competition with China has continued to tick upwards. Sino-Indian competition, in particular, is picking up. Two rounds of informal summits have not been helpful in mitigating the competition and tension in the relationship. China’s growing influence and penetration in southern Asia and Indian Ocean has led to a pushback, including the quadrilateral (Quad) arrangement, which gained further traction in 2019. Bilateral relations — such as the India-Japan, India-Australia, and India-US — and trilaterals including the India-US-Japan have become stronger for the same reason.

But one of my main focus has been on Sino-Indian competition, which is picking up, including in outer space.

The Indian anti-satellite (ASAT) in March 2019 was one consequence, a clear deterrence signal to China, which had already tested its ASAT a decade earlier. The test did raise some concern about debris in outer space. On the flip side, there were fears in India that it would yet again sit on the fence and miss an opportunity to develop a critical defense technology, as it had done in the nuclear arena. The debate on an Indian ASAT had become loud after the first successful Chinese ASAT test in January 2007. There has been consensus among all the different Indian stakeholders – the civilian, scientific and military bureaucracies – on the need to demonstrate India’s capability.

India’s newly-acquired capability has raised many questions but Prime Minister Modi argued that the test was a “defensive” move to protect India’s own space assets. Like India, most countries use space for a number of civilian applications including in areas like agriculture, disaster management, weather forecasting and communication, and there is a strong global interest to preserve outer space as a public good. Now that India has acquired an ASAT capability, New Delhi must take earnest efforts at preventing trends towards space weaponisation.

Another important issue has been the end of the INF Treaty and what it means for global security. The treaty led Washington and Moscow to destroy a total of 2,692 short-, medium-, and intermediate-range missiles by 1991. The treaty was seen as particularly important as it is the only nuclear arms control measure that abolished an entire class of weapons. Important questions have been raised as to whether the end of the INF would have strategic implications in the Indo-Pacific. Many in the US Congress as well as arms control advocates have lamented that walking out of a treaty without an alternative one in place as a recipe for an arms race.

Now that the treaty has ended, Russia could possibly build develop a series of INF-category missiles but the real concerns have been about China. Both the Obama and Trump administrations had accused Russia of violating its INF commitments, one of the reasons for the US to end the treaty. In addition to the Russian breaches, the Trump Administration was particularly worried about the Chinese inventory of around 2,000-odd ballistic and cruise missiles, a significant majority of which would be in violation of the INF if China was a party to the treaty. But now that the shackles of the INF are gone, Beijing argues that Washington could deploy conventional ground-launched missiles in East Asia that could possibly tilt the military balance in the region. This could of course legitimize all of the missiles that China has already deployed, which are threatening to its neighbours as well as the US. There has been talk about a possible multilateral arrangement as a successor to the INF but China has remained categorically opposed to such ideas.

Unfortunately, global governance mechanisms are not keeping up with the increasing threats that international peace and stability are facing. The failure was most evident at the 2018-2019 United Nations Group of Governmental Experts (GGE)

on PAROS (Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space). The failure in developing consensus among great powers has been an issue for more than two decades now. The state of the play within the Conference on Disarmament (CD) is illustrative of this paralysed nature of inter-state relations, especially among the great powers. I was associated with the UN GGE on PAROS as a Technical Advisor to the Group, which deliberated on PAROS over two two-week long sessions but at the end, the divisions within the Group was so stark that it could not agree upon a commonly-agreed upon text to be released as a consensus report.

As the year ends, therefore, it is clear that there is a lot of work to be done if we have to maintain a stable international order. But there is also growing worry that we are running out of time.

China takes seriously only the language of power, deterrence! Why India’s A-SAT missile test was a necessity - The Financial Express, March 29, 2019

I wrote a fourth piece on the Indian ASAT test for The Financial Express, looking at the rationale and compulsions for India to actually demonstrate the capability.

After debating for more than a decade, India has now conducted its anti-satellite (ASAT) missile test, pushing itself into an exclusive group of countries that includes the US, Russia and China. Prime Minister Narendra Modi made this announcement in a televised address saying that the demonstration of the Indian ASAT capabilities has made it a true space power. Hitting a satellite at an altitude of 300 kms. in the low earth orbit, one must agree that this has been a fairly responsible act on India’s part because this would not create long-lasting space debris, which is a serious problem in space.

For example, the Chinese ASAT test in 2007 created a huge debris problem. The US ASAT test in 2008 was done at an altitude of 275 kms and the debris possibly came down in a few weeks. Thus, India will not come in for major flak on that count. As for the rationale and timing, there could be several factors at play. Clearly, the terrestrial competition with China and the larger geopolitical games underway in Asia have possibly had a determining say in the Indian ASAT decision. China’s growing power and aggressiveness, as well as its disregard for established global norms and rules means that it only understands the language of power and deterrence.

For the full article, click here.



It was China’s 2007 ASAT test that broke a long-standing voluntary moratorium on such tests. Moreover, that test was particularly unfortunate because, as mentioned earlier, it created a huge debris field. Such disregard has become a characteristic of China’s behaviour. It appears that China will only take seriously the language of power and deterrence. Thus, demonstrating an ASAT capability was an absolute strategic necessity to let Beijing and others know that if Indian assets in outer space are attacked, India has the means to retaliate. A second important calculation for India is to not find itself in the NPT (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) trap yet again. In the case of the NPT, India’s reluctance to push for a nuclear test in the 1960s left it out of the NPT category of “nuclear weapon state”, and India was unwilling to give up the nuclear option by signing on as as a non-nuclear weapon state. Thus, India found itself outside the entire NPT structure.

Having gone through the “pariah” experience for three decades, India has been particularly mindful of the developments in the global governance area to avoid being caught in a similar trap. There have been a few initiatives on and off in the past decade to regulate activities in outer space and India did not want to be on the wrong side of the wall again. However, neither the International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities proposed originally the European Union nor the current UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) seek to ban ASAT tests but it may have been the apprehension about such initiatives that could have motivated India to demonstrate the ASAT capability now.

There is also nothing that stops the current three countries who have tested ASAT capabilities from framing an NPT-like treaty for outer space denying others the technological capacity to develop such weapons. Moreover, India’s test does not violate any existing norms or rules, as the press note put out by the Ministry of External Affairs points out. India is a signatory to all the major agreements on outer space, including Moon Treaty that has seen very few signatories.

Nevertheless, some criticism and concern from other countries should be expected. China has put out a somewhat cautious statement to suggest that countries should “uphold peace and tranquillity in outer space” whereas Pakistan had a stern response calling upon international community to condemn India’s test. Russia and the US are yet to issue a statement. Countries that have pursued strong disarmament efforts such as Japan, for instance, could be a little uneasy with India’s test.

They could perceive India’s test as triggering fresh prospects for militarisation of outer space, which indeed would be unfortunate. India has little interest in militarization of space, considering how dependent India itself is on outer space for a variety of civilian needs. On the other hand, India also had little choice but to respond to China’s earlier test in order to maintain deterrence and protect India’s assets in outer space. Having done that, New Delhi should redouble its efforts to build a global movement to strengthen the norm of non-militarization of outer space.

India’s Missile Test Spotlights Its Lingering Space Challenges, The Diplomat, March 28, 2019

In this week's Diplomat column, I focused on India's demonstration of the ASAT capability arguing that while a recent test is no doubt historic, New Delhi has much work left to do to address the challenges that remain.

Earlier this week, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi made a televised address to announce that India had conducted an anti-satellite (ASAT) missile test from the Dr. A. P. J. Abdul Kalam Island launch complex. Modi went on to tweet that this is a moment of “utmost pride” and an event of “historic impact.”

The test targeted and destroyed one of India’s own satellites operating in low-Earth orbit (LEO). A press release, rather an FAQ issued by the Ministry of External Affairs, claimed that the test was “fully successful” and achieved all mission objectives.

Modi also recalled the precise and complex nature of the exercise, saying “#MissionShakti was a highly complex one, conducted at extremely high speed with remarkable precision. It shows the remarkable dexterity of India’s outstanding scientists and the success of our space programme.”

For the full piece, click here.



It is not clear when India’s ASAT program started but it is safe to assume that it began after the first successful Chinese ASAT test in January 2007. Going by the statements issued by scientists, ministers, as well as military leaders, it is clear that China’s ASAT was a big factor. The previous government of the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) led by the Congress party has indeed taken credit for starting the program. Former Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) officials like Dr. V.K. Saraswat had previously stated that India had developed the technological blocks for an ASAT demonstration but lacked the political will to demonstrate the capability.

Traditionally, India’s space program focused largely on civilian and developmental uses but has increasingly had a national security and strategic focus also. Over the last decade, India has deployed a number of satellites with specific national security roles in surveillance as well as military communication. It launched the first dedicated military satellite for the Indian Navy in 2013. This was the result not just of India’s growing technological capacity but also of the increasing competition in the space arena.

China’s efforts to catch up with the United States in outer space, while understandable, also have a second-order impact on India’s national security. And China’s power in both Asia and particularly in South Asia means that New Delhi could not ignore China’s capabilities, including in outer space. Terrestrial conflict and competition have begun to impact outer space activities too, much as during the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union.

In addition, India has also felt the need to conduct spectacular space operations to demonstrate its capabilities. These help demonstrate India’s achievements and possibly give it a bigger voice in international discussions about managing outer space. Though international management of outer space is beginning to fray, with more players, more challenges, and greater nationalism, this is all the more reason for countries like India to make efforts to re-establish some of the norms and rules of managing outer space.

But developing technological capabilities is only one dimension of the challenges India faces. An equally serious challenge is building the institutional apparatus within the government to use these capabilities in the most effective manner possible. To take just one example, the Indian government established the Integrated Space Cell more than a decade ago, which was a good first step, but the Cell has not been able to perform the kind of integrative functions it was originally meant to.

Similarly, the establishment of a triservice aerospace command has been debated for two decades with no real progress. The idea was first articulated by Air Chief Marshal SK Sareen back in 1998 when he headed the Indian Air Force (IAF). Two decades later, India is getting closer to having a Defense Space Agency but not yet a Command. Many in the IAF leadership have argued that the changing nature of warfare, with greater integration of space capabilities as seen during the U.S. military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, should be clear imperatives for India to proceed with institutional changes. Moreover, other countries like China are learning from United States’ operations and reorienting their own space programs.

But India has not progressed much in developing an integrated approach to outer space or creating the institutional architecture to ensure greatest effectiveness and efficiency. This task, in fact, may be harder than just developing technology, which is one reason why this has not kept pace with technological developments.

Another area where New Delhi must change is with regard to its involvement in global space governance. India so far has been quite reluctant to get involved in space governance or in the debates about its future. Having demonstrated its ASAT capability, India should not shy away from playing an active role in ensuring that outer space remains peaceful, without weapons, and developing mechanisms that would curb certain irresponsible actions in outer space. At the very least, India should take the lead in shaping the norms of responsible behavior even if formulating legally binding mechanisms are challenging given that developing consensus among major spacefaring powers has been the biggest challenge in this regard.

Having Tested Its ASAT Capability, India Should Help Shape Global Space Norms - The Wire, March 28, 2019

In a second piece on India's ASAT test, I published a short essay in The Wire. I argued here that now that India has demonstrated its ASAT capability, it should move away from its current position of ambiguity to taking a proactive role in shaping the norms, rules and regulations in this area. Having crossed the rubicon, it can join the conversations along with other established space powers to ensure that space remains weapons-free.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced on Wednesday that India has conducted an anti-satellite missile test against a live satellite in low earth orbit (LEO). The ASAT test from the Dr. APJ Abdul Kalam Island launch complex lasted for three minutes and was claimed to be “fully successful” and accomplished all the parameters set out for the missions.

Modi also tweeted that this was a proud moment for India and stated that this test is special for two reasons: First, “India is only the 4th country to acquire such a specialised and modern capability,” and second, “The entire effort is indigenous. India stands tall as a space power! It will make India stronger, even more secure and will further peace and harmony.”

Thereafter, the Ministry of External Affairs provided some additional details on the rationale and the timing for the test in the form of FAQs. The document underlined the rationale for India to demonstrate its ASAT capability as a means “to safeguard our space assets”.

For the full essay, click here.



ASAT itself is not a new technology. The US and the Soviet Union had conducted many ASAT tests during the latter years of the Cold War. After a voluntary moratorium that was in place for more than two decades, China conducted its own first successful ASAT test in January 2007.

The Chinese ASAT test was conducted at an altitude of 865 km and resulted in the creation of 3,000-odd pieces of long-lasting space debris. This was followed by the US, which conducted its own ASAT test, bringing down an old satellite in 2008 at an altitude of 275 km, but with very limited debris. India’s test today was at an altitude of 300 km and thus any debris that has been created could burn up in the atmosphere or come down in a few weeks and months. The larger pieces of debris will come down much faster because gravity will act on them more, but even the smaller pieces should down-enter the atmosphere and burn up in a few months’ time.

India’s demonstration of its ASAT capability has obvious implication for national and international security. For instance, though other countries have tested this capability, they are not thought to have actually deployed it. India is also likely to follow the same path and avoid deploying this system. However, this does not take away from the utility of the demonstration itself. This was required in order to avoid some of the mistakes that India had done in other areas, such as the nuclear domain. India refused to test its nuclear capability in the 1960s, thus being left out of the Non Proliferation Treaty’s category of “nuclear weapon state”.

Clearly, India does not want an NPT for space to be developed and then be banned from developing and demonstrating its ASAT capability. Before today’s test, there were only three countries that have demonstrated this capability and the three could easily come up with an international mechanism that would ban additional ASAT tests. India has been mindful of any such efforts to develop political and legally binding agreements addressing the trend towards weaponisation.

The other key question is the rationale for India to do the ASAT test. Since China’s ASAT test in January 2007, India has been concerned about the security of its space assets. Given India’s investment in the outer space domain including the services and ground infrastructure, India has significant material stakes. Therefore, developing certain deterrent capabilities against any ASAT threat is important.

Now that India has demonstrated its ASAT capability, it should move away from its current position of ambiguity to taking a proactive role in shaping the norms, rules and regulations in this area. Having crossed the rubicon, it can join the conversations along with other established space powers to ensure that space remains weapons-free.

There have been a number of efforts in recent years, including the Code of Conduct proposed by the European Union in the early 2010s to the current UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS), which will submit its report soon to the UN General Assembly for further action. India can and should be an active player in these deliberations.

India’s ASAT test: Further steps - ORF March 28, 2019

SO, India finally conducted an anti-satellite (ASAT) test on March 27, 2019. And there I was in Geneva for the UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) Meeting on Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS). The timing was interesting and strange in many ways. But amidst all the GGE work, I managed to write a few OpEds on the ASAT test, the strategic implications of it and what needs to be done now that it has a demonstrated ASAT capability.

For the ORF, I wrote a piece examining the next steps following the ASAT test. India’s ASAT test is not surprising although the timing of the test is. India started developing its ASAT capabilities in the last decade after the first successful Chinese ASAT test in 2007. It goes without saying that other countries could follow suit and build ASATs. But China made the first move with regard to ASATs and it took India a dozen years to decide whether it wanted to demonstrate this capability or not.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced yesterday that India has conducted an anti-satellite (ASAT) missile test, hitting a live satellite at an altitude of 300 kms. This makes India only the fourth country after the US, Russia and China to demonstrate such a capability. The only other country that is thought to have this capability is Israel, although it has not demonstrated it as yet.

India’s ASAT test could raise some questions given that it is likely to be perceived as a path to weaponisation but Modi argued that this was a “defensive” move meant to secure India’s own assets. He said, “Our aim is to maintain peace over war mongering. The space programme’s aim is peace, India’s economic and technological progress.” Highlighting the salience of space to India, Modi asserted, “Today, we are using space and satellites for all sorts of purposes, including agriculture, defence, disaster management, communication, entertainment, weather, navigation, education, medical uses, and other things. In such a situation, the security of these satellites is extremely important.”

In fact, the former DRDO chief Dr. VK Saraswat has claimed several times that India is developing the necessary technologies in order to destroy an enemy satellite. In fact, the successful testing of India’s anti-ballistic missile on March 6, 2011 was seen as taking a step closer to India’s development of an ASAT capability.

For the full article, click here.



Many will question the need for India to develop and test such capabilities when it is mired in a number of developmental challenges but the fact is that India is not located in a benign neighbourhood and cannot afford to ignore the new realities within the region and globally within the space domain. Therefore, even though India’s space programme is largely civilian oriented, it has acquired a slightly greater focus on national security concerns. While India still wants to ensure that outer space remains free of weapons and continues as a domain of peace and stability, it is of course not up to New Delhi alone to ensure that. India cannot avoid the increasing militarization of outer space and ignoring this reality will only hurt India’s security interests. Moreover, these developments are taking place at a time when there is a larger power transition within Asia and beyond. India’s difficulties with an aggressive China have also been pushing India down this path.

India has come a long way as far as the ASATs are concerned. From fierce opposition to the US and Soviet ASAT tests in the 1970s and 1980s, India has come to appreciate the strategic utility of these capabilities and demonstrations. While India’s approach to non-proliferation issues and the global regimes has been changing since the early 2000s, a clearer articulation on space began to appear after the Chinese ASAT test in January 2007. The Chinese test was a wake-up call for Indian policymakers who called for breaking down some of the bureaucratic and inter-departmental barriers within the Indian government to better address this threat. Then DRDO Chief Dr. M Natarajan suggested that there must be greater integration between institutions such as Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO). Similar statements were echoed by former ISRO chiefs like Dr. K Kasturirangan, who said that India has spent huge amount of resources to develop and place assets in space and therefore there is responsibility “to protect them from adversaries.”

India did not have knee-jerk reaction to China’s tests but given the worsening security competition, New Delhi had little choice but to make this decision in the interest of ensuring deterrence. But all sides will lose in such an unbridled competition because all are dependent on space.

Now that India has crossed the rubicon and has a demonstrated ASAT capability, New Delhi must make earnest efforts to help develop rules of the road that will bring about certain restraint in outer space activities. Under the current international political climate, it is unrealistic to assume that the major spacefaring powers will develop a consensus for a global treaty but India must not lose opportunities in making those efforts. At the very least, India must coordinate with all the key players in producing some consensus language about those global governance arrangements that can be taken up in multiple foras including the Conference on Disarmament, UN First Committee, and UN Disarmament Commission.