India-Vietnam Virtual Summit Strengthens Partnership - The Diplomat, 28 December 2020

In my latest column for The Diplomat, I looked at the recently-concluded India-Vietnam virtual summit meeting and how the strategic necessity of dealing with an aggressive China brings India and Vietnam closer together.  

Earlier last week, India and Vietnam held a virtual summit between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his Vietnamese counterpart Nguyen Xuan Phuc. India and Vietnam have held a number of meetings and consultations this year leading up to the summit.

For the full post, click here.  

Modi, during his remarks at the summit, lauded Vietnam’s important role in India’s Act East Policy and as an “important partner of our Indo-Pacific Vision.” He highlighted the “long-term and strategic view” of the India-Vietnam relationship and the breadth and depth of their bilateral ties. He also underlined the importance of their shared purpose of “peace, stability and prosperity” for the Indo-Pacific region.

The two leaders also signed a joint vision document, “India-Vietnam Joint Vision for Peace, Prosperity and People.” The document is meant to drive the future of the India-Vietnam Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, based on their “deep-rooted historical and cultural bonds, shared values and interests, and mutual strategic trust and understanding between the two countries.” The two countries also signed a “Plan of Action for period 2021-2023 for further implementation of Comprehensive Strategic Partnership” in order to strengthen their bilateral partnership with a clear agenda for the next two years, as well as seven other agreements that cover a number of important areas of cooperation including defense, nuclear safety and radiation protection, petro-chemicals, clean energy, and U.N. peacekeeping.

The fact that India and Vietnam have been at the receiving end of the China’s aggressive behavior in the South China Sea and on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) has made the partnership even stronger. Given China’s aggressive behavior in South China Sea, which has remained a significant challenge for Vietnam, the joint vision document devoted attention to it. The very first paragraph of their “joint vision” highlighted a “shared commitment to international law” and agreement to “work towards achieving a peaceful, stable, secure, free, open, inclusive and rules-based region.”

With this strategic factor in mind, the focus on defense cooperation was inevitable. The joint statement laid emphasis on the implementation of the high speed guard boat (HSGB) manufacturing project with the Vietnam Border Guard Command. The project is being implemented through a $100 million defense line of credit already extended by India to Vietnam. The project, according to the Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) would involve also “handing over of one completed HSGB to Vietnam; launch of two HSGBs manufactured in India; and keel-laying of seven HSGBs to be manufactured in Vietnam.”

The joint vision document from the summit also recognized the importance of enhanced bilateral defense partnership in the context of the changing geopolitical and geoeconomic environment in the region and beyond. The document highlighted how a strengthened defense and security collaboration between India and Vietnam could be “an important factor of stability in the Indo-Pacific region.” To this end, the two sides agreed to augment military-to-military exchanges, training, and capacity building engagements between the two militaries including the coast guard. India and Vietnam also agreed to step up defense industry partnerships, taking advantage of the Indian credit lines already extended to Vietnam. More importantly, the two countries also decided to formalize their partnership by further institutionalizing defense exchanges through a number of programs including mutual logistics support, regular ship visits, joint exercises, and exchanges in military science and technology. The document also identified the decision to work through institutionalized dialogue structures in dealing with traditional and non-traditional security threats in some of the technology domains such as outer space and cyber space as well as a range of threats such as health security, natural disasters, terrorism, and transnational crimes through strengthened legal cooperation.  

This iteration comes against the backdrop of Indian Defense Minister Rajnath Singh’s bilateral meeting with his Vietnamese counterpart General Ngo Xuan Lich in November, which emphasized defense collaboration as “a key pillar of Comprehensive Strategic Partnership” between the two countries. In addition to defense industry collaboration, the two sides concluded an “Implementing Arrangement for cooperation in the field of Hydrography between National Hydrographic Office, India and Vietnam Hydrographic Office” at the earlier virtual defense ministers meeting. The sharing of hydrographic data will help in developing navigational charts by both countries. The two countries also agreed to produce an institutionalized framework agreement for industry collaboration soon. India also agreed to step up the scope and level of training extended to Vietnam military personnel in the Indian defense training institutions.

Vietnam has remained interested in the acquisition of a range of weapons and platforms from India, including the Akash air defense system and the Brahmos supersonic cruise missiles. These two systems have been on the India-Vietnam defense trade agenda for a long time but have not materialized yet. The possible sale of Brahmos systems to Vietnam was initially problematic from a Russian perspective, but those issues have reportedly been resolved.

While there has been historically strong strategic affinity between India and Vietnam, these bonds have become stronger, driven by the strategic necessity of dealing with an aggressive China that has been questioning the sovereignty and territorial integrity of both countries.

India-Iran-Uzbekistan Pursue Central Asian Connectivity - The Diplomat, 18 December 2020

In my column for The Diplomat this week, I looked at India-Iran-Uzbekistan plans for Central Asian connectivity.  The region has its fair share of great power politics, but the Iranian port of Chabahar has the potential to shift some of the regional dynamics in India's favor.   

India, Iran, and Uzbekistan have held their first trilateral meeting for possible joint use of Chabahar port. The meeting was chaired jointly by India’s Secretary of Shipping Sanjeev Ranjan, Uzbekistan’s Deputy Minister of Transport Davron Dehkanov, and Iran’s Deputy Transport Minister Shahram Adamnejad. Using Chabahar port for trade and transit purposes as well as strengthened regional connectivity were the key agenda items at the meeting. India’s keenness to explore this option comes from its desire to extend connectivity into Eurasia. Double landlocked Uzbekistan has also been interested in using the port for transit facilities into the Indian Ocean and as a means to expand its trade and transit options. That Uzbekistan has already developed rail connectivity into Afghanistan as a means to link with Iranian railway lines reflects Tashkent’s seriousness. Other Central Asian states like Kazakhstan have also been interested in exploring such options.  

For the full post, click here.  

Given the geostrategic location of Central Asia, the region is also witnessing a fair share of great power competition. While the region is viewed as Russia’s immediate backyard and Moscow has traditionally maintained a dominant role in relations with Central Asia, China has steadily strengthened its footprint. India has also been pursuing both geopolitical and economic ties with the region. 

Chabahar has the potential to shift some of the regional dynamics in India’s favor. First, it could prove to be a gateway to Central Asia and Eurasia, which can, most importantly, avoid Pakistan. A year ago, the Trump administration exempted India from sanctions for the development of the port because of the benefits it potentially had for both India and Afghanistan. A Trump administration official said, “We have provided a narrow exemption for the development of Chabahar that allows for the construction of the port and rail line that allows for the export of refined oil products to Afghanistan.” 

This week’s trilateral meeting is reported to be an outcome of last week’s India-Uzbekistan bilateral summit between India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyoyev. This is clearly an effort at exploring an alternate option for Central Asia to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). India has long historic connections to Central Asia, but its relations with the region waned for a number of reasons, most importantly the partition of the Indian subcontinent and the creation of Pakistan, which blocked Indian access to the region. Since coming to office, Modi has made fresh efforts to re-establish linkages with the region, calling Central Asia a part of the country’s extended neighborhood. 

But lack of physical connectivity has proven to be a major hurdle in building trade and economic ties. Modi became the first Indian leader to travel to all five Central Asian republics – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan – in 2015. In addition to energy security cooperation, India and Central Asia have both shunned Islamic terrorism and extremist ideology. Fighting cross-border terrorism has become an important common issue shaping their agenda. India has also been stepping up defense cooperation with the region, with a defense attaché posted in each of the Indian missions in Central Asia. Among the Central Asian republics, Uzbekistan has emerged as one of the more proactive players in its engagement with India. The two countries signed a civil nuclear agreement in January 2019, under which Uzbekistan agreed to supply India with uranium.  

Regional connectivity and infrastructure projects have also been high on Uzbekistan’s agenda. Seeing Chabahar port as a connectivity solution for Uzbekistan is not new either. In fact, in June 2018, following an earlier meeting between Modi and Mirziyoyev on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit, then-Indian Foreign Secretary Vijay Gokhale said the two leaders were keen to use Chabahar port as an additional connectivity route.  

Not surprisingly, at last week’s bilateral summit meeting between India and Uzbekistan, infrastructure and connectivity projects figured prominently. The two countries signed nine agreements including on counterterrorism and infrastructure-related issues. Both Modi and Mirziyoyev agreed to pursue connectivity projects via the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC). INSTC is a multi-modal infrastructure initiative spanning around 7,200 km. It encompasses a network of ship, rail and road routes for transporting freight between India, Iran, Afghanistan, Central Asia, Azerbaijan, and Europe, with the goal of creating transport linkages among major cities including Astrakhan, Baku, Bandar Abbas, Moscow, and Mumbai. Feasibility studies undertaken so far has shown significant reduction of transportation costs, to the tune of $2,500 per 15 tons of cargo. India is “pitching for” Uzbek participation in the INSTC connectivity project.  

India’s push with the trilateral arrangement for Uzbekistan to use Chabahar port is important in the context of expanding bilateral, trilateral, as well as broader regional cooperation. But more significantly, it is a geopolitical move aimed at countering growing Chinese influence in the region. India has capacity issues in this regard compared to China, but New Delhi is planning on cashing in on existing projects to expand its reach and linkages so that the Central Asian republics have an alternative to China’s BRI.  

Assessing the British Proposal on Space Security - The Diplomat, 10 December 2020

In my column for The Diplomat last week, I looked at the recent UK proposal on space security governance.  That the UK proposal emphasizes a bottom-up approach and stresses trust-building are important.  It is a critical first step.  

Space security issues have potentially serious consequences. The consequences of either a deliberate or even an accidental conflict in space are too horrible to contemplate. A day without the utility provided by outer space is difficult to even conceive and yet the actions of states might lead the world in that direction sooner than later. Unless states take measures to restrain some kinds of activities in space, access to space will not be safe, secure, or guaranteed. 

For the full post, click here.  

Because of the highly competitive and contested nature of major power relations today, even peaceful applications and technological developments such as On-Orbit Satellite Servicing or technologies to tackle space debris are viewed with much suspicion. There are also more specific space security threats – the return of anti-satellite (ASAT) testing, and cyber and electronic warfare in space, for example. Any satellite service disruption or damage will have a wide-ranging impact, one that cannot be contained to the security or economic sectors alone, and one that cannot be limited geographically either given the significant global dependence on space. Space is truly a global commons. 

All of this suggests we need new rules of the road. There have been recent efforts including the Russia-China sponsored draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects (PPWT), originally proposed in 2008 (with a revised text introduced in 2014); the 2010 EU-initiated International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities (ICoC), the U.N. Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on transparency and confidence building measures (TCBMs) in 2013, and the 2018-19 GGE on further practical measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS). None of these have led to a favorable conclusion.  

The biggest challenge facing the development of an outer space regime is a lack of consensus among major powers. These are essentially political impediments and therefore that much harder to overcome than practical issues. Major power relations are characterized by a serious lack of trust and confidence in each other. And therefore, what we need in the first instance are measures that would strengthen confidence.  

The United Kingdom has also made a recent proposal — “Reducing Space Threats through Norms, Rules and Principles of Responsible Behaviors” — aimed at looking at problems in space through a bottom-up approach. The proposal, in one of its operational clauses:

encourages Member States to study existing and potential threats and security risks to space systems, including those arising from actions, activities or systems in outer space or on Earth, characterize actions and activities that could be considered responsible, irresponsible or threatening and their potential impact on international security, and share their ideas on the further development and implementation of norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviors and on the reduction of the risks of misunderstanding and miscalculations with respect to outer space.

It further calls on the U.N. secretary general to get views from member states in a substantive report to be submitted to the General Assembly at the 76th session scheduled for September 2021 for additional discussion. The plan is to include this in the provisional agenda of the General Assembly’s session, under the item, “Prevention of an arms race in outer space,” with a sub-item entitled, “Reducing space threats through norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviors.” 

One of the key features of the U.K. proposal is to focus on a behavior-based approach, since debates focused on an object-based approach have not gone very far. The U.K. proposal is not prescriptive in suggesting a particular type of outcome or a particular format. Thus, this proposal provides room for greater flexibility and certain amount of maneuvering among member states as they debate the threats and challenges and possible ways forward. 

Even though there is no particular preference for a specific format as an outcome, it is important to look at this as a process that would lay stress on trust-building as a key driver. Given the high level of disagreements among major space powers, this is a sensible approach. In this regard, transparency and confidence building measures (TCBMs) offer a good first step between recognizing the functional need of regulating space and the negotiation of a binding instrument. There has been any number of debates on the need for and effectiveness of binding and non-binding instruments, but these discussions have not led to any meaningful outcome. TCBMs are certainly not a substitute for legal measures but they can be effective tools in bringing about openness, transparency, and information sharing, which are badly required to raise the level of political confidence between key great powers. TCBMs are essentially a bridge that can provide opportunities for countries to talk to each other and work on building greater trust in each other. This is a recognition that political issues have become the biggest hindrance in developing new rules of the road for outer space activities. 

A few measures that could be considered in this regard include pre-launch notifications (already contained in the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation) and ASAT test guidelines and rules for intentional orbital breakups. Others include the UNIDIR proposal (no debris, low debris, and notification) and pledges like “Not the First to Act beyond the scope of Article 51” because many developing countries worry that the right to self-defense under U.N. Charter Article 51 may be used as an excuse for space weaponization. 

While an end goal of developing more binding agreements for space security must be pursued, reaching a political consensus to commit to legal instruments appears to be difficult in today’s political and security environment. Revising or reforming the 1967 Outer Space Treaty is problematic precisely due to the current political impediments. Therefore, states need to first invest a great deal in developing mutual trust. The U.K. proposal provides an alternative to the PPWT or the EU ICoC, both of which have run into their own problems. The bottom-up approach emphasized in the U.K. proposal, letting member states to identify threats and challenges from their national security perspectives, is a welcome step.

Countering Chinese assertiveness: India’s changing posture in the Indian Ocean - Indo-Pacific Analysis Brief, Perth USAsia Centre, 4 December 2020

In my third Analysis Brief as an Indo-Pacific Fellow at the Perth USAsia Centre, I looked at India's changing Indian Ocean strategy in order to address China's growing footprint in the region.  

Note: The paper contains endnotes, which I have not been able to incorporate here.  So, please check out the main page of the article, the link for which is given here.  

Major Takeaways are: 

→ The Indian Ocean region is becoming increasingly contested as Chinese presence expands. In recognising the threat posed by China, India has shifted its perceptions and priorities in the region. 

→ A large concern is the security of sea lines of communication in the Indian Ocean, which many Asian countries use as a trade corridor. 

→ China has demonstrated an objective to become a key player in the region with increased presence and activities, including in India’s Economic Exclusion Zone. 

→ India has become more active in protecting its interests in the region by calling for cooperation with external powers and enhancing its capabilities in the Indian Ocean to overcome capacity constraints. 

→ Cooperation between like-minded powers in the region is challenging due to divergences in individual perspectives, approaches and outlooks. Closer coordination is needed between these powers to build greater synergy. 

The Indian Ocean is once again at the centre of major geopolitical competition. China’s growing footprint and influence in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) has made the contest for power and control in the region between China and the US and its partners significant. The Indian Ocean sea lines of communication (SLOCs) are important for many Asian countries because it is both an energy and trade corridor, making these countries sensitive to any vulnerabilities. Now, undersea cables add to these vulnerabilities.1 

India has long been wary of power-plays in the Indian Ocean but finds itself with few options today but to participate in securing a free and open Indo-Pacific. 

In the process, India appears to be willing to reconsider some of its old concerns about external actors in the Indian Ocean. On the other hand, there are also some questions about the terms of engagement between India and its partners about the focus of their common efforts. Resolving these could lead to greater synergy and easier cooperation. 

For the full brief, click here.  

Growing Chinese presence is cause for concern

India’s stakes in the IOR are obvious, despite India’s lack of attention to the maritime front. From a security perspective, since independence, India has not faced any significant maritime threat. Much of the Indian maritime security focus was in terms of the relatively minor naval threat from Pakistan and non-traditional threats including piracy and terrorism. While these concerns remain, they have been overtaken by worries about China as an emerging IOR power, with a growing footprint in the region. 

Darshana Baruah argues that China’s growing Indian Ocean presence is not just about contesting India’s strategic role in the IOR, but it is part of a determined agenda to “emerge as a key player in the IOR” which feeds into “China’s larger objective of becoming a global maritime power2 .” The PLA Navy’s growing strength means that it is shaping up to be a formidable force to reckon with. This is complemented by China’s growing maritime ties with countries in the IOR and increasing naval presence in the region. 

India has multiple concerns about China in the Indian Ocean. One, already alive, is Chinese activities in India’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Speaking earlier this year, Indian Navy Chief Admiral Karambir Singh said that both Chinese research vessels and fishing boats have been seen in Indian Ocean, including in the Indian EEZ. 

This is a long brief but I concluded the Brief with the following thoughts.  

Australia’s participation at the 2020 Malabar naval exercises is a clear recognition of India’s changing attitude towards foreign navies in the Indian Ocean. It is a step towards fulfilling Modi’s call for cooperation with like-minded strategic partners, fuelled by India’s changing posture towards China. 

It is also an indication of the increasing synergistic approach among the major Indo-Pacific powers – Australia, India, Japan and the United States. The expanded Malabar exercises demonstrate the common strategic endeavour among the four to develop cogent responses to the many security challenges in the Indo-Pacific including China. The naval exercises could go a long way in creating greater confidence and interoperability among the four navies, which will be key in ensuring a stable, secure and prosperous Indo-Pacific. 

But cooperation with such partners will also require some common terms of understanding, most basically of the relationship between the ‘Indian’ and ‘Pacific’ components of the IndoPacific. Even though the concept of Indo-Pacific has gained greater traction over the last couple of years, there have been differences in the understanding of what constitutes the Indo-Pacific. 

The geographical limits of the Indo-Pacific in particular has been a topic of considerable debate. India, Japan and France have similar perceptions that the term ‘Indo-Pacific’ covers the area from the eastern shores of Africa to the west coast of America. Others, especially the US, appear more focused on the Pacific component. The Pacific powers, including Japan, the US, Australia, and New Zealand, appear to be more focused on countering China’s power in the Pacific and South China Sea, whereas Indian worries have been around China’s expansion into the Indian Ocean. There clearly needs to be better coordination between these two sets of concerns. Only when there is better coordination between these two sets of focus areas would it be possible to consider burden-sharing between the partners. 

Hopefully, a clearer enunciation of India’s Indian Ocean strategy will also translate into efforts for coordination between India and its partners in dealing with maritime challenges, especially those posed by China. 

There is a precedent for cooperation, though, at a smaller scale: India has worked with others to cooperate in anti-piracy operations. These, of course, included China also. Cooperating to deal with the security challenge posed by China in the Indo-Pacific will be at an entirely different scale and seriousness. This would require a sustained dialogue involving the different partners to evolve some sort of division of labour and burden sharing in order to effectively monitor China’s naval activities in all theatres of the Indo-Pacific. This could lead to arrangements in which India bears a greater burden in the Indian Ocean, while others bear a similar burden in the eastern waters. Other minilaterals in the Indo-Pacific are exploring such options of burden sharing in order to address capacity gaps – the India-France-Australia trilateral is a case in point. 

There is little doubt that China’s growing naval capacity affects all Indo-Pacific powers. New Delhi appears to recognise the difficulties involved and thus appears more keen to cooperate with other maritime powers in maintaining security in the Indian Ocean region. This is a good first step to greater Indo-Pacific cooperation, but further coordination is clearly needed.

Why the India-Sri Lanka-Maldives NSA-level Talks Matter - The Diplomat, 4 December 2020

In my first column for The Diplomat in December, I looked at the increasing strategic relevance of the India-Sri Lanka-Maldives NSA-level talks.  I argue that the nature of bilateral political relations in the Indian Ocean region has an impact on the quality of subregional engagements such as the NSA-level talks held in Colombo.  

Last week, Colombo hosted an India-Sri Lanka-Maldives trilateral maritime security dialogue. The meeting saw the revival of the national security advisor (NSA)-level dialogue among the three countries, which began almost a decade ago in 2011. That the meeting took place six years after the last edition in 2014 is significant. Both Sri Lanka and the Maldives are rcritical maritime neighbors to India in the Indian Ocean region and there have been continuous efforts by both India and China to win friends and favors in Colombo and Male.

For the full post, click here.  

The NSA-level talks are also a demonstration of the Indian intent to push subregional diplomacy, which has been gaining traction in India’s foreign policy in the last few years. The Modi government has made efforts to engage in subregional diplomacy as a useful track following the near-complete halt in regional diplomacy in South Asia under the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). 

For the Colombo trilateral, the Indian side was represented by National Security Advisor Ajit Doval whereas the Maldives sent its defense minister, Mariya Didi, and Sri Lanka was represented by Defense Secretary Maj. Gen. (retd) Kamal Gunaratne. Mauritius and the Seychelles were also present virtually at the level of senior officials. With the goal of encouraging meaningful maritime cooperation in the Indian Ocean region, India, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives discussed a number of areas for possible collaboration such as maritime domain awareness (MDA), humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR), joint military exercises, capacity building, maritime security threats, marine pollution, and maritime underwater heritage. The Heads of Delegations decided that they would meet periodically to maintain the momentum of the dialogue and to ensure timely execution of the decisions taken at the NSA-level meetings. According to the joint statement, a decision was also made to institute deputy NSA-level working group meetings biannually for cooperation at the operational level.  

So far, there have been several iterations of the trilateral meetings at the NSA-level. The first, hosted by the Maldives, was held in Male in 2011, following which Sri Lanka hosted the second edition. The third was held in New Delhi in 2014, which was attended also by Mauritius and the Seychelles as “guest countries.”   

Following the first trilateral meeting, the India-Maldives “DOSTI” joint coast guard exercise in 2012 added Sri Lanka and was held as a trilateral exercise. The India-Maldives DOSTI exercises have been going on since 1991 and are aimed at strengthening capabilities of the three partners in the area of search and rescue operations, combating piracy and armed robbery, damage control, and casualty evacuation at sea. India and Sri Lanka also have held bilateral naval exercises called SLINEX since 2005. The latest iteration, the eighth, was held off Trincomalee in Sri Lanka in October 2020. India’s official statement on the exercise noted that the synergistic approach developed by the two navies for “seamless coordination” was in evidence when the two navies came together in September 2020 to assist MT New Diamond, a Very Large Crude Carrier (VLCC), that caught fire off the East Coast of Sri Lanka. 

While broader maritime security, anti-piracy, and HADR are important components of the growing India-Sri Lanka-Maldives strategic narrative, the real worry for India is growing Chinese activism in the Indian Ocean region. China’s efforts at cultivating the Indian Ocean littoral states have been a concern for New Delhi. In response, New Delhi has pursued many paths to build rapport with these neighbors, including bilateral, trilateral, and minilateral conversations in the region.  

While India is a resident Indian Ocean power and has its own advantages, there are capacity gaps in India’s ability to play a sustained or dominant role. Meanwhile, China has the economic and military wherewithal to expand its military presence in the Indian Ocean and has been developing serious inroads into the region through bases and other strategic networks. It is these that India is most concerned about and to which it is responding.  

While India is stepping up its efforts in naval modernization, these are capital intensive and time-consuming projects. The small budget allocations for the Indian Navy are not helpful either. Therefore, India has also entered into a series of partnerships with like-minded countries in the Indo-Pacific, such as Australia, Japan, and the United States, to offset the growing Chinese influence as well as to enhance India’s own capabilities. The logistic agreements that India has signed with a number of countries — including the United States, Australia, France, South Korea, Singapore, and Japan — in recent years are a demonstration of the Indian intent to enhance the geographical reach of the Indian Navy, and also to strengthen the combined capability mix that is available to deal with China’s aggressive maneuvers in the Indian Ocean region. It is also an important tool for messaging both to its friends and foes.  

Meanwhile, even as India pursues a neighborhood first approach, it has also acknowledged the limitations of regional groupings such as the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), which came to a grinding halt a few years ago. Modi had reached out to the SAARC nations when he came to office in 2014 but the bonhomie did not last long. Therefore, India has energized other regional groupings such as BIMSTEC and subregional arrangements such as the BBIN and India-Sri Lanka-Maldives trilateral. While the subregional initiatives have primarily focused on connectivity and similar issues, India is also exploring the possibility of engaging in subregional security cooperation.  

But subregional initiatives are not free from the state of bilateral relations with these countries. As K. Yhome explained in a recent essay, the nature and framework of bilateral political relations will have an impact on these subregional initiatives. The case of the NSA-level trilateral maritime dialogue between India, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives is a case in point. The talks were stalled from 2014 primarily because of India’s poor relations with Maldives under then-President Abdulla Yameen. India, as a big state, has to be mindful of the needs and aspirations of its much smaller neighbors and has to be able to adapt to meet their requirements. 

SITMEX: India-Singapore-Thailand Complete Second Trilateral Maritime Exercises - The Diplomat, 27 November 2020

In my column for The Diplomat last month, I looked at the India-Singapore-Thailand Trilateral Maritime Exercises that were just concluded.  I argue that China’s growing economic might and its aggressive military posturing have provided India, Singapore and Thailand strategic rationale to combine their efforts.  

India, Singapore and Thailand recently concluded their trilateral naval exercise SITMEX-20. This is the second edition of SITMEX. Hosted by the Republic of Singapore Navy from November 21-22, the exercise was held in the Andaman Sea. This represents a growing number of naval engagements that India has been holding with various navies, including those in Southeast Asia. But it also indicates the growing willingness of regional navies to look to India as a maritime partner, as well as the increasing comfort level in coming together at the regional level rather than look to just the U.S. in dealing with a rising China. That these exercises were held in spite the challenges imposed by COVID-19 pandemic suggests the importance attached by the three navies to these exercises and also the seriousness of the threats they mutually face.

For the full post, click here.  

This particular trilateral exercise is relatively new. The first edition was held in the Andaman Sea only last year, in September 2019. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi had announced the trilateral exercise at his keynote address at the 2018 Shangri La Dialogue in Singapore.  At the inaugural edition of the exercise, the Indian Navy was represented by the guided missile destroyer INS Ranvir, missile corvette INS Kora, Offshore Patrol Vessel Sumedha and P8I long-range maritime reconnaissance aircraft.  

Indian Ministry of Defense said that the second edition of the exercise was being conducted “as a ‘non-contact, at sea only’ exercise in view of COVID-19 pandemic,” emphasizing this as being indicative of the “growing synergy, coordination and cooperation in the maritime domain between the three friendly navies and maritime neighbors.”  The statement added that the three navies would engage in a series of “exercises including naval maneuvers, surface warfare exercises and weapon firings.”  The stated goals of these exercises were to strengthen “mutual interoperability” and to understand and assimilate “best practices” between the three navies.  

The Indian Navy ships participating in the exercise include the indigenously-built ASW (anti-submarine warfare) corvette Kamorta and missile corvette Karmuk. Singapore sent its Formidable-class frigates, Intrepid and the Endeavour, an Endurance-class LST (landing ship tank).  Thailand was represented by a Chao Phraya-class frigate, the Kraburi.  

Explaining the importance of the exercise, the commander of SITMEX 20 Task Force and commanding Officer of RSS Intrepid, Lieutenant Colonel Oh Zongbo said that the SITMEX “serves as a useful exercise for the three like-minded navies to enhance our inter-operability in maritime operations. The ability to execute and conduct these operations together is a testament to the long-standing ties and trust that we have established with one another.”  After the SITMEX concluded, the Singapore Navy joined the Indian Navy for a bilateral naval exercise, SIMBEX 20, in the Bay of Bengal from November 25 to 27.   

The military exercises with Singapore and Thailand also demonstrate the increasingly strategic nature of engagements that India has developed with the countries in Southeast Asia. From a “Look East” policy in the early 1990s (which itself was not very successful) that focused on economic issues to an “Act East” policy initiated by Modi in 2014, bilateral relations in the region as well as the regional context have been transformative. Even though these exercises have been shortened on account of the pandemic, the fact that the navies of the three countries decided to go ahead with the exercise is a clear reflection of the similarity of views between India, Singapore and Thailand.  This could mean that the three navies may continue to strengthen these exercises in terms of scope of the maneuvers, expansion of the geographical areas of their exercise, and greater sophistication in terms of their overall objectives of SITMEX. 

Singapore, of course, has been one of India’s stronger security partners in the region. Defense relations between the two began with the signing of their first Defense Cooperation Agreement in 2003. Since then, the two have signed several more agreements for greater military-to-military interactions. Given that Singapore is a small island nation, India has been a good partner, offering training to the Singapore Armed Forces at its military training facilities like the air force and artillery firing ranges. Their main naval interaction, SIMBEX, has continued now for more than 20 years. The importance of freedom of navigation and open seas, in line with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as well as respect for international law, have been often-repeated themes in their bilateral discussions.  

India-Thailand bilateral relations are not as deep, but they have also picked up pace over the last decade with a number of high-level political visits and institutional mechanisms. These include periodic Foreign Office Consultations, India-Thailand Joint Commission Meetings (which are held at the foreign ministers level) and defense cooperation mechanisms that have seen military exercises between the armies and the air force of the two countries.  In addition to the annual army and air force exercises, the two countries also hold bi-annual coordinated maritime patrolling by the two navies. Given the slowly brewing tension between Thailand and China, it is likely that Thailand will reach out to countries such as India to hedge against possible longer-term trouble in relations with Beijing. Such moves are also backed by growing popular opposition to Chinese high-handedness across the region. The Milk Tea Alliance, which grew from online squabbles between Chinese and Thai netizens represents “deep-seated reservations about the relationship among Thai people.” The so-called Milk Tea Alliance also quickly expanded, with support pouring in from other countries such as Taiwan, the Philippines, and Hong Kong.  

China’s growing economic might and its aggressive military power have provided India, Singapore and Thailand strategic rationale to combine their efforts. Increasing concerns about American commitment to the region have spurred such efforts and they will likely continue.  

Contradictions Grow Amid Another BRICS Summit - The Diplomat, 19 November 2020

In an earlier column for The Diplomat in November, I wrote on the 2020 BRICS Summit and the contradictions therein.  I argued that the group has always been diverse in terms of economic, political, and security interests.  The question, therefore, is it anything more than an ineffective talkshop?  

BRICS, the Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa grouping, met virtually on November 17 for its 12th summit meeting. Prior to the meeting, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) released a statement saying that the meeting would discuss intra-BRICS cooperation around counterterrorism, energy, trade, health, and ways to mitigate the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. Each of the five leaders stressed various aspects of cooperation in the face of the pandemic and the resultant economic slowdown. 

For the full post, click here.  

Chinese President Xi Jinping talked about “global epidemiological security” and said that “the BRICS countries firmly believe in the primacy of international law” and considered the World Health Organization to be the leading institution in addressing the pandemic. He added that once the pandemic is taken care of, focus must shift to economic recovery. Here, he argued “China can once again lead the way.” Citing how China’s “economy already bounced back from its low point earlier this year,” he said, “its new development paradigm of dual circulation where domestic and international circulation mutually reinforce one another will help stimulate the global economy” as well as “repair the damage done by some countries’ protectionist policies.” He concluded by saying that there will be “hiccups along the way” but “the trust-based relations between the BRICS countries could serve as a very stabilizing factor during this unprecedented transition in global political and economic affairs as the world begins to embrace new models.”  

Xi’s statements on the primacy of international law and trust-based relations within BRICS are bound to be taken with more than a little skepticism given China’s punitive economic actions against many of its neighbors and even partners further away. Such statements from China are not new. At the BRICS Foreign Ministers meeting last week, Wang Yi, China’s foreign minister, said that the BRICS countries should come together in addressing the challenges of the pandemic and global economic recovery, and foster multilateralism and seek “political settlement of hot-spot issues.” 

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi also spoke about the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and the reform process that has been initiated by his government to get the economy back on track. Modi highlighted the need for reform of multilateral institutions such as the IMF, WHO and WTO, but his particular emphasis was on terrorism, which he characterized as “the biggest problem today.” Modi said that the group must ensure that “countries that support and help terrorists are also held to account.”  

It is doubtful that the other members of BRICS necessarily share India’s view of the terrorism problem, but that is not the sole difficulty. The BRICS summit is also taking place at a time when India and China have squared off at their border, a temporary line called the Line of Actual Control (LAC). BRICS, as a multilateral platform, cannot address bilateral issues and hence, it was, understandably, not expected to address that particular issue. And given that the summit was held virtually, the possibility of informal bilateral meeting on the sidelines of the summit was nonexistent.  

The group itself has always been diverse in terms of economic, political, and security interests. These have only grown over the last two decades as Abhijnan Rej highlighted recently. China has emerged as the world’s second largest economy, while Brazil, Russia, and South Africa are nowhere near the indicators that brought them into the grouping initially.  

Politically, too, the group is diverse, with few common political interests other than singing the song of multilateralism. Even that rhetoric may not hold for long given the yawning gap between China’s rhetoric of multilateralism and its unilateral aggressive behavior on the ground.  

China and Russia have an anti-American political goal for the grouping, which sits very uneasily with Indian interests, considering India has invested significantly in building and nurturing its bilateral ties with the United States as well as engaging in strategic minilaterals such as the Quad and various trilaterals in the Indo-Pacific.  

That India works with China in the BRICS format, when the aim of India’s Quad and other such minilaterals are to restrict and restrain China’s aggressive and bullying behavior, adds to the growing array of contradictions. Certainly, BRICS cannot be a military and security grouping given the significant differences between each of the players, most notably between India, China, and Russia. The success of groupings such as BRICS will depend on the health of bilateral ties among those within the group. India-China relations in the backdrop of the Galwan conflict do not suggest that all is well on the bilateral front or even in the regional context.  

India’s aim in engaging with BRICS may be an effort to demonstrate that it retains strategic autonomy and that it engages with all major powers irrespective of these incongruences. In this respect, it may serve a limited domestic political agenda. But as contradictions keep piling up, questions about the future of BRICS as anything other than an ineffective talkshop are bound to grow.  

India-China Talks on the Standoff: Cautious Optimism? - The Diplomat, 12 November 2020

In my column for The Diplomat last month, I looked at the India-China talks on the continuing stand-off in Ladakh and if there was any room for optimism.  Reports vary about the details of the latest talks, but there seems to be some optimism for an agreement.  

Indian and Chinese military forces have been engaged in a military standoff in Ladakh for more than six months now. Several rounds of military and diplomatic talks had yielded no progress. But there was cautious optimism in New Delhi after the eighth round of corps commander-level talks between India and China, held on November 6. There are increasing hints that some agreement may be reached. According to one report in the Indian media, the two sides reportedly “agreed to restoring status quo ante” on the Line of Actual Control (LAC). According to sources quoted in the report, “all that remains is for both sides to formalize the sequencing of steps required to achieve the objective.”  

But this is the most optimistic of the reports, though earlier reports about the November 6 meeting also claimed that progress had been made. On the same day that these more optimistic reports appeared, Indian Army Chief General M.M. Naravane, speaking at a public event in Delhi, said, “We are hopeful of reaching an agreement which is mutually acceptable and is really beneficial in keeping with the overarching policy guidelines.” There remains understandable caution, as he also added that the border troops are fully equipped with appropriate clothing and weapons and that the forces face “no shortages whatsoever.”  

For the full post, click here.  

In earlier reports on the November 6 meeting, an official said that India “want[s] complete de-escalation. Reduction of troops from some areas and de-induction of weapons is not a viable option and is not what we have proposed.” Chief of Defense Staff General Bipin Rawat also maintained that the any change in the status quo “is not acceptable to India” and that one cannot rule out the “situation getting out of hand and spiralling into a larger conflict.”  

India’s official statement was also along the same lines and did not mention “restoring status quo ante.” The statement simply said that “the two sides had a candid, in-depth and constructive exchange of views on disengagement along the Line of Actual Control in the Western Sector.” The statement further added that the two sides would “earnestly implement the important consensus reached by the leaders of the two countries, ensure their frontline troops to exercise restraint and avoid misunderstanding and miscalculation.” 

Other Indian media reports also suggested some progress, though not that the two sides had agreed to restore the status quo ante. According to one of these reports, an Indian Army officer said that “China’s latest proposal is better than their previous proposals.”  

There is also disagreement in the reports about the sequencing of steps for a withdrawal of forces. Some media reports said that India and China have agreed to a three-point disengagement agenda which included pulling back of tanks and anti-personnel carriers within a day as the first step. A second step would involve the withdrawal of 30 percent of troops on both sides every day for three days around the northern bank on the Pangong Tso.  This reportedly would push the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) east of Finger 8. The third step would include withdrawal of frontline troops on both sides in the southern bank of Pangong Tso, as well as areas around Chushul and Rezang La  The three-step disengagement process is to be enforced through a joint verification mechanism, which includes both delegation meetings as well as the use of drones.  

Another report, however, suggested that China would pull back from the Pangong Tso area first. China “has apparently agreed to go back to Finger 8 and remove all temporary structures and deployments the PLA had put up between Finger 4 and Finger 8 since May,” according to this report. The area between Finger 4 and 8 could be kept as a “no-patrolling” area, with neither side permitted to patrol.  But there is no agreement to this effect, yet. The second step would be disengagement of heavy armor and artillery. Currently, the deployment of tanks in close proximity, T-72 Indias on the Indian side and Type-99s on the Chinese side, in the Chushul sector, is seen by both sides as risky. Other reports have said that these are all still proposals, which will be taken up in the next round of talks. It should be noted too that only one report has talked about both sides agreeing to restoring the status quo ante.  

Even if the current tensions were to be resolved in the near term, India’s security perceptions about China are forcing India to undertake some force restructuring to maintain constant vigilance along the LAC, especially in the western sector. In addition to the 3 Infantry Division that is responsible for the LAC in eastern Ladakh, the Northern Command has decided to deploy another division of around 10,000 troops in Ladakh on a longer-term basis.  

Whether these optimistic reports will be borne out remains to be seen. On both sides, there are likely to be worries about the risks involved in withdrawing from positions that they now hold, which carries with it the risk that the other side may renege and attempt to occupy these positions. Trusting each other may still be the biggest hurdle.  

Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons Set to Enter Into Force - The Diplomat, 5 November 2020

In my column for The Diplomat in November, I looked at the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons that is set to enter into force in January 2021.  But the key question I asked is if it will matter.  

The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), or the Nuke Ban Treaty, is set to enter into force soon. In 2016, the U.N. General Assembly, through resolution 71/258, decided to hold a conference for the negotiation of the treaty. The conference took place in March 2017. The treaty was subsequently adopted by a vote with 122 states in favor (with one vote against and one abstention) at the United Nations on July 7, 2017 and was opened for signature by the U.N. Secretary General on September 20, 2017.  When Honduras ratified the treaty in late October, it reached the requisite 50 ratifications, and is set to enter into force on January 22, 2021.  

For the full post, click here.  

The TPNW contains provisions that prohibit states from participating in any nuclear weapons-related activities including development, testing, possession, stockpile, use, or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Signatories are required “to prevent and suppress any activity prohibited under the TPNW undertaken by persons or on territory under its jurisdiction or control.”  

While this is commendable on its own, the efficacy of the treaty is questionable because none of the current nine nuclear-armed states support the treaty or have signed it.  The United States in a recent letter sent to signatories of the TPNW stated that the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council — the P-5 countries, who also happens to be the five nuclear weapons states recognized by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) — and NATO allies “stand unified in our opposition to the potential repercussions” of the treaty. In fact, the only NATO country that took part in the negotiations was the Netherlands but due to its NATO commitments, it voted against the treaty when it came up for adoption. 

The letter from the United States went on to add that the TPNW also “turns back the clock on verification and disarmament and is dangerous” to the NPT. Urging the signatories to walk out of the treaty, the letter further said that while these states have the sovereign right to determine whether to become parties to and ratify the treaty, “we believe that you have made a strategic error and should withdraw your instrument of ratification or accession.” 

The day when the treaty was opened for signature at the U.N., the United States, the United Kingdom, and France issued a joint statement slamming the treaty, saying it “risks undermining the existing international security architecture which contributes to the maintenance of international peace and security,” and that all states “share a common responsibility to protect and strengthen our collective security system in order to further promote international peace, stability, and security.”  

Countries like India, which have opposed the treaty. also made their positions clear.  While responding to a query on the Indian position on the treaty, the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) spokesperson said that it “did not participate in the negotiations… Also, none of the other States possessing nuclear weapons participated in the negotiations.” It had also voted against a U.N. General Assembly resolution in 2019 welcoming the adoption of the treaty. Earlier in 2016, it abstained from voting on the U.N. General Assembly resolution that gave the formal mandate for states to start the treaty negotiations.  

Much of Asia and the Middle East also remains outside of the TPNW. Ratification of the treaty by just 50 state parties still means that there is a sizeable number of countries that remain outside the TPNW. The International Campaign for the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) has engaged in an effort to name and shame states that are not party to TPNW, but how effective that effort will be remains to be seen.  

Without the support of the nuclear armed states, it may not be possible to promote nuclear disarmament. Beyond nuclear-armed states, even those states such as Japan that are under the extended U.S. nuclear umbrella may be somewhat reluctant to support the TPNW.  While prestige may remain a factor in countries’ decision to pursue nuclear weapons, security considerations may not entirely be absent. These considerations should not be allowed to prevent progress on nuclear disarmament, of course, but treating such concerns as serious may help move the conversation in a more helpful direction than simply preaching or castigating such states. 

There are also complications that arise from the relationship of the TPNW to the NPT.  The NPT also includes obligations toward nuclear disarmament, though these obligations have not been seriously addressed by the nuclear weapon states. Some believe that the nuke ban treaty undermines the importance of the NPT as the foundation of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. Gustavo Zlauvinen, president-designate of the 2020 Review Conference for the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) raised questions about the effectiveness of the TPNW saying that it cannot challenge the “legitimacy of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).” 

In a recent interview to Kyodo News, he said, “You can’t have nuclear disarmament without the nuclear weapon states in that system. And that’s why, for the time being, the only treaty that has been accepted by at least five nuclear weapon states, that includes obligations on nuclear disarmament, is the NPT.” He added that there exists a “huge difference” between the NPT and the TPNW and that the TPNW should not “erode the validity and the legitimacy of the NPT.” He also feared that this will be “another issue of contention” at the upcoming review conference. Maintaining the significance of the NPT as the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime, he added that “I believe that once the TPNW reaches numbers similar to the NPT, and obviously includes the signature and ratifications of nuclear weapon states, then probably we can talk about that new treaty being another pillar of the regime.”  

Although the TPNW is the realization of a long and dedicated struggle by civil society activists and some states, the history of previous such efforts are not encouraging. For example, the International Campaign to Ban Land Mines (ICBL) has done stellar work that led to the Land Mine Ban Treaty and for greater endorsement of the treaty globally, with the aim of banning landmines and cluster munitions. While the Mine Ban Treaty is often showcased as one of the more successful treaties with only 32 states outside the treaty, many critical states including the U.S., Russia, China, India, Iran, and Pakistan remain outside.  Their refusal to adhere to the treaty undermines its effectiveness, and there has been little pressure on these states to change their minds. This experience suggests the need for some caution about the TPNW. Addressing the critical problem of nuclear disarmament should fare better than that example.