Tiger Triumph: US-India Military Relations Get More Complex - The Diplomat, 15 November 2019

In my column for The Diplomat last week, I wrote on how the maiden joint tri-services humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) exercise between the Indian and the US militaries will further deepen the ties between the two countries in general and the two militaries in particular.

The Indian and U.S. militaries are engaged in their maiden joint tri-services humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) exercise, which they are calling “Tiger Triumph,” in Visakhapatnam and Kakinada in the southern Indian state of Andhra Pradesh. This represents an improvement over the type of joint military exercises that the two countries have held to date, and is an indication that defense relations between the two sides are steadily deepening.

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The U.S. and Indian militaries have been engaged in a number of different military exercises since the early 1990s, including Yudh Abhyas and Vajra Prahar (army), Malabar and RIMPAC (multilateral, navy) and Red Flag (air force). This followed the big boost to U.S.-India defense relations with the Kicklighter proposals in 1991, which included service-to-service exchanges between India and the United States.

The first India-U.S. military exercise codenamed “Teak Iroquois” took place between the two armies in February 1992; the first naval exercise named Malabar-I in May 1992. In addition to generating interoperability, these exercises have been great familiarization opportunities for the two militaries to understand each other’s strategic and security perspectives. With each iteration, these exercises have grown in terms of the number of personnel and platforms involved, and the exercises themselves have become much more complex and useful.

This week, we saw another indication of the increasing complexity of U.S.-India exercises with the holding of Tiger Triumph, the maiden tri-service HADR exercise. The exercises, which started on November 13, should last a week. It is taking place on the India’s eastern seaboard with the participation of all three Indian services along with the U.S. Navy and Marines.

Indian naval ships Jalashwa, Airavat, and Sandhayak; Indian Army troops from 19 Madras and 7 Guards; and Indian Air Force MI-17 helicopters and Rapid Action Medical Team (IAF-RAMT) are participating in it from the Indian side. The United States has sent the USS Germantown and troops from the U.S. 3rd Marine Division. The U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific, is leading the efforts on the U.S. side. There are a total of 1,200 Indian and 500 U.S. men and women from different services participating in the first-ever U.S.-India tri-service exercise.

The exercise, focused on HADR aspects, is meant to be an annual event from now on, bolstering the already-strong military-to-military collaboration between India and the United States.

The exercise is aimed at building and nurturing better and more effective interoperability between the services of the two militaries. It is because the two militaries have held specific service-led military exercises for more than a decade that the Indian and the U.S. militaries were able to respond to the 2005 Indian Ocean tsunami in a prompt and coordinated fashion. Interoperability is the mantra, especially for a region that is characterized by a high number of natural disasters on a fairly periodic basis to which multiple countries respond.

According to an Indian government press release, the exercise will begin with a Harbor Phase at Vishakapatnam, which will be followed by a Sea Phase conducted in Kakinanda, where “the landing of Relief Forces would be undertaken to the Exercise scenario.” A Joint Command and Control Centre will be established by the Indian Army and U.S. Marines. The HADR area will also have a medical facility camp, established by the IAF-RAMT and the U.S. Navy Medical team, that will cater to the “victims” who would have been shifted to the facility by air and road. The exercise, with a goal of helping capacity-building for both the militaries, will simulate a full scenario involving field training and moving humanitarian assistance and disaster relief from ship to shore. The exercise will end with a closing ceremony on board the U.S. naval vessel Germantown on November 21.

Beyond Tiger Triumph itself, the trend of increasing complexity of U.S.-India exercises is rooted in broader strategic dynamics. These exercises are the result of the growing convergence between American and Indian strategic interests with the changing strategic dynamics in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. In this context, there is a recognition on both sides that more capable powers such as India and the United States have to join forces to prevent the possibility of a hegemonic Asia.

This has manifested itself in how both sides have been talking about each other within their broader strategic approaches. There have been repeated assertions from the United States on the importance of India in their Indo-Pacific strategy, and this is asserted in the U.S. National Security Strategy document as well as the U.S. Department of Defense’s 2019 Indo-Pacific Strategy Report. India does not bring out formal, official strategy papers, but statements by senior government officials and the upgrading of the Quad talks to ministerial level are a demonstration of similar sentiments on the Indian side too. And the idea of a free, open, and inclusive Indo-Pacific was reiterated by Prime Minister Narendra Modi at the Shangri La Dialogue in 2018.

Engagements such as Tiger Triumph are also a demonstration of the fact that despite the occasional irritants in the relationship, U.S.-India ties are still deepening amid these wider strategic dynamics.

India Must Look Beyond ASEAN in Regional Security - The Diplomat, 8 November 2019

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I wrote on India's diplomatic outreach to ASEAN and the possible limits to that engagement. I argue that in recognition of ASEAN’s limitations, New Delhi must also continue to strengthen its ties with other institutions, frameworks, and countries as well.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi was in Thailand recently for three major summits – the India-ASEAN Summit, the East Asia Summit, and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) Summit. His visit was focused on a number of issues such as trade and connectivity, as well as security partnerships.

India’s diplomatic establishment was keen to highlight this aspect of India’s engagement of ASEAN. The Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), in a special press briefing on Modi’s visit, said “The ASEAN-related summits are an integral part of our diplomatic calendar,” highlighting the fact that this was Modi’s ASEAN-India summit and sixth East Asia Summit.”

With India’s renewed focus on Southeast Asia with the Act East Policy, this should not surprise anyone. But while India sees a central role for the ASEAN in its Indo-Pacific strategy, it also needs to be cognizant of the fact that ASEAN has its own limitations.

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India has been keen on warming up its ties to Southeast Asia since the end of the Cold War. It initially adopted what was called the “Look East” policy which emphasized trade and economic linkages, but over the last decade this relationship has evolved into one that is at least equally concerned with security and strategic considerations. The policy was rebranded as “Act East” under the Modi government, to emphasize greater activism and commitment on India’s part. In January 2018, India hosted the 25th anniversary of the India-ASEAN friendship and the 15th year of the India-ASEAN summit, in which all the ten ASEAN leaders participated.

Clearly, this new approach is dictated by India’s concern about China. But if that is so, it is not clear how far ASEAN will or can go in balancing China. ASEAN’s tepid reaction to the ‘Indo-Pacific’ concept is reflective of the ASEAN’s wariness in annoying China. Earlier in the year, ASEAN did release its “Outlook on the Indo-Pacific” document, which was appreciated by New Delhi, which saw this as converging with its own Act East policy. But managing China would require a more coherent strategy and ASEAN has not been able to present a unified front when it comes to China. This division within ASEAN will likely only get deeper as Beijing becomes more muscular.

Thus far, in the face of China’s extensive economic linkages with the region, ASEAN has found it harder to take strong positions against China. While it has been particularly hard for smaller countries like Cambodia and Laos, even bigger players such as Malaysia have said they cannot afford to confront China. Most recently, the Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad said that “Malaysia does not want to take a confrontational stance toward China over the disputed South China Sea and Beijing’s alleged mistreatment of its minority Uighur Muslims.”

In the face of a divided ASEAN, India needs to strengthen its engagement with the region through other but associated platforms such as the East Asia Summit which includes key Indo-Pacific powers such as Australia, Japan and the United States. Many analysts believe that despite East Asia Summit being a key leaders forum, it has never gained the kind of traction that APEC or the G-20 has. However, they argue that it has the potential to become a major platform because of the “broad remit” it enjoys and the “inclusive” nature of the institution.

Other initiatives proposed by India also bear careful watching. At this year’s East Asia Summit, Modi proposed a new initiative called the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative, which is a reiteration of India’s commitment towards a free, open and inclusive Indo-Pacific region based on a rules-based order. The new initiative enlarges the focus on the strategic maritime space in the Indo-Pacific and is also a clear indicator of India’s willingness to address China’s maritime aggressiveness in an emphatic manner. The proposal was reportedly welcomed by ASEAN’s outgoing chair, Thailand, as well as Australia. Vijay Thakur Singh, Secretary of the MEA, detailed Modi’s new initiative as “creating partnerships among interested States in several pillars ranging from enhancing maritime security to preserving and sustainably using marine resources, building capacity, disaster prevention and management as well as working together in trade and maritime transport.”

On the sidelines of these summits, there was also a consultative meeting of the Quad countries where the Quad members reiterated “their commitment towards a free, open, prosperous and inclusive Indo-Pacific Region based on shared values and principles and respect for international law” while reflecting on “ongoing and additional practical cooperation in the areas of connectivity and infrastructure development, and security matters, including counterterrorism, cyber and maritime security, with a view to promoting peace, security, stability, prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region.” This came in the backdrop of a status report on the Indo-Pacific strategy from the U.S. State Department which also highlighted a “critical role” for India in the Indo-Pacific.

New Delhi is likely to continue to engage in large regional meetings and summits, but is probably also likely to step up engagement at bilateral and trilateral levels as well as the Quad and other minilaterals. A thicket of overlapping partnerships with like-minded partners is a better bet than following just single-track partnership with ASEAN alone. In order to develop concrete ideas on the Indo-Pacific Oceans initiative, India’s efforts cannot be limited to a normative exercise alone. Strategic partnerships with other key (and financially more capable) Indo-Pacific powers such as Japan has also become crucial.

What Does ASEAN’s Evolving Approach to the South China Sea Issue Mean for Vietnam? - The Diplomat, 1 November 2019

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I write on the ASEAN Summit and what does it mean for Vietnam in terms of the South China Sea issue. Though the regional grouping continues to have difficulties on the issue, it nonetheless remains important to Hanoi’s calculations.

While a range of issues will be in discussion during this weekend’s summit of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the South China Sea will be among them. And for Vietnam in particular, how ASEAN manages the issue will be important for its own calculations and options in dealing with the South China Sea.

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ASEAN’s ability to speak in one common voice on important issues such as sovereignty and territorial issues has been under scrutiny in recent years, with the organization working on the basis of consensus and having to accommodate views of countries like Cambodia. The South China Sea issue is no exception to this. While Chinese behavior in the South China Sea has been concerning, there are worries that ASEAN will eventually settle for a code of conduct that will avoid maritime incidents. There are broader realities too: the economic dependency on China for many of the Southeast Asian countries is a reality that these countries cannot afford to ignore.

But the situation in the South China Sea will not wait for these realities to play out. Indeed, the South China Sea has been witnessing increasing tensions in the last year. Vietnam, Malaysia and the Philippines have all been pushing back against China, albeit to varying degrees and through different pathways. In June this year, a Filipino fishing boat was sunk by a Chinese ship in Bai Co Rong (Recto Bank). Earlier, Malaysia’s oil rig operation near Luconia Shoals off the coast of the Sarawak State was stopped by a Chinese Coast Guard vessel.

But Vietnam has been particularly affected by Chinese activities in the South China Sea, and Hanoi’s pushback has correspondingly been the strongest among the ASEAN claimant states. Since July this year, China has sent one survey vessel and at least four Chinese maritime vessels into Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone and continental shelf in the south of the East Sea (as Vietnam calls it). Vietnam responded with its own deployment of its Coast Guard vessels. Vietnam has called for greater support for its position but the response from all the big powers in the region and beyond has been fairly low-key. In a further assertion of its claims, China reportedly organized the seventh Sinan Cup Regatta in Duy Mong island, part of the Paracel (Hoang Sa) archipelago.

Vietnam has appeared to be pursuing multiple tracks to address the issues confronting its sovereignty. In the absence of concrete support to Vietnam from within the region and beyond, Vietnam is pursuing diplomatic tracks along with tough posturing. Last week, the Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc told the National Assembly (NA) that “What happened in the East Sea recently was getting very complicated, including serious violations in Vietnam’s sea recognized by international law… We will keep fighting in means in line with international law.” The Vietnamese Foreign Ministry also reiterated last week “that the Vanguard Bank lies completely within Vietnam’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and continental shelf, as delineated from the Vietnamese shore in accordance with the United Conventions on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS) 1982, and that the Vanguard Bank is not a disputed area or with overlapping claims.”

Vietnam has also tried the regional route to address its concerns. In late July, Vietnamese Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Pham Binh Minh took China’s latest survey vessel deployment issue to ASEAN, saying that the “Chinese geological survey vessel group Haiyang Dizhi 8’s activities [are] violating Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone and continental shelf in the waters…” and “seriously threaten legitimate rights of coastal countries, erode trust, and worsen tensions, thus hurting peace and stability in the region.” The response, however, was one of general reiteration of the need “to uphold and comply with international laws, including the UNCLOS 1982, the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the East Sea (DOC), toward perfecting an effective COC.”

Given their big focus on trade and investment, it is unlikely that the ASEAN will call out Chinese behavior that directly. And China will have no objections as long as the statements are neutral, calling on all parties to “building trust as well as ensuring peace, stability, safety and freedom of navigation and aviation in the waters.”

But for Vietnam, despite these limitations, the position ASEAN takes on issues like the South China Sea is nonetheless critical. Diplomacy continues to be among the paths Vietnam adopts to manage the South China Sea issue. And with Vietnam taking up the chairmanship of ASEAN next year, Hanoi itself will have to endeavor to find a balance between the economic and strategic interests of the ASEAN and its own disputes with China, alongside other challenges including doubts about the extent and shape of U.S. engagement under U.S. President Donald Trump.