Staying away from CHOGM meeting will be a strategic blunder, my take on India's indecisiveness reg. CHOGM in Colombo and what it means for IFP...

Here's an OpEd of mine on India's indecisiveness regarding CHOGM to held in Colombo next month and what it means for Indian foreign policy.

If Prime Minister Singh decides not to go to Colombo for narrow political interests, it will be a strategic blunder. India's foreign policy interests cannot be driven by such narrow political interests of just staying in power. This is a dangerous trend in Indian foreign policy.

Sri Lanka is all set to host the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) on November 15, 2013. India still appears to be uncertain whether it should take part or boycott altogether the meeting on account of mounting pressure from Tamil Nadu. On October 24, Tamil Nadu Chief Minister J Jayalalitha sponsored a resolution calling for a "total boycott" of the meeting and the State Assembly unanimously adopted the resolution. The resolution noted that "only a boycott would bring about a genuine change in Colombo's attitude to the Tamils on the island." In addition, the state opposition party, the DMK that has remained traditionally supportive of the Tamil cause, has also asked the central government to boycott the meeting in Colombo. Congress Party MPs from Tamil Nadu are also raising the pitch asking for a boycott of the meeting.

The political pressure displayed by all the political parties appears to be a stunt in the backdrop of the national level elections in 2014. The UPA Government is concerned about losing the 39 seats from Tamil Nadu, either to the AIADMK or the DMK in the forthcoming elections. The government should have the guts to call the bluff and face the consequences. India's foreign policy cannot be run by such narrow political interests. India's decision to do a total boycott or a decision on who should represent and at what level, will have consequences beyond its domestic politics. Therefore, the decision should not be left to be driven by domestic interests alone.

Tamil Nadu politicising the Sri Lankan Tamil issue is also full of ironies and contradictions. While the AIADMK and the DMK have postured themselves as the ultimate guardians of the Tamil interests and therefore do not want to engage the Rajapakse Government until Colombo has acted on the alleged war crimes and violations of human rights in the final phase of the LTTE War, Tamil politicians based in Sri Lanka are on a pro-active mode with the Rajapakse government to strengthen their influence and leverage. The new Chief Minister of Sri Lanka's northern provincial council, CV Wigneswaran, in a message to the Indian government, was categorical that Prime Minister Manmohan Singh should attend the CHOGM meeting, highlighting that the Indian leader could use the CHOGM forum to send a clear message.

India's indecisiveness on the CHOGM issue throws open opportunities to Sri Lanka to deepen and widen Colombo's relations with Beijing and Islamabad, among others. With the exception of the Canadian Prime Minister, all the other leaders from the Commonwealth countries are attending the meeting, implicating India negatively. Should India isolate itself at a major forum such as CHOGM when it is being held in its backyard?

Sri Lanka is generally seen in India as a potential area where China could create mischief and if the Indian Prime Minister decides to abstain, that only provides opportunities for Sri Lanka's friends to consolidate their ties at the cost of India. Given particularly the importance of Sri Lanka in India's Indian Ocean strategy, New Delhi cannot afford to isolate itself from Sri Lanka. In that context, India must remind itself that it is doing no favour to the Rajapakse Government if the Prime Minister finally decides to attend the CHOGM Summit. New Delhi's participation will create new avenues where it can highlight the deficiencies on the part of the Sri Lankan government. India's participation will also help keep the channels of communication open and the acceptability of India as a neutral party in dealing with the Tamil issue.

If India decides to abstain from the CHOGM meeting, New Delhi should be clear that it will isolate itself totally vis a vis the Sri Lankan leadership and thereby lose any opportunity to influence affairs in Sri Lanka, including the interests of the Tamils and that of (Indian) Tamil fishermen.

Commenting on the Indian dilemma, Sri Lankan High Commissioner to India, Prasad Kariyawasam, in a television interview, commented along the same line: "Sri Lanka would be going ahead hosting the conference and we are happy at the level of participation that we have. It will be those who do not participate who will be isolated, not those who are participating." In addition, India's abstention will strengthen the impression that the Tamil interests solely drive India's interests in Sri Lanka. India's efforts to create multiple constituency articulating closer India-Sri Lanka relations will be hampered as well.

Lastly, an OpEd in the Hindu highlighted Prime Minister Nehru's viewpoints on multilateral forums and how India must not waiver from its principled stand on "full participation in international conferences." Whether India has such a principle or not, the more important point is that it will have an ability to shape and influence events and actions if India is in the room than outside. Staying outside the camp and protesting also does not bode well for a major regional power such as India.

If Prime Minister Singh decides not to go to Colombo for narrow political interests, it will be a strategic blunder. India's foreign policy interests cannot be driven by such narrow political interests of just staying in power. This is a dangerous trend in Indian foreign policy.

Does eliminating the LTTE solve the problem?

This analysis on the Sri Lankan situation appeared first on the ORF website.

Sri Lanka is on the verge of defeating the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), or so the Rajapakse Government claims. The key question, however, is whether militarily crushing the LTTE solves the island-nation’s ethnic conflict. The Rajapakse government has so far not proposed any political package in dealing with the problem. Military victory, not backed by political package for Tamils, can prove disastrous for Sri Lanka. Such a situation could in fact lead to the birth of many more LTTEs in the future.



While majority of Sri Lankan Tamils may not want a separate state of Eelam, they do want to live well and live with dignity. How can this be assured by the Rajapakse government? While it is clear that there will not be a separate state of Tamil Eelam, the existing unitary set up also remains unacceptable. From the time he took over power in 2005, Rajapakse has been of the view that he is for maximum devolution of power within a unitary state. But it is not clear what that means. There has to be dramatic changes made in the political architecture of Sri Lanka in which the Tamils are able to find a political space for themselves. The aspect that needs to be kept in mind in understanding the Sri Lankan ethnic problem is the Sinhalese allergy to the word “federalism.” One must though admit that the Sinhala government has come a long way, when in December 2002, the Joint Communiqué after the end of the bilateral talks with India, noted that the idea of federal structures would be examined. This was again reiterated in the Tokyo meeting. During Rajapakse’s visit to India in December 2005, the Joint Statement said that more devolution of powers would be undertaken. However, President Mahinda Rajapakse is yet to do anything to live up to this commitment.
In today’s situation, there is only a small miniscule representation of Tamils in various bodies, including in the Sri Lankan Army, where Sinhalas represent 99.4% of total strength and the Sri Lankan Police, where the figure is 96%. In the case of civil administration, one or two Tamils are selected each year. The government will have to undertake to undo several of its legislative measures of the past that established the discrimination and alienation of the Tamils. In fact, successive legislations brought upon the Tamils by the Sinhala governments, including the enactment of “Sinhala Only language policy” in 1961, brought down Tamil representation in civil administration, armed forces and police services. Similarly, the government will have to revisit the 13th amendment (which established Provincial Councils) and bring all Tamils under a permanent merger of the North and East Provinces, done originally under the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord of 1987. India, however, having burnt its finger once, remains wary of getting involved in the conflict. In such a scenario, India’s recent actions appear designed more to soothe the anger of the regional parties in Tamil Nadu than a genuine expression of concern.
What are India’s challenges? India, being a neighbour, should keep in mind that unity of Sri Lanka is of utmost importance to India in the sense that any disintegration of the country can create problems for India. In that sense, it is in India’s interest to ensure that Sri Lanka remains united. India, entrenched in coalition politics, is tied down by several constraints. However, India can contribute significantly in ensuring a political package for the Tamils. India needs to start talking to the major parties -- SLFP, UNP -- on a political package. After reaching a consensus with these two major parties, they can convince JVP and other democratic Tamil parties and thereby start a political process and see how best to implement the 13th amendment. The 13th amendment is critical since it devolves some authority to the provinces and in essence, the provincial councils will enjoy statute power with regard to items in the provincial list, including local infrastructure (roads and bridges), education, health, land, irrigation, agriculture.
Military solution unaccompanied by a political package will give birth to new problems.

Sri Lanka Presents India Five Challenges

This analysis on Indian Challenges vis a vis Sri Lanka appeared first on the ORF website.

While most people in India would not be unhappy to see the Tamil Tigers, and particularly their boss, Vellupillai Prabhakaran, get their comeuppance, the situation does present some complications. New Delhi’s boilerplate declarations about a ‘peaceful solution acceptable to all’ mask the serious challenges that India faces as Colombo prepares for the final push against the Tigers.



New Delhi faces five challenges. First, it is deeply concerned over the spill over effects of the ethnic conflict in terms of the refugee inflow into the Indian mainland and the political ramifications in Tamil Nadu and other parts of India. Escalation of the conflict has resulted in the exodus of more than 20,000 Sri Lankan Tamil refugees into India in the last two years. But this has tapered off over the last few months. It appears for the time being that Tamil civilians who are caught in the conflict are staying put in Sri Lanka as they are in restricted camps set up by the Sri Lankan government. Increased vigil on the India-Sri Lanka coastlines is also dissuading some. However, this situation may change if Colombo does not come out with a political solution once the military operations are over.
The second serious challenge is LTTE operations in and around India. LTTE activities in the Palk Bay are one cause for concern for India as Indian fishermen are often caught in the crossfire between the Sri Lankan Navy and the Sea Tigers. Another issue is that of LTTE sleeper cells in Tamil Nadu and possibly elsewhere. Most importantly, if the LTTE is defeated in Sri Lanka’s North East, they might want to continue the fight from Tamil Nadu, where they have a support base. This could, without doubt, have spillover effects on nascent Tamil nationalist movements in Tamil Nadu.
Third, the impact on Tamil Nadu politics could be significant. LTTE sympathisers, especially those active in Tamil Nadu politics, have already exploited the situation. Fear of agitation by these groups has meant that the Indian government has so far sent only relief and medical supplies to Sri Lanka. Despite requests from the Sri Lankan government for defense items, India has not supplied anything, though the Indian position has been to quietly support the Rajapakse Government. While it may be too early to say what effect the anger and resentment in Tamil Nadu will have on New Delhi, it could affect the formation of the next coalition government in Delhi. The loser in such coalition-building exercise would have an interest in stoking tensions.
The fourth challenge is of other countries meddling in Sri Lanka. India’s refusal to supply defence items to Colombo has forced it to look to Pakistan and China. Increasing defence cooperation between these countries would have adverse security implications for India. Pakistan has emerged as a major supplier of defence items, including tanks and light weapons. Additionally, Pakistani pilots are thought to have flown some of the precision strikes against the LTTE leadership. Pakistan has also been seeking to exploit the presence of the Muslim population in Sri Lanka’s East, building mosques in the region and activating fundamentalist groups there.
The increasing Chinese links with Sri Lanka are also not in Indian security interests. China is engaged in a series of infrastructure and port development projects in Sri Lanka. Of most consequence is the development of the Hambantota port, where China could possibly set up listening-posts that could be activated in times of conflict in the future. The second aspect relates to China’s defence cooperation with Sri Lanka. The warehouse of the Chinese arms supplier, Norinco, in Galle is a case in point. Sri Lanka has a credit line and its forces are permitted to take items from the warehouse as and when they need it. Lastly, there is a trilateral partnership between Sri Lanka, Pakistan and China, which is detrimental to Indian interests. The commonality of defence equipment among them has increased defence interaction between them.
Because of the election season in India, it is unlikely that New Delhi will take major initiatives. Post-election coalition politics is also likely to affect Indian options. However things turn out in New Delhi, the next Indian administration will have some serious challenges to face in Sri Lanka.