Where Is Japan in Its Military Push Under Abe?, my column for The Diplomat this week...

In this week's column for The Diplomat, "Where Is Japan in Its Military Push Under Abe?," I write about Japan's efforts in building up its capabilities as it confronts regional security threats.

Amid continuing tensions in the Korean Peninsula and China’s rising power and aggressive behavior, it is no surprise that Japan has been taking a whole host of steps to boost its own military capabilities over the past few years under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s leadership. While the most often cited manifestation of this is Abe’s effort to reform the Japanese Constitution, there is also a wider range of measures being undertaken both in terms of what Tokyo is doing on its own as well as what it is doing with allies and partners.

The past few weeks have offered indications of where Japan is on a couple of these fronts. Just last week, Abe spoke about constitutional revision at the ruling Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP) annual convention in an effort to develop the required consensus to take this process forward. After the speech, the LDP decided to follow Abe’s direction to amend Article 9 and include “an explicit reference to the Self-Defense Forces.” This step has been seen as a requirement; several constitutional experts have called the SDF unconstitutional because “it violates the war-renouncing Article 9 of the Constitution.”

Abe went on to add that the proposed amendment will bring about clarity to the SDF’s status under the constitution but “it will not alter in any way Japan’s national security policies.” Also, in an effort to secure broader public support, Japan’s Defense Minister Itsunori Onodera asserted that civilian control over military will be maintained “based on prewar lessons.”

Following these deliberations and the continuing threats from China and North Korea, Japan has also undertaken a major organizational revamping of its Ground Self-Defense Forces (JGSDF) with the creation of a centralized command and amphibious forces, which we have been hearing more about of late. The reorganization constitutes the largest since JGSDF was formed in 1954.

Instituting the new Command for the GSDF is meant to create abilities to undertake seamless and flexible operations across the country whereas the amphibious forces are meant for defending remote islands, particularly relevant in the context of China’s assertive maritime posturing.

In the face of the North Korean threat, a unified command for the GSDF will bring about greater synergy and coherence among the five regional armies. The defense minister, while addressing the media, stated that there will be situations in the future where the Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces have to coordinate nationwide in a quick reaction against ballistic missile launches, attacks on islands, and natural disasters.

The GSDF Command, headquartered at Camp Asaka in Tokyo, will be headed by Lt. Gen. Shigeru Kobayashi, former head of the GSDF’s Central Readiness Force. The Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade will be headed by Maj. Gen. Shinichi Aoki, who was the former deputy chief of staff of the Western Army.

The naval and air wings of the SDFs already had a central command center, and now, with all the three services having their own central commands, the defense ministry believes that there will be better coordinated joint operations among the three arms of the SDF. This could also possibly create better communication linkages with the U.S. military based in Japan.

While both North Korea and China are major threats to Japan, Beijing’s aggressive policy in the maritime domain has been of particular concern to Tokyo. Japan has been mindful of the kind of tactics China employed in the South China Sea to alter the status quo. Thus, the amphibious brigade that has been created will have an important role in retaking islands if they are unlawfully taken.

The brigade will cover southwest, from Kyushu to Taiwan, and will include Miyako Island, about 210 km from the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea. This is an area that has seen increased Chinese military activity in the recent past – the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) has become particularly active in the airspace between Okinawa and Miyako Islands. Additionally, Chinese naval vessels have been frequenting these waters, increasing tensions there.

But amid the hype around all this, it is worth noting that the amphibious brigade is still being set up, and it could be some time before the full capacity is in place. For instance, there is uncertainty around the deployment of the U.S.-made V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft, which will be key in transporting troops. The government’s plans to deploy 17 of the newly procured Osprey aircraft have not gained local approval.

There are broader uncertainties too. Amending the constitution is no easy task. Even as LDP lawmaker Hiroyuki Hosoda has developed consensus on the revisions on the constitution, other members of the ruling coalition are not entirely happy. Junior coalition partners like Komeito are not entirely on board with Abe’s plans, and since a two-thirds majority is required in both houses of the Diet to make these constitutional changes, the math means that LDP likely needs the support of Komeito in the Lower House and the support of other smaller opposition parties in the Upper House to effect these changes.

As for the support from the public, different surveys have produced different results, but those variations in and of themselves suggest that public perception is a variable that ought not to be left out in this discussion. A survey conducted by Kyodo News revealed 48.5 percent of respondents against the constitutional changes whereas 39.2 supported the amendments. Another survey conducted over telephone had shown only 33 percent of respondents supporting Abe’s moves and 54.8 opposing the revisions. These numbers certainly look better than a few years ago, but Abe still faces many challenges in terms of public perception, whether it is linked to defense issues or other domestic concerns.

There is opposition also within some parts of the bureaucracy. Media accounts have already surfaced citing sources from the defense ministry who criticized the move as “useless,” saying it will only delay the decision-making process that is required to get things done on the defense side.

Beyond these internal challenges, there are also external concerns as well. Among those are how these moves, including constitutional changes, may be perceived by China and South Korea, which have their own respective concerns about a militarized Japan.

Despite all this, Abe shows few signs of easing on his military push for Japan. That is no surprise given his own personal commitment to this goal as well as the regional trends that are impacting Japan’s security. Whether or not that will change, and to what extent all this lasts once he leaves office, remains to be seen.

China, a major factor pushing changes in Japan's security narrative. a short essay on the Japanese defence White Paper....

Here's a short essay of mine on the China factor in Japan's defense White Paper. The White Paper that was released in June highlights important issues facing regional and international community such as WMD proliferation, safe and continued access to global commons like sea, outer space and cyber space, and international terrorism, from a Japanese perspective. In terms of the regional threat perception, North Korea and China figure prominently in the paper. Satoshi Morimoto, the Japanese Defence Minister, in his introduction to the White Paper, notes that the security environment faced by Japan is "increasingly harsh."

For full essay, click here.

Japan's new White Paper on defence was released on 25 June, 2013. A comprehensive document, the first part deals with the security environment both at the regional and global levels and then it looks at the defence policies of important countries and regions - the US, Korean Peninsula, China, Russia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, Australia and Europe - and important issues facing the international community such as WMD proliferation, safe and continued access to global commons like sea, outer space and cyber space, and international terrorism, from a Japanese perspective. However, the most interesting and pertinent one is the section on developing Japan's Dynamic Defence Force1.

Satoshi Morimoto, the Japanese Defence Minister, in his introduction to the White Paper, notes that the security environment faced by Japan is "increasingly harsh." The major emphasis on Japan's regional threat perception was on North Korea and China. North Korea's continuing nuclear and missile development efforts - including the recent missile test that Pyongyong called as a "satellite" test - was particularly highlighted. In addition to the three rounds of nuclear tests, Tokyo is worried that North Korea could be "developing nuclear weapons using highly-enriched uranium." Pyongyang's continuing development of delivery mechanisms, including the long-range ballistic missiles, also pose "a significant threat to Japan's security, and are absolutely unacceptable as they are significantly detrimental to the peace and stability in Northeast Asia and the international community."

Next, the White Paper focuses on China's military modernisation along with its rising defence budget. Even though China justifies Taiwan as the main driver of its modernisation, the report notes that China's rise as a major economic and political power will dictate it to expand its military capabilities and also that the global community will pay greater attention to China. However, the report notes that China's rapid expansion and modernisation of its military and the enhancement of its power projection capabilities, along with lack of transparency, are alarming not only to Japan and the region but also to the larger global community. While the report acknowledged that the publication of Chinese defence white papers since 1998 is a means to address the transparency issue, the document also notes that "China has not yet achieved the levels of transparency expected of a responsible major power in the international society."

The document noted that the Chinese strategy "emphasize(s) not only physical means but also non-physical means with respect to military affairs and warfare, incorporated the concept of "Three Warfares"-"Psychological Warfare," "Media Warfare," and "Legal Warfare"-into the tasks of the political work by military, and declared a policy of "close coordination between military struggle and political, diplomatic, economic, cultural, and legal endeavors."

As for the long-term plans and objectives, the White Paper said that China will want to reach "basic mechanization and achieve a major progress in construction of informatization by 2020." This is expected to be done with the long-standing primary objective of developing capabilities to win a local war under informationized conditions, while beefing up to undertake multiple and diverse military missions and "complete the historical military missions in a new phase of the new century."

The rising Chinese defence budget is a key issue. The paper says the nominal size of China's announced national defence budget has more than doubled in the past five years and has grown nearly 30-fold in the last 24 years. The paper noted that the announced figures are only a part of the actual military spending, pointing out that "equipment procurement costs and research and development expenses" are not part of the budget.

The paper, in addition, goes into great detail about the growing size of the Chinese inventory - various types and ranges of ballistic missiles: intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), intermediate-range ballistic missiles/medium-range ballistic missiles (IRBM/MRBM), and short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) - and what it might mean for Japan and the region. In addition to procurement that goes unabated, the paper notes with alarm China's ability to serial production of missiles in large numbers for domestic as well as export purposes.

Increasing number of Chinese vessels in close proximity to Japanese waters engaged in information gathering activities and training exercises has also been highlighted in the White Paper. There have also been Chinese government ships "engaged in monitoring activities for protection of its maritime rights and interests" in addition to advancements by Chinese naval surface vessels to the Pacific Ocean since 2008.

China has criticised the new White Paper in harsh terms and has called on Japan to "conduct some introspection and do more to facilitate regional peace and stability." The criticism has been along expected lines, with China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokeswoman Hua Chunying arguing that "China adheres to a road of peaceful development and pursues a national defense policy with a defensive nature," while dismissing the issue of opaqueness about the military and saying that it does not pose threat to any country. On the Senkaku islands, the spokeswoman said that China will "not change its position and determination" and that it will take any additional measure that is necessary to protect its sovereignty.

Given the growing number of challenges, Japan foresees development of defensive capability in accordance with the National Defense Program Guidelines and the Mid-Term Defense Program, despite difficult economic scenario. This defensive capability will involve development of the Dynamic Defense Force on a priority basis. The paper notes that in the backdrop of heightened military modernisation in the region, "not only deterrence through the existence of the defense force per se, but also "dynamic deterrence", which focuses on operational use of the defense force such as demonstrating the nation's will and its strong defense capabilities through timely and tailored military operations under normal conditions, is important."2

Japan has been changing in its security posture over the last several years. Its attempts to become a "normal" nation by assuming greater security responsibilities have been driven more by necessity than choice. While the US-Japan security alliance is key to Japan's security, the US distraction over the last few years in Afghanistan and Iraq forced Japan to re-examine its own security options. Also Japan has been assuming more security responsibilities in the international arena which became evident in the deployment of Japanese troops in Iraq and its naval vessels in the Arabian Sea in support of the US military operations in Afghanistan.

Also the growing partnership between the US and China has cast doubts in Tokyo about the credibility of the US-Japan alliance. Given such apprehensions, Japan has been developing new partnerships and strengthening old ones. The newer and enhanced role of the Self Defence Forces (SDFs) appears to have domestic support; a recent public survey showed a 91.7% approval for the SDFs. Thus, there is a high likelihood of a more "normal" and muscular Japan emerging in the coming years.

1. "Dynamic Defense Force" was first referred to in the 2010 National Defense Program Guidelines, with "response to large-scale disasters and various other situations" as one of the key roles assigned for this force. Maritime security and protection of the sea lanes are also highlighted as important roles.

2. Additionally, the paper said, "warning times of contingencies is shortening due to exponential advances in military technology. Thus, in order to respond speedily and seamlessly to a contingency, comprehensive operational performance such as readiness is increasingly important."

Asia-Pacific Security: Challenges and Opportunities, one of the latest books on the subject and I have a chapter on it as well....

Here's a chapter of mine on the Asia-Pacific security, edited by Dr. Adam B. Lowther. I have contributed a chapter on the US role in the region, to this edited book, titled, Asia-Pacific Century: Challenges and Opportunities. The book has been published by the US Air Force Research Institute, Alabama.

The United States’ Pacific pivot has been much debated since the end of last year. This chapter addresses three specific questions: (1) how Asia-Pacific nations see the role of the United States in the region; (2) as China rises, how its neighbours in the region will react, whether they will they bandwagon or balance; and (3) how states in the region are hedging their bets on the future. The discussion delves into the new alliances and partnerships that are likely responses in view of the new challenges.

For the full book, click here.



Type rest of the post here

North Korean imbroglio: Who can do what?, my short essay on the subject.....

Here's a short essay on the situation in North Korea and who can do what to calm down the tempers?

While on the surface, both the US (and South Korea and Japan) and China appear to have the goal of seeing a stable Korean Peninsula, there appear to be serious differences about what regional stability means.




North Korea appears to be yet again on a war path with repeated provocations and increasing rhetoric for the past few months. It has also been a year since Kim Jong-un formally took over power. Power transfer to the new young leader has not however eased the policies in Pyongyang. In fact, the military-first politics of North Korea is continuing ever more fervently under Kim Jong-un. The situation may even be more dangerous under Kim Jong-un than the previous leaders because at least previous leaders were slightly more experienced and had a sense of the thresholds that must not be crossed.

This has serious implications for the region. The US, bound by its alliance commitments, has reassured its partners Japan and South Korea that the US will do what was necessary to any attack from North Korea. After his visit to Seoul, the US Secretary of State John Kerry headed to Beijing where he called upon China to step in actively to bring about restraint in Pyongyang’s behavior. Given that Pyongyang is already so isolated internationally and that China continues to be one of the few countries that maintain ties with the regime, Kerry said "China has an enormous capability to make a difference here." Thereafter, while in Tokyo, Kerry even softened up a bit to say, "Our choice is to negotiate, our choice is to move to the table and find a way for the region to have peace," but of course if Pyongyang gives up its nuclear weapons programme.

What are the expectations from the region and beyond on China? Following the meeting with Chinese officials, there was much optimism with headlines like, "Kerry Hails Chinese North Korea Pledge", "China, United States to work together to calm down North Korea" and the like.

Will China rise to the occasion and do something? Would China step in as an active partner in bringing down the tempers in the Korean Peninsula? Are China and other regional powers on the same page as far as regional security is concerned?

Beijing’s continuing aid and trade relations with Pyongyang does offer it a leverage and one that can be used to extract some benefits in the interests of regional stability. However, China’s State Councilor Yang Jiechi’s statement that "We advocate addressing and settling the problem through dialogue and consultation and by peaceful means," and that it is "the common responsibility of all" does not suggest that China is serious on extracting any conciliatory steps out of North Korea.

While on the surface, both the United States (and South Korea and Japan) and China appear to have the goal of seeing a stable Korean Peninsula, there appear to be serious differences about what regional stability means. It appears that Chinese perspective on regional stability is driven by a narrow objective of ensuring no internal crisis in Pyongyang which will drive a large number of refugees into China; and second, that there is no US military presence near its borders. This vision differs sharply with that of the others who perceive a denuclearized North Korea that respects human right for its people as an essential step to regional stability. This time around, at least in its rhetoric, China has made calls for denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, which was not the case earlier.

Does the Chinese rhetoric for a denuclearized Korean Peninsula mean anything if it fails to act on North Korea? What could be the potential rationale for China not to act on Pyongyang? One, it may be a buffer between China and the US and its allies in the neighbourhood. So, it may be in China’s interests to sustain the regime but under limits and one that does not engage in repeated provocations that reinstate the role of external players, particularly that of the US.

On the other hand, it is possible that China may not enjoy the same clout as it did earlier vis a vis the new regime in North Korea. It is a fact that the new leader has not much of a contact with the new leadership in China nor has Kim Jong-un undertaken a visit to Beijing to solidify relations between the new leadership teams in both countries. And if one were to go by a Wikileaks report, it may be true that China is beginning to be frustrated with North Korea including over the increasing belligerent approach and the failing economy of Pyongyang. While there is a grain of truth in these reports, the Chinese response to some of the recent incidents including the Cheonan sinking or the repeated missile tests suggest otherwise.

While China may be increasingly getting frustrated with the North Korean leadership, they remain the sole friend and benefactor, extending the much needed economic, political and moral support to the Kim Jong-un regime. Therefore, China remains the sole country that has some leeway in bringing the North Korean situation under control. The west should not get carried away by the Chinese pledges and open rhetoric and instead get China to act on its words.

It may also be in the interests of China to see that North Korean nuclear programme is rolled back because if Pyongyang were to continue with repeated tests including that of its delivery vehicles, it would only strengthen the regional insecurities prompting Seoul and Tokyo to contemplate all options including potential nuclearisation. While China may see immediate short-term benefits in not acting strongly against the Pyongyang leadership in curbing its nuclear programme, the end result of a nuclear Seoul or Tokyo may be much harder for China to live with. Therefore, taking strong measures and going beyond the rhetoric on North Korea may be in the long-term interests of China as well.

North Korea's nuclear test: Regional dynamics

Here's a short essay on the recent North Korean nuclear test... looking at regional reactions, most specifically at the Japanese options.

The test, conducted in defiance of regional and global concerns, has been criticised by the UN, US, Japan and South Korea. The test has clearly upped the ante in the neighbourhood with Japan and South Korea raising the military alert levels to be prepared for any eventuality. The test raises a lot of questions: How does this affect the regional threat matrix? How would countries like Japan and South Korea respond? The timing of the test, on the day of President Obama's State of the Union address, is curious, especially in the backdrop of the North Korean state media agency statement pointing to the US as one of the reasons why they have conducted the test.



North Korea conducted a nuclear test for the third time on February 12, sparking criticism from the region and beyond. According to Asahi Shimbun, the state media agency, Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) stated that the test was conducted in a safe manner and this is aimed at coping with "outrageous" US hostility that "violently" undermines the North Korea's peaceful, sovereign rights to launch satellites. The agency went on to say that the test was packed with more explosive power and a "miniaturized" and "lighter" nuclear bomb. If these reports are true, Pyongyang has progressed in mastering the complex and complicated technology involved making the nuclear warhead small enough to fit into its missiles. The missile tests last December exhibited the increased range of new North Korean missiles, raising concerns in the region and beyond. The nuclear test also raised the suspicion about whether North Korea has made the switch from plutonium to uranium for its nuclear weapons. Japanese news media point out that North Korea has abundant deposits of uranium, and it is far simpler to enrich uranium in centrifuges than to reprocess plutonium.

Second, what is the rationale from the North Korean point of view? The new leadership in Pyongyang under Kim Jong Un could be trying to assert power and buy credibility through these tests. The power transition in Pyongyang has not exactly been smooth and there is believed to be infighting among multiple power centers. This test may be a reflection of the fact that King Jong Un is not in control of the affairs in Pyongyang.

Third, since North Korea has tested twice before, how significant is this in international political terms? Is North Korea testing again signify that the region did not respond in sufficiently serious ways to the first two Pyongyang tests? Japan, for instance, had contemplated serious responses, including possibly pre-emptive strikes as well as revisiting Tokyo's own nuclear options in each of the past crises. However, Tokyo has not done anything as yet, for a variety of reasons. These options could seriously impact the US-Japan security alliance. In addition, Japanese public opinion on nuclear weapons has remained uncertain. While a few right-wing politicians have called for exercising these options, the public continues to be wary of nuclear weapons. On the other hand, Fukushima notwithstanding, this is changing. The very fact that there is an open debate in Japan today along these lines says a lot about the future prospects of nuclear weapons in Japan. In Japan, those who have favoured these options have found justifications, tracing debates way back to 1956 when Prime Minister Hatoyama stated, "It is not an objective of the Constitution to oblige us to sit and wait to perish."

Japan has possibly looked at these options for two reasons. One, the continuing concerns about the non-proliferation regime and its effectiveness in tackling issues such as North Korea and Iran. Japan has reasons to believe that North Korea's nuclear and missile-related issues cannot be sorted out through international arms control agreements. While the North Korean threat is progressing, Japan is not certain about the effectiveness of international agreements to curb the North Korean threat.

Circumstances may be different today with an Abe administration, a more hardline government, in control in Japan. However, is Tokyo in a better position as far as its response options are concerned? Amendment to the Japanese Constitution and changing Article 9 is often talked about. This will be a significant boost to strengthen Japan's military options. Nevertheless, it is too early to say with certainty how Japan will respond to the changing threat dynamics.

The advancements that Pyongyang has made in terms of miniaturization of the device may be significant particularly in the backdrop of long-range delivery vehicles. With Pyongyang having tested the longer-range missiles in recent months, threat to even the United States has increased, which is reflected in Obama's reactions to the test. The Obama administration, unlike its milder response following the missile test, sounded much more alarmed. Secretary Panetta, for instance, has said, "We just saw what North Korea has done in these last few weeks, a missile test and now a nuclear test. They represent a serious threat to the United States of America, and we've got to be prepared to deal with that." This brings the question about the US response. Beyond the rhetoric, how differently will the US respond? Does the Obama Administration see the nuclear non-proliferation regime as an appropriate vehicle to bring on the pressure on Pyongyang?

The test also raises questions about the relevance of the six-party talks. So far, it appears that the talks have not fructified. The talks stalled in 2009 when North Korea decided to pull out following a failed satellite launch. This brings out into the open also the Chinese role in the six party talks. Beijing has remained the sole friend and benefactor to North Korea, extending the crucial economic, political and moral support. While there has been criticism that China has not been proactive in condemning Pyongyang's aggressive actions, the other side of the story may be as to how much of a leeway does China really have on North Korea to stop such posturing. There have been reasons to believe that China may have reached a point of frustration, as some of the WikiLeaks reports suggested.

In conclusion, while all the major players understand the challenges, they find themselves uniquely constrained in responding to North Korea.

Why is India Shy of Playing Geo-strategic Games?

Here's an analysis of mine on the recent (Indian) MOD decision not to send Indian Army Chief for the Pacific meet of Army Chiefs in Singapore, published by ORF. Indian decision-makers appear to live in splendid isolation and do not recognise the importance of meetings like the Pacific Army Chiefs Conference. These meetings have become more institutionalised and are likely to gain greater momentum.



Indian Army Chief General VK Singh should have been in Singapore this week for a meeting of the Army Chiefs from all the Pacific countries. The meeting, the biennial Pacific Army Chiefs Conference sponsored by the U.S. Pacific Command (July 28-31, 2011), would have been an ideal platform for army chiefs in the region to start conversations outside of formal meetings. It is reported that Pakistan and China are represented by their respective army chiefs; so is the case with almost all other invited and participating countries. So far, there is a confirmed participation of around 23 Army Chiefs whereas India has decided to stick to its earlier policy of sending only Vice Chief to attend the Conference (the only exception was in 2009 when Army Chief Gen. Kapoor had attended). This also raises the protocol issue as to how and whether other army chiefs would meet and have meaningful meetings with the Indian Army Vice Chief.

Indian decision-makers appear to live in splendid isolation and do not recognise the importance of such meetings that have become more institutionalised and are likely to gain greater momentum over time. Intentionally or otherwise, India is clearly losing out on opportunities and opportunities don't come knocking every day.

Is India averse to accepting a leadership role in Asia and beyond? On the one hand, we cry hoarse for a UN Security Council seat, but on the other we are not even willing to be part of new forums and initiatives in Asia that are gaining strength year after year. In fact, the Indian leadership ought to recognize that traditional alliances and partnerships have almost entirely been replaced by the new floating partnerships, based on issues rather than any permanent interests. One good illustration is the role of China on the North Korean nuclear issue. China has become the "interlocutor" for the outside world to engage with Pyongyang. While there is no dearth of conflictual issues between China and the U.S., Washington has understood the game, as it deals with the North Korean imbroglio. Therefore, India has to recognise that it has to become part of these regional groupings and forums if it wants to play a meaningful role in Asia and beyond. A revamp of Indian thinking in dealing with the external world has become urgent if India wants to play a greater global role.

Why is the Singapore forum important? As mentioned earlier, it provides a platform for bilateral and multilateral engagements with a region that is of critical importance. Some of the Southeast Asian countries appear to be more keen today than India is in deepening its engagement with the region. The Vietnamese leadership, for instance, has been arguing for a closer partnership with India; in fact, members of the military or civilian defence bureaucracy have visited India, in an effort to bring New Delhi closer to Hanoi. They are reported to have offered India Vietnamese naval base for use although India is yet to take a decision on it.1 It appears that India is yet again willing to lose an opportunity. Take the case of Hambantota Port development project in Sri Lanka. It was first offered to India by Sri Lanka. After getting no positive response, Sri Lanka went ahead and offered it to China. However till date, India holds it against the Sri Lankan leadership as a hostile move on the part of Colombo. India has to recognize that it has to get its act together and become more responsive and responsible if it does not want to lose crucial strategic space in Asia.

Unless India is willing to come out of the cocoon and adapt itself to the changing geostrategic games, New Delhi can forget about taking a seat at the high table. Indian leadership should also be reminded that it will be forced to take hard decisions once they assume positions of power. As a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, India is already confronted with difficult choices. So, it may be good to check whether it would like to be in a such position or is it going to be happily contended staying just as another South Asian nation.

1 For the Vietnamese offer, see Malcolm Moore and Praveen Swami, "Vietnam Offers Navy Base to Foil China," The Telegraph (U.K.), November 08, 2010, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/vietnam/8116192/Vietnam-offers-navy-base-to-foil-China.html. As part of the deal, India is to assist Vietnamese Army in jungle warfare.

Non-Proliferation Challenges in Asia: An Indian Perspective

This was subject of my presentation at a recent bilateral dialogue between ORF and a Russian think-tank.

While nuclear non-proliferation has remained a major challenge for more than sixty years, the enormity of the challenge has grown manifold particularly since the end of the Cold War. In the past where there was one major nuclear threat – US-Soviet rivalry and the threat of nuclear war – today the world is faced with other challenges – WMD proliferation, terrorism, with a special emphasis on nuclear terrorism. Today, the number of countries pursuing nuclear weapons has gone up significantly. It is particularly in this context that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) along with their delivery systems has become a major issue of concern. The threat is particularly loud and clear in India’s neighbourhood. Issues of China-Pakistan nuclear and missile cooperation, nuclear and missile activities of North Korea and Iran are of specific concern from an Indian perspective. Chinese proliferation of nuclear weapons and technology, including delivery mechanisms to North Korea, Pakistan and Iran has altered military balance in South Asia and beyond.

The paper is divided into three broad aspects. The first section of the paper provided a contextualisation to the developments taking place in Asia, wherein there is a major emphasis on military power, conventional or otherwise. This in particular dealt with the changing security environment that is feeding into these developments. The second outlined three major non-proliferation challenges in Asia – China-Pakistan nuclear cooperation; North Korea; Iran. The last section examines the Indian approach to proliferation and to each of these particular cases.

Having listed out particular crises, it has to be acknowledged that the biggest challenge is the crisis of confidence among major powers. The lack of consensus among major powers on agreeing a particular course of action has stood in the way of taking any effective action against these individual challenges and more importantly it has contributed to the weakening of the regime itself.

If anyone is interested in reading the full paper, I will be happy to mail it.



First, unless the major powers are able to reach a consensus on the challenges, there are going to be many more countries and entities that will exploit the weakness of the regime.

Second, importance and insufficiency of non-proliferation efforts based largely on technological control; supply side of the issue needs to be addressed. Technological controls or export control regimes or sanctions only let the hard-core countries buy time and invest domestic, dedicated talent towards weaponisation. These measures do not and cannot halt the programmes of the hard-core countries.

Third, as long as the P-5 members are not able to agree on a timeframe for nuclear disarmament, countries around the world are going to pursue these weapons. Under such a scenario, global disarmament appears to remain a pipe dream for the near future.

North Korea Goes the Asymmetric Way -- Cyber Warfare Capabilities

One often hears about the Chinese cyber warfare capabilities but not so much the North Korean capabilities. Here's one report that talks about Pyongyang's growing capabilities in this arena. In 2007, Pyongyang was estimated to have 30,000 electronic warfare specialists, including some 1,200 personnel under two electronic warfare brigades. Each Army corps is reported to operate an automation unit, or an electronic warfare unit.

Some reports published by the North Korean Army in 2005 stated as to how Kim Jong-il himself had emphasised on the importance of cyber warfare in any future warfare, saying "Modern war is electronic warfare. Victory or defeat of a modern war depends on how to carry out electronic warfare."



Concerns about North Korea's cyber warfare squads are resurfacing after Friday's cyber and GPS jamming attacks, which are being blamed on the North. Pyongyang began developing electronic warfare capabilities in 1986 when it founded Mirim University, the present-day Automation University, to train specialists.

A defector who graduated from the university recalled that 25 Russian professors were invited from the Frunze Military Academy in the former Soviet Union to give lectures, and some 100 to 110 hackers were trained there every year.

Mirim is a five-year college. The Amrokgang College of Military Engineering, the National Defense University, the Air Force Academy and the Naval Academy are also reportedly training electronic warfare specialists.

Jang Se-yul of North Korean People's Liberation Front, an organization of former North Korean military officers and servicemen,
recalled that when he fled the North in 2007, "I heard that the North Korean military has about 30,000 electronic warfare
specialists, including some 1,200 personnel under two electronic warfare brigades."

"Each Army corps operates an automation unit, or an electronic warfare unit. " Jang used to be an officer of a North Korean electronic warfare command. Staff monitor traffic flow at the Korea Internet and Security Agency in Seoul on July 8, 2009.
Material published by the North Korean Army in 2005 quotes leader Kim Jong-il as saying, "Modern war is electronic warfare. Victory or defeat of a modern war depends on how to carry out electronic warfare."

In a 2006 report, the South Korean military warned North Korean hackers could paralyze the command post of the U.S. Pacific Command and damage computer systems on the U.S. mainland.

Experts believe that the North's 600 or so special hackers are as good as their CIA counterparts. They attempted in August 2008 to hack the computer of a colonel in South Korean Field Army headquarters. In 1999, the U.S. Defense Department said the most frequent visitor to its website was traced to North Korea.

Due to economic difficulties since the 1990s, the North Korean regime had a hard time boosting its conventional military
capabilities and instead focused on strengthening so-called asymmetric capabilities that would allow it to achieve relatively large effects with small expenses. That includes not only nuclear and biochemical weapons and missiles but also special forces and hackers.

North Korean Crisis and China

Here's an article of mine on the North Korean crisis, looking specifically at the role of China. The article was published on the ORF website and can be accessed here.

China has to recognise the pitfalls of its approach as it deals with North Korea. China has to recognise that North Korean actions are triggering several developments that are not necessarily in the interests of China. For instance, it has triggered major debates on defence in Japan about becoming proactive in defending themselves, including the option of nuclearisation. Can a nuclearised East Asia be ruled out in the next decade if Pyongyang is to continue on the same path?



North Korea appears to be in an aggressive mode with its second attack this year against South Korea, provoking the world at large, and certainly its neighbours, to respond. In March this year, Pyongyang had sunk the 1,200 ton South Korean corvette Cheonan in the Yellow Sea, which prompted the United Nations to issue a resolution condemning the incident, although it did not blame Pyongyang for the incident. This week Pyongyang shelled a South Korean fishing community and military base in Yeonpyeong, a disputed island, on Nov.23 with highly inflammable ammunition that killed four people, including two civilian construction workers, and blew the windows out of a school and torched houses. As of November 29, the US and South Korea had completed their third day of naval exercises off the Korean Peninsula’s west coast, although Seoul has cancelled the live firing drill at Yeonpyeong.

Meanwhile, Pyongyang has also clarified that it is pursuing its nuclear programme vigorously. It recently stated that it has a uranium-enrichment facility with thousands of centrifuges, to provide for a light water reactor, for “peaceful purpose of meeting electricity demand.” Quoting an editorial from the ruling communist party’s newspaper, Rodong Sinmun, media reports said, “Our nuclear energy development, which is for peaceful purposes and to solve the electricity demand, will be more active.” In fact, this was the first time that Pyongyang has openly talked about its nuclear programme. The existence of the modern enrichment facility was disclosed by Stanford University professor and scientist Siegfried S Hecker, who was given a tour of the site on November 12.1

What has prompted Pyongyang to adopt such hardline measures in the recent years? The “military-first politics” of Kim Jong Il, the expansion of DPRK military capabilities and its increasing defence budget continue to be an area of concern. Pyongyang has continued to argue that nuclear weapons and missiles along with their conventional capabilities are required as deterrents against possible South Korean, Japanese and American military aggression against North Korea. The North Korean leadership has also maintained that this is one possible way that it can get the international attention and that the world will engage it only under such conditions. This argument is difficult to sell anymore given that the international community, and the US in particular, have been engaged with Pyongyang on a bilateral basis as well as through the Six Party talks format.

Second, is there a message for the world that the new leadership in North Korea is as hardline as the old one? In fact, continuity can be visualised as far as Pyongyang’s future trajectory is concerned, given that Kim Jong Il chose the youngest son and not the older one (who is considered a peacenik) to carry on with the Kim Jong Il legacy in Asian affairs.

What has been the role of China in this regard? The Chinese interests, while they seem congruent on the surface with that of the US and other regional powers, are actually different and incongruent. For instance, the Chinese and American perspectives about the issue of North Korean stability are very different. For the regional powers as well as the US, what they want is a denuclearised North Korea at peace with its neighbours, and also a country that protects the human rights for its own people, whereas Chinese interests are to ensure that there is no crisis that might prompt the influx of large number of refugees into China and that there are no US troops on the Chinese borders, say if South Korea takes over the North after a collapse. Therefore, the Chinese interests are driven by narrower perceptions of North Korean stability.

Pyongyang has adopted a defiant attitude in its dealings with its neighbourhood, with the possible exception of Beijing. Beijing has become almost the only friend of the Kim Jong Il regime, extending the crucial economic, political and moral support. China remains North Korea’s largest trading partner as well as an important source of food, fuel and arms.2 Given that Pyongyang’s relations, particularly with Seoul, have declined drastically after the two nuclear tests, Beijing’s bargaining power with the North Korean leadership should have increased dramatically.

Some analysts argue that the US is dependent on China to put any serious pressure on North Korea. While this may be partly true, it is also possible that China has not put any serious pressure on North Korea because they see it as a buffer state between itself and the US allies in its neighbourhood. Second, with the US having been preoccupied with Iraq and Afghanistan, China has managed to create a vital strategic space in Asia, particularly as the US deals with problem cases like North Korea or Myanmar. In both of these cases, China has emerged as the conduit for any dealing, be it the democracy, human rights or the WMD proliferation issues. Therefore, China does not want to lose that privileged position where the West has to route itself through Beijing to achieve some of their foreign policy objectives.

However, some have argued that the West has overestimated the Chinese hold on North Korea and that Beijing is unable to exercise that kind of influence on Pyongyang. There are experts who note that China is beginning to reach a point of frustration with North Korea on three issues: its increasingly belligerent behaviour; growing economic crisis; and the leadership succession issues. The recently-released WikiLeaks too suggested that China may have been re-thinking its policy towards North Korea, although the Cheonan incident and the recent shelling incident have established that Beijing has not altered its policy towards North Korea. There have been undoubtedly subtle changes in the last few years in China’s approach towards Pyongyang, evident from the support lent by China in imposing sanctions on North Korea post-nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009.3 There were reports which noted that after the Cheonan incident, although China did not issue any action against North Korea despite strong evidence, President Hu Jintao is believed to have directed the leadership to be less provocative and avoid confrontations.4 Nonetheless, the subtle change that one witnessed is clearly reversible, which was evident in the recent crises.

Whether there is a change or not, China’s role in finding a solution to the North Korean crisis is critical. However, like any other country, China will get on board with an effective response only if it sees that its interests are affected or its interests can be served better by an active role. For China, there are three issues that could drive a more active role. As mentioned earlier, one of the major imperatives for China keeping Pyongyang as an ally is because it is a buffer state between the pro-west US-allies and Beijing. The Chinese have been paranoid about the US troops on its border. Second, in the case of any instability in North Korea or a serious conflict, there could be a huge refugee influx into China -- a nightmare scenario becoming a reality for Beijing. Lastly, any serious crisis on the Korean Peninsula can also weaken the Chinese standing and hurt its leadership, exposing its inability to deal with a problem successfully in its neighbourhood. This will seriously damage the image of the global leader-in-the-making.

In conclusion, China has to recognise the pitfalls of its approach as it deals with North Korea. China has to recognise that North Korean actions are triggering several developments that are not necessarily in the interests of China. For instance, it has triggered major debates on defence in Japan about becoming proactive in defending themselves, including the option of nuclearisation. Can a nuclearised East Asia be ruled out in the next decade if Pyongyang is to continue on the same path?

China-Iran Military Ties

Here's the link to an article of mine on the China-Iran military ties. The Occasional Paper has been published (August 09, 2010) by the Middle East Institute, New Delhi (MEI@ND).

While China may agree with the US that a nuclear Iran may contribute to regional instability, it does not want to hamper its own goals vis-à-vis Iran or other countries in the Middle East per se. These goals are: Iran’s oil and gas resources; gaining access to Central Asia; and ensuring the emergence of an anti-Western regional power in the Middle East. Given these potential benefits, China seems to solidifying the relationship with Iran. As far as Iran is concerned, three major drivers appear to be pushing its ties with China – becoming self-reliant, attaining regional power status and establishing strong deterrence against any attacks.

What has been most critical in Iran-China military ties is not the actual transfer of weapon units and other systems as much as the Chinese assistance in setting up and aiding their indigenous production capabilities. While these may be difficult to monitor and track, they have been more useful to Iran than simple transfer of units and have created a dangerous situation wherein the country can develop these systems on its own without any outside help. The kind of self-sufficiency that Iran has been able to achieve in a few decades, mostly due to the Chinese assistance, is significant.

For the full paper, click here.



Type rest of the post here

USI-Okazaki Institute Bilateral Interaction on Regional Security Issues

Recently, I attended the USI-Okazaki Institute bilateral interaction on regional security issues, where I also presented a paper on US-Japan security alliance.



The United Service Institution of India (USI) and the Japanese think-tank Okazaki Institute held its bilateral interaction on regional security issues on November 27, 2009. The discussions centered around four major aspects -- China's rise; Chinese military modernisation; US-Japan security alliance in the backdrop of major regional developments including rising China factor and North Korean missile and nuclear activities; and non-traditional security threats facing the region and identifying the scope and potential for a strengthened India-Japan partnership.

I presented a paper on the US-Japan security alliance: problems and prospects. The main argument of the paper is that while the US-Japan security alliance has served as the bedrock of stability in the Asia-Pacific, the centrality of the alliance in ensuring stability in the future is not certain. There may be alternative measures taken up by both sides, in consultation with each other or independently, to avoid destabilising consequences for the region. This is in the light of increasing disappointment by each of the alliance partner of their commitments.

There have been several problems facing the US-Japan security alliance in the last nearly two decades. The problems may be categorised as increasing mismatch between the expectations of the US and Japan of each other in terms of alliance commitments; and the Japanese own assertiveness in the military-security arena in the backdrop of the above-mentioned challenges, especially when there is an increasing perception that the US may not be able to deliver on extended nuclear deterrence.

The end of the Cold War, however, changed contours, at least from the US point of view. The US expected Japan to take more security responsibility. In essence, the US was telling the Japanese not to be “security free riders”. However, Japan having followed a peace constitution not only in letter but also in spirit, was finding itself unable to meet the new expectations of its alliance partner and this began to tell on the alliance, although one may feel that all is well with the bilateral security alliance, if one goes by the rhetoric. But in reality, the strategic partnership that President Clinton followed vis a vis China or Obama’s coddling of Beijing are not reassuring to Japan. In between, the George Bush Administration tried to correct some of these concerns and put in place processes in the Pentagon to revitalise the relationship. September 11 terrorist attacks changed the situation drastically and the US was seeking Japanese assistance and the Koizumi Government came forward with significant support in the war on terror. This provided a new impetus to the alliance; however, many believe that it was not the shared views or collective self-defence that motivated the Japanese response, but a “fear of abandonment.”

However, the more important consequence has been the lack of consensus on common threat to their shared interests. The US, particularly after the 9/11 terror attacks, may be devoting greater attention to issues such as terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism, rising China factor, to some extent, depending on whether it is a Republican or Democratic administration in office, North Korean threats. While some of these may factor on the Japanese radar, the intensity of the threats may differ significantly in the duo’s perspectives. With increasing US-China partnership and the talk of a G-2, there could be serious divergences of opinion as to what kind of a threat would China pose in the future to the two countries.

There have been problems with the strategy of extended deterrence right from the beginning. For instance, if China attacks Tokyo, by the logic of extended deterrence, the US should attack Beijing. Increasingly, the question is whether the US will attack Beijing or not; whether Tokyo is worth the cost for the US. Basically, the US allies will have to feel confident that the US will provide deterrence against China. Irrespective of what the US says, if the allies are not confident of that, then that alliance will weaken. One of the Japanese concerns has been that a closer Sino-US partnership could possibly widen the “gap between Tokyo’s and Washington’s security perspectives” and could weaken the US security commitment. Any doubts over US security will strengthen the narrow voice within Japan to “accelerate Japan’s conventional build-up or even to develop nuclear deterrence.” Such sentiments are expressed in the backdrop of the gradually declining status of the US and given such uncertainties, Shintaro Ishihara stated the dependency on the US is “extremely risky for Japan.” It is also becoming evident that there is a significant section of the population, especially among the younger generation, that seeks a stronger Japan that is more assertive in international affairs and more particularly in Asian affairs.

Constant coddling China as Clinton did and now Obama is doing, it will worry the allies. Some of the recent decisions by the Obama Administration have not been reassuring to Japan. The decision by the Obama Administration to cut back on some of the defense programmes involving high technology weapon systems could be detrimental to Japanese security, as Obama is cutting down on missile defence and satellite programmes. The Airborne Laser program that is being axed remains an important component in intercepting ballistic missiles in the “boost” phase, shortly after launch. All these scenarios put Japan and its security at serious risk. The US’ decision regarding F-22 Raptor also appears to send wrong signals to Japan. Therefore, Japan might be forced to go pro-active and offensive in its postures, even if gradually.

Given the increasing divergence in their threat perceptions or the approach to tackling some of these threats, Tokyo has been contemplating measures independent of Washington. For instance, on the North Korean issue, the public debates on the possible Japanese response have been, by and large, to adopt hardline measures, more on the lines of preemptive strikes and nuclear deterrence. In 2003, Japanese defence minister had suggested that it should contemplate a “preemptive strike” on North Korea if Japan saw an evidence of North Korea planning an attack on it. In 1994, the Clinton Administration came close to carrying out preemptive strikes on North Korea. US plans in this regard in fact involved some Japanese security and intelligence officials as part of the debates; the plan was however rejected due to the spiralling consequences it could potentially have. According to some reports, citing official documents, the Japanese themselves were contemplating a five-stage war-like response to the 1994 crisis. Similar debates have taken place following the 1998 Taepodong-I missile tests too. The subject came up yet again in 2003 when then Defense Agency Director Shigeru Ishiba said, “If a country declares that ‘we will burn Tokyo into flames,’ and that country is about to fuel a ballistic missile, and they erect the missile on a missile launcher, then this action can be seen as the beginning of an attack against Japan.” Following such discussions, the LDP in 2004 proposed that the country debate about whether it should develop offensive military capabilities and if so, how it should be used. Some security analysts believe that developing offensive strike capability will be an effective measure in defending Japan against ballistic missile attacks on several accounts. Firstly, the SDF “can attack missile launch sites when a country intends to attack Japan and the missile is being prepared for launch.” Second, analysts argue that even when Japan is attacked first, “an offensive strike capability could prevent subsequent ballistic missile attacks against Japan.” Third argument revolves around using offensive capability as a deterrent against any missile attacks.

This debate gained a further momentum after the 2006 missile tests and the October nuclear tests by North Korea when some members within the government and the Liberal Democratic Party argued that Japan should “consider developing the capability to strike a foreign missile base if there is an imminent threat of an attack on Japan.” Debates in this regard focused on preemptive military strikes against North Korean missile facilities. Kyodo News reported Finance Minister Shoichi Nakagawa as saying that “We (Japan) should hold a proper debate about attacking launch bases and about shelters in case something does happen.” Japan, however, lack the wherewithal as of now in terms of long-range bombers or missiles. Japan would need to acquire a few systems in place, including a) ability to destroy air defense radars; b) low-flying aircraft so as to avoid radar detection; c) air-to-surface guided missiles or cruise missiles; and ability to collect intelligence on enemy sites.

It is possible that Japan has been compelled to consider options along these lines on two accounts. First, the worry that North Korea’s nuclear- and missile-related issues cannot be sorted out through international arms control agreements. There is a sense that international arms control arrangements are not effective in taking care of problems like Iran, North Korea. Such a line of thinking led the Bush Administration to go for a preemptive attack on Iraq. The validity of these actions is a separate debate. In a similar vein, Japan is sensing the increasing North Korean threat and is not certain about the effectiveness of international agreements to curb the North Korean threat.

Japanese own uncertainties too add to the complexities of this bilateral alliance. Issues relating to Okinawa base have been one, from the Japanese side. The issue assumed explosive proportions after the rape of a 12-year old girl by US service personnel in 1995 initiated a new round of negotiations by the Japanese on the possible closure of the Futenma base. Another issue that has complicated the alliance relates to the financial aspects of maintaining these bases. The issue has been gaining significance since the 1990s. In recent terms, with global economic meltdown, Japan is feeling the pinch and has cut down on the money that used to be rolled out earlier in terms of public works in Okinawa. Third, Japanese have remained concerned about the growing ties between Beijing and Washington and expressed concerns as to whether Japan would be dumped for China in the future. More recently, the Hatoyama Government’s electoral promises to forge closer ties with Asian countries, particularly with China as well as to take a fresh look at the US-Japan security agreement, specifically at the reorganisation of US troops in Japan, raises doubts in several countries, including India and the US.

Why is Hatoyama adopting a policy that is breaking away from the past? One has to keep in mind a few issues. First of all, geopolitics in Northeast Asia is becoming more complex today, with an important feature being the interplay between the US-led alliance structure and China’s reinvigorated multilateral engagement in East Asia. Beijing is of the view that its increasing interaction with the region will gradually reduce the US role and influence in East Asia and that the new regional framework that emerges out of China’s interactions will become a competitor to the US. Second, China argues that the ‘China threat’ theory will also diminish with increasing regional cooperation between China and the small- and medium-sized powers and thereby reduce their dependence on the US as a security guarantor. Lastly, China argues that increased multilateral interactions between the US and China in East Asia should gradually seek to establish a linking mechanism between the two multilateral approaches that would further erode US bilateral ties with several nations in East Asia. It remains unclear whether such interactions between the US and China, creating a diarchy, will be seen as beneficial by some of the other major Asian powers including India, Japan and Russia.

Similarly, Japan’s proposal for an East Asian Community seems to be sending mixed signals about its foreign policy orientations. Many view that Hatoyama is initiating a shift in Japan’s diplomatic focus to relations with its Asian neighbours. China, South Korea and the ASEAN have been forthcoming in their support for the group, although Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao expressed hesitancy due to the varied economic and social systems prevalent in Asia as well as the fact that they are different stages of development. As far as the membership is concerned, Japan suggested that it could include Japan, China, South Korea, Australia, ASEAN and India. If that be the case, the US factor might become a major hindrance. However, the more important concern is more in terms of the mutual distrust among the major Asian powers. Despite increasing economic interaction between these countries, trust deficit continues to be an issue, with these countries “on guard against each other” which could be a serious impediment in establishing a way towards a unified Asia.

What has been the US view and why does the US want to continue with the US military presence in Japan? US security analysts have continued to argue the significance of Okinawa base to the US, in terms of power projection into the Far East, due to the island’s close proximity to mainland Japan, China, Taiwan and the Korean Peninsula. The presence of about 65% of the 47,000 troops based in Japan ensure that vital trade routes are kept open as also serve a deterrent purpose vis a vis China and North Korea.

Conclusion
While China has clearly emerged as the most significant challenge in Asia, the difference in the treatment to the challenge by both Washington and Tokyo can be even a greater challenge in the decades to come. Washington under a Democratic administration has reverted to their traditionally pro-Chinese approach. This is even truer in the current Obama Administration that looks upon China to salvage it from the current economic crisis. Given the kind of symbiotic relationship between China and the US, it is possible that Washington will be less critical of Chinese military and the overwhelming power that grows from it and even on issues like non-transparency of the Chinese defence spending and the military modernisation. If Washington becomes insensitive to Japanese concerns about the rising China and the North Korean nuclear and missile issues, Tokyo may go independent in its security policies. At various crisis points, Japan has contemplated adopting hardline postures, including pre-emptive and nuclear options. However, these options have consequences that go beyond the borders. First of all, these strikes will be seen as a return to a “militaristic” Japan. Second, Japan’s development of such capabilities could spur North Korea into testing more advanced weapon systems, which will force Japan to carry out further measures. This will lead to a regional arms race. If Japan changes its current defensive stance, China will be compelled to increase the quantity and quality of its offensive weapons; thereafter India will follow the suit and then Pakistan and it could even impact the situation in Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Egypt. However, if Japan is to occupy the rightful place in the Asian balance of power, Tokyo has to move out of its security umbrella with the US and assume more power as well as responsibilities.

If the US’ relative decline gains further momentum with a systematic rise of other powers, this will also have serious security implications in Asia. As of now, the US maintains nuclear primacy, although this equation could change in the next decade or so. China, outside of any arms control arrangement (unlike US and Russia), could be improving their capabilities in the nuclear arena to mach the US. In such a scenario, what is more worrying for countries like Japan and South Korea is that US nuclear primacy could erode with projected reduction in US ICBM whereas there will be a significant increase in the Chinese capabilities. Similarly, there are concerns about a possible arms control agreement between Pyongyang and Washington. Such scenarios will drive both the countries towards more independent security options.

With increasing doubts on the credibility of the US alliance, Japan could possibly take steps to improve their conventional military capabilities and potentially even nuclear weapons in the not too distant future. The very fact that there is an open public debate about the nuclear option in Japan is possibly a prelude to the country going nuclear.

This is the first time in centuries that there is simultaneous rise of three major powers in Asia. While China is realistic to understand that rise of other major powers in Asia -- Japan and India -- cannot be halted, it does adopt approaches that are counterproductive to a cooperative framework in Asia. India and Japan, for instance, will continue to look for an inclusive approach as opposed to the Chinese’ exclusivist approach that appears directed against India, US and Japan. India may not be willing to see an Asia dominated by any one power. India will certainly like to see a more powerful Japan taking a larger security role in Asia and global affairs. Japan will need to play a greater role in the emerging balance of power. However, Obama’s recent talk of common security or collective security in Asia appears to be premature as Asia is not yet ripe for such a mechanism. Asia has several inherent problems including Japan’s past militarism, unsettled boundary and territorial issues, inherent distrust among the major powers, and uncertainties about China’s military modernisation and its purpose. Therefore, competition for influence between China and Japan, China and the US, China and Russia and China and India are going to be some of the unfortunate features of the new Asian century. US choice as either an engaged Asian power or a reclusive offshore balancer will be an indicator to its key security partners in Asia about the credibility of the US extended deterrence strategy as well as the future Asian security matrix.

Russia, China, Iran and North Korea challenge US interests, US National Intelligence Strategy

The US National Intelligence Strategy 2009 released on September 15, 2009, has identified Russia and China along with Iran, North Korea and non-state and sub-state actors posing major challenges to US interests at home and abroad. While analysing the prevailing and emerging strategic environment, the report also identified other challenges such as environment, emerging technologies, pandemics, failed states and ungoverned spaces and economic crisis.



Detailing on the challenges, the NIS 2009 said that adversaries are likely to use asymmetric means and technology to compete with and challenge the US interests. Talking about China, the report noted that while US and China cooperate on several issues, "its increasing natural resource-focused diplomacy and military modernisation
are among the factors making it a complex global challenge." Speaking on similar lines, Defence Secretary Robert Gates said that China's advanced weapon systems could possibly undermine US military power in the Asia-Pacific. Gates was speaking to the Air Force Association in Maryland noted, "In fact, when considering the military-modernization programs of countries like China, we should be concerned less with their potential ability to challenge the US symmetrically -- fighter to fighter or ship to ship -- and more with their ability to disrupt our freedom of movement and narrow our strategic options." Similarly, China's "investments in cyber and anti-satellite warfare, anti-air and anti-ship weaponry, and ballistic missiles could threaten America's primary way to project power and help allies in the Pacific -- in particular our forward air bases and carrier strike groups."

Similalrly on Russia, the report said that the two countries are cooperating a great deal on issues like securitng fissile material, nuclear terrorism and so on, but the fact that Russia "may continue to seek avenues for reasserting power and influence in ways that complicate US interests" is worrying to the US. The report considers Iran as a challenge essentially due to its nuclear- and missile-related activities, but also for its involvement in terrorism, providing lethal aid to US and other Coalition adversaries. On North Korea, the report noted that it continues "to threaten peace and security in East Asia because of its sustained pursuit of nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities, its transfer of these capabilities to third parties, its erratic behavior, and its large conventional military capability.

The report additionally identified six major mission objectives: Combat Violent Extremism; Counter WMD Proliferation; Provide Strategic Intelligence and Warning; Integrate Counterintelligence capabilities; Enhance Cybersecurity; and Support Current Operations (ongoing US diplomatic, military, and law enforcement operations). The report has also categorised seven "enterprise objectives" including, 1) Enhance Community Mission Management; 2) Strengthen Partnerships; 3) Streamline Business Processes; 4) Improve Information Integration & Sharing; 5) Advance S&T/R&D; 6) Develop the Workforce; and 7) Improve Acquisition.

China has reacted sharply to the NIS 2009, with the Foreign Ministry spokesperson Jiang Yu stating that "As a staunch force safeguarding and promoting world peace and stability, China will not pose a threat to any country in its development. We urge the US to abandon Cold War mentality and prejudices, correct mistakes in the report, and stop making remarks that mislead the US public and undermine mutual trust between China and the US."

DPJ Coming to Power: How Does It Impact on the US-Japan Security Alliance?

Here's an anlysis on the weekend electios in Japan and how if the opposition party, DPJ comes into power, will affect US-Japan security alliance. The analysis first appeared on the ORF website.

Yukio Hatoyama, leader of the DPJ, who could become Japan’s next Prime Minister, has stated that he will ban US nuclear weapons from Japanese soil if the DPJ is elected. The DPJ is also reported to be developing a stance that is “more independent of the United States.” However, it is unlikely that Japan will shift policies radically even under the DPJ; Tokyo rather wait and watch the unfolding US policies under Obama and respond accordingly. The US-Japan security alliance will continue to be the cornerstone of its foreign and security policy, whether it is an LDP or DPJ government in power.



With the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) set to come to power following the weekend elections, the issue of US nuclear weapons on Japanese soil is in the news. Yukio Hatoyama, leader of the DPJ, who could become Japan’s next Prime Minister, has stated that he will ban US nuclear weapons from Japanese soil if the DPJ is elected. However, it is unlikely that Japan will shift policies radically even under the DPJ; Tokyo rather wait and watch the unfolding US policies under Obama and respond accordingly. The US-Japan security alliance will continue to be the cornerstone of its foreign and security policy, whether it is an LDP or DPJ government in power.
Hatoyama’s comments relate to the controversial and “secret” pact between US and Japan to allow the US to bring nuclear weapons into Japan even unannounced and without prior bilateral consultations. In his remarks on a television programme, Hatoyama is reported to have said that he will follow up the issue “with firm determination” with the Obama Administration, in getting a guarantee from President Barack Obama on not deploying American nuclear weapons on Japanese territory. Some documents declassified in 1999 showed that both the countries had reached an agreement in 1959 that would allow US warships and aircrafts carrying nuclear weapons to make a stop-over in Japan as also pass through Japanese air space and/or territorial waters even without prior consultation with Tokyo. These documents were reclassified immediately after the Japanese request to cancel the declassification, as these documents dealt with issues that are sensitive to Japan. The original US-Japan security Treaty was concluded in 1951 but it was the revised treaty of 1960 that included provisions for prior consultations on the issue of US bringing in nuclear weapons into Japan. However, nuclear-armed US warships and aircrafts passing through Japan was exempted from these consultations. This secret deal is in clear violation of the “three principles” that Japan has put in place, of not producing, possessing or allowing nuclear weapons to be brought into Japan. While this is not legally binding, there is significant opposition to nuclear weapons among the public. This is despite the fact there is a new sense of nationalism developing particularly among the younger generation. Some Japanese security analysts are reportedly of the view that this new nationalism could affect Japan significantly in the sense that they may not feel the need to be relying on the US for their security and be beholden to US objectives and principles. They may even result in questioning the need to continue with a pacifist constitution imposed upon them by the US. If that be the case, it could lead to an independent foreign and security policy, including the nuclear option.
The DPJ is also reported to be developing a stance that is “more independent of the United States.” The opposition party in fact has vowed to question the US on several foreign and security policies issues, while seeking to improve ties with countries like North Korea and China, which have been Japan’s traditional adversaries. While improving relations with Beijing and Pyongyang may be in the interests of Japan, distancing from the US may prove to be difficult. Japan, having been under the US security umbrella for the last fifty years, has not developed adequate military capability. While there is skepticism in the minds of Japanese policy makers and leaders about the reliability of the US as a credible partner, they believe the US security cover still remains the best option. Moving away from that cover may not prove to be a viable option, as several Japanese policy analysts have pointed out. However, if US power is in serious decline and if it is not able to provide extended deterrence, it could lead to some regional powers taking security on their shoulders rather than relying on the US. Second, given the kind of highly interdependent relationship between China and the US, especially in the current scenario of global economic crisis, Japanese security analysts wonder whether the US would provide that kind of security to Japan if there is a catastrophic attack on Japan from North Korea or China. A related but similar concern in Japan stems from the fact that closer Sino-US partnership could possibly widen the “gap between Tokyo’s and Washington’s security perspectives” and could weaken the US security commitment.
The DPJ has also been in clear opposition to the Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP) policy of extending and widening the scope of Japanese military capability. In the post-Cold War era, particularly during the first War, Japan came under sharp criticism from the US that Tokyo was enjoying a free ride without taking any security roles or responsibilities. Following such critique, Japan began to assume larger politico-strategic and security roles by increasingly engaging power in ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), East Asia Summit (EAS) as well as sending its Self Defence Forces (SDFs) to distant theatres such as the Indian Ocean, Iraq, and the Gulf of Aden on anti-piracy missions. The LDP has continued to argue that these measures are necessary for strengthening the US-Japan security alliance. The DPJ, being in opposition, has continued to oppose these laws, including blocking one of the military missions. On the current agreement on extending refueling support to the US-led coalition forces in Afghanistan, the DPJ has maintained that instead of withdrawing the support immediately, it will continue till the end of the term (December 2009).
While the DPJ may argue for peace and cooperation with North Korea and China, the reality of missile strikes or nuclear threats and the lack of transparency of the Chinese military programme will hit them once they are in power. It is possible that once they are in positions of power, these realities will force them to become more realistic and pragmatic. The question of nuclear weapons and a more assertive and independent foreign and security policy approach too is likely to be corrected after assuming power. It should be noted that the DPJ has hardly been in power, except for a brief period of 11 months in the mid-1990s. Serious geopolitical developments in the region such as a possible Korean reunification, although a distant possibility, too will have serious consequences for Japan. If re-unification of the Koreas takes place, another question that will gain immediate prominence will be whether that it would be a nuclear Korea. In such a scenario, distancing from the US may not be a realistic option for Japan. Instead, one may witness a further strengthening of the US-Japan alliance, irrespective of the fact whether a DPJ or an LDP government in power. In the years ahead, as the US power is seen to be gradually waning, Japan may have to shoulder more of its security responsibilities.

________________________________________
1 Emma Chanlett-Avery and Mary Beth Nikitin, “Japan’s Nuclear Future: Policy Debate, Prospects, and US Interests,” CRS Report for Congress, February 19, 2009, available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34487.pdf.
2 Brad Glosserman, “Japan Peers into the Abyss,” PacNet Newsletter #20, March 20, 2008, cited in Emma Chanlett-Avery and Mary Beth Nikitin, “Japan’s Nuclear Future: Policy Debate, Prospects, and US Interests,” CRS Report for Congress, February 19, 2009, available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34487.pdf.

North Korean N-tests: Japan's Options and Implications

North Korea conducted its second round of nuclear tests on May 25, 2009. North Korea also fired three surface-to-air missiles into the sea, according to South Korea's defense minister, Lee Sang-hee, in an apparent effort to chase off U.S. spy planes monitoring the nuclear test site.

How does the region and more specifically Japan deal with a nuclear North Korean in its neighbourhood? While Japanese officials have acknowledged that a direct attack on Japan may not be on the anvil, the more serious worry will be Pyongyang’s ability and possible intention to proliferate these dangerous weapons to states or more so, non-state actors through black market, like they had sold and proliferated missile technology in the Middle East. Despite such acknowledgement, the threat of an attack cannot be ignored altogether.



While North Korea has been pursuing its nuclear weapons programme, in the last decade it has advanced to a great degree. In fact, Pyongyang believes that nuclear weapons and missiles along with their conventional capabilities are required as deterrents against possible South Korean, Japanese and American military aggression against North Korea. Soon after the May tests, the Korean Central News Agency announced that Pyongyang had “successfully conducted one more underground nuclear test as part of the measures to bolster up its nuclear deterrent for self-defence in every way as requested by its scientists and technicians. The test will contribute to defending the sovereignty of the country and the nation and socialism and ensuring peace and security on the Korean Peninsula and the region around it with the might of (the military first policy) Songun.” Japan has, time and again, contemplated pre-emptive strikes and nuclear deterrence as effective options. Will Japan purse such options in the wake of the second round of nuclear tests or will Japan be constrained by the US-Japan security alliance?

The recent nuclear tests, Pyongyang argues that, is in response to the international response, more particularly the UN statement criticizing the April 5 missile/rocket launch. Following these responses, North Korea (Foreign Ministry spokesman) had suggested that Pyongyang’s “additional self-defensive measures could also include a uranium enrichment programme to enhance its nuclear capabilities.” The implication of this is that they have sufficient fuel and other paraphernalia to carry out nuclear tests, once they decide on further tests (within a month too). Such capabilities are destabilizing on several accounts. The situation is slightly complex because the government mines its own uranium, builds laboratories using its own technical expertise and generates its own plutonium, making it hard to stop the process from the outside.

Prime Minister Taro Aso said that Japan "absolutely cannot tolerate" the nuclear test because North Korea is also beefing up its ballistic missile capability, which "could be a means of transportation for weapons of mass destruction." Chief Cabinet Secretary, Takeo Kawamura said, “The North Korean nuclear test, along with the nation, building up the capability of carrying devices of mass destruction by its long-range missiles, poses a serious threat to Japan’s peace and security as well as to the region.”
Following the recent nuclear tests, former Defence Chief General Nakatani said in a meeting of the LDP officials that Japan should consider developing the capability to conduct pre-emptive military strikes on North Korea. He elaborated saying “We must look at active missile defense such as attacking an enemy’s territory and bases.” One of the options he considers is to equip naval ships with cruise missiles. Earlier, following April 2009 missile tests, an LDP panel had articulated the need to change its policy (thereby the constitution) that would permit attacks on “hostile areas.” Japan also deployed naval and land-based ballistic missile defences fearing a repeat of the 2006 missile tests when parts of the missile fell on Japanese territory. Kyodo News reported Finance Minister Shoichi Nakagawa as saying that “We (Japan) should hold a proper debate about attacking launch bases and about shelters in case something does happen.”[1] Under the pacifist clause of its post-war constitution, Japan is nominally barred from taking aggressive action or acquiring aggressive weapons. Even before Monday’s test, the LDP officials were exploiting the previous missile test to argue that Japan should be able to take “preemptive action” and not “sit and wait for death”.
Following the tests, Japan dispatched three military aircraft from separate bases to monitor the possible presence of radioactive substances in the air, the Defense Ministry said. Japan's anxiety about the test is heightened by its vulnerability to attack from nearby North Korea, which has more than 200 mid-range Nodong missiles capable of striking most of the country. Several experts, including American and Japanese have concluded that North Korea has built or is attempting to build nuclear warheads small enough to fit atop those missiles.
The earlier public debates on the possible Japanese response have been again to adopt a hardline, more on the lines of preemptive strikes and nuclear deterrence. Since mid-1995, a section of the Japanese government has believed that Japan should have the capability to strike North Korean assets if Japan perceives an imminent attack. Following the 1998 Taepodong-1 missile tests in August 1998, the Japanese government, media and security analysts debated serious counter-measures, including development of missile defence programmes and “acquisition of military strike capabilities” on North Korean missile bases. The subject was debated again in 2003 when the Japanese defence minister suggested that it should contemplate a “preemptive strike” on North Korea if Japan saw an evidence of North Korea planning an attack on it. Following such discussions, the LDP in 2004 proposed that the country debate about whether it should develop offensive military capabilities and if so, how it should be used.[2] Some security analysts believe that developing offensive strike capability will be an effective measure in defending Japan against ballistic missile attacks on several accounts. Firstly, the SDF “can attack missile launch sites when a country intends to attack Japan and the missile is being prepared for launch.” Second, analysts argue that even when Japan is attacked first, “an offensive strike capability could prevent subsequent ballistic missile attacks against Japan.” Third argument revolves around using offensive capability as a deterrent against any missile attacks.[3] This debate gained a further momentum after the 2006 missile tests by North Korea when some members within the government and the Liberal Democratic Party argued that Japan should “consider developing the capability to strike a foreign missile base if there is an imminent threat of an attack on Japan.”[4] Debates in this regard focused on preemptive military strikes against North Korean missile facilities. The 2006 debates were triggered by the statement of Defence Agency Director General Fukushiro Nukaga. He said, “As a sovereign nation, it is natural to consider possessing the minimum capability (for a preemptive strike against a foreign missile base) within the confines of the Constitution in order to protect the citizens.”[5] Following Nukaga’s remarks, Foreign Minister Taro Aso and Chief Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe too expressed similar sentiments, with Aso saying that “Japan must consider the acquisition of a preemptive strike capability within constitutional constraints.”[6] In August 2006, the Subcommittee on Defence Policies in the Liberal Democratic Party’s National Defense Division was debating whether Japan should “acquire the capability to attack ‘a foreign enemy base’.”[7]
Japan, however, lack the wherewithal as of now in terms of long-range bombers or missiles. Japan would need to acquire a few systems in place, including a) ability to destroy air defense radars; b) low-flying aircraft so as to avoid radar detection; c) air-to-surface guided missiles or cruise missiles; and ability to collect intelligence on enemy sites.[8] Additionally, many experts believe that such pre-emptive strikes can be destabilising for the entire region. First of all, these strikes will be seen as a return to a “militaristic” Japan. Second, Japan’s development of such capabilities could spur North Korea in to testing more advanced weapon systems, which will force Japan to carry out further measures. This will lead to a regional arms race. If Japan changes its current defensive stance, China will be compelled to increase the quantity and quality of its offensive weapons; thereafter India will follow the suit and then Pakistan and it could even impact the situation in Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Egypt. However, what is probably feasible might be for Japan to improve its missile defence capabilities to an advanced level, whereby it can detect the launch at the boost phase itself, which might not be viewed as offensive capability by the international community. Despite these debates, such strike options are complicated in the Japanese case given the restrictive nature of Japanese constitution.

Similar has been the Japanese debates whether it should go nuclear or not. Most of the debates, however, are not connected with war-fighting scenarios as is in the case of China or due to an existential threat like in the case of Israel. The debate is placed within the “political and strategic entropy that would be associated with a collapse of the US extended deterrence commitment.”[1] In fact, some Japanese scholars believe that Japan should acquire nuclear weapons whenever situation warrants, because as they argue, “credibility of the US commitment to Japan would inevitably erode, China would develop a blue water naval presence in Japanese strategic sea lanes, and the international community would acquiesce to North Korea’s nuclear weapons and allow the NPT regime to collapse.”[2]
All the while, the opinion among prominent Japanese opinion-makers was a clear no, owing to two main reasons. First, it was believed that Japanese nuclear programme in response to China could evoke regional instability. Second issue was that a Japanese nuclear programme could possibly affect the US security ties and weaken the alliance.[3] Public allergy to nuclearisation remains strong, despite the fact that there is a new sense of nationalism developing particularly among the younger generation. A few security analysts have been of the view that this new nationalism could affect Japan significantly in the sense that they may not feel the need to be relying on the US for their security and be beholden to US objectives and principles.[4] They may even start questioning the need to continue with a pacifist constitution imposed upon them by the US. If that be the case, it could lead to an independent foreign and security policy, including the nuclear option. Serious geopolitical developments in the region such as a possible Korean reunification could have serious consequences for Japan. If re-unification of the Koreas takes place, one question that will gain immediate prominence will be whether that it would be a nuclear Korea.

Tokyo however remains frustrated about its options vis a vis Pyongyang. The 6-party talks haven’t worked; nor the unilateral sanctions against NK by Japan. Tokyo already maintains tough sanctions against North Korea—with a ban on all imports from North Korea, no transport links and a prohibition on exports of luxury items. The Nikkei English News reported that the government was considering a complete ban on exports to North Korea.

In conclusion, Japan maintains that the US nuclear umbrella and the security assurance with the US remain the best choice, without giving up the potential for a deterrent capability at a future date. This is also due to the fact that Japanese strategists continue to be concerned about possible US arms control agreements with China and North Korea that could leave Japan at a strategic loss, facing serious insecurities. Even when Japan maintains that the US security umbrella remains the best security cover, they would like to get a better ownership of security, be it nuclear or otherwise. This could be also due to the rising nationalism among the younger generation who may not like to be dictated by US directives.

Implications: However, if Japan and South Korea perceive that US’ extended deterrence strategy as not credible, these countries will be forced to take security on their shoulders. Japan, for instance has been compelled to consider hardline options on two accounts.[1] First, the worry that North Korea’s nuclear- and missile-related issues cannot be sorted out through international arms control agreements. There is a sense that international arms control arrangements are not effective in taking care of problems like Iran, North Korea. Such a line of thinking led the Bush Administration to go for a preemptive attack on Iraq. The validity of these actions is a separate debate. In a similar vein, Japan is sensing the increasing North Korean threat and is not certain about the effectiveness of international agreements to curb the North Korean threat.

Second, the Japanese apprehension about the US ability and intention to extend support through extended deterrence. There is an increasing perception that there is a gradual erosion of the US’ extended deterrence strategy.[2] If US power is seen to be declining and it is not able to provide extended deterrence, this could lead to some regional powers, including Japan, taking security on their shoulders rather than relying on the US. If regional powers start taking security onto their own shoulders, this may in turn mean that the US must selectively choose to decide regions that are vital to its strategic interests and thereby apply extended deterrence selectively. In this scenario, the question that needs to be asked is whether Japan is worth the cost to prioritise and maintain its bases and provide credible deterrence.[3]

Lastly, Where does Japan figure in that new configuration of priorities? If preponderance is also exercised through extended deterrence strategy and thereby forward deployment and basing policy, it becomes a costly proposal. Whether the US is willing to risk and take that additional cost any more is an issue.[4] Hence, some scholars have argued that a preponderance strategy if continued will be a drain on the US economy, thereby reducing its economic might and “weaken its geopolitical standing” in the new century.[5] Obama appears to be taking these measures a bit too seriously ignoring the fact that it is America’s “hard power” that is most influential in the Asia-Pacific and any discount on that front can cost the US’ standing in Asia as well as risk its allies in the region.[6] The recent decision by the Obama Administration to cut back on some of the defense programmes involving high technology weapon systems could be detrimental to Japanese security, as Obama is cutting down on missile defence and satellite programmes.[7] The Airborne Laser program that is being axed remains an important component in intercepting ballistic missiles in the “boost” phase, shortly after launch. All these scenarios put Japan and its security at serious risk.[8] The US’ decision regarding F-22 Raptor could also send wrong signals to Japan.[9] Therefore, Japan might be forced to go pro-active and offensive in its postures, even if gradually. The Bush Administration, despite its even ties with China, had maintained that its relations with Japan remain the backbone of its security in Northeast Asia.[10]

Lastly, a point about China in the US calculations in East Asia. Given the kind of highly interdependent relationship between China and the US, especially in the current scenario of global economic crisis, it is a serious dilemma in the minds of Japanese security analysts as to whether the US would provide that kind of security to Japan if there is a catastrophic attack on Japan from North Korea or China. A related but similar concern in Japan stems from the fact that a closer Sino-US partnership could possibly widen the “gap between Tokyo’s and Washington’s security perspectives” and could weaken the US security commitment.[11]

Similarly, there is a greater sense of apprehension on the minds of Japanese security officials on the US intention to punish North Korea for its nuclear- and missile related activities. This was clearly evident as early as in the 1994 crisis. Imposition of sanctions would have been considered provocative and as “declaration of war,” so the US was quick to enter into an agreement and brought Pyongyang back into the non-proliferation order on the condition that no force will be employed on North Korea.[12] The move was exemplary from the conflict resolution framework, although the US’ response was not necessarily in tune with its extended deterrence commitments to Japan.[13] This sense has been best captured by Green and Sakamoto in their analysis when they state that “while strategic conversion underlies a broader level of support for the alliance in both countries than ever before [at the end of the Cold War], there is increasing tactical disagreement about how to manage relations. This soron sansei/kakuron hantai (agreement in principle/disagreement on the specifics is emerging as the greatest challenge for alliance in the future.”[14]

Another issue complicating the US-Japan security alliance is Obama’s recent push towards global disarmament. Tokyo will be forced to choose between a secure nuclear umbrella or nuclear abolition in the face of serious threats from Pyongyang. Support for Washington giving up its nuclear arsenal is intricately tied to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. For now, Japan feels it still needs to be protected under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. And until it no longer considers North Korea's nuclear weapons a threat, it will be hard for Tokyo to support the global zero movement. Japanese security analysts believe that so long as the Japanese government needs the nuclear umbrella, ‘Zero’ or nuclear disarmament could remain just a dream.
[1] Some of these aspects have been dealt with in great details in Daniel A. Pinkston and Kazutaka Sakurai, “Japan Debates Preparing for Future Preemptive Strikes against North Korea,” The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, vol. XVIII, no. 4, Winter 2006, pp. 95-121, available at http://cns.miis.edu/north_korea/Pinkston_Sakurai_KIDA_Winter_2006.pdf.
[2] See, Christopher Layne, “From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America’s Future Grand Strategy,” International Security, vol. 22, no. 1, Summer 1997, p. 104. The concept has become even more problematic with the relative decline of the US power and its capability to protect the interests of the allies and the nature of new threats.
[3] Some of these thoughts have been articulated also by Michael J. Green and Katsuhisa Furukawa, “Japan: New Nuclear Realism,” in Muthiah Alagappa, The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia (Stanford University Press: Stanford, California, 2008) p. 354.
[4] As early as in 1997, Pentagon was contemplating reduction of US forces in Asia, due to cost considerations. See, Paul Richter, “US Pacific Troop Strength May Be Cut, Admiral Says,” Los Angeles Times, February 04, 1997, p. A14, cited in Christopher Layne, “From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America’s Future Grand Strategy,” International Security, vol. 22, no. 1, Summer 1997, p. 109.
[5] Christopher Layne, “From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America’s Future Grand Strategy,” International Security, vol. 22, no. 1, Summer 1997, pp. 95-96.
[6] Dan Blumethal, “The Erosion of US Power in Asia,” Far Eastern Economic Review, May 01, 2009, available at http://www.aei.org/article/100445.
[7] The Obama Administration is believed to be reducing the missile defense budget by $1.4 billion. See, Jim Kouri, “Obama Imitates Clinton with Major Defense Budget Cuts,” Pacific Freeze, April 13, 2009, available at http://pacificfreeze.ips-dc.org/2009/04/obama-imitates-clinton-with-major-defense-budget-cuts/.
[8] Dan Blumethal, “The Erosion of US Power in Asia,” Far Eastern Economic Review, May 01, 2009, available at http://www.aei.org/article/100445.
[9] Analysts in Washington note that exporting F-22 stealth fighters could potentially impede the “strategically important Sino-US relations.” Meanwhile, Japan is believed to be developing a Japanese stealth fighter, called Shinshin, meaning the heart of God. Japan has allocated about 8.5 billion yen in the next financial year for the purpose. Japan plans to spend a total of a total of 39.4 billion yen for the fighter programme until the fiscal year 2015. The US might be thinking of replacing F-22 Raptor with F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, but the issue remains that F-35 cannot be a replacement. Although both are of the current generation, the F-22 is clearly a superior fighter that ensures air superiority whereas F-35 is intended primarily as a ground attack aircraft. The other more important capability remains that F-22 is a “first strike” weapon if armed with nukes, and with a 1.5 Mach speed, it would have been an apt system for Japan. Given the short duration of a missile (once launched) from North Korea, F-22 would have been the perfect weapon system. See, Kosuke Takahashi, “Japan Frets over the US’s F-22s,” Asia Times, February 05, 2009, available at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/KB05Dh01.html; Dennis Sevakis, “Killing the F-22,” American Thinker, April 11, 2009, available at http://www.americanthinker.com/2009/04/killing_the_f22.html.
[10] Even with all the reductions, it might be wrong to conclude that the US’ commitment towards Japan might be reducing. In fact, the US military commitment has been evident through a range of steps that it has taken including, its joint development of missile defence system with Japan and possibly Taiwan; its deployment of F-22A Raptors in Japan and so on. Interestingly, the US decision with regard to a defence contract showed US determination regarding Asia-Pacific. Pentagon opting for a tanker aircraft (Northrop Grumman/ EADS) which “can fly the longer distances, and carrying more people and cargo, required for rapid, trans-Pacific Ocean deployments” made it amply clear the US priorities. This is believed to be in tune with the priorities set out in the QDR that stated a “strategic shift from Atlantic to Pacific oceans” while particularly looking at potential hot spots like North Korea, China/ Taiwan and even the Southeast Asian region ripe with Islamic terrorism and so on. See, “Tanker Award Shows Pacific Strategy,” AviationWeek.com, March 06, 2008, available at http://www.defensetech.org/archives/004046.html.
[11] Brad Glosserman, “Japan Peers into the Abyss,” PacNet Newsletter #20, March 20, 2008, cited in Emma Chanlett-Avery and Mary Beth Nikitin, “Japan’s Nuclear Future: Policy Debate, Prospects, and US Interests,” CRS Report for Congress, February 19, 2009, available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34487.pdf.
[12] Joel S. Wit, Daniel B. Poneman, Robert L. Gallucci, Going Critical: The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), pp. 55-56. Cited in “Chapter Four: The 1993-94 Nuclear Crisis,” PhD Thesis, Aberystwyth University, UK, pp. 103-04, available at http://cadair.aber.ac.uk/dspace/bitstream/2160/1552/5/10_Chapter%20Four.doc.
[13] This is another area where Japan feels that the US does not share its concerns vis a vis North Korea. US’ soft pedaling on the North Korean issue could also widen the gap between Tokyo and Washington in their strategic perspectives. This view is also expressed by some other security analysts. See, Brad Glosserman, “Nuclear Basics for the Alliance,” PacNet Newsletter, #21, April 19, 2007, cited in Emma Chanlett-Avery and Mary Beth Nikitin, “Japan’s Nuclear Future: Policy Debate, Prospects, and US Interests,” CRS Report for Congress, February 19, 2009, available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34487.pdf.
[14] Michael Jonathan Green and Kazuya Sakamoto, “The US-Japan Alliance after the Cold War,” in Yoichi Funabashi, Alliance Tomorrow: Security Arrangements after the Cold War (The Tokyo Foundation: Tokyo, 2001), p. 48. See also, Michael J. Green, “Asia in the Debate on American Grand Strategy,” Naval War College Review, Winter 2009, available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0JIW/is_1_62/ai_n31415250/?tag=content;col1.
[1] Michael J. Green and Katsuhisa Furukawa, “Japan: New Nuclear Realism,” in Muthiah Alagappa, The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia (Stanford University Press: Stanford, California, 2008) p. 348.
[2] In fact, Terumasa Nakanishi argues that with Japan going nuclear, it will improve Japan’s diplomatic position vis a vis China than weaken and isolate it. See, Terumasa Nakanishi, Nihonkoku Kakubushou heno Ketsudan (Japan’s Decision to be Armed with Nuclear Weapons), Shokun!, August 2003, pp. 14-58, cited in Michael J. Green and Katsuhisa Furukawa, “Japan: New Nuclear Realism,” in Muthiah Alagappa, The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia (Stanford University Press: Stanford, California, 2008) p. 357.
[3] Emma Chanlett-Avery and Mary Beth Nikitin, “Japan’s Nuclear Future: Policy Debate, Prospects, and US Interests,” CRS Report for Congress, February 19, 2009, available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34487.pdf.
[4] Emma Chanlett-Avery and Mary Beth Nikitin, “Japan’s Nuclear Future: Policy Debate, Prospects, and US Interests,” CRS Report for Congress, February 19, 2009, available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34487.pdf.
[1] Isabel Reynolds, “North Korea Rocket Revives Japan Pre-emptive Strike Talk,” Reuters UK, April 06, 2009, available at http://uk.reuters.com/articlePrint?articleId=UKTRE5351L120090406.
[2] Liberal Democratic Party Policy Research Council, “Proposal, Japan’s New Defense Policy – for a Secure, Peaceful Japan,” March 30, 2004, available at http://www.nakatanigen.com/teigen.htm, cited in Daniel A. Pinkston and Kazutaka Sakurai, “Japan Debates Preparing for Future Preemptive Strikes against North Korea,” The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, vol. XVIII, no. 4, Winter 2006, pp. 95-121, available at http://cns.miis.edu/north_korea/Pinkston_Sakurai_KIDA_Winter_2006.pdf.
[3] Daniel A. Pinkston and Kazutaka Sakurai, “Japan Debates Preparing for Future Preemptive Strikes against North Korea,” The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, vol. XVIII, no. 4, Winter 2006, pp. 95-121, available at http://cns.miis.edu/north_korea/Pinkston_Sakurai_KIDA_Winter_2006.pdf.
[4] “Our Very Own Preemptive Option,” Editorial, The Japan Times, July 18, 2006, available at http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/ed20060718a1.html. See also, “Anthony Faiola, “In Japan. Tough Talk About Preemptive Capability,” The Washington Post, July 11, 2006, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/10/AR2006071000106_pf.html.
[5] “Our Very Own Preemptive Option,” Editorial, The Japan Times, July 18, 2006, available at http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/ed20060718a1.html.
[6] “Reinvasion Plans Reach Severe Level,” Korean Central News Agency, July 26, 2006, available at http://www.kcna.co.jp. The English version of the editorial is a short summary without the citations of Japanese officials. The English version is available as “Japanese Authorities’ Theory of ‘Preemptive Attack’ on DPRK
Assailed,” Korean Central News Agency, July 26, 2006, available at http://www.kcna.co.jp. For English versions of remarks by Abe, Aso and Nukaga, see Kyodo News Agency, “Japan Needs Debate on Possessing Capability to Attack Foreign Bases–Official,” BBC Monitoring International reports, July 9, 2006, in Lexis-Nexis, available at http://www.lexis-nexis.com; Hiroko Nakata, “First Strike Permitted if Attack Imminent: Abe Hitting Missiles Seen as Self-defense,” Japan Times, July 11, 2006, in Lexis-Nexis, available at http://www.lexis-nexis.com; “Japan Has Right to Protect Itself from N. Korea Aggression–Foreign Minister,” AFX–Asia, July 9, 2006, in Lexis-Nexis, available at http://www.lexis-nexis.com, cited in Daniel A. Pinkston and Kazutaka Sakurai, “Japan Debates Preparing for Future Preemptive Strikes against North Korea,” The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, vol. XVIII, no. 4, Winter 2006, pp. 95-121, available at http://cns.miis.edu/north_korea/Pinkston_Sakurai_KIDA_Winter_2006.pdf.
[7] Japan Economic News Wire, “LDP Begins Debate on Possession of Capability to Attack Enemy Base,” Kyodo News Service, August 04, 2006, in Lexis-Nexis, available at http://www.lexis-nexis.com, cited in Daniel A. Pinkston and Kazutaka Sakurai, “Japan Debates Preparing for Future Preemptive Strikes against North Korea,” The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, vol. XVIII, no. 4, Winter 2006, pp. 95-121, available at http://cns.miis.edu/north_korea/Pinkston_Sakurai_KIDA_Winter_2006.pdf.
[8] Daniel A. Pinkston and Kazutaka Sakurai, “Japan Debates Preparing for Future Preemptive Strikes against North Korea,” The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, vol. XVIII, no. 4, Winter 2006, pp. 95-121, available at http://cns.miis.edu/north_korea/Pinkston_Sakurai_KIDA_Winter_2006.pdf.