Growing India-South Korea Strategic Synergy: The Defense Domain - The Diplomat, 13 September 2019

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I wrote on the growing strategic synergy between India and South Korea and how that is beginning to impact upon the defence domain.

In the first week of September, Indian Defense Minister Rajnath Singh was on a five-day tour of Northeast Asia, making South Korea his second stop after Japan. During the visit, the Indian minister met his counterpart, Jeong Kyeong-doo, with the two leaders highlighting the potential for expanding their cooperation in the defense and security sectors.

After undertaking a comprehensive review of the defense relations, the ministers signed two agreements, one to extend logistical support to each other’s navies, and a second one to deepen defense educational exchanges. The agreement on naval logistics sharing is particularly a significant one, given that India has such arrangements so far only with the United States and France. India is currently negotiating such an agreement with Japan.

For the full essay, click here.



While it is a clear demonstration of the deepening strategic partnership between India and South Korea, the military logistics agreement will also go a long way in enhancing India’s strategic reach in the Indo-Pacific. India’s limited naval presence in the Pacific can be addressed by the agreement as the Indian military will be in a position – to take just one example – to use the South Korean military facilities if needed.

In another important development, the two countries have developed a roadmap that will strengthen India-South Korea defense industry collaboration. This is a key area given that the Indian government has decided not to use Chinese systems and components in the broad defense electronics sector and India is yet to develop indigenous capability to fill in this gap.

Given the high-end and sophisticated nature of the South Korean defense electronic capabilities, this offers itself as an ideal win-win opportunity for Seoul and New Delhi. A defense ministry statement noted that Rajnath Singh, at a meeting of the CEOs of Korean and Indian defense industries in Seoul, listed a number of possible areas for cooperation including land systems, aero systems, naval systems, R&D co-operation and collaboration in testing, certification, and quality assurance.

Elaborating on the defense trade potential in India, the minister went on to add that “India offers tremendous business opportunity to Korean defense industries in India with liberalized licensing regime, attractive FDI provisions, strong and skilled industrial work force, single window clearances and establishment of Defense Investor Cell to facilitate investors and various other industry friendly initiatives.”

Other lines of effort also bear noting in this regard. For instance, the defense minister also invited the Korean defense industry to participate in the next DefExpo — DefExpo 2020 — that will be held in Lucknow in February 2020. The Indian defense minister has also established a joint task force to identify military systems and hardware that can be produced in India through the participation of Korean defense industries, which will be useful in avoiding the import costs of these systems.

India’s push for stronger defense cooperation comes against the backdrop of the Indian Army’s induction of the K-9 Vajra self-propelled howitzers, which is a version of the South Korean K-9 Thunder. South Korean defense industry, Samsung-Techwin, and India’s Larsen & Toubro had entered into an agreement for the sale of 100 howitzers in May 2017.

The first batch of these howitzers entered service in November 2018, with the second batch to be supplied in November 2019 and the final batch of 50 is to be delivered in November 2020. The South Korean Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) announced in 2016 that it is working on a new fully automatic projectile-and-charge loading system that will be retrofitted to the K9, fitting the howitzers with a robotic turret, thereby reducing the role of crew operating the howitzers. Partnership between the Indian Larsen & Toubro and the Samsung-Techwin could strengthen indigenous effort to develop and strengthen remote control systems in India’s defense sector.

According to the defense ministry statement, the minister had also said that “We are progressing towards becoming a manufacturing hub of defense equipment and investors can use India as a spring board to export defense equipment manufactured in India to various friendly countries in South East Asia, Middle Asia, Middle East Asia, South Asia and Africa.”

The broader push for India-South Korea defense and strategic collaboration was taken during Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Seoul in February this year. There is a growing synergy and complementarity between South Korea’s New Southern Policy and India’s Act East Policy, both of which seek to establish a stable, secure and prosperous Indo-Pacific order. Recalling President Moon Jae-In’s visit to India in 2018, Modi said during his Korea visit that “the coordination of India’s Act East Policy and Korea’s New Southern Policy is giving a strong platform to further deepen and strengthen our Special Strategic Partnership.” He further added, “we have made significant progress in our relations in a very short time. This is based on our shared vision of progress and roadmap of our relations in future, people, peace and prosperity.”

While India’s relations with South Korea are improving, it remains to be seen how New Delhi will maneuver around a couple of trouble spots. One is the worsening tensions between South Korea and Japan, another of India’s vital strategic partners in the region. A more critical one is Seoul’s closeness to China (despite South Korea’s own occasional difficulties with Beijing). Both require careful and sensitive handling.

Army Exercise Showcases Growing India-Singapore Defense Collaboration - The Diplomat, April 17, 2019

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I looked at the significance of the recently concluded India-Singapore joint army exercise, called “Bold Kurukshetra 2019. As was noted in these pages earlier this week, India and Singapore have just completed their annual joint army exercise, called “Bold Kurukshetra 2019.” The recent bilateral military exercise is a reflection of the growing strategic proximity between India and Singapore in the face of a series of challenges, including a growing and muscular China.

For the full essay, click here.



Singapore has remained one of India’s major security partners in Southeast Asia. The two countries signed their first Defense Cooperation Agreement in October 2003 and a separate memorandum of understanding on joint army exercises in 2005. The two then signed several more agreements for accelerating the pace of military-to-military relations in 2007 and 2008. These agreements have been reviewed and renewed periodically, maintaining their commitment to developing a habit of cooperation between the two countries’ armed forces.

Given Singapore’s territorial limitations, India has also opened its own military training facilities, such as the air force and artillery firing ranges, to the Singapore Armed Forces. Besides, the Indian and Singapore navies have been engaged in the annual naval exercise series called SIMBEX for more than two decades. In fact, the two countries celebrated the silver jubilee of their naval exercises last year with major displays of “multidimensional drills,” which saw the participation of many different types of ships and aircraft from India and Singapore.

Starting in 2015, the two countries have also held three editions of the Defense Ministers’ Dialogue, the last of which was held in November 2018. The third edition of this Dialogue had both the defense ministers appreciating the conclusion of the Navy Implementing Arrangement Concerning Mutual Coordination, Logistics and Services Support in June 2018. This, along with the Navy Bilateral Agreement signed in November 2017, broadened and deepened India-Singapore bilateral naval cooperation, taking the relationship higher.

They are also manifestations of the broader focus by both sides on maritime security, as evidenced by other developments as well such as a technical agreement on the sharing of white shipping information and advancing coast guard collaboration. Highlighting the significance of maritime security, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi had stated during the ASEAN India Commemorative Summit, “We remain committed to work with ASEAN to enhance our practical cooperation in our shared maritime domain.” He said India is particularly interested in pursuing cooperation on disaster risk reduction and management, joint patrols and exercises, and maritime capacity building.

India-Singapore engagements have gotten a lot stronger in recent years. Certainly, Modi has infused more traction into this relationship as part of his strengthened outreach to Southeast Asia with the Act East Policy. And there are upcoming developments that will showcase this as well, including reports that India is planning a new trilateral maritime exercise in the Andaman Sea with Singapore and Thailand later in the year.

The broader convergence of strategic interests between India and Singapore is clearly the driving factor for these engagements. At the Defense Ministers’ Dialogue, both sides have repeatedly emphasized “the importance of maintaining freedom of navigation and overflight consistent with international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.” Further, while reiterating the importance of international law, they have articulated the need to resolve disputes through peaceful means.

On the issue of deepening defense technology collaboration, India and Singapore have a set up a bilateral Defense Technology Steering Committee as well as the India-Singapore Defense Industry Working Group and they are reported to be making good progress. Areas of cooperation include Combat Care and Vehicle Armor.

The growing economic muscle and military posturing by China provides an important rationale for India and Singapore to strengthen their bilateral relations. Irrespective of the results of the current Indian national elections, which are expected in late May, it is likely that India-Singapore ties would deepen and that Singapore will remain an important priority for India’s outreach to Southeast Asia.

India-Indonesia Naval Patrols Highlights Maritime Collaboration - The Diplomat, 22 March 2019

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I looked at the India-Indonesia growing maritime collaboration and some of the recent events are a reminder of efforts by both sides to forge greater cooperation in this realm.

The Indian and Indonesian navies have just begun their 33rd coordinated patrol exercise from the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, and it will go on until April 4. The exercise includes the Indonesian Naval Ship KRI Sultan Thaha Syaifuddin and Maritime Patrol Aircraft CN-235, along with Indian vessels and aircrafts, with the two militaries undertaking patrolling on their respective sides of the 236 nautical miles long International Maritime Boundary line.

Simultaneously, the Indian Coast Guard ship INS Vijit is undertaking a four-day visit to the Indonesian port of Sabang in a further demonstration of the increasingly close maritime collaboration. India’s growing involvement in Sabang port has been seen over the past year – last July, another Indian naval ship, INS Sumitra, had also visited Sabang.

These developments underscore the close maritime cooperation between the two countries over the past few years, and their widening defense relationship more generally. While the close relationship between the two countries in some senses is not new – they were both champions of the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM) in the 1950s for instance – strategic alignment had been far from clear, and the defense aspect of that has only begun to take off more in recent times.

For the full essay, click here.



That should come as no surprise. For one, generally, under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, India has began to pay more strategic attention to Southeast Asia in general and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in particular, and Indonesia is a vital part of that. Last June, Prime Minister Narendra Modi had travelled to Indonesia as part of this three-nation trip to Southeast Asia giving a big push to India’s Act East Policy.

For another, as this process has been underway, both countries have interests that are aligned somewhat in terms of addressing the rise of China and making advances in the maritime domain. This comes amid the rising conversation about the Indo-Pacific, with Indonesia hosting a meeting on the subject this week.

As a result, it is no coincidence that we continue to see defense-related and maritime-related developments continue to take shape between India and Indonesia. To take just one example, there has been an agreement signed between the two countries to advance economic engagements between Andaman and Nicobar Islands and Aceh and North Sumatra Province. This agreement envisions joint development of the region to promote cruise and eco-tourism, start air transport linkages by introducing commercial flights between Indonesia and Port Blair, and sea transportation connectivity in the form of RoRo vessel shipping to facilitate trade between the two regions. These have the potential to create a constituency on both sides that could propel the economic aspects of the bilateral relationship.

In another example, in order to push the economic relationship between the two sides, Indonesia just hosted the 2nd India Indonesia Infrastructure Forum (IIIF). The first such Forum between the two sides was held last year with elaborate plans for regional connectivity in terms of economy, infrastructure and energy links. India has also agreed to join hands with Indonesia in developing a deep-sea port in Sabang. The port will clearly give India a bigger foothold in the region while enhancing the maritime links between India and Southeast Asia.

The strategic imperatives as well as new developments at play in the India-Indonesia relationship suggest that we are likely to see the two sides continue to grow closer in the coming years. But at the same time, expectations about this new partnership must be tempered with reality. There are no shortage of challenges as well, including New Delhi’s continued lack of nuanced understanding on how Southeast Asian nations like Indonesia operate as well as India’s own changes in its China policy in the face of complications. These serve as important reminders that even though there are larger strategic interests binding them together, there are also limitations.

Is India Expecting Too Much From Its Strategic Partnership With Vietnam? - 14 December 2018

In this week's column for the Diplomat, I wrote about the state of India-Vietnam strategic partnership. It appears that all is not well with the partnership. I argue that despite growing strategic convergence, New Delhi should also be mindful of some of the limitations in the relationship.

It has been an active few months for India-Vietnam relations, with several diplomatic and defense visits being recorded by the two sides. That in and of itself should come as no surprise for those following developments in the Asia-Pacific. Vietnam is one of India’s closest international partners and an important component of India’s Act East Policy. Over the last decade, Vietnam has also become a vital part of India’s strategy to counter China’s rise in Asia.

But while Vietnam-India relations have remained strong, with multiple senior-level visits between the two countries, there are indications that all is not well with the relationship. Put simply, New Delhi might be expecting too much from the Vietnam relationship, while Vietnam, though also very keen on the India relationship, may be facing constraints in how close it can get to New Delhi and how much it can serve New Delhi’s strategic objectives. Indian strategy should consider the limitations that Vietnam faces and pare down its expectations from Hanoi.

For the full article, click here.



On the surface, there are natural affinities that should lead to closer India-Vietnam ties. Historically, the two countries have had good relations going back to the Vietnam War. During that war, India consistently and vocally supported the Vietnamese cause, much to the irritation of Washington and despite India’s dependence on the United States for economic assistance. India even supported Vietnam during its invasion and occupation of Cambodia, despite the fact that this was not a particularly popular position internationally. India also supported Vietnam when China attacked it in 1979, with Foreign Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee cutting short his visit to China in protest.

These historical ties are now complemented by deep strategic necessity. Both India and Vietnam worry about China’s growing power and domination. Both have had recent experiences of being attacked by China. And both have independently realigned their policies, becoming friendly with the United States as well as traditional American allies in the Indo-Pacific such as Japan and Australia. Both also, of course, have active territorial disputes with China.

These natural affinities have indeed strengthened the relationship between the two countries, especially in the defense and strategic sector. There are frequent high-level visits and meetings between the two sides. The most recent of these was the Indian Chief of Army Staff General Bipin Rawat’s visit to Vietnam on November 22-25. His visit came barely a week after Indian President Ram Nath Kovind completed his state visit, during which he was given the rare honor of addressing the Vietnam National Assembly, which only Chinese President Xi Jinping had done before.

A couple of months before Kovind’s visit, Indian Defense Minister Nirmala Sitharaman also visited Vietnam. Moreover, India has supplied military equipment and military training to Vietnamese armed forces. New Delhi had hoped that this military relationship would further deepen with sales of other equipment such as the Akash surface-to-air missile. India and Vietnam had already concluded a strategic partnership, one of the very few that Vietnam had entered into.

But despite this natural affinity and the closeness of the strategic relationship, there are also indications that there are limits to this relationship. For one, though Vietnam is building up its military strength to defend against China and building partnerships with other like-minded countries, Vietnam faces the same difficulties in balancing against Beijing that most of China’s neighbors face: even as it seeks to increase its capacity to defend against China, Hanoi is also concerned about provoking China.

Thus, Vietnam has been very reluctant to be seen as “ganging up” against China with other countries. In particular, it is wary of being seen to be an integral part of the the Quadrilateral Security Initiative (Quad). Indeed, it is notable that the Vietnamese ambassador to India, Pham Sanh Chau explicitly stated as much in a recent interview in New Delhi.

In addition to multilateral alignments like the Quad, Vietnam also seems concerned about how far it wants to go in deepening the military relationship with India. For instance, though Vietnam has bought some naval equipment from India and has allowed India to train its naval personnel, Hanoi has been reluctant to buy additional equipment from India. India has extended a $500 million line of credit to Vietnam for purchase of Indian military equipment, but much of that remains unused. Indeed, Vietnam had sought to convert some of that for non-defense purchases, which India has refused.

Despite India pushing the Akash surface-to-air missile, Vietnam has appeared resistant to purchase this. There have also been rumors about India selling the BrahMos anti-ship missile to Vietnam, which does not appear to have gone through, though it is not clear whether it is because of Vietnamese reluctance or other factors.

What this suggests is that though Indio-Vietnamese ties are deep, including in the defense sector, and though there may be strong strategic rationale pushing the two countries together, there are also potentially clear limits to the relationship. As much as Hanoi needs greater support, it also has to worry about potential negative Chinese reactions. This is not an idle concern: there have already been concerns raised in the Chinese media about India-Vietnam ties.

New Delhi needs to be careful not to push Vietnam too far, especially considering its own reluctance in being seen as “ganging up” against China. India itself has been dragging its feet on the Quad, it is worth noting. And the concerns about a negative response from China is not limited to India and Vietnam, but is common in most countries in China’s periphery.

China’s tremendous power and its demonstrated willingness to use diplomatic and economic resources to get its way mean that most of its neighbors are reluctant to push balancing strategies too hard. This requires New Delhi to be sensitive to Vietnam’s concerns and not be too ambitious about the potential for the relationship.

More than just a buzzword: How can Asia’s democracies bring the Indo-Pacific to life? -

Earlier this week, I wrote a short essay on the Indo-Pacific for the Asia & the Pacific Policy Society's Policy Forum, Australian National University. I argue that even as more and more countries are buying in to the Indo-Pacific construct, they must overcome the problems of coordination and burden-sharing if the concept is to have strategic teeth.



For the full essay, click here.

The idea of the Indo-Pacific is not entirely new, although it has certainly received much more attention in recent years. And as the result of changing power dynamics in Asia and beyond, many more countries are becoming comfortable with the construct.

In one of its earliest articulations, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe promoted the Indo-Pacific concept when he addressed a joint session of the Indian Parliament in 2007. As he spoke about the confluence of the two seas, he said “The Pacific and the Indian Oceans are now bringing about a dynamic coupling as seas of freedom and of prosperity. A ‘broader Asia’ that broke away geographical boundaries is now beginning to take on a distinct form.”

Former Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, while addressing his East Asian counterparts at the India-ASEAN Commemorative Summit in 2012, noted that India seeks with them a future that is “inter-linked”, for which “a stable, secure and prosperous Indo-Pacific region is crucial.”

Similarly, former Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa called for a region-wide treaty to safeguard an Indo-Pacific “engine for global economic growth.”

Australia, in its 2013 Defence White Paper introduced the concept formally, becoming one of the first countries to officially adopt the term, which was only natural considering the two-ocean geography of the country.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi talked about the Indo-Pacific concept recently at the Shangri-La Dialogue. He said: “India’s vision for the Indo-Pacific region is a positive one … India does not see the Indo-Pacific region as a strategy or as a club of limited members. Nor as a grouping that seeks to dominate. And by no means do we consider it as directed against any country.”

Though the term has been around for a few years, there is still a lack of clarity about its meaning. It broadly refers to the idea of the Indian and Pacific oceans as a single geographical construct, as Abe mentioned in his speech. While there are economic and other linkages that can be attached to the Indo-Pacific concept, it is the political, strategic, and possibly military aspects that have gained greater prominence because of the underlying geopolitical tensions in the region.

More on this:Podcast: the rise of the Indo-Pacific
The idea of Indo-Pacific is that the Indian and Pacific oceans are increasingly a unified and shared strategic space. This implies that what happens in the Indian Ocean will impact on the Pacific Ocean.

Despite these differences, the number of countries embracing the term as a useful strategic idea has increased. Most recently, France reiterated the importance of the concept as its President Emmanuel Macron visited Australia. Using the term means acknowledging the strategic consequences of China’s rise and its muscular policies, and the general balancing strategy underway within Asia.

One of the reasons why India has embraced the term is because ‘Asia-Pacific’ is seen by many to exclude India, even though China’s rise affects everybody in the region. So, Indo-Pacific is a way for India to include itself in the Asia-Pacific, and for the Asia-Pacific to bring India into the mix. This is only natural. Given its geographical location above the Indian Ocean, India’s role cannot be ignored. A country with a vast coastline of 7,500 kilometres and 1,380 islands, more than two million square kilometres of Exclusive Economic Zone, and emerging blue water naval capabilities, will have an important role to play irrespective of geographical or definitional issues.

But it should also be noted that the Indo-Pacific plays out almost entirely as a maritime construct rather than a continental one.

More on this:what should we make of the ‘Indo-Pacific’?
There are a couple of problems that need to be faced. While the Indo-Pacific concept has gained greater salience for larger powers, there is more reluctance on the part of smaller countries because they are understandably concerned about a negative reaction from China. China has taken due note of the concept’s growing popularity and it could turn out to be a lot more aggressive in countering it in the coming years.

Another problem that has to be resolved is how to combine the different concerns, even if they are all about China. Many Pacific powers (Japan, US, Australia, New Zealand) want to focus on countering China’s power in the Pacific and the South China Sea. But India is obviously concerned more about China’s expansion into the Indian Ocean. Thus, there are those who argue that India’s Indian Ocean focus and its capacity constraints to exercise any serious power projection will limit New Delhi’s role. In the Indo-Pacific it will be diplomatic, economic and rhetorical.

The question is how to bring about better coordination between these two sets of concerns. For proponents of the Indo-Pacific, there is a need to start focusing on some form of burden-sharing. Without it, coordinated action – and the goal of making the Indo-Pacific concept more than just a strategic buzzword – is going to be difficult.

The Strategic Logic of Modi’s Indonesia Visit - my OpEd in The Diplomat, June 6, 2018

It has been a busy month and I am once again lagging behind in writing my posts but let me try and get up-to-date.

In the first week of June, I wrote a piece for The Diplomat looking at the strategic logic of Modi's Indonesia visit. Modi undertook a three-nation Southeast tour before heading to make his maiden speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue. His short visit to Malaysia was importance because of the change in leadership in Kuala Lumpur but I thought his Indonesia visit was a really substantial one. This visit has been planned for a while and the trip reinforced both the growing strategic alignment between New Delhi and Jakarta as well as its limits.

Last week, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi was on a three-nation visit to Southeast Asia – Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore – in an effort to give a fillip to India’s ‘Act East’ Policy. India’s Act East Policy acquired fresh momentum when Modi re-launched the original Look East Policy at the East Asia Summit in 2014. Most recently, the leaders of the ten Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries were in India for the 69th Republic Day celebrations in January 2018, a reflection of the growing strategic convergence between India and Southeast Asia in ensuring a free, open, and transparent Indo-Pacific.

Driven by the China factor, Modi’s visit to the three key states in Southeast Asia has the potential to propel greater strategic engagement especially in the maritime domain, but India’s capacity and strategic interest in playing a proactive role in the region is key. The most interesting of the three stops was Modi’s visit to Indonesia.

For the full essay, click here.



Indonesia remains a key player within Southeast Asia for several reasons. Most clearly, Indonesia will be essential in extending India’s maritime outreach. Indonesia is the largest archipelagic state, and has a coastline of 108,000 kilometers, 17,504 islands, and a total of maritime areas of 6,400,000 square kilometers, including its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The distance from India’s Andaman Islands to Indonesia’s Aceh province is barely 80 nautical miles, underscoring the importance to both India and Indonesia of the importance of enhanced maritime cooperation for the continuing peace, stability and economic prosperity of the Indo-Pacific region.

These make India and Indonesia two key maritime powers in the Indo-Pacific, and the two navies have partnered in naval exercises for several years now with naval ships patrolling between the Andaman Sea and Malacca Straits. But it has also become clear that is is time to deepen these engagements in the light of the changing strategic dynamics in the broader Indo-Pacific front.

Modi’s visit to Jakarta from May 29-30 witnessed extensive strategic discussions with President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo on everything from maritime issues to outer space and broader defense cooperation. According to the joint statement signed by the two leaders, the big underlying emphasis was the “importance of achieving a free, open, transparent, rules-based, peaceful, prosperous and inclusive Indo-Pacific region, where sovereignty and territorial integrity, international law, in particular UNCLOS, freedom of navigation and overflight, sustainable development and an open, free, fair and mutually beneficial trade and investment system are respected.”

Modi and Jokowi emphasized also the importance of rule of law, in particular the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of Sea (UNCLOS), clearly with China’s recent behavior in mind. Elevating the importance of Andaman Islands and increasing maritime connectivity were also emphasized during the visit.

Indonesia has also shown some interest in joining the Bay of Bengal initiative, which appears sensible both from an economic and security perspective. Given the geographical proximity of the Andaman Island with Sumatra Island to the south, Indonesia should be part of this initiative. The Lombok Strait also provides “an easy access to the Indian Ocean and Australia.”

India has also shown interest in joining the Malacca Straits Patrol (MSP), a four-nation arrangement between Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand for exchange of intelligence, and coordinated air and sea patrol through the Malacca Straits. But India may have to wait a bit on this. For one, New Delhi does not appear to have paid much attention to the mechanics of how the MSP operations actually work. For instance, a meeting among technical experts on May 10 explored the issue but it is reported that “both sides quickly realised that the Indian side had not fully come to grips with the nuts and bolts of the MSP.” India expected that its navy could undertake patrols in the Malacca Straits, whereas under the MSP, each of the four countries do “coordinated patrols” within their own territorial waters and do not cross into each other’s waters.

Similarly, New Delhi also appears not to have understood how MSP aerial patrols work, assuming that Indian aircraft could patrol on their own in the region, which is not the MSP practice. New Delhi will have to prepare much more professionally in future engagements. As a political face-saver, the joint statement issued by the Modi and Jokowi simply noted that the technical experts meeting on May 10 was “to explore ways in enhancing strategic technical cooperation on maritime security.”

For another, Indonesia and others in the MSP also appear to worry about setting a precedent that China can exploit if they allow an extra-regional power such as India join the MSP. These are understandable concerns, and New Delhi and the MSP countries will have to figure out carefully how they can cooperate but at a pace and manner that is comfortable for all.

India appears to have assumed that China’s aggressive push in South China Sea would make Southeast Asian states welcome India with open arms, but New Delhi must realize they have their own concerns about antagonizing China. Nonetheless, there is an underlying commonality of strategic concerns that can be the foundation for deepening ties, even if both sides have to be careful in how they proceed. But proceed they must.

India, Malaysia Kick Off Military Exercise, my column in The Diplomat, 4 May 2018

In May, my first piece for The Diplomat was on the latest round of India-Malaysia military exercise held in Malaysia from 30 April - 13 May. The essay published on 4 May looked at the strategic rationale that is driving both countries to cultivate and nurture deeper security ties.


The Indian defense ministry, in a statement, said that the exercise is aimed at “bolstering cooperation and coordination between the armed forces of both the nations and to share the expertise of both the contingents in conduct of counter-insurgency operations in jungle terrain.” The 4 Grenadiers Battalion of the Indian Army and 1 Royal Ranjer Regiment and the Royal Malay Regiment from the Malaysian Army are participating, and, with a focus on tactical operations in jungle warfare, the two sides will engage in joint training, planning and executing a series of training activities in the dense forests of Sengai Perdik, Hulu Langat, Malaysia.

These exercises will refine and sharpen the operational counterinsurgency tactics of both the armies, but the larger aim is clearly to boost the strategic partnership between the two countries. Though this is not the first joint military exercise in this series, New Delhi has claimed that “(T)his is the first instance wherein a joint training exercise of this magnitude involving Indian and Malaysian soldiers is being organized on Malaysian soil.”

For the full essay, click here.



In the face of unprecedented uncertainties in the Indo-Pacific, mostly driven by China’s rise, India’s outreach efforts to ASEAN has accelerated. The effort has included an increased number of security consultations, political dialogues, and joint military exercises with Southeast Asian countries.

All 10 ASEAN leaders were in India for the 69th Republic Day celebrations, a first. The usual pattern has been to invite one foreign leader for these celebrations. The invitation was indicative of the importance India attaches to the strategic engagement with the ASEAN countries.

Now, in another indicator of India’s stepped up outreach to the region, India is holding another iteration of a large joint military exercise with Malaysia. The military exercise, titled “Harimau Shakti,” is being held in Malaysia from April 30 to May 13. The joint combat exercise is meant to create greater synergy and interoperability between the two armed forces.

The Indian defense ministry, in a statement, said that the exercise is aimed at “bolstering cooperation and coordination between the armed forces of both the nations and to share the expertise of both the contingents in conduct of counter-insurgency operations in jungle terrain.” The 4 Grenadiers Battalion of the Indian Army and 1 Royal Ranjer Regiment and the Royal Malay Regiment from the Malaysian Army are participating, and, with a focus on tactical operations in jungle warfare, the two sides will engage in joint training, planning and executing a series of training activities in the dense forests of Sengai Perdik, Hulu Langat, Malaysia.

These exercises will refine and sharpen the operational counterinsurgency tactics of both the armies, but the larger aim is clearly to boost the strategic partnership between the two countries. Though this is not the first joint military exercise in this series, New Delhi has claimed that “(T)his is the first instance wherein a joint training exercise of this magnitude involving Indian and Malaysian soldiers is being organized on Malaysian soil.”

The two sides have had a history of military cooperation, and became strategic partners in 2010. In the defense arena, the two sides have engaged in exchange of information on training, maintenance and technical support for Su-30 fighter aircraft, in addition to the establishment of a “Systems School” for the fighters at the Gong Kedak airbase. The Indian Air Force had also stationed a team in Malaysia between 2008 and 2010 as Malaysia was inducting and starting the operation of the Su-30 MKM fighter aircraft, which they had just procured. Earlier in the 1990s, the Malaysian Air Force had sent its pilots and technicians to India to train on the Mig-29 Fulcrums.

Bilateral naval cooperation has also remained strong, and the Indian Navy regularly participates along with other external partners in the Langkawi International Maritime and Aerospace Exhibition in Malaysia. Port visits by Indian Navy and Coast Guard ships are also of significance especially in the context of the increasing Chinese naval footprint in in the Indian Ocean. India and Malaysia have also established a mechanism for information sharing information for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) and white shipping.

The relatively increased emphasis on the defense domain in India’s ties with Southeast Asian states including Malaysia bears watching from a historical perspective. When India’s Look East Policy was announced in the early 1990s, India’s focus was limited mostly to economic and trade issues, and Singapore was the focal point within ASEAN. The economic focus is still important, including in India’s ties with Malaysia. Najib during his trip to India in 2017 noted that Malaysia had not tapped into realizing “the full potential of the bilateral relationship” but “is belatedly showing interest in the Indian economy to some extent.”

But the strategic aspects of the relationship have also clearly become more important over time as “Look East” has begun to be translated more into “Act East.'” Ties with individual countries in the region such as Indonesia and Malaysia are gaining greater traction and visibility. Malaysia and India, for one, have emphasized their commitment to maintaining open seas and freedom of navigation, on the basis of the principles enshrined in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The two have also reiterated their call to all claimant parties to avoid using unilateral measures and find peaceful solutions to disputes involving sovereignty and territorial integrity. As China becomes increasingly active in India’s backyard in South Asia, New Delhi can be expected to focus equally on China’s backyard in Southeast Asia.