Russian ASAT Test: More Trouble for Space Security - The Diplomat, 31 July 2020

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I looked at the recent Russian ASAT test and what it means for space security. I argue that even as the war of words continues, there will need to be practical measures to deal with the increasing threats to space.

On July 23, the U.S. Space Command (USSPACECOM) released a statement saying that Russia had “conducted a non-destructive test of a space-based anti-satellite weapon.” According to the statement, Russia, on July 15 “injected a new object into orbit from Cosmos 2543” in close proximity to another Russia satellite. This reportedly is similar to a prior Russian in-orbit activity undertaken in 2017. The latest Russian action also comes against the backdrop of a Russian anti-satellite test in April, when it fired a missile into space. Although Russia did not destroy any target during this test, the April test along with the July one raises doubts about Russia’s rhetoric of non-weaponization of space.

If these activities continue unabated, it will only further intensify competition among the major space players, potentially leading to weaponizing space. The space security regime is already in trouble; the Russian test creates additional problems. The experience of the UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) is a reflection of the current poor state of dealing with issues of global space governance. The failure of the major space powers to address space security challenges and agree upon a future path will be detrimental to maintaining space as a safe, secure, and sustainable domain.

For the full essay, click here.



This is not the first time that Russia has undertaken such an action. In 2017, the Russian “inspector” satellite Cosmos 2519 released a subsatellite, Cosmos 2521. The United States has been direct and harsh in its criticism of Russia. Well before the July tests, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Ford categorically characterized Russian actions thus: “Not to put too fine a point on it, but Cosmos 2521 demonstrated the ability to position itself near another satellite and fire a projectile” (italics in original). Quoting Gen. John W. “Jay” Raymond, commander of USSPACECOM, Ford explained that the U.S. has specific concerns because Russia has repeatedly demonstrated its capabilities in this regard. Apparently, there were two other Russian satellites, Cosmos 2542 and 2543, that were launched by Russia in November and December 2019 and these have undertaken maneuvers close to a U.S. satellite in low earth orbit. The United States views these actions, Ford said, as “highly provocative.”

U.S. criticism became even sharper after the July 23 Russian test. Raymond noted that “the United States, in coordination with our allies, is ready and committed to deterring aggression and defending the nation, our allies and vital U.S. interests from hostile acts in space.” Ford said that this action “highlights Russia’s hypocritical advocacy of outer space arms control, with which Moscow aims to restrict the capabilities of the United States while clearly having no intention of halting its own counterspace program — both ground-based anti-satellite capabilities and what would appear to be actual in-orbit anti-satellite weaponry.”

Meanwhile, Russia has rejected the U.S. claims as “propaganda.” The Russian Foreign Ministry argued that the test “did not create a threat for other space equipment and most importantly, did not breach any norms or principles of international law.” Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov also dismissed the U.S. claims, saying that “Russia has always been and remains a country that is committed to the goal of fully demilitarizing outer space and non-deployment of any kinds of arms in outer space.”

It has to be noted that Russia has been trying to push initiatives to prevent weaponization of space for some time. Russia, along with China, has been calling for a treaty banning the placement of weapons in outer space. In 2008, the two together submitted a draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects (PPWT). A revised text was submitted in the summer of 2014. A second Russian proposal is that of the “No First Placement” initiative, in which countries are expected to voluntarily agree not to be the first to place weapons in outer space.

Neither of these proposals have found many takers for a number of reasons. First, many countries argue against a treaty-based mechanism in the current international political climate. They would instead prefer political instruments such as transparency and confidence building measures (TCBMs) or a code of conduct, all of which are non-legal instruments. But other countries argue that while non-legal measures can be useful, they cannot be a substitute for legal instruments. Second, there are also practical issues such as the definition of a “weapon” in space. In the absence of definitional clarity, it is likely to be difficult to come up with a mechanism to prevent the placement of weapon in outer space.

While there is merit to both these arguments, the reality is also that unless steps are taken to improve transparency and predictability with regard to outer space activities, states will likely find themselves spiraling toward weaponizing outer space.

Even as the war of words continues, there will need to be practical measures to deal with the increasing threats to space. We are witnessing a number of escalatory actions including ASAT tests, cyber and electronic warfare targeted at space assets, and now what appears to be an actual kinetic weapon in space. Unless decisive steps are agreed upon by the major space players, access to space for civil and peaceful as well as security requirements will be harmed. While formal treaty mechanisms have been favored previously, today’s contentious global politics may not allow for such measures in the near term. These trends are of course dictated by global power transition leading to a new and competitive geopolitics. Therefore, expecting to develop a legal measure in the near term will remain difficult. Finding alternate approaches, such as developing norms of responsible behavior, may be a better path.

US-India Ties Amid the Eastern Ladakh Crisis and the Pandemic - The Diplomat's Asia Geopolitics Podcast, 29 July 2020

Earlier this week, I had a chat with Ankit Panda, Editor-at-Large at The Diplomat on US-India ties amid the Eastern Ladakh crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic, for the Diplomat's Asia Geopolitics podcast. In the podcast, we looked at how the US-India ties have evolved in the middle of the Sino-Indian border crisis in Ladakh crisis and the pandemic.

You can listen to The Diplomat’s Asia Geopolitics podcast on iTunes here; if you use Windows or Android, you can subscribe on Google Play here, or on Spotify here.

This podcast is a take-off from my latest column for The Diplomat's Asia Defense Blog, where I focused on the open and public support for India in its border conflcit with China. Unlike during the Doklam confrontation, this time around, there has been much larger visible and open US support for India. It is possible that this has the tacit approval of New Delhi, which would be one more indicator that the two sides are getting much more comfortable in their partnership.



I have a weekly column with the Asia Defense Blog of The Diplomat where I focus on a range of Asian strategic issues, including major power politics, nuclear security, outer space and global governance aspects. You can check out my articles here.

This Time the US Is Taking India’s Side Against China - The Diplomat, 23 July 2020

In my column for The Diplomat last week, I looked the US positioning on the India-China border conflict, where I argue that this time around, the US is taking India’s side against China. Unlike in 2017, U.S. support for India at a time of confrontation with China is much more pronounced this time around.

As India and China confront each other across the Himalayas, it also clearly appears to have driven India and the United States closer. The two have conducted joint military exercises and seem to have been in regular contact, including regarding the Sino-Indian confrontation. What is more surprising is a series of high-profile statements from senior U.S. officials and lawmakers supporting India. In contrast to the present tensions, during the 2017 Doklam confrontation, there were no standalone statements, although U.S. government spokespeople and unnamed officials did comment on it in a manner that fit Indian objectives. It is also possible that India may not have wanted public expressions of U.S. support at the time, viewing them as potentially complicating its negotiations with China.

For the full essay, click here.



This time, the situation appears different. The consultations between the two sides are much more open, and the United States has publicly and repeatedly supported India. Even prior to the Galwan clash that resulted in the deaths of 20 Indian Army personnel, senior Indian and U.S. officials appear to have been in contact. In one of the first conversations amid the border stand-off, Indian Defense Minister Rajnath Singh and U.S. Secretary of Defense Mark T. Esper spoke on the phone on May 29. The two sides discussed the state of bilateral defense ties and agreed to keep up with their efforts “for a strong and enduring U.S.-India defense partnership.” The readouts of the call did not mention China specifically but the statements issued by the U.S. Department of Defense and the Indian Ministry of Defense said that the two discussed regional security issues, which suggest they talked about the border stand-off. In mid-July as well, Singh and Esper held a telephone conversation where they talked about bilateral defense cooperation and issues of mutual interest, which would likely have included China and the continuing border stand-off.

A few days later, on June 2, Prime Minister Narendra Modi and U.S. President Donald Trump had a telephone call. The readout of the call stated that the two leaders talked about the Sino-Indian border tensions as well as World Health Organization reforms (in May India became the new head of the WHO’s executive board). Trump also talked about the possibility of expanding the G-7 to include countries like Australia, India, South Korea, and maybe Russia, too. It is noteworthy that China is not part of the G-7 grouping or the expansion Trump floated.

An even more stark indicator of the growth in ties is the flurry of statements from U.S. officials in support of India, unlike during the Doklam standoff. Just this week, while speaking at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London, Esper criticized China for engaging in “systematic rule-breaking, coercion and other malign activities.” To a question on the Sino-Indian border situation, he said that the U.S. is “monitoring it very closely and what’s happening along the Line of Actual Control (LAC).” Esper later retweeted a media story reporting his remarks that the U.S. was following the situation “very closely,” adding the comment, “Very closely indeed.”

This followed a steady stream of comments from senior U.S. officials condemning the Chinese aggression while extending support to India. In one of the first statements, days after the June 15 clash, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo tweeted, “We extend our deepest condolences to the people of India for the lives lost as a result of the recent confrontation with China. We will remember the soldiers’ families, loved ones, and communities as they grieve.”

Barely a week after that, Pompeo was speaking to the German Marshall Fund’s Brussels Forum where he once again reiterated criticism of China’s habit of breaking international commitments and bullying its neighbors – India, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines. With these threats from the Chinese Communist Party, he said, “We’re going to make sure we’re postured appropriately to counter the PLA. We think that’s the challenge of our time, and we’re going to make sure we have resources in place to do that.”

Just a week ago, Pompeo said, “India has been a great partner. They are an important partner of ours. I have a great relationship with my foreign minister counterpart. We talk frequently about a broad range of issues. We talked about the conflict they had along their border with China.”

In the context of the Indian decision to ban 59 Chinese apps, Pompeo said, “We’ve talked about the risk that emanates from China, Chinese telecommunications infrastructure there, you’ve seen the decision they made to ban some several dozen Chinese software firms from operating inside of the country on phones of people operating inside of India.”

He emphasized that the “whole world is coalescing around the challenge that we face,” saying that “Democracies, free nations of the world, will push back on these challenges together. I’m very confident of that.”

This week while doing a joint press briefing along with the British foreign secretary, Pompeo once again slammed China, saying, “You can’t go make claims for maritime regions that you have no lawful claim to. You can’t threaten countries and bully them in the Himalayas. You can’t engage in cover-ups and co-opt international institutions like the World Health Organization.”

Lower level officials have taken up the refrain. In mid-July while speaking at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), David Stilwel, assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, compared Chinese behavior in the Himalayas with similar actions elsewhere: “When Beijing uses coercion, empty promises, disinformation, contempt for rules, bad-faith diplomacy, and other underhanded tactics in the South China Sea, it is drawing on a playbook that it uses worldwide. We see it in the East China Sea and around Taiwan, where Beijing has expanded its maritime provocations and threatening sorties. We see it in the Himalayas, where Beijing recently took aggressive action on its frontiers with India.” Even earlier, in May, outgoing U.S. Secretary for South and Central Asia Alice Wells, referring to the Sino-Indian border stand-off, said that it is a “reminder of the threat by China.”

Senior lawmakers have also come out strongly in support of India. On the floor of the Senate, Majority Leader Mitch McConnell said, “for the sake of grabbing territory, the [People’s Liberation Army] appears to have instigated the most violent clash between China and India since those nations went to war in 1962.” Senator Marco Rubio, a Florida Republican, also tweeted that he had spoken to Indian Ambassador in the U.S. Taranjit Singh Sandhu “to express our solidarity with the people of #India as they firmly confront unwarranted & lawless armed aggression by the Communist Party of #China. India has made it clear, they will not be bullied by Beijing.” Around the same time, Senator Tom Cotton, a Republican from Arkansas, characterized the Chinese action as an invasion of India, “an ally of ours.”

In the other chamber of the U.S. Congress, Representative Lance Gooden of Texas tweeted that, “As more news comes out about the deadly conflict between China and India, once again CHINA appears to be an aggressive bad actor. The #CCP cannot be taken at their word, EVER.”

Reflecting bipartisan support for India, Democratic lawmakers have also come out slamming China and supporting India. Even prior to the Galwan clash, the House Foreign Affairs Committee chairman, Democrat Eliot Engel, called out Chinese aggression, saying, “I am extremely concerned by the ongoing Chinese aggression along the Line of Actual Control on the India-China border. China is demonstrating once again that it is willing to bully its neighbors rather than resolve conflicts according to international law.”

After the clash, others Democrats including Ami Bera, chair of the House Foreign Affairs subcommittee on Asia, tweeted concern about “continued Chinese aggression along its border with India.” The Indian decision to ban the Chinese apps also received support from some U.S. lawmakers such as Republican Representative Jim Banks of Indiana.

Clearly, this time around, there has been much larger visible and open U.S. support for India compared to the Doklam confrontation. It is possible that this has the tacit approval of New Delhi, which would be one more indicator that the two sides are getting much more comfortable in their partnership.

Is India Ready to Play the ‘Tibet Card’ in Its Battle With China? - The Diplomat, 16 July 2020

I am a bit behind in updating my blog but here is the column I did for The Diplomat a couple of weeks ago, looking at the 'Tibet Card' in India's battle with China. While the talk of a “Tibet card” in India’s hands is not new, the key question is if New Delhi is likely to play it?

In the month since 20 Indian Army personnel were killed as a result of the clash at Galwan on the Sino-Indian border, public anger at China is palpable. There have been growing calls for a strong response from the Indian government, including a strengthened partnership with Taiwan. There have also been similar calls for enhanced support for Tibet and the Dalai Lama.

For the full essay, click here.



About 10 days after the Galwan clash, Pema Khandu, chief minister of Arunachal Pradesh, referred to the Line of Actual Control dividing India and China as the India-Tibet border. Several points are noteworthy here: He was speaking at an Indian Army meeting at the Bumla border post; he is from the BJP, the party that also holds power in New Delhi; and his state is entirely claimed by China, which calls it “southern Tibet.”

Coming against the backdrop of the Galwan clash, this could appear to be an attempt at rekindling the Tibet issue, which India has done every now and then when there is a conflict with China. This was of course music to the ears of Tibet activists, who have been seeking active Indian support for a long time. Tenzin Tsundue, a Tibetan writer and activist, during a recent media interview, echoed Khandu and said that the border must be called “the Tibet border and not the China border.” Not surprisingly, Chinese media has commented on such Indian views and opposed them.

There is ongoing debate about how India should respond to the Tibet question in the light of China’s increased pressure. Some Indian public commentators support playing the Tibet card while others are somewhat cautious. Well before the current conflict, in 2018, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), the Hindu nationalist organization out of which the BJP emerged, had argued for a reappraisal of India’s Tibet policy. Prominent BJP ideologues have supported reopening the Tibet issue, even supporting the right of Tibetans to live “as a free nation.”

Such voices have become louder. A retired senior Army officer wrote about the strategic importance of Tibet, and argued that time has come “to challenge the very legitimacy of the Chinese claim over Tibet.” In another opinion piece in Business World, Krishan Varma, a former head of India’s foreign secret service, made a case for a fresh assessment of India’s Tibet policy. He argued that a new Indian policy approach on Tibet “has the real potential of causing major turbulence in China’s underbelly.” He added that India might do well to “align its policy on the issue with the U.S. and support the ‘Tibet Policy and Support Act (2019)’ that has been passed by the U.S. Congress and is pending U.S. Senate approval before being promulgated into law through due process.”

Similarly, an editorial in Hindustan Times, a national newspaper, called for a rethink of India’s Tibet policy. Stating that India has had an inconsistent approach to Tibet, it said, “Delhi now needs to shed its hesitation, not just because Tibet is a ‘card’, but is intertwined with the values of freedom and peace central to the vision to resist China.” The editorial added that although India has continued to respect to China’s core interests, Beijing has not reciprocated. The editorial argued for honoring the Dalai Lama with the Bharat Ratna, India’s highest civilian honor, and for India to take up the rights of Tibetans in international platforms and build deeper links with the younger generation of Tibetan activists who are the face of the new resistance. Finally, it also recommended that India make a statement on the Dalai Lama’s successor indicating that India will respect the Dalai Lama’s wishes on the succession issue. Others have argued that China’s paranoia about the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan presence in India ensures that India continues to have a Tibet card to play at all.

The idea of the “Tibet card” is not new, of course. And various Indian commentators have previously warned against such a strategy. For example, Suhasini Haidar, a prominent foreign policy correspondent, had argued in 2018 that the idea of the Tibet card is “out of step” with shifting ground realities in Tibet and cautioned the Indian establishment against using “the Tibetan population in India as a strategic tool,” a point others have also made.

Similarly, Sudha Ramachandran, writing also in 2018, asserted that India never did have a Tibet card, considering that India and the even the Tibetans have accepted the One China formulation and India’s efforts to keep the Tibet card has only angered China, “without yielding tangible dividends.” Echoing Ramachandran’s sentiments, P. Stobdan, a China analyst who had previously argued that the idea of a Tibet card is a folly, declares in a recent book that China’s slow invasion tactic has been successful in dealing with India whereas New Delhi, even after 60 years, has made no significant gains in its China policy. Instead, he argues that India is now “worryingly and helplessly entangled in a Tibetan quagmire with serious implications for the stability of its frontier region.” What is noteworthy is that arguments against using the so-called Tibet card have been rare during the current crisis.

Part of the problem is the inconsistency in the Indian approach to Tibet under the Modi government. In December 2016, the Dalai Lama was invited to the Rashtrapati Bahavan, India’s presidential palace in New Delhi, for an event in honor of Nobel Peace prize winners, which raised objections from China. In March 2017, the Dalai Lama was also allowed to travel to Tawang, which was again questioned by China. In July that year, in the middle of the Doklam conflict, Lobsang Sangay of the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA), the Tibetan government-in-exile, was allowed to unfurl the Tibetan flag at Pangong Tso in Ladakh, one of the points of the current stand-off. But since the 2017 Doklam confrontation, New Delhi has attempted to play down the Tibetan presence in India, even preventing government officials from attending the 60th anniversary of the Dalai Lama’s exile.

Ultimately, it is unlikely that the Modi government will really play any “Tibet card,” despite the frequency and prominence of those arguing for it in the Indian debate. Even these opinions are more likely a reflection of the general anger toward China, rather than carefully thought out policy proposals.

Calls for India to Play the Taiwan Card Grow Louder - The Diplomat, 9 July 2020

In my column for The Diplomat last week, I looked at the growing calls for strengthening India's relations with Taiwan. I argued that as tensions simmer between New Delhi and Beijing, some have called for India to focus on developing stronger relations with Taiwan.

Amid the continuing border standoff, there is increasing public antagonism toward China in India. This matches growing anger among Indian elites toward China and India’s current China policy, which I wrote about last week. This is leading to more public discussion about possible asymmetric diplomatic strategies to challenge China, such as altering India’s “one China policy” to enhance India’s relations with Taiwan.

For the full essay, click here.



For example, a prominent Indian national newspaper, Indian Express, editorialized in May that India should be pragmatic in considering the question of Taiwan’s observer status in the World Health Assembly: the decision “should not be made either out of peevishness or fear.” The editorial argued that New Delhi should judge the issue on “apolitical appreciation of the specific technical issues involved.” Thus, though the paper did not call for changing India’s general policy on China and Taiwan, it was a reflection of the growing debate about the general unhappiness with India’s ultra-cautious policy when it comes to China.

Other opinions have been much more insistent. The Times of India, editorializing on the same issue, asked the government to “not shy away from supporting Taiwan.” The editorial went one step further than the Indian Express by saying that this should remain an important aspect of the reform of the World Health Organization (WHO). It also argued that India should stop being “overly deferential to Beijing” when China has routinely worked against Indian interests in the UN and other multilateral organizations. The Times of India concluded that “if Delhi is to get itself taken seriously, it must demonstrate that it can stand up and be counted.”

It should be noted that this is not the first time that the Times of India has taken such a stand on Taiwan. In 2019, in the wake of Chinese threats to Taiwan, the paper put out an editorial arguing that India should step up its cooperation with Taiwan. It also made reference to a 2018 Indian Parliamentary Standing Committee report on India-China relations, which called for stronger partnership between India and Taiwan, adding that it was strange that India has shied away from cooperating with Taiwan, whereas Taipei and Beijing had active trade and investment ties despite their political disagreements.

Such views are finding greater traction. Sana Hashmi, formerly a consultant with India’s Ministry of External Affairs and currently a Taiwan Fellow at the Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University in Taipei, argued for a stronger role for Taiwan in India’s Indo-Pacific strategic construct. She suggested that the recent Sino-Indian border clash in Galwan was an apt moment for India to start engaging with Taiwan more seriously. She cautioned, however, that India-Taiwan ties should not be approached just through the China angle, but that Beijing’s recent behavior has provided an opening for developing greater traction in relations between New Delhi and Taipei.

Echoing similar sentiments, Namrata Hasija, a research associate at the Delhi-based Centre for China Analysis and Strategy, asserts that India must stop seeing Taiwan through the China lens that gets activated every time there is tension in Sino-Indian ties. Instead, she argues that it is time for India to develop independent ties with Taiwan across economic and strategic sectors.

Highlighting that Taiwan was one of the first countries to send medical equipment to India, former diplomat G. Parthasarathy also made the case for India to strengthen its relations with Taiwan. He added that Taiwan offers opportunities for cooperation in several key sectors, especially in India’s semiconductor industry, which could also possibly reduce India’s reliance on China in the electronics and communication industries. He added that this also fits well with the general objective of other Indian strategic partners such as the United States, Japan, and South Korea in diversifying global supply chains.

This, of course, is music to the ears of Taiwanese electronic industry giants such as Foxconn, which have wanted a stronger presence in India. Amid the border standoff, Foxconn’s Chairman Liu Young-Way, while speaking at its annual general meeting, portrayed India as a “bright spot” for the company’s growth and expansion. He said that the Foxconn is “fully pushing ahead with next steps there, and maybe in a few months’ time we can reveal on our website the next steps and report back to everyone. We’ll have further investment there.” Currently, Foxconn has most of its factories in China and possible entry into India will form part of the recent plans of many industries to shift their base out of China. Others are less sanguine and worry about the consequence of Sino-Indian tensions on their businesses.

Understandably, Taiwanese opinion supports closer ties with India. For example, Taipei Times called on Taiwan to “deepen ties with India, in particular economic, military and intelligence ties, to contain Chinese expansionism and put Xi back into his box.” This also fits well with President Tsai Ing-wen’s New Southbound policy which has a particular focus on India.

It is unlikely that the extremely cautious Modi government will accept such suggestions. But the calls for greater engagement with Taiwan are a clear sign of popular and elite Indian anger and frustration in dealing with China.

Space Café WebTalk Recap: Dr. Raji Rajagopalan On Indian Space Security And The Future Of Indian Space - 2 June 2020

On 2 June, I did a virtual seminar on National Security Dynamics in India's Space Programme with the SpaceWatch Global's new series, Space Cafe WebTalk. I discussed how India’s approach to outer space has changed over the last decade and how it is now driven increasingly by national security concerns. I also addressed a range of other significant topics, including India’s controversial ASAT test, my thoughts on space collaboration with other nations, and the growth of private space industry in India, including ISRO’s support of it.

The talk was hosted by Torsten Kriening, co-publisher of SpaceWatch.Global and COO of ThorGroup GmbH. The Space Café WebTalks series is SpaceWatch.Global’s innovative webinar platform featuring global space experts.

For the video link to my talk, click here.



Type rest of the post here

Darkening Mood in Delhi Over China - The Diplomat, 3 July 2020

In my column for The Diplomat last week, I look at the changing moods and perceptions on China in Delhi. I note that opinions in New Delhi are hardening, even among sections of elite opinion-makers who are not seen as hyper-nationalists.

The Sino-Indian border confrontation may fundamentally alter Sino-Indian relations, if the darkening mood in New Delhi is any indication. Diplomatic and military negotiations have been ongoing since the June 15 clash at the Galwan River, but they do not appear to be yielding much progress. Not only has there been no troop disengagement on the border, both India and China appear to be sending more troops to the border.

For the full essay, click here.



China is also reported to be building up forces opposite the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, hundreds of kilometers to the east of the current confrontation. Adding to an already complex situation, Pakistan is sending almost 20,000 troops to territories it controls on India’s western flank opposite Ladakh, confronting India with a possible two-front problem. Pakistani radars are also reported to be active. Citing military sources, reports say that the Skardu air base in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) has been active as well. China is reportedly in talks with cadres of terrorist groups such as Al Badr to possibly stir-up violence in Jammu and Kashmir. The Indian Air Force and the Navy are also reportedly on high alert.

The so-called areas of “friction” under discussions include the north bank of Pangong Tso, Galwan Valley and the Gogra Post-Hot Springs pockets. Meanwhile, there has also been the meeting of the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination (WMCC) on June 24 and according to news reports, this will be done on a more regular basis. At the 15th meeting held on June 24, it was reportedly decided that the WMCC will be active in finding terms of disengagement, non-violation of the current but differing perceptions of the LAC, and adherence of the existing border mechanisms such as the 1993 and 1996 agreements.

Reports quoting Indian Army sources say that the “Army is preparing for the long haul and the standoff is expected to continue well into the winter.” Commenting on the last meeting of the military officials on June 30, the Indian Army Public Affairs Directorate is reported to have said that both sides “have emphasised the need for an expeditious, phased and step wise de-escalation as a priority.” With the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) and the Ministry of Defense (MoD) making no formal statements, “army sources” paint a rather a gloomy picture of the meeting.

The crisis has impacted the broader Sino-Indian relationship. Several Indian infrastructure projects in which China won the contract have been revoked or cancelled. Examples include the Shanghai Tunnel Engineering Company of China which received a contract to build the underground portion of the rapid rail project between New Delhi and Meerut, a city about 60 kilometers away. Similarly, the Bihar government cancelled a deal for the construction of a new mega bridge because two out of the four contractors had Chinese partners, China Harbour Engineering Company and Shaanxi Road Bridge Group Company (JV), even though they had earlier been cleared by the Central Cabinet Committee on Economic Affairs. There are also calls by the Maharashtra government to boycott Chinese investment. For instance, memorandum of understanding (MoU) worth 50.2 billion Indian rupees (INR) ($670 million) signed with three Chinese firms, Hengli Group (2.5 billion INR), Great Wall Motors (37.7 billion INR), and PMI Electro Mobility Solutions, a joint venture with Foton (10 billion INR) is already on hold.

Opinions in New Delhi are hardening, even among sections of elite opinion-makers who are not seen as hyper-nationalists. Ajai Shukla, a prominent defense analysts usually critical of the Modi government, tweeted that “India’s military has to fight this out, or New Delhi becomes vassal to Beijing and the Middle Kingdom.” Another moderate voice, Lt. Gen. H.S. Panag argues that with diplomacy reaching a dead end, “it is logical that India may have to exercise the military option to restore status quo ante April 2020.”

Similarly, Shivshankar Menon, National Security Adviser under the previous Congress party-led government of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, noted that China’s behavior today is different, something that has not been seen in a very long time. As he put it, this crisis “is serious . . . And it is even more serious because it is a part of a broader Chinese behaviour, not just vis a vis us, but with other people as well.” India’s deterrence appears not to be working, he suggests. The question then becomes “how do you then deal with it politically because this is more than just a military problem, this is diplomatic, political, it’s a much broader challenge.”

Gautam Bambawale, former Indian Ambassador to China, also argues that the current PLA offensive is different because China has come in large numbers up to areas of their perceived Line of Actual Control (LAC). He charges that China’s PLA has violated “all the principles, norms, standard procedures which have evolved over the past 25 years to maintain peace and tranquility in the border areas. They have displayed how little store it sets by agreements signed by its own government.” In an earlier interview, he said that “For minor tactical gains on the ground, China has strategically lost India.” More pertinently, he makes a clear call for “India as a country, as a people, including, of course, the government in the lead” to do “a fundamental reassessment of its China policy, make changes in it, and then implement it at the earliest.”

What is important is that these are voices that had usually supported stronger, mutually beneficial even if clear-eyed, relations with China. Whether these opinions will necessarily lead to changes in India’s long-term policy remains to be seen. C. Raja Mohan, one of India’s most important foreign policy commentators, has suggested that “the potential direction of the Sino-Indian relationship is likely to depend on how the current military confrontation in Ladakh is resolved.” But there is little doubt that, much like the Sino-Indian war of 1962, fundamental questions are being asked in New Delhi of India’s China relations.

The Sino-Indian Clash: Russia in the Middle - The Diplomat, 25 June 2020

Once again, I am lagging with my blog updates. A couple of weeks ago, I wrote a piece for The Diplomat on the Sino-Indian border clash and how Russia has positioned itself on the same. Clearly, the Sino-Indian clash puts Russia in an awkward position.

In the midst of a border crisis with China, Indian Defense Minister Rajnath Singh is away in Moscow. At the same time, India’s foreign minister joined his Russian and Chinese counterparts online for an Russia-India-China (RIC) meeting. The Sino-Indian crisis potentially puts Russia in a difficult position, having to choose between its traditional partners in India, which also represents a lucrative arms market, and its new but much more powerful friend in the east, China.

For the full essay, click here.



The ostensible reason for Singh’s visit to Russia was to attend the rescheduled Victory Day Parade. The annual parade commemorating the end of World War II was supposed to be held on May 9, but was postponed due to the pandemic. A 75-member tri-service Indian military contingent participated in the parade.

The Chinese defense minister was also in Moscow to attend the same parade. However, the Indian side made it clear that there would be no meeting between the two ministers. All negotiations between India and China on the border crisis are taking place bilaterally either through diplomatic channels or through local military commanders. The fact that the RIC meeting was an online affair also helps to ensure that Russia is not forced to mediate between the two sides.

Indian anger at China is palpable. In fact, Indian Foreign Minister Dr. S. Jaishankar in his speech at the RIC pointedly stated that “the challenge today is not just one of concepts and norms, but equally of their practice. The leading voices of the world must be exemplars in every way.”

India’s interests in Russia are obvious. A significant part of Indian military equipment comes from Russia. In the midst of the crisis with China, the Indian Air Force has asked for 33 new fighter aircraft including 21 MiG-29s and 12 Su-30 MKIs from Russia. This is an old acquisition plan, but it has been pushed for accelerated delivery. The deal is worth over 60 billion Indian rupees ($793 million) and is expected to be approved by the Ministry of Defense in the coming days. In addition, India had already ordered 272 Su-30 MKIs spread over a 10 to 15-year time frame.

Meanwhile, India has also asked Russia for the expedited delivery of the S-400 anti-missile system. The two sides signed a contract for the S-400s in 2019. The original delivery was scheduled for 2021. There were reports that because of COVID-19, the delivery would be delayed. Singh was expected to seek an expedited delivery of the system.

Singh was also seeking assurances that the spare parts supply for Russian equipment that India already has in its arsenal will not be delayed during any crisis with China. Specifically, he was referring to the issue of spare parts for Russian-origin fighter aircraft (including the Su-30MKIs and MiG-29s of the Air Force and the MiG29Ks of the Indian Navy), the T-90 battle tanks for the Army, and the Navy’s Kilo-class submarines.

The Sino-Indian clash puts Russia in an awkward position as a recent analysis in The Wall Street Journal by Yaroslav Trofimov and Thomas Grove pointed out. There is growing recognition in Moscow about pressure from Beijing. But as the report pointed out, Russia is also stuck with China because of pressure from the West. Russia’s difficulties in improving relations with Europe have left Moscow with few options.

In the current crisis, Russia appears to have little interest in mediating between China and India. As Konstantin Kosachev, a senior lawmaker and chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Russian Federation Council, told the Indian media that Russia should not interfere in the India-China dispute and that these should be dealt with through bilateral channels.

At the recent RIC meeting, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov also maintained that India and China do not need any help in resolving their bilateral issues. Although Russia might want to keep its head down in the current crisis, Russian reactions are also being closely watched by the Indian public. Russia has a reservoir of support in India because of its traditional support, including during the 1971 India-Pakistan War. This support glosses over the fact that Russia was neutral during the 1962 Sino-Indian War because it occurred simultaneously with the Cuban missile crisis. Russia’s relations with China had become increasingly rocky – in fact, closer Soviet relations with India were one factor in the Sino-Soviet rift – but the need for Beijing’s support during the Cuban missile crisis forced Moscow to be neutral. That removed an important leg of India’s diplomatic strategy at the time. Almost 60 years later, New Delhi is probably worried that history will repeat and Russia might lean toward China simply by staying neutral.