India Must Look Beyond ASEAN in Regional Security - The Diplomat, 8 November 2019

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I wrote on India's diplomatic outreach to ASEAN and the possible limits to that engagement. I argue that in recognition of ASEAN’s limitations, New Delhi must also continue to strengthen its ties with other institutions, frameworks, and countries as well.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi was in Thailand recently for three major summits – the India-ASEAN Summit, the East Asia Summit, and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) Summit. His visit was focused on a number of issues such as trade and connectivity, as well as security partnerships.

India’s diplomatic establishment was keen to highlight this aspect of India’s engagement of ASEAN. The Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), in a special press briefing on Modi’s visit, said “The ASEAN-related summits are an integral part of our diplomatic calendar,” highlighting the fact that this was Modi’s ASEAN-India summit and sixth East Asia Summit.”

With India’s renewed focus on Southeast Asia with the Act East Policy, this should not surprise anyone. But while India sees a central role for the ASEAN in its Indo-Pacific strategy, it also needs to be cognizant of the fact that ASEAN has its own limitations.

For the full post, click here.



India has been keen on warming up its ties to Southeast Asia since the end of the Cold War. It initially adopted what was called the “Look East” policy which emphasized trade and economic linkages, but over the last decade this relationship has evolved into one that is at least equally concerned with security and strategic considerations. The policy was rebranded as “Act East” under the Modi government, to emphasize greater activism and commitment on India’s part. In January 2018, India hosted the 25th anniversary of the India-ASEAN friendship and the 15th year of the India-ASEAN summit, in which all the ten ASEAN leaders participated.

Clearly, this new approach is dictated by India’s concern about China. But if that is so, it is not clear how far ASEAN will or can go in balancing China. ASEAN’s tepid reaction to the ‘Indo-Pacific’ concept is reflective of the ASEAN’s wariness in annoying China. Earlier in the year, ASEAN did release its “Outlook on the Indo-Pacific” document, which was appreciated by New Delhi, which saw this as converging with its own Act East policy. But managing China would require a more coherent strategy and ASEAN has not been able to present a unified front when it comes to China. This division within ASEAN will likely only get deeper as Beijing becomes more muscular.

Thus far, in the face of China’s extensive economic linkages with the region, ASEAN has found it harder to take strong positions against China. While it has been particularly hard for smaller countries like Cambodia and Laos, even bigger players such as Malaysia have said they cannot afford to confront China. Most recently, the Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad said that “Malaysia does not want to take a confrontational stance toward China over the disputed South China Sea and Beijing’s alleged mistreatment of its minority Uighur Muslims.”

In the face of a divided ASEAN, India needs to strengthen its engagement with the region through other but associated platforms such as the East Asia Summit which includes key Indo-Pacific powers such as Australia, Japan and the United States. Many analysts believe that despite East Asia Summit being a key leaders forum, it has never gained the kind of traction that APEC or the G-20 has. However, they argue that it has the potential to become a major platform because of the “broad remit” it enjoys and the “inclusive” nature of the institution.

Other initiatives proposed by India also bear careful watching. At this year’s East Asia Summit, Modi proposed a new initiative called the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative, which is a reiteration of India’s commitment towards a free, open and inclusive Indo-Pacific region based on a rules-based order. The new initiative enlarges the focus on the strategic maritime space in the Indo-Pacific and is also a clear indicator of India’s willingness to address China’s maritime aggressiveness in an emphatic manner. The proposal was reportedly welcomed by ASEAN’s outgoing chair, Thailand, as well as Australia. Vijay Thakur Singh, Secretary of the MEA, detailed Modi’s new initiative as “creating partnerships among interested States in several pillars ranging from enhancing maritime security to preserving and sustainably using marine resources, building capacity, disaster prevention and management as well as working together in trade and maritime transport.”

On the sidelines of these summits, there was also a consultative meeting of the Quad countries where the Quad members reiterated “their commitment towards a free, open, prosperous and inclusive Indo-Pacific Region based on shared values and principles and respect for international law” while reflecting on “ongoing and additional practical cooperation in the areas of connectivity and infrastructure development, and security matters, including counterterrorism, cyber and maritime security, with a view to promoting peace, security, stability, prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region.” This came in the backdrop of a status report on the Indo-Pacific strategy from the U.S. State Department which also highlighted a “critical role” for India in the Indo-Pacific.

New Delhi is likely to continue to engage in large regional meetings and summits, but is probably also likely to step up engagement at bilateral and trilateral levels as well as the Quad and other minilaterals. A thicket of overlapping partnerships with like-minded partners is a better bet than following just single-track partnership with ASEAN alone. In order to develop concrete ideas on the Indo-Pacific Oceans initiative, India’s efforts cannot be limited to a normative exercise alone. Strategic partnerships with other key (and financially more capable) Indo-Pacific powers such as Japan has also become crucial.

Army Exercise Showcases Growing India-Singapore Defense Collaboration - The Diplomat, April 17, 2019

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I looked at the significance of the recently concluded India-Singapore joint army exercise, called “Bold Kurukshetra 2019. As was noted in these pages earlier this week, India and Singapore have just completed their annual joint army exercise, called “Bold Kurukshetra 2019.” The recent bilateral military exercise is a reflection of the growing strategic proximity between India and Singapore in the face of a series of challenges, including a growing and muscular China.

For the full essay, click here.



Singapore has remained one of India’s major security partners in Southeast Asia. The two countries signed their first Defense Cooperation Agreement in October 2003 and a separate memorandum of understanding on joint army exercises in 2005. The two then signed several more agreements for accelerating the pace of military-to-military relations in 2007 and 2008. These agreements have been reviewed and renewed periodically, maintaining their commitment to developing a habit of cooperation between the two countries’ armed forces.

Given Singapore’s territorial limitations, India has also opened its own military training facilities, such as the air force and artillery firing ranges, to the Singapore Armed Forces. Besides, the Indian and Singapore navies have been engaged in the annual naval exercise series called SIMBEX for more than two decades. In fact, the two countries celebrated the silver jubilee of their naval exercises last year with major displays of “multidimensional drills,” which saw the participation of many different types of ships and aircraft from India and Singapore.

Starting in 2015, the two countries have also held three editions of the Defense Ministers’ Dialogue, the last of which was held in November 2018. The third edition of this Dialogue had both the defense ministers appreciating the conclusion of the Navy Implementing Arrangement Concerning Mutual Coordination, Logistics and Services Support in June 2018. This, along with the Navy Bilateral Agreement signed in November 2017, broadened and deepened India-Singapore bilateral naval cooperation, taking the relationship higher.

They are also manifestations of the broader focus by both sides on maritime security, as evidenced by other developments as well such as a technical agreement on the sharing of white shipping information and advancing coast guard collaboration. Highlighting the significance of maritime security, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi had stated during the ASEAN India Commemorative Summit, “We remain committed to work with ASEAN to enhance our practical cooperation in our shared maritime domain.” He said India is particularly interested in pursuing cooperation on disaster risk reduction and management, joint patrols and exercises, and maritime capacity building.

India-Singapore engagements have gotten a lot stronger in recent years. Certainly, Modi has infused more traction into this relationship as part of his strengthened outreach to Southeast Asia with the Act East Policy. And there are upcoming developments that will showcase this as well, including reports that India is planning a new trilateral maritime exercise in the Andaman Sea with Singapore and Thailand later in the year.

The broader convergence of strategic interests between India and Singapore is clearly the driving factor for these engagements. At the Defense Ministers’ Dialogue, both sides have repeatedly emphasized “the importance of maintaining freedom of navigation and overflight consistent with international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.” Further, while reiterating the importance of international law, they have articulated the need to resolve disputes through peaceful means.

On the issue of deepening defense technology collaboration, India and Singapore have a set up a bilateral Defense Technology Steering Committee as well as the India-Singapore Defense Industry Working Group and they are reported to be making good progress. Areas of cooperation include Combat Care and Vehicle Armor.

The growing economic muscle and military posturing by China provides an important rationale for India and Singapore to strengthen their bilateral relations. Irrespective of the results of the current Indian national elections, which are expected in late May, it is likely that India-Singapore ties would deepen and that Singapore will remain an important priority for India’s outreach to Southeast Asia.

Minding the Gaps in India’s Act East Policy - September 17, 2018

Earlier this week, I wrote for the Diplomat exploring the role of Southeast Asia in India's idea of the Indo-Pacific construct. In "Minding the Gaps in India’s Act East Policy," I argue that New Delhi’s approach to Southeast Asia within the wider Indo-Pacific region is strategically sound but has limits.



India’s approach to Southeast Asia has been lately shifting from one dominated by trade and development to one in which strategic considerations play an important complementary role. This has taken a new form, and is now called the “Act East” Policy, marking also an expansion to include other Indo-Pacific countries.

But there are some doubts about whether the ASEAN countries are entirely comfortable with the idea of the “Indo-Pacific.” Several ASEAN states have been lukewarm to the idea, worried about having to take sides between the United States and China. This raises questions about the viability of India’s new “ASEAN-centric” approach to the Indo-Pacific.

ASEAN’s weaknesses in managing China is becoming more evident every day. While its success in regional economic integration is undeniable, on more fractious political issues, ASEAN was always less effective. These divisions have become far deeper when it comes to China. It is not clear that ASEAN will be able to act in a united manner when it comes to the South China Sea or on matters relating to China.

Smaller ASEAN countries are still wary of inviting China’s wrath by an open embrace of the Indo-Pacific concept. This is, paradoxically, a consequence of ASEAN’s success in integrating economically with China, making it hard for these countries to break with Beijing. This is particularly so for smaller countries like Cambodia, though several bigger players like Malaysia and Singapore have been resistant as well. ASEAN, therefore, is a divided house.

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New Delhi has no good options to deal with this problem. It is probably this recognition that has led India to stress additional platforms like the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) which includes Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Bhutan, and Nepal.

There has also been some suggestion from experts that BIMSTEC could be expanded to include countries such as Indonesia. On the other hand, BIMSTEC has also so far been less than a grand success. Though India has recently attempted to revive BIMSTEC – partly to sideline the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), which includes Pakistan – New Delhi’s efforts have sometimes fallen flat. An effort to expand the scope of BIMSTEC by conducting its first-ever military exercise saw two countries, Nepal and Thailand, refusing to join.

India and other countries are also stepping up efforts to chip away at one source of ASEAN’s dependence on China – infrastructural aid. India and Japan, along with the United States, have already started doing this. The private sector in India and Japan are also joining the United States under the Indo-Pacific Business Forum to promote infrastructure.

Such measures would provide real choices to countries in ASEAN and elsewhere in the Indo-Pacific that are otherwise stuck with China. India and its partners have had some success in pointing out the flaws in China’s model of infrastructure “aid,” which has at times led to debt traps that forced countries to give up valuable assets to China. This new form of neocolonialism is now well recognized. But without alternatives, the temptations of China’s checkbook diplomacy are hard to resist for many smaller countries. Thus, infrastructural assistance has to be an integral part of any strategy to counter China’s efforts in this direction.

The downside here is that India does not enjoy a very good track record in this regard. Despite the rhetoric of a strengthened outreach, the capacity to extend regional connectivity and infrastructure building has been insufficient. The Modi government too appears to have laid more emphasis in its official statements, with very little to show on the ground. The trilateral highway with Myanmar and Thailand is a case in point: though Thailand has completed its part of the highway, India has yet to do so on the Indian side of the border.

India’s poor track record in its infrastructure building in India’s Northeast is yet another indicator. If India cannot develop even its own connectivity with ASEAN, its pledges to help others in ASEAN with infrastructure are bound to sound hollow. India needs to do more to convert its rhetoric into reality.

India clearly wants to help ASEAN stand up to China because it is in New Delhi’s interest. But while there is little doubt about New Delhi’s desires, ASEAN countries are likely to look for actual deliveries rather than promises. India’s repeated assertion of ASEAN-centrality has so far not given ASEAN countries – especially the smaller ones – sufficient reason to hope that India can be an effective substitute for China. This will only deepen the existing divisions within ASEAN and make India’s ASEAN-centrality strategy that much more difficult to accomplish.

India, Malaysia Kick Off Military Exercise, my column in The Diplomat, 4 May 2018

In May, my first piece for The Diplomat was on the latest round of India-Malaysia military exercise held in Malaysia from 30 April - 13 May. The essay published on 4 May looked at the strategic rationale that is driving both countries to cultivate and nurture deeper security ties.


The Indian defense ministry, in a statement, said that the exercise is aimed at “bolstering cooperation and coordination between the armed forces of both the nations and to share the expertise of both the contingents in conduct of counter-insurgency operations in jungle terrain.” The 4 Grenadiers Battalion of the Indian Army and 1 Royal Ranjer Regiment and the Royal Malay Regiment from the Malaysian Army are participating, and, with a focus on tactical operations in jungle warfare, the two sides will engage in joint training, planning and executing a series of training activities in the dense forests of Sengai Perdik, Hulu Langat, Malaysia.

These exercises will refine and sharpen the operational counterinsurgency tactics of both the armies, but the larger aim is clearly to boost the strategic partnership between the two countries. Though this is not the first joint military exercise in this series, New Delhi has claimed that “(T)his is the first instance wherein a joint training exercise of this magnitude involving Indian and Malaysian soldiers is being organized on Malaysian soil.”

For the full essay, click here.



In the face of unprecedented uncertainties in the Indo-Pacific, mostly driven by China’s rise, India’s outreach efforts to ASEAN has accelerated. The effort has included an increased number of security consultations, political dialogues, and joint military exercises with Southeast Asian countries.

All 10 ASEAN leaders were in India for the 69th Republic Day celebrations, a first. The usual pattern has been to invite one foreign leader for these celebrations. The invitation was indicative of the importance India attaches to the strategic engagement with the ASEAN countries.

Now, in another indicator of India’s stepped up outreach to the region, India is holding another iteration of a large joint military exercise with Malaysia. The military exercise, titled “Harimau Shakti,” is being held in Malaysia from April 30 to May 13. The joint combat exercise is meant to create greater synergy and interoperability between the two armed forces.

The Indian defense ministry, in a statement, said that the exercise is aimed at “bolstering cooperation and coordination between the armed forces of both the nations and to share the expertise of both the contingents in conduct of counter-insurgency operations in jungle terrain.” The 4 Grenadiers Battalion of the Indian Army and 1 Royal Ranjer Regiment and the Royal Malay Regiment from the Malaysian Army are participating, and, with a focus on tactical operations in jungle warfare, the two sides will engage in joint training, planning and executing a series of training activities in the dense forests of Sengai Perdik, Hulu Langat, Malaysia.

These exercises will refine and sharpen the operational counterinsurgency tactics of both the armies, but the larger aim is clearly to boost the strategic partnership between the two countries. Though this is not the first joint military exercise in this series, New Delhi has claimed that “(T)his is the first instance wherein a joint training exercise of this magnitude involving Indian and Malaysian soldiers is being organized on Malaysian soil.”

The two sides have had a history of military cooperation, and became strategic partners in 2010. In the defense arena, the two sides have engaged in exchange of information on training, maintenance and technical support for Su-30 fighter aircraft, in addition to the establishment of a “Systems School” for the fighters at the Gong Kedak airbase. The Indian Air Force had also stationed a team in Malaysia between 2008 and 2010 as Malaysia was inducting and starting the operation of the Su-30 MKM fighter aircraft, which they had just procured. Earlier in the 1990s, the Malaysian Air Force had sent its pilots and technicians to India to train on the Mig-29 Fulcrums.

Bilateral naval cooperation has also remained strong, and the Indian Navy regularly participates along with other external partners in the Langkawi International Maritime and Aerospace Exhibition in Malaysia. Port visits by Indian Navy and Coast Guard ships are also of significance especially in the context of the increasing Chinese naval footprint in in the Indian Ocean. India and Malaysia have also established a mechanism for information sharing information for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) and white shipping.

The relatively increased emphasis on the defense domain in India’s ties with Southeast Asian states including Malaysia bears watching from a historical perspective. When India’s Look East Policy was announced in the early 1990s, India’s focus was limited mostly to economic and trade issues, and Singapore was the focal point within ASEAN. The economic focus is still important, including in India’s ties with Malaysia. Najib during his trip to India in 2017 noted that Malaysia had not tapped into realizing “the full potential of the bilateral relationship” but “is belatedly showing interest in the Indian economy to some extent.”

But the strategic aspects of the relationship have also clearly become more important over time as “Look East” has begun to be translated more into “Act East.'” Ties with individual countries in the region such as Indonesia and Malaysia are gaining greater traction and visibility. Malaysia and India, for one, have emphasized their commitment to maintaining open seas and freedom of navigation, on the basis of the principles enshrined in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The two have also reiterated their call to all claimant parties to avoid using unilateral measures and find peaceful solutions to disputes involving sovereignty and territorial integrity. As China becomes increasingly active in India’s backyard in South Asia, New Delhi can be expected to focus equally on China’s backyard in Southeast Asia.