China’s Second Aircraft Carrier: A Sign of PLA Naval Muscle? - The Diplomat, 26 December 2019

In my column for The Diplomat last week, I looked at China's commissioning of its second aircraft carrier and what it means for the overall PLA Navy.

On December 17, China commissioned into service its first home-built aircraft carrier, Shandong, at the Sanya naval base in Hainan, with President Xi Jinping presiding over the commissioning ceremony.

The commissioning of the aircraft carrier is significant. This is China’s second aircraft carrier, and an important addition to China’s power projection capabilities. It is also noteworthy because it displays China’s capability to develop aircraft carriers indigenously.

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Military analysts argue that the layout of the warships “limits her military potential” as also its power projection capabilities since it is simply a copy of its first carrier, Liaoning, which itself is a refurbished ship bought from Ukraine. The J-15s that it operates also imposes limitations on the kind of operations it can undertake. Nevertheless, PLA Navy is clearly on the way to becoming a more credible blue water navy and it warrants close attention from key Indo-Pacific nations including, India, the United States, Japan and Australia.

China’s Navy has traditionally remained weak on account of the excessive focus on China’s ground force. As such, it did not have an aircraft carrier and even lacked amphibious operations capabilities. But all this is changing. China has strengthened its ability to project sea power significantly in the last few years. The building of the naval base, Sanya, in Hainan was one such indicator. Sanya has the capacity to maintain a large fleet of surface warships, and as an underground base for submarines. The Sanya base gives China significant advantages because of its proximity to the South China Sea as well as the Malacca Straits.

China has given great importance to building its aircraft carriers. It sees the utility of a carrier both for achieving sea control and for sea denial goals. The PLA Navy acknowledges the importance of maintaining air superiority in future naval conflicts, for which large aircraft carrier are important. The best pilots are being selected for the air wing, and they are also expected to eventually command these ships.

The construction of the Shandong, displacing around 50,000 tons, and with a conventional propulsion system, appears to have begun in 2013. The carrier can reportedly “carry up to 24 Shenyang J-15 multirole fighter jets and a variant of the fourth-generation Sukhoi Su-33 twin-engines air superiority fighter, as well as around ten rotary wing aircraft including Changshe Z-18, Ka-31, or Harbin Z-9 helicopters.” Unlike the U.S. aircraft carriers that can carry up to 100 fighter jets, Shandong will be able to carry a total of only 32 aircrafts, as per senior PLAN officers.

China had procured its first aircraft carrier, Liaoning (originally the Varyag, and built for the Soviet navy) from Ukraine as scrap for $20 million, but it was eventually restored and entered service in 2012. A senior colonel and spokesman for the Ministry of National Defense, Geng Yansheng, said the carrier was to be “used for scientific research and training.” But the colonel also clearly outlined the necessity of an aircraft to protect China’s varied interests, giving some clue to future Chinese plans.

In November, on its ninth sea trial (since May 2018) to undertake equipment tests and personnel training, it sailed through the Taiwan Straits. Both of China’s aircraft carriers have a ramp to launch J-15 fighter aircraft, which is seen as the primary combat jet for the Chinese carrier battle group.

The exact composition of a Chinese carrier battle group is unknown, but some have suggested that a future Chinese Carrier Strike Group (CSG) could include Jiangkai-II-class (Type 054A) frigates, Luyang-III-class (Type 052D) destroyers, Renhai-class Type 055 destroyers, and a couple of Yuan-class (Type 039A) or Song-class (Type 039) submarines along with additional support vessels. There are also reports that both of China’s carriers could operate together, along with others (two Type 055 guided-missile destroyers; four Type 054 frigates; six guided-missile frigates, as well as one supply ship and three Type 093B nuclear submarines), to prevent u.s. or Japanese military assistance to Taiwan in case of a war.

The PLAN’s operational tempo is also increasing. A PLA naval formation led by its first carrier, Liaoning entered the Miyako Strait for the second time in June this year; the first such passage was in December 2016. Japan had then sent its surveillance vessels although an article by Xiakedao, the official WeChat account operated by the overseas edition of People’s Daily, called the Japanese action an overreaction and unnecessary, adding that “China’s aircraft carriers will routinely pass the Miyako Strait.” In addition to a possible Taiwan Straits scenario, experts foresee the use of the aircraft carriers “to stop US long-range bombers from taking off from a naval base in Guam.”

While the induction of China’s second aircraft carrier is a significant development, there are still issues that China will need to resolve in terms of training and operational experience in operating an aircraft carrier. There will also be issues of jointness to be sorted out with other combat units such as the amphibious troops, rocket forces and other service legs.

A more significant issue would be its ability to take on other traditional naval powers such as the United States and Japan. China’s two carrier battle group together would have only 30 J-15 fighter jets to take on U.S. forces in the area. And unlike the American aircraft carriers that use catapults, Shandong’s ski-jump configuration adds additional burdens, including how fast aircraft could be launched. China plans to address this issue in the next two aircraft carriers that it will build in the coming years. The U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency in a January 2019 report on China’s military power had noted other limitations of the ski-jump configuration including its ability to “operate large, specialized support aircraft, such as an AEW [airborne early warning] aircraft.”

There are other weaknesses as well that China needs to address before it can take on more capable navies in the Indo-Pacific. But the fact remains that China’s progress so far has been impressive, and that point ought not to be lost even as we remain cognizant of Beijing’s limitations.

Vietnam Confronts China, Alone - The Diplomat, 26 September 2019

In this week's column for the Diplomat, Vietnam Confronts China, Alone, I looked at the slow boiling stand-off in the South China Sea that has not received sufficient attention.

Vietnam and China are engaged in a slow boiling stand-off in the South China Sea that has not received sufficient attention. China has reportedly sent one survey vessel and at least four Chinese maritime vessels; Vietnam has responded by deploying its Coast Guard vessels.

According to Vietnamese news reports citing its Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the stand-off is taking place in Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone and continental shelf in the south of the East Sea (as Vietnam calls it) since July this year. The exclusive economic zones have been drawn in accordance with the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which both Vietnam and China are party to. Vietnam is finding itself in a tough spot, without very much support beyond words, as it faces a determined China.

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The most recent troubles began in mid-July, when the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lê Thị Thu Hằng claimed that the “Chinese geological survey vessel group Haiyang Dizhi 8 recently violated Việt Nam’s exclusive economic zone and continental shelf in the south of the East Sea.” Vietnam asserts that it has repeatedly reached out to China “to protest the violations.”

In addition, Vietnam has asked all the major powers to make efforts at bringing peace and order back in the region by saying “maintaining order, peace and security in the East Sea is a common interest of countries both inside and outside the region. Việt Nam wants concerned countries and the international community to protect and maintain this joint interest.” Toward the end of July, the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry spokesperson reaffirmed its stand asking that “China immediately withdraw all of its vessels from Việt Nam’s waters and… respect Việt Nam’s sovereign right and jurisdiction, for the sake of the relations between the two countries and for regional stability and peace.” Vietnam asserts that it has repeatedly reached out to China through several different channels.

Taking the issue to the ASEAN in late-July, the Vietnamese Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Pham Bình Minh “expressed his grave concern over the recent developments in the East Sea, with Chinese geological survey vessel group Haiyang Dizhi 8’s activities violating Việt Nam’s exclusive economic zone and continental shelf in the waters.” He added that such activities “seriously threaten legitimate rights of coastal countries, erode trust, and worsen tensions, thus hurting peace and stability in the region.”

Noteworthy too is that this time around, China has followed a different deployment pattern. The author has learnt from Vietnamese analysts that unlike in the past, when Chinese vessels stayed for a couple of months in the same area, this time China deployed its survey ships for a few weeks before withdrawing, only to come back again into the same Vietnamese exclusive economic zone areas later. In the beginning of August, the Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson announced that “the Haiyang Di Zhi 08 (Marine Geology 8) survey vessel has halted its geological mission and left Việt Nam’s Exclusive Economic Zone and southeastern continental shelf.” A few days later, however, the Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson stated that “the Chinese vessel group and a number of escort ships came back to Việt Nam’s territorial waters.” Vietnam once again appealed to the international community to respond to the situation in order to maintain regional peace and stability. Meanwhile, China has also reportedly begun fresh military exercises near Hoàng Sa (Paracel) Islands.

Despite the continuing protests by Vietnam, the stand-off has continued, and is now in its third month. A few days ago, Nguyễn Mạnh Đông, head of the maritime affairs department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ National Border Committee, in a detailed interview to the Vietnam News Agency, maintained that “Disputes are inevitable in interpretation and application of the [UNCLOS] Convention, but all countries have the obligation to settle these disputes in a peaceful manner via measures stipulated in Article 33 of the UN Charter and Article 279 of UNCLOS.”

China has become much more aggressive in the region in the last couple of years. A month before the current stand-off with Vietnam began, a Chinese ship sank a Philippines fishing boat in Bai Co Rong (Recto Bank). Earlier in May 2019, a China Coast Guard vessel, Haijing 35111, reportedly prevented Malaysia’s oil rig operation near Luconia Shoals off the coast of the Sarawak State. In another move to assert its claims, China organized the seventh Sinan Cup Regatta in Duy Mộng island, part of the Hoàng Sa archipelago.

Meanwhile, Vietnam has reached out to India, the United States, Russia, Australia and other Indo-Pacific countries. But the regional and global reactions to these developments have been muted. Malaysia in its new foreign policy document has said, “the South China Sea should be a sea of cooperation, connectivity and community-building and not confrontation or conflict. This is in line with the spirit of Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN). Malaysia will actively promote this vision in Asean.” Further, a joint statement issued on August 27 between Vietnam and Malaysia “emphasized the importance of self-restraint, non-militarization and observance of international legal obligations in good faith, respect for sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction of the coastal states, and rule of law in accordance with the 1982 UNCLOS and avoidance of activities that may escalate tensions.”

Extraregional powers have also made similar statements but not much beyond. Testifying in front of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, David Stilwell, Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs said, “through repeated illegal actions and militarization of disputed features, Beijing has and continues to take action to prevent ASEAN members from accessing over $2.5 trillion in recoverable energy reserves.”

Other powers have stopped with reiterations of the importance of freedom of navigation, such as the India-France joint statement during Prime Minister Modi’s recent visit to France. The recently-held conference on Indian Ocean in the Maldives on September 3-4, where the prime minister of Sri Lanka and foreign ministers of Singapore, Maldives were present, also stressed the freedom of navigation but again there was no mention of South China Sea.

Japan has been slightly firmer, with the foreign minister saying that “South China Sea is an important sea lines of communications for Japan and many other countries. It is directly related to the stability and the peace of the region, and the international community, including Japan, pay serious attention to the situation in South China Sea. Japan opposes to any actions by anybody to increase the tension in South China Sea.” Similarly, India has emphasized that it “has an abiding interest in the peace and stability in the region. India firmly stands for the freedom of navigation and over-flight, and unimpeded lawful commerce, in the international waters, in accordance with international laws, notably UNCLOS.”

It appears unlikely that Vietnam will be able to get any stronger support from its partners in the region and outside. It is also unlikely that Vietnam will be able to resist China on its own. Beijing appears to have correctly calculated that it does not have to fear any serious, united opposition.

From Sea to Space: India and France Deepen Security Cooperation

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I focused on the visit of the French President, examining two facets that gained particular traction in India-France security relations. The essay titled, "From Sea to Space: India and France Deepen Security Cooperation," examined why and how outer space and maritime security had come to feature prominently during the French president’s India visit this week.

French President Emmanuel Macron was on a four-day visit to India earlier this week, with both sides trying to elevate the India-France strategic relationship. The bilateral partnership covers an entire gamut of issues from defense, civil nuclear, and space to climate change, clean energy, and urbanization, and India and France signed 14 agreements. But what was of particular importance on the defense side were those on outer space and maritime security in the Indian Ocean.

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On outer space, the two countries identified nine specific areas in the India-France Joint Vision for Space Cooperation of which a few including high resolution earth observation, space domain and situational awareness, satellite navigation, space transportation, and human exploration, stand out. Space Situational Awareness (SSA) and high resolution earth observation are especially relevant in the context of the growing concerns around maritime security and the Indian Ocean.

The two countries have shared concerns on a number of issues, including, as they framed it, “maritime traffic security, especially in the Horn of Africa; respect of international law by all States, in particular freedom of navigation and overflight; fight against organized crime, trafficking, including in weapons of mass destruction, smuggling and illegal fishing.”

Recognizing the need to develop a joint action plan, the two sides signed a Joint Strategic Vision for Cooperation in the Indian Ocean Region. A practical joint action in the area of maritime surveillance around Indian Ocean waters would at the very least call for a clearer understanding of the maritime environment that they are operating in and this has pushed both India and France to increase sharing of information on the emerging maritime scenario in the Indian Ocean.

The MoU signed between the two space agencies foresees them joining hands to design and develop “products and techniques, including those involving Automatic Identification System, to monitor and protect assets in land and sea.” This, the two sides believe, will significantly boost maritime domain awareness in the region. Given the growing reliance and vulnerabilities that exist in the outer space domain, the two space agencies also agreed to develop a cooperative agenda that will protect their space assets, by also developing infrastructure that is necessary to create a broader engagement on SSA.

Underlying all these practical steps is the shared strategic vision, particularly driven by the strategic uncertainties around China’s rise and its growing assertiveness. The two share a common strategic objective of “establish[ing] an open, inclusive and transparent cooperation architecture, with the aim of delivering to all associated with the region, peace, security and prosperity.”

Modi, during his meeting with Macron said that both sides believed in the importance of the Indian Ocean for the global community, while Macron in his own remarks acknowledged the importance of the Indian Ocean for the stability of the entire region. Most significantly, India and France agreed to reciprocal access to each other’s naval facilities to military facilities. France has facilities in the island of La Réunion, Mayotte, and the French Southern and Atlantic Lands. Indian access to French military facilities will help India spread its reach and influence, especially in western Indian Ocean.

This is similar to the understanding that India had earlier reached with the United States with the signing of LEMOA. That agreement occasioned a lot of criticism in India, with commentators suggesting that India was bargaining away its precious “strategic autonomy.” Indeed, that agreement was delayed for years precisely because of the fear of such criticism.

But the agreement with France has largely received a positive reception in the Indian media. The difference between the treatment of these two agreements indicates a clear evidence of the continuing opposition among sections of the Indian elite to any closer ties with Washington. Indeed, precisely for this reason, France may be a good supplement to India’s strategic partnerships. It should also be remembered that France has generally been supportive of critical issues of concern to India, including India’s nuclear weapons program (before it acquired its current level of legitimacy).

On the other hand, the limitations of the partnership should also be kept in mind. If France has not received as much importance in New Delhi as some others such as the United States, despite France’s well-acknowledged sympathy for India’s strategic concerns, the reason has been mostly due to France’s relatively limited capacity. The current bonhomie overlooks this old and unchanged limitation: though France can help India, its own remaining weakness will likely not allow Paris to become a major source of strategic support to New Delhi. But in these troubled times, one more supporter is surely welcome.