BORDER CLASHES WITH CHINA: DOES INDIA FACE A FAIT ACCOMPLI? - 9DashLine, 26 May 2020

Last week, I published a short essay for the 9DashLine.com on the current India-China border standoff.

There is still a lot of difficulty in understanding what is happening on the Sino-Indian border because of patchy and contradictory reporting, mostly based on sources in New Delhi Thus any analysis has necessarily to be quite preliminary and tentative. As of today, citing government sources, one media report said, “there are close to 10,000 soldiers of China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) on Indian territory.” It should be noted though that other reports have suggested fewer numbers.

For the full essay, click here.



The current series of incidents started on 5 May, when around 250 Indian and Chinese military personnel clashed at Pangong Tso, a large lake in eastern Ladakh region. These were reportedly violent clashes, injuring several soldiers on both sides. Quoting a senior bureaucrat, one Indian media report said that some Indian troops were detained, but then released. But the Indian Army promptly denied this, though the detention story has continued.

In addition to Pangong Tso, there is also reported to be Chinese forces crossing the Line of Actual Control (LAC) further to the north, near the junction of the Shyok and Galwan rivers, though there have been no reports of confrontations here. A newly constructed Indian road runs along the Shyok river to the north, a critical supply line for Indian forces. Quoting an unnamed military source, China’s state-run newspaper, Global Times, said that it was India who crossed the boundary in Galwan and entered Chinese territory. Meanwhile, on 9 May, clashes also reportedly took place at Naku La Pass in North Sikkim, much farther to the east.

If China has indeed moved forward and built roads and checkposts beyond where it has traditionally had such facilities, India faces a fait accompli. New Delhi faces the choice of either escalating or accepting the new reality on the ground.

Initially, even the government assumed that these were merely fisticuffs and that the two sides were possibly engaged in the usual stand-offs that happen between these forces every summer. The Indian Army Chief even said, possibly to reduce tensions, that “aggressive behaviour by both sides resulted in minor injuries to troops post which both sides disengaged.” But it seems clear now that three different confrontations, hundreds of kilometres apart, is unlikely to be an accident. The large number of Chinese forces included also suggest some prior planning. In fact, a knowledgeable former Indian ambassador to China, Ashok Kantha, referred to these “incursions at multiple locations” as “worrisome.” He argued that China appears “to be physically changing the ground situation.”

Indian analysts are at a loss to understand China’s behaviour. A former Indian Foreign Secretary, Shyam Saran, suggests that China was warning India about its policies on COVID, Taiwan and foreign investment (India had recently changed foreign investment rules that may affect Chinese investments). Ambassador Gautam Bambawale, who was formerly Indian ambassador in Beijing, meanwhile argued that the current incidents could be related to India’s actions with regard to Jammu and Kashmir in 2019, when India split the Jammu and Kashmir state to form a new province for the Ladakh region, administered directly from Delhi. Ambassadors Saran, Bambawale and Kantha appear to also suggest the closer India-US strategic engagement as a factor. Most Indian analysts also suggest that China’s response was at least partly a response to India’s faster infrastructure building along the LAC. China has already built excellent infrastructure on its side, and India’s is still wanting, though it has dramatically improved in the recent past.

There have not been much of an formal response from India to the ongoing crisis. Commenting on the situation, on 14 May, India’s Ministry of External Affairs spokesperson Anurag Srivastava said that both countries see enormous importance in maintaining peace and tranquillity along the entire border. The spokesperson added that the problem is the difference in perception of the alignment of the LAC, suggesting that this “could have been avoided if we had a common perception of the LAC.” India has long suggested this, but China has balked, apparently fearing that this could lead to additional problems. What is worrying is that existing mechanisms to resolve such disputes do not appear to be working.

India and China have signed several agreements, including the Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas (September 1993), the Agreement on Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas (November 1996), and most recently, the Border Defence Cooperation Agreement (2013), none of which appear so far to have helped in the current tensions. Even though these agreements are significant, there have also been problems with their implementation because many clauses in these agreements require both sides to limit their activities in reference to the LAC. In the absence of clarity on where the LAC is, it is very difficult to execute these agreements, even in the best of times.

India’s options are also severely constrained in dealing with this crisis. In the Doklam crisis, India moved to block China’s actions, forcing China to choose to either escalate or back down. China backed down, helped by India also backing away on the promise that China would desist from continuing with its road-building. This time, the shoe is on the other foot: if China has indeed moved forward and built roads and checkposts beyond where it has traditionally had such facilities, India faces a fait accompli. New Delhi faces the choice of either escalating or accepting the new reality on the ground, or possibly offering concessions (halting infrastructure development in the region, for example) in order to get China to recall its forces. New Delhi is not going to be happy with any of these choices. Irrespective of how this plays out, one thing is certain: India’s attitude towards China will only harden.

The Pandemic and China Are Strengthening U.S.-India Relations, for Now - Asia Unbound, Council on Foreign Relations, 4 May 2020

In a first, I have a short essay on India-US relations for the Council on Foreign Relations blog, Asia Unbound where I guest-blogged for Alyssa Ayres. The Pandemic and China Are Strengthening U.S.-India Relations, for Now, as the title suggests, argued that the pandemic and China's aggressive behaviour are driving the US-India relations.

This post was published a few days ago, and is part of an Asia Unbound series of voices from Asia on the COVID-19 crisis, and on its implications for Asia and for Asian views of the United States. This is the ninth post in this series; the first can be found here, the second here, the third here, the fourth here, the fifth here, the sixth here, the seventh here, and the eighth here.

Despite the COVID-19 pandemic, U.S.-India relations have shown signs of continued cooperation. Officials of the two countries are in frequent contact, including President Donald J. Trump and Prime Minister Narendra Modi, and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and his counterpart, External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar. Concerns about China’s growing aggressiveness may be driving New Delhi and Washington closer together. But there are signs of turbulence ahead, and the outcome of the U.S. presidential election and the uncertain path of the pandemic itself make any prognosis tentative at best.

For the full essay, click here.



The United States has taken the lead in extending assistance to other countries, including India. According to a Department of State Fact Sheet issued on April 16, the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) together have earmarked about $500 million dollars in emergency health, humanitarian, and economic assistance. This is in addition to State Department funding to multilateral and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) actively providing assistance during the pandemic. Washington and New Delhi have great potential for further collaboration. This crisis drives home the importance of ensuring that multilateral agencies remain effective and unbeholden to any one power. India and the United States can work together with their allies to promote neutrality, transparency and accountability in such agencies.

Both countries have a stake in ensuring that they do not cede influence to China in the provision of pandemic relief, especially to smaller countries in the region. The pursuit of influence continues unabated despite the pandemic. China’s missteps such as allowing the pandemic to spread, focusing more on shifting blame than investigating the origins of the virus, using pandemic aid for publicity, and engaging in assertive military behavior toward its smaller neighbors have helped but they only provide an opportunity, not a guarantee, for regional leadership. The United States has stepped up diplomatic consultations for cooperation with a geographically diverse group of countries, which has now been dubbed the Quad-plus because it includes South Korea, Vietnam and New Zealand in addition to the original Quad (United States, India, Australia and Japan). The crisis could help generate subsequent strategic cooperation—the original Quad grew out of multilateral cooperation after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami.

China’s behavior is also making this cooperation easier. Despite the crisis, China appears to be stepping up its military presence in the region. Since early February, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has been probing Taiwan’s air and maritime borders. The PLA Eastern Theatre Command has been particularly active, deploying fighter jets and bombers around Taiwan. According to reports, Chinese fighter planes momentarily traversed into Taiwanese airspace. China has claimed that it was only conducting military exercises though the United States has said that this was completely inappropriate. PLA air exercises have continued into April. In addition, China’s new aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, and five other warships sailed close to Taiwan’s waters in mid-April.

Meanwhile, in Southeast Asia, the PLA has been particularly aggressive toward Indonesia and Vietnam. Chinese fishing vessels accompanied by coast guard ships have been intruding in Indonesian waters off the Natuna Islands. Last week, China also established two districts on disputed territories in the South China Sea. China this week also targeted a Philippine Navy vessel that was conducting territorial defense operations and sovereignty patrol. And in a more serious incident in early April, Chinese ships hit and sank a Vietnamese fishing vessel near the Paracel Islands, leading Vietnam to issue a formal diplomatic protest. The U.S. State Department also put out a strongly worded statement, expressing serious concern at “the latest in a long string of PRC actions to assert unlawful maritime claims and disadvantage its Southeast Asian neighbors in the South China Sea.”

If COVID-19 cooperation and China’s behavior are helping to keep the momentum in U.S.-India relations, there are also some uncertainties. New Delhi is unlikely to be happy at the latest changes in U.S. immigration rules which could pose a challenge to the Indian expatriate community in the United States. New pressure on India’s budget means that India is unlikely to have enough money to buy foreign military equipment, including from the United States. Trump has been a keen promoter of U.S. arms sales and could retaliate if deals with India fall through.

But the most serious uncertainty concerns the U.S. elections in fall 2020. On one side, there appears to be a growing political consensus in the United States that China is a problem, leading to efforts by both U.S. presidential candidates to frame the other as “soft on China." This is music to India’s ears. But New Delhi has concerns about both candidates. The Democrats are perceived to have been traditionally soft on China. But Trump’s unsteady hands at the tiller is also a problem for New Delhi. His early praise for Chinese President Xi Jinping’s handling of the crisis, in particular, is seen in India as an example of his undependability. New Delhi should be most concerned about the growing chorus from both sides of aisle in the United States to draw down its global commitments. As China flexes its muscle, India is looking for more U.S. involvement, not less.

This could take several forms. At the declaratory level, Washington could emphasize that ensuring a non-hegemonic Asia is a core American interest. But the US also needs to act consistently to promote this value including by supporting countries that are threatened by coercive trade practices and by leading regional response against using force to resolve territorial disputes. Finally, the United States should also take the lead to coordinate the various minilaterals in the region in order to promote the values enshrined in the idea of the free and open Indo-Pacific.

China’s Worrying Military Exercises Near Taiwan, The Diplomat - 17 April 2020

In last week's column for The Diplomat, I looked at China's worrying military exercises near Taiwan. I argued that China’s moves in the region, despite the pandemic, are only likely to generate fear and inspire greater cooperation with Washington.

In my column for The Diplomat last week, I looked at China’s military activities and resultant confrontation with its Southeast Asian neighbors, Indonesia and Vietnam. Despite the Indo-Pacific region reeling under the coronavirus pandemic, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has been active farther east as well. There have been reports of several Chinese naval and air intrusions in Taiwan and Japan.

Back in the first half of February, the PLA Eastern Theater Command started sending its fighter jets and bombers around Taiwan. In response, Taiwan’s Air Force had to scramble its own fighters to shadow the Chinese aircraft. On February 10, Chinese jets reportedly briefly crossed “an unofficial middle line in the Taiwan Strait.” The same day, the PLA Eastern Theater Command stated that its military has been engaged in “air-ground assault and fire support drills to further refine and test their multi-service joint combat capabilities.” Further, Zhang Chunhui, Air Force spokesman of the PLA Eastern Theater, said that “following the February 9 sea-air combat readiness cruise, the theater forces organized a joint exercise of sea and air forces in the sea area of ​​southeastern Taiwan on February 10, mainly carrying out air-ground assault, firepower support and other actual combat training, further tempering and testing the joint combat capabilities of multiple arms in the theater.”

Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs in a tweet asked Beijing to stop threatening Taiwan militarily, and instead focus on the coronavirus. Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) in a statement affirmed that “provocations by PLA warships and planes which have frequented the vicinity of the Taiwan Strait in recent years to seek unification through military force gravely undermine the status quo in the Taiwan Strait and heighten regional tensions.” Commenting on the situation, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs R. Clarke Cooper said, “It was completely inappropriate of China to take such an aggressive act.” Elaborating on the impact on the security of the Indo-Pacific, Cooper said that “there should be responsible behavior to make sure that the region is free and open — not just for navigation but also for trade and for relationships. Such coercive, aggressive behavior is counter to having a free and open Indo-Pacific region.”

The PLA’s air intrusions continued in March and April as well. In mid-March, Taiwan’s Ministry of Defense stated that they had to respond to Chinese J-11 fighters and KJ-500 airborne early warning and control aircraft, which flew into the waters southwest of Taiwan conducting night-time exercises. This was possibly the first time that they were engaged in a night-time drill near Taiwan. The Ministry also said that these aircraft had come close to Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone. The Ministry added that “After our air reconnaissance and patrol aircraft responded appropriately, and broadcast (an order) to drive them away, the communist aircraft flew away from our Air Defense Identification Zone.” Toward the end of March, Taiwan’s Defense Ministry claimed that there were as many as four “targeted” drills by China around Taiwan, which Taipei considered as “concrete evidence of provocations and threats.” In response, Taiwan conducted its own exercise, deploying its F-16 fighter jets. The PLA Daily reportedly said that the Eastern Theater Command responsible for Taiwan had carried out long-endurance training with its early-warning aircraft lasting for 36 hours.

Tensions between China and Taiwan are not new. Friction has been increasingly evident since Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen came to power in 2016 and her re-election in January has served to further increase tensions. Put simply: Beijing fears that Tsai will encourage pro-independence forces in Taiwan.

Meanwhile, in mid-April, China’s aircraft carrier Liaoning and five other warships were reportedly sighted sailing past Taiwan waters and through the Miyako Strait. A Japanese Ministry of Defense official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity, said that they tracked the Chinese aircraft carrier, two guided missile destroyers, two multirole warships, and one supply-class fast combat support ship. Citing Taiwan’s Ministry of Defense statement, the report said that the Taiwanese navy, too, had sent its ships to monitor the carrier strike group as it sailed east of Taiwan. Taiwan’s vice defense minister, Chang Guan-chung, stated in parliament that when the pandemic was spreading worldwide, “if the Chinese Communists attempted to make any military adventure leading to regional conflict, they would be condemned by the world, and regardless of what would happen, we are all ready and have made the best preparation for this.”

Currently, the Chinese aircraft carrier is the only one in the area. Two U.S. carriers, Theodore Roosevelt and Ronald Reagan, are in port. The Theodore Roosevelt is now in Guam, on account of an outbreak of coronavirus cases among the crew, and the Ronald Reagan is in Yokosuka Naval Base for maintenance. However, the increase in PLA military activities in the Taiwanese waters and airspace have spurred greater U.S. military engagements as well. It has been reported that a U.S. Navy EP-3 reconnaissance plane was sighted close to Taiwanese airspace near Kaohsiung. Increased military drills of such kinds could potentially lead to unintended mishaps. The EP-3 spy plane incident in April 2001 should be a useful reminder regarding the kind of mishaps that can happen. China’s military moves in the region, despite the pandemic, are only likely to generate fear in the region and inspire greater cooperation with Washington.

How Is COVID-19 Reshaping China-India Relations? - The Diplomat, 02 April 2020

Earlier in the month, I wrote about the impact of COVID-19 on India-China relations, for The Diplomat. The global pandemic has hit amid the 70th anniversary mark for relations and affected perceptions and realities in ties.

India was the first non-communist country in Asia to establish diplomatic ties with the People’s Republic of China on April 1, 1950. But the plans for celebrating the 70th anniversary of the event have been hit by the coronavirus pandemic.

For the full post, click here.



Despite the cancellation of 70th anniversary events, a senior Chinese official is reported to have said that the two countries “will emerge stronger and their relationship can scale new heights after the pandemic.” The presidents and the premiers on both sides have exchanged congratulatory messages and have made the expected euphoric statements about the two working together to “bring more benefits to the two countries and peoples and contribute more positive energy to Asia as well as the world.”

The Chinese Ambassador to India, Sun Weidong, tweeted Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s reference to the Panchsheel principles, “the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, which is a historic contribution to the promotion of a new type of intl relations.” Considering Sino-Indian history, the Panchsheel may not have been the best reference, considering that Indian officials rarely invoke it because it is associated in Indian perceptions with the Sino-Indian war of 1962 and what is widely seen as Chinese betrayal. That aside, there are also questions about how the coronavirus pandemic will affect Sino-Indian ties.

Responding to a question during the daily press briefing, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying sounded quite jubilant. The spokesperson pointed out that during the second informal Sino-Indian leaders summit in Chennai, Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping had agreed to host 70 activities commemorating the 70 years of diplomatic relations, which will contribute to significant progress on the bilateral ties, and highlighted the “deep historical connection between two ancient civilizations.” The planned activities were supposed to cover an entire gamut of areas including legislature, business, culture, and defense.

Also, the foreign ministries of both countries announced detailed plans for celebrations in October 2019. Hua went on to say that with the 70th anniversary celebration “as an opportunity, we would like to work with India to elevate our bilateral relationship to a new height.” On another question about whether China would send help India in fighting address the pandemic by supplying ventilators, the spokesperson said that it would do what it can once the domestic demand is met.

As of now, the Indian government has been careful not to blame China for the coronavirus or its propagation because of China’s actions. Indeed, External Affairs Minister Dr. S Jaishankar tweeted saying he had discussed with both State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi in addressing the corona virus and build collaborative efforts in this regard. China has tried to woo India by saying that it “stands ready to share its experience in epidemic prevention and control and diagnosis and treatment, and provide further support and assistance to the best of our capability.” But there is likely to be some wariness in Delhi, based on the kind of Chinese assistance provided to a number of countries including Italy, Czech Republic, and Spain, where even the testing kits sent from China showed faulty results.

Moving forward, China’s role in the pandemic is likely to have a negative impact on Sino-Indian relationship. If China had been transparent, the pandemic could have been tackled much more efficiently, and this is clear for all to see including India. Not only has China been not transparent about the level of spread within the country and the human transmission issues, but more importantly it had silenced the World Health Organization and other international organizations from raising concerns about the Wuhan virus.

That WHO went one step ahead with its Director General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus praising China for its “transparency” and added that China is a model to follow as far as the response to the virus management is concerned made this clear for all to see. This is despite the fact that there were ample number of reports pointing to the Chinese state efforts to cover up the extent of the virus’ outbreak and silencing of whistleblowers. It should be noted that the current Director General came to office in 2017 with China’s backing.

Though India has so far managed to control the spread of the coronavirus within the country with a national lockdown, the economic costs are going to be large, and it is likely that public perception in India is likely to blame China for the damages this has caused, once the pandemic itself is under control. Though India is unlikely to officially blame China, Beijing’s behavior will deepen the general public distrust of China and it will impact Indian domestic debate about Sino-Indian ties. Thus, for all the polite words and mutual congratulations about the anniversary, the pandemic once again seems to indicate to New Delhi that China is likely to be an irresponsibly selfish actor, deepening the concern that India already had about China’s behavior.

Can Taiwan Ever Integrate with Mainland China in Political Terms?

Can Taiwan ever integrate with Mainland China in political terms? Economic terms, yes, but in political terms, it is not going to happen. The social and political cultures of ROC and PRC are so different. One has a vibrant democracy, wherein freedom of the press and individual freedom are so vital and on the other hand, PRC remains a socialist, communist and most importantly an authoritarian government with severe curbs on several aspects ranging from the freedom of the press, freedom of the internet which in a way restrains severely the freedom of the individual, freedom of assembly, to freedom of religion and even reproductive rights.

In fact, I have just come back from a two-week trip to Taiwan where I had the opportunity to experience first hand what the country is all about and get the pulse of the common people, in addition to benefiting from the official line on a range of issues, through formal briefings. In the next couple of days, I will be putting across some of the recent surveys in Taiwan on the entire integration issue, particularly after the ECFA between ROC and PRC.



Type rest of the post here

US Annual Threat Assessment 2010: What Does It Say about China?

US Annual Threat Assessment 2010 is out ...



Four areas of PLA modernisation have been identified as challenging its neighbours: China's military relationship across the developing world; its aggressive cyber activities; its development of space & counterspace capabilities; its expansive definition of maritime & air space with consequent implications for restricted freedom of navigation for other states.

The report adds: "Important PLA modernization programs include: ballistic and cruise missile forces capable of hitting foreign military bases and warships in the western Pacific; anti-satellite (ASAT) and electronic warfare weapons to defeat sensors and information systems; development of terrestrial and space-based, long-range intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems to detect, track, and target naval, air, and fixed installations; and continuing improvements to its increasingly capable submarines to place naval surface forces at risk. Many of these programs have begun to mature and improve China’s ability to execute an anti-access and area-denial strategy in the Western Pacific."

What is worrying is the increasing trend in China to find military solutions to geopolitical problems. The Taiwan issue remains a territorial issue that can be sorted out through non-military means; militarization of the conflict can lead to additionally security burden in the region. China has argued time and again that its military modernisation is geared towards a Taiwan scenario, but many of the capabilities that China has acquired in the recent past go well beyond Taiwan.

China Develops ASBMs

The US Office of Naval Intelligence Report of August 2009, titled The People’s Liberation Army Navy: A Modern Navy with Chinese Characteristics, reveals that China is close to developing the world’s first anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) system. How does this alter the military equation in the Asia-Pacific region? Development of these systems is particularly significant given that it will have the capability to defeat US carrier strike groups operating in the region, making it a “no-go-zone” for the US and other advanced navies. Such capability-building needs to be seen in conjunction with the increasingly aggressive Chinese behaviour not only with neighbours with which Beijing has border and territorial issues with, but also with the United States. More importantly, Chinese tendency to rely on military solutions to geopolitical problems can be a worrying trend. For instance, the 1996 Taiwan missile crisis is believed to be one of the factors that pushed Beijing towards the development of these missile systems. The crisis clearly showed how the PLA Navy (PLAN) was wanting in response against US navy carrier groups. However, finding military solutions to problems like Taiwan can set a dangerous trend.



The anti-ship missile systems are believed to be using the modified DF-21 missile (solid propellant ones) that has better accuracy and can carry nuclear warheads big enough to inflict damage on large naval vessels. The missiles, reportedly with a range of 2,000 kilometers, covering the second chain of islands, are aided by a network of satellites, radar and unmanned aerial vehicles that can locate US ships and then guide the weapon, enabling it to hit moving targets. The employment of a complex guidance system, low radar signature and maneuverability makes its flight path unpredictable, thereby making the tracking systems ineffective.

While there may be skepticism among analysts as to whether China has advanced to such high level of sophistication, Dai Xu, a Chinese military expert, who spoke to Global Times (China) said, “China is indeed developing anti-ship ballistic missiles. It is not a secret. During the 60th anniversary National Day military parade, China exhibited such missiles.” He however added that these systems need not necessarily have a “killer” effect, capable of defeating US fleet, as has been made out in several reports. While one may agree with such an argument, what has been worrying is Beijing’s increasingly aggressive behaviour even in the seas against the US and Japanese naval vessels and thereby the potential of these missile systems to create difficult situations in the future. One of the latest instances of such aggressive behaviour is that of the March 2009 incident in which US Navy reported that five Chinese ships harassed the US submarine surveillance vessel USNS Impeccable in the South China area. There have been also several media reports citing Pentagon reports bringing out at least half a dozen such incidents in the very same week, where US surveillance vessels were “subjected to aggressive behavior, including dozens of fly-bys by Chinese Y-12 maritime surveillance aircraft.” Increasing Chinese assertiveness, based on China’s claim to the entire South China Sea as its territory and creating conflictual situations with several countries, including the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan, could lead to increasing tensions and possible accidents particularly in the seas. In order to negate such effects, the US has been taking efforts to put in place an incidents at sea agreement, similar to the 1972 US-Russian Incidents at Sea Agreement. Although there is scope for these discussions in the 1998 US-Chinese Military Maritime Safety Agreement, the two sides have not been able to address these incidents in a useful manner.

The trend in Chinese military strategy is worrisome. One of the key areas that China has focused on in the last few years relates to the area denial strategy. Such a strategy will essentially restrain the ability of another country to use a particular space or facility. Such a capability will allow China to create a buffer zone around its land and maritime periphery which in turn will increase the difficulty for other states to operate close to Chinese mainland.

Chinese sea denial capability is essentially enforced through its growing submarine force. China has a force of 62 submarines, including 12 new and advanced Kilo-class Russian submarines, in addition to different classes of domestically-developed diesel submarines and several nuclear-powered attack boats. China also has a significant number of surface combatants, including air-defence guided missile destroyers such as Luyang-II and Luzhou class vessels and several powerful multi-role vessels (Sovremenny class destroyers) like Hangzhou. Besides, Beijing has a large number of different anti-ship missiles that can be launched from submarines, surface ships and airplanes and even shore-based launchers, such as the SS-N-22 Sunburn and SS-N-27 Sizzler systems procured from Russia. The US Navy does not yet have an effective way of defending their aircraft carriers against these missiles. In a potential conflict on the Taiwan Straits, the PLA Navy could possibly destroy some ships of the US carrier battlegroups, including US aircraft carriers. China also reportedly has a range of medium- and long-range ballistic missiles that can target surface ships at great distances.

Similarly, the January 2007 ASAT test provides a new platform for area denial to China. During times of conflict, the US may be restrained from using space-based assets after the test of SC-19 ASAT missile. Sea mining is another tactic that the Chinese could possibly employ in future warfare. Sea mines are available widely and at cheaper rates, whereas counter-measures are expensive and time consuming. However, given the difficulty in laying mines, and in the absence of significant air superiority, use of submarines might prove to be the best option for China. Sea-mining by air is another option. This would entail again blockading a certain section of the sea, a certain coastal area, or a certain country by way of air-dropped mines in order to blockade seaports and sea lanes as well as attack targets trying to break the blockade. Chinese military strategists estimate the role of such air blockades to increase further in the future.

Development of such capabilities with an objective of denying space to other countries in the region is a disturbing trend. The Chinese claim that its military modernisation is geared towards a Taiwan scenario only, but it does not justify the level and pace of its military upgradation. However, from a Chinese point of view, it appears that they want to develop advanced and sophisticated capabilities, particularly in the naval arena, to deny access to other modern navies that could be operating in the region, anticipating a crisis on the Taiwan Straits. In fact, General Xu Caihou, Vice Chairman of China’s Central Military Commission, who was visiting the United States in October noted that its “rapid military modernization, including the deployment of advanced weapons in the Pacific, is only to meet the minimum requirements of national security.” In their perception, advanced navies such as that of the US and Japan need to be denied access to the region and therefore an increased focus on access control/denial strategies in the last few years.

While it may appear justified from a Chinese point of view, development of anti-ship missile and area denial weapon systems have upped the ante in the region and beyond. First, development of such capabilities by China could potentially lead to arms race in Asia, with countries wanting to develop systems that can counter Beijing’s ASBM capabilities. The US Navy is already looking at responses, in terms of building deep water ballistic defence destroyers. It is moving away from a strategy of building a fleet that would operate in shallow waters near coastlines to developing capabilities for deep sea anti-ballistic defenses. The US Navy is actually looking at Zumwalt DDG 1000 destroyer as the answer to the latest Chinese weapon. Admiral Lyons, while analysing the situation, wrote that the destroyer is the best option, given that it is stealthy (thereby improving the survivability), and also has “the power, cooling, space and weight margin to meet the full spectrum of future threats, both known and unknown.” While this may be the best response, the US Navy, for a variety of factors including costs, has decided to put a cap and limit production of the Zumwalt class DDG 100 to just three ships with no ballistic missile defence capability. The US Navy, instead, is planning to build more of the 30-year old design Aegis Arleigh Burke class DDG 51 destroyers which have only the most basic BMD capability. Unless the US Navy reverses the decision, this will have repercussions not only for the US but also for its allies, Taiwan, Japan and South Korea.

Militarization of the conflict-response mechanism on Taiwan by Beijing is therefore leading to dangerous games, with arms race as a predominant feature in the coming years. US’ counter-measures to the Chinese ASBM will inevitably evoke response from Russia.

Although unlikely, a Sino-Russian conflict on the port of Vladivostok cannot be ruled out in the future. Chinese penetration into the Russian Far East, its increasing footprint in Central Asia are areas of friction between the two countries that could get sharpened in the years to come.

Similarly, Chinese assertiveness in the Indian Ocean region, its increasing presence in all the littoral countries, could spiral conflict with India. Additionally, the Chinese approach to finding techno-military solutions to these problems can lead to a destabilizing situation emerging in Asia.