Friday, December 28, 2018

Why India Fears Trump’s Emerging Afghanistan Approach - 28 December 2018

In my latest column for The Diplomat, "Why India Fears Trump’s Emerging Afghanistan Approach," I write on the US troop withdrawal from Afghanistan and what it could mean for Indian security. I argue that a weaker American presence would only compound New Delhi’s existing Afghan conundrum.
Last week, U.S. President Donald Trump decided to pull out about 7,000 American troops from Afghanistan. The decision to slash the number of troops by half appears to have been taken by Trump against the advice of his own senior administration officials, and this has provoked varied reactions in the region and in the United States.

For India, however, there is little question that this surprising decision puts it in a tough position of having to manage any potential fallout while having few viable policy options to deal with the emerging situation in Afghanistan. It is no surprise that commentators in New Delhi have almost uniformly expressed concerns about the consequences of the decision for India.

For the full essay, click here.



India’s policy has been to suggest an “Afghan-led, Afghan-owned and Afghan-controlled,” process with participation of the Afghan government. The gist of this appears to be that India wants to leave Pakistan out of the process. But it has become increasingly concerned about the central role that all key players are giving to Pakistan. In reality, most of the other stakeholders have simply ignored India’s views and have been engaged in finding a solution with the inclusion of Taliban and its sponsors in Pakistan. Oddly enough, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi, for the first time acknowledged that India has a stake in Afghanistan and that Indian cooperation is necessary for the peace process in the country.

A clear effect of India’s stand has been to isolate India in the multiple ongoing negotiations for ending the war. As an editorial in an Indian newspaper, The Hindustan Times, noted, “the American withdrawal comes at a time when its [India] views on Afghanistan are at a significant variance with other traditional regional partners like Russia and Iran.” In fact, the U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation, Zalmay Khalilzad, had twice skipped New Delhi when he had visited the region to hold talks on Afghan reconciliation. Even India’s long-standing ally, Russia, has ignored India’s objections to negotiating with the Taliban, and invited the Taliban to the second round of talks in Moscow in early November (India swallowed its pride and did send two former foreign service officials to the Moscow talks).

Of course, India has not been entirely forgotten in the Afghanistan conversation. For instance, India can take some comfort from the fact that Ambassador Khalilzad will be stopping over in India over his next swing through the region in January, while the Russian Special Envoy, Zamir Kabulob, also visited New Delhi last week for bilateral India-Russia discussions on Afghanistan. Nonetheless, all in all, it is clear that despite the fact that India has contributed a huge amount of economic assistance to Afghanistan and the supposed-support for India among the Afghan masses, New Delhi has found itself without much viable options in discussions about the future of Afghanistan.

India’s problem of being increasingly marginalized in discussions involving a wider range of regional players is only compounded by the fear of the potential consequences of American troop pullout. The first concern is about which forces will be withdrawn. As a former senior Indian foreign service officer wrote in a recent column in an Indian newspaper, The Asian Age, “if the air assistance component is kept intact and only trainers leave, then perhaps the effect may be gradual.” This point was also reiterated by “people in the know in New Delhi” presumably government officials, who also stated that whether the troops being pulled back would be those “involved in counter-terrorism or those advising Afghan combat troops or both.”

A second issue mentioned by these so-called “people in the know” is the time frame for the withdrawal, whether they leave before the upcoming Afghan elections or after. But the Indian concerns are not just about what happens in Afghanistan but also the effects of that in the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir. A former senior police official from the state pointed out that “the US pulling out troops from Afghanistan will have implications in the Kashmir Valley as terrorist outfits there may feel emboldened.” It is also clear that Indian commentators are increasingly rethinking the earlier hostility towards the Taliban. As one noted, “India can’t remain oblivious to the ground realities in Afghanistan by maintaining a hostile attitude towards Taliban.”

There is little doubt that New Delhi is becoming increasingly anxious about the state of the Afghan peace process and particularly about Trump’s sudden decision to withdraw forces. But at the same time, India also finds itself without very many good options about how to proceed. If the United States does go ahead with a significant withdrawal of forces from Afghanistan, India’s troubles will undoubtedly deepen.

Wednesday, December 26, 2018

India’s Big Defense Acquisition Challenge - December 22, 2018

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I wrote on India’s big defense acquisition challenge. I argue that occasional concerns about corrupt defense deals are merely the symptoms of broader structural issues that need to be addressed.


Accusations about corruption in defense deals are once again roiling in Indian politics. This time, the charges pertain to India’s decision to purchase 36 Rafale fighter jets from France. Questions have been raised about why the deal was abruptly changed from 126 fighter jets, many of which would have built under license in India, to just 36, which are being bought as fly-aways.

Irrespective of the veracity of the charges, it is clear that opposition parties will use the issue in the upcoming general elections in mid-2019. The case illustrates the broken nature of India’s defense acquisition process, but even more importantly, it demonstrates that the Indian political system and governing institutional mechanisms have not come up with a way to adjudicate these issues outside of the political arena. The consequence is that Indian defense acquisitions are likely to continue to suffer for the foreseeable future.

The immediate consequence will be felt by the Indian Air Force (IAF). The IAF has a sanctioned strength of 42 squadrons but it is currently down by a quarter at just about 31 squadrons. Even of these 31, almost half of the aircraft are of the 1960s and 1970s vintage, such as the MiG-21s, MiG-27s, and Jaguars.



The IAF was planning to replace these under the MMRCA (Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft) program, which featured competition between fighter planes from several countries, with Rafale emerging as the ultimate winner. Negotiations for the acquisition of the Rafale, however, proved to be difficult and the Congress-led UPA government, which initiated the deal, was replaced before the deal could be concluded.

But in 2015, Prime Minister Narendra Modi changed the deal and decided to purchase 36 jets outright. Questions were raised about the sudden change but more recently, opposition parties have charged that the new deal and particularly its offset clause favors business interests, who are alleged to be close to the ruling BJP and specifically Modi. While the deal itself is going through, it still leaves the IAF with a huge shortfall. The IAF has restarted the process for buying another 110 fighter planes, which would see a re-run of the MMRCA competition with the same planes once again competing for more-or-less the same deal.

More importantly, the travails of the MMRCA deal highlight once again the politically fraught nature of large defense acquisitions in India. The charges of corruption in defense deals are not new. There have been accusations of corruption in previous defense deals also including the Bofors artillery gun, coffins bought for soldiers during the Kargil War, and the purchase of Augusta Westland VVIP choppers.

While none of these accusations have been decided by the courts in India, the political and bureaucratic effects on India have been far more damaging. Fear of accusations has slowed Indian defense procurement to a crawl as illustrated by the nearly two-decade long MMRCA case.

Part of the response to these problems has been to write very elaborate rules for acquisition, with the hope being that such rules will eliminate any element of discretion because any exercise of discretion could potentially be challenged as being motivated by ulterior reasons. But other than complicating the process, these rules really haven’t helped smooth the path of defense acquisition. Bureaucrats are increasingly worried about having their name attached to any such deals because they could later be called to answer questions if the deals run into problems at the political level. Thus, they would rather postpone making decisions, leaving the choice to their successors rather than risk being caught up in political games.

An important part of the problem is also the inadequacy of Indian police agencies and Indian courts. These cases are usually handled by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), but the CBI has a very poor record of being an effective or independent police agency. It is usually seen as acting on the whims of the government in power, changing its positions on criminal and corruption cases when its political masters change. Even the Supreme Court (SC) has criticized the CBI, calling it a caged parrot.

Even more importantly, the CBI’s investigative capacity is also clearly wanting. Even in cases where political masters are presumably interested in letting the CBI move ahead, such as the cases involving a previous government, the CBI has not been able to effectively investigate or close these cases. The consequence of the CBI’s lack of autonomy and its incompetence is that these cases are likely never to be closed but continue to run in political cycles for decades on end. The absence of a neutral and effective investigative and judicial process means that accusations of corruption essentially become simply political ploys rather than matters of justice that eventually reach any closure.

Thus, India is likely to continue facing to have difficult time with large defense acquisitions, especially when they involve foreign military equipment. And consequent to this, India’s defense acquisition is likely to continue to be slow and creaky. Combined with low levels of defense budgets, the effect on India’s defense preparedness is likely to be telling.

Friday, December 14, 2018

Is India Expecting Too Much From Its Strategic Partnership With Vietnam? - 14 December 2018

In this week's column for the Diplomat, I wrote about the state of India-Vietnam strategic partnership. It appears that all is not well with the partnership. I argue that despite growing strategic convergence, New Delhi should also be mindful of some of the limitations in the relationship.

It has been an active few months for India-Vietnam relations, with several diplomatic and defense visits being recorded by the two sides. That in and of itself should come as no surprise for those following developments in the Asia-Pacific. Vietnam is one of India’s closest international partners and an important component of India’s Act East Policy. Over the last decade, Vietnam has also become a vital part of India’s strategy to counter China’s rise in Asia.

But while Vietnam-India relations have remained strong, with multiple senior-level visits between the two countries, there are indications that all is not well with the relationship. Put simply, New Delhi might be expecting too much from the Vietnam relationship, while Vietnam, though also very keen on the India relationship, may be facing constraints in how close it can get to New Delhi and how much it can serve New Delhi’s strategic objectives. Indian strategy should consider the limitations that Vietnam faces and pare down its expectations from Hanoi.

For the full article, click here.



On the surface, there are natural affinities that should lead to closer India-Vietnam ties. Historically, the two countries have had good relations going back to the Vietnam War. During that war, India consistently and vocally supported the Vietnamese cause, much to the irritation of Washington and despite India’s dependence on the United States for economic assistance. India even supported Vietnam during its invasion and occupation of Cambodia, despite the fact that this was not a particularly popular position internationally. India also supported Vietnam when China attacked it in 1979, with Foreign Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee cutting short his visit to China in protest.

These historical ties are now complemented by deep strategic necessity. Both India and Vietnam worry about China’s growing power and domination. Both have had recent experiences of being attacked by China. And both have independently realigned their policies, becoming friendly with the United States as well as traditional American allies in the Indo-Pacific such as Japan and Australia. Both also, of course, have active territorial disputes with China.

These natural affinities have indeed strengthened the relationship between the two countries, especially in the defense and strategic sector. There are frequent high-level visits and meetings between the two sides. The most recent of these was the Indian Chief of Army Staff General Bipin Rawat’s visit to Vietnam on November 22-25. His visit came barely a week after Indian President Ram Nath Kovind completed his state visit, during which he was given the rare honor of addressing the Vietnam National Assembly, which only Chinese President Xi Jinping had done before.

A couple of months before Kovind’s visit, Indian Defense Minister Nirmala Sitharaman also visited Vietnam. Moreover, India has supplied military equipment and military training to Vietnamese armed forces. New Delhi had hoped that this military relationship would further deepen with sales of other equipment such as the Akash surface-to-air missile. India and Vietnam had already concluded a strategic partnership, one of the very few that Vietnam had entered into.

But despite this natural affinity and the closeness of the strategic relationship, there are also indications that there are limits to this relationship. For one, though Vietnam is building up its military strength to defend against China and building partnerships with other like-minded countries, Vietnam faces the same difficulties in balancing against Beijing that most of China’s neighbors face: even as it seeks to increase its capacity to defend against China, Hanoi is also concerned about provoking China.

Thus, Vietnam has been very reluctant to be seen as “ganging up” against China with other countries. In particular, it is wary of being seen to be an integral part of the the Quadrilateral Security Initiative (Quad). Indeed, it is notable that the Vietnamese ambassador to India, Pham Sanh Chau explicitly stated as much in a recent interview in New Delhi.

In addition to multilateral alignments like the Quad, Vietnam also seems concerned about how far it wants to go in deepening the military relationship with India. For instance, though Vietnam has bought some naval equipment from India and has allowed India to train its naval personnel, Hanoi has been reluctant to buy additional equipment from India. India has extended a $500 million line of credit to Vietnam for purchase of Indian military equipment, but much of that remains unused. Indeed, Vietnam had sought to convert some of that for non-defense purchases, which India has refused.

Despite India pushing the Akash surface-to-air missile, Vietnam has appeared resistant to purchase this. There have also been rumors about India selling the BrahMos anti-ship missile to Vietnam, which does not appear to have gone through, though it is not clear whether it is because of Vietnamese reluctance or other factors.

What this suggests is that though Indio-Vietnamese ties are deep, including in the defense sector, and though there may be strong strategic rationale pushing the two countries together, there are also potentially clear limits to the relationship. As much as Hanoi needs greater support, it also has to worry about potential negative Chinese reactions. This is not an idle concern: there have already been concerns raised in the Chinese media about India-Vietnam ties.

New Delhi needs to be careful not to push Vietnam too far, especially considering its own reluctance in being seen as “ganging up” against China. India itself has been dragging its feet on the Quad, it is worth noting. And the concerns about a negative response from China is not limited to India and Vietnam, but is common in most countries in China’s periphery.

China’s tremendous power and its demonstrated willingness to use diplomatic and economic resources to get its way mean that most of its neighbors are reluctant to push balancing strategies too hard. This requires New Delhi to be sensitive to Vietnam’s concerns and not be too ambitious about the potential for the relationship.

Tuesday, December 11, 2018

Why the 2018 US-India Air Force Exercises Matter - 11 December 2018

I wrote for the Diplomat on the ongoing US-India Air Force Exercises that will be wrapped up in a few days. I argue that the ‘Cope India’ military exercise holds broader significance for the bilateral relationship.

In June 2017, Prime Minister Narendra Modi and U.S. President Donald Trump underlined the central role of India and the United States in maintaining peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region. Recalling the tenets of the UN Charter, the two leaders emphasized the underlying importance of sovereignty and international law which should be universally respected in order for every nation to prosper.

This emphasis on strategic alignment has continued onto 2018 and its principles were reiterated again during the first U.S.-India 2+2 Strategic Dialogue held in September 2018. These principles and commitments have also formed the substantial basis for Washington and New Delhi to firm up their strategic and military engagements for the last several years.

In accordance with the bilateral commitments to a free and open Indo-Pacific, the Indian and the U.S. Air Forces have come together for a 12-day joint exercise dubbed “Cope India 2019” to be held through the end of this week (December 3 to 14).

This is the fourth iteration of the exercise conducted by the two militaries. The previous editions of the Cope India Exercise were held in 2004, 2008 and 2009 respectively. But none have been held since then, making the current exercise an indicator of the renewed mutual U.S.-Indian interest in deepening their military engagement.

For the full post, click here.



Colonel Darryl Insley, the commander of the 13th Air Expeditionary Group-Cope India 2019 (AEG-CI19) said, “We are excited and grateful for the opportunity to fly and train with our Indian air force counterparts within their home country.” The Indian Air Force Chief noted during his visit to the exercise that the significance of the joint exercises was in “create[ing] an environment of camaraderie and an opportunity to learn from each other’s best practices in enhancing operational synergy.”

The exercises are being hosted at two air force bases in India – Air Force Station Kalaikunda in Midnapore and Air Force Station Arjan Singh at Panagarh, both located in the eastern Indian state of West Bengal, not too far from the Sino-Indian border where Indian and Chinese forces were locked in a confrontation in 2017. It should be noted that the second hub of the U.S.-supplied C-130J Super Hercules transport aircrafts of the (IAF) is also hosted at the Arjan Singh Station.

The U.S. complement includes 200 U.S. Airmen with 15 aircraft from the 18th Wing, Kadena Air Base, Japan, and 182nd Airlift Wing, Illinois Air National Guard. The Indian side is being represented by Su-30MKI, Mirage-2000, Jaguar, C-130J, as well as AWACS. The Special Forces from the both the USAF and IAF are also taking part in the exercise.

The restarting of the Cope India exercises appears to be yet another indicator of the slow but growing comfort level in India about military engagement with the United States. Despite concerns by some in the Indian strategic community, India has signed the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (or what is now called the Logistics Services Agreement) and the Communication and Information Security Memorandum of Agreement (or what is now called the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement). These agreements are further boosting the U.S.-India military relationship. But India has yet to sign the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement, another of the foundational agreements that the United States has been pushing. India had early on signed the General Security of Military Information Agreement.

These agreements and military exercises tie India and the United States closer militarily. This also suggests that U.S.-India military exercises are likely to increase in scope and intensity in the coming years. Notably, India is also stepping up military exercises with other countries in the Indo-Pacific that may be considered like-minded and also have close ties with the United States. For example, India is also conducting a joint air force exercise with Japan, at the same time as the Cope India exercise with the United States.

While India’s bilateral military exercises are increasing with many countries, there are not as many multilateral joint exercises, even though the logic of carrying them out is quite clear. In some cases, such the Malabar exercise, there appears to be concern about the kind of message being sent with such exercises, especially to China. On the other hand, it is unclear why New Delhi feels that large numbers of bilateral military exercises will be more acceptable to China.

What this suggests is that India continues to want to both build up its military ties with like-minded countries, but also assuage any concerns in Beijing about India forging closer ties with potential adversaries. Whether this delicate balancing act will work remains to be seen.

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