India-Vietnam Relations: Strong and Getting Stronger - The Diplomat, 28 August 2020

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I wrote on India-Vietnam relations. I argue that with China as a shared concern, India and Vietnam continue to deepen their relationship.

Earlier this week, India and Vietnam held the 17th meeting of their bilateral Joint Commission on Trade, Economic, Scientific and Technological Cooperation. The Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) in a statement said that the meeting was co-chaired by External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar and Vietnam’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Pham Binh Minh via video conference.

It appears that both sides have been pleased with outcomes of the meeting and the pace of the relationship. Jaishankar was particularly appreciative of Vietnam’s positive leadership of ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations) this year, especially at a time when the region is battling the COVID-19 pandemic. Both sides reportedly also discussed China’s aggressive behavior in their respective neighborhoods.

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At the meeting, the two sides took stock of the state of the India-Vietnam Comprehensive Strategic Partnership and agreed to step up their defense and economic partnership. The two sides put special emphasis on areas such as civil nuclear energy, space, marine sciences, and emerging technologies. India and Vietnam also agreed to strengthen their strategic partnership “in line with India’s Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI) and the ASEAN’s Outlook on Indo-Pacific to achieve shared security, prosperity and growth for all in the region.”

IPOI is an initiative launched by Prime Minister Narendra Modi at the East Asia Summit in Thailand in November 2019. The initiative is centered around seven pillars including maritime security; maritime ecology; maritime resources; capacity building and resource sharing; disaster risk reduction and management; science, technology, and academic cooperation; and trade connectivity and maritime transport. India has called on Vietnam to partner on one of the seven pillars of the IPOI.

Both India and Vietnam have maintained close relations with frequent meetings between senior officials from both countries. For instance, Pham Sanh Chau, Vietnam’s ambassador to India, recently met with Indian Foreign Secretary Harsh Shringla, and briefed him about the recent tensions following China’s deployment of an H-6J bomber to Woody Island, part of the disputed Paracel Islands. The ambassador conveyed Vietnam’s determination to further the bilateral Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with greater energy and vigor.

Earlier, on August 4, Pranay Verma, India’s ambassador to Vietnam, had a meeting with Tran Quoc Vuong, Politburo member and permanent member of the Party Central Committee’s Secretariat, who again emphasized the need for closer ties between New Delhi and Hanoi. Vuong was particularly appreciative of India’s stand on the South China Sea issue, and reiterated Vietnam’s firm stand that all the claimant states must resolve the sovereignty and territorial disputes through dialogue and peaceful means, and by respecting international law including the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.

Vietnam is also keen for India to expand its presence in oil and gas exploration in the South China Sea and has firmly maintained that the areas fall well within Vietnam’s economic zone. India has on many occasions explained that it will continue to maintain its oil and gas exploration tie-ups with Vietnam in Vietnamese waters. A recent virtual meeting of the Vietnam Trade Office in India and the Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry of India (ASSOCHAM) identified several additional areas for cooperation between India and Vietnam.

At the recent Joint Commission meeting, India also reiterated its development and capacity assistance for Vietnam through quick impact projects (QIP), Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) and e-ITEC initiatives, Ph.D. fellowships and proposals in the area of water resource management in Vietnam’s Mekong Delta region, Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and digital connectivity. The MEA in its press release stated that India has already approved 12 QIPs for implementation in Vietnam: seven in water resource management in Vietnam’s Mekong Delta Region and five linked to construction of educational infrastructure in Vietnam. Research and training are also important in the bilateral agenda and this has translated to a couple of MoUs between the Sushma Swaraj Institute of Foreign Service (SSIFS), New Delhi and Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam, Hanoi, and the National Maritime Foundation, New Delhi and Scientific Research Institute of Sea and Islands, Hanoi.

Defense ties between India and Vietnam are also gathering traction. India earlier gave Vietnam a $100 million line of credit for the procurement of 12 high-speed patrol boats. An Indian private sector firm, Larsen & Toubro (L&T) is developing the boats. In February this year, J.D. Patil, director and senior executive vice president of defense and smart technologies at L&T, stated that they will be delivering the first boat this September. “Five boats will be built by L&T while the remaining will be built in Vietnam. We are trying to finish the boats by mid 2021,” Patil told The Hindu.

India has also given Vietnam another $500 million line of credit for buying defense equipment from India. Discussions are on currently to identify the systems that Vietnam may be interested in buying from India. According to defense sources quoted in the media, Hanoi is interested in India’s Akash surface-to-air systems and Dhruv advanced light helicopters. Defense analysts argue that especially in the wake of the Galwan clash, India must proceed with both the Brahmos and the Akash missile systems and not continue being coy on account of China’s reactions. Discussions on the possible sale of Brahmos have been going on for a few years now. Reportedly, disagreements with Russia (the missile was jointly developed with Russia) on the sale have been resolved.

Keeping in mind the strategic challenges in the Indo-Pacific region, primarily those posed by China, India and Vietnam have decided to work in close coordination at multilateral institutions such as the U.N. Security Council, where both India and Vietnam are elected to be non-permanent members in 2021. The two also decided to continue the momentum in regional strategic platforms such as those under ASEAN. This will be in continuation of the already vibrant conversations between India and ASEAN. For instance, in December 2019, India hosted the Delhi Dialogue-XI with ASEAN countries under the theme “Advancing Partnership in the Indo-Pacific.” In February 2020, India, Australia, and Indonesia hosted the 4th East Asia Summit Conference on maritime security issues. There are a number of platforms and venues that have been created at track 1 and 1.5 levels in recent years to create and sustain linkages between India and ASEAN countries on the Indo-Pacific theme. Vietnam’s leadership of ASEAN may make it easier for India and ASEAN to cooperate more on regional security issues. Some of the big powers within ASEAN like Indonesia are also likely to take stronger positions against China given the sustained harassment and naval intrusions by China in Indonesia’s Natuna islands earlier in the year.

The Sino-Indian Clash: Russia in the Middle - The Diplomat, 25 June 2020

Once again, I am lagging with my blog updates. A couple of weeks ago, I wrote a piece for The Diplomat on the Sino-Indian border clash and how Russia has positioned itself on the same. Clearly, the Sino-Indian clash puts Russia in an awkward position.

In the midst of a border crisis with China, Indian Defense Minister Rajnath Singh is away in Moscow. At the same time, India’s foreign minister joined his Russian and Chinese counterparts online for an Russia-India-China (RIC) meeting. The Sino-Indian crisis potentially puts Russia in a difficult position, having to choose between its traditional partners in India, which also represents a lucrative arms market, and its new but much more powerful friend in the east, China.

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The ostensible reason for Singh’s visit to Russia was to attend the rescheduled Victory Day Parade. The annual parade commemorating the end of World War II was supposed to be held on May 9, but was postponed due to the pandemic. A 75-member tri-service Indian military contingent participated in the parade.

The Chinese defense minister was also in Moscow to attend the same parade. However, the Indian side made it clear that there would be no meeting between the two ministers. All negotiations between India and China on the border crisis are taking place bilaterally either through diplomatic channels or through local military commanders. The fact that the RIC meeting was an online affair also helps to ensure that Russia is not forced to mediate between the two sides.

Indian anger at China is palpable. In fact, Indian Foreign Minister Dr. S. Jaishankar in his speech at the RIC pointedly stated that “the challenge today is not just one of concepts and norms, but equally of their practice. The leading voices of the world must be exemplars in every way.”

India’s interests in Russia are obvious. A significant part of Indian military equipment comes from Russia. In the midst of the crisis with China, the Indian Air Force has asked for 33 new fighter aircraft including 21 MiG-29s and 12 Su-30 MKIs from Russia. This is an old acquisition plan, but it has been pushed for accelerated delivery. The deal is worth over 60 billion Indian rupees ($793 million) and is expected to be approved by the Ministry of Defense in the coming days. In addition, India had already ordered 272 Su-30 MKIs spread over a 10 to 15-year time frame.

Meanwhile, India has also asked Russia for the expedited delivery of the S-400 anti-missile system. The two sides signed a contract for the S-400s in 2019. The original delivery was scheduled for 2021. There were reports that because of COVID-19, the delivery would be delayed. Singh was expected to seek an expedited delivery of the system.

Singh was also seeking assurances that the spare parts supply for Russian equipment that India already has in its arsenal will not be delayed during any crisis with China. Specifically, he was referring to the issue of spare parts for Russian-origin fighter aircraft (including the Su-30MKIs and MiG-29s of the Air Force and the MiG29Ks of the Indian Navy), the T-90 battle tanks for the Army, and the Navy’s Kilo-class submarines.

The Sino-Indian clash puts Russia in an awkward position as a recent analysis in The Wall Street Journal by Yaroslav Trofimov and Thomas Grove pointed out. There is growing recognition in Moscow about pressure from Beijing. But as the report pointed out, Russia is also stuck with China because of pressure from the West. Russia’s difficulties in improving relations with Europe have left Moscow with few options.

In the current crisis, Russia appears to have little interest in mediating between China and India. As Konstantin Kosachev, a senior lawmaker and chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Russian Federation Council, told the Indian media that Russia should not interfere in the India-China dispute and that these should be dealt with through bilateral channels.

At the recent RIC meeting, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov also maintained that India and China do not need any help in resolving their bilateral issues. Although Russia might want to keep its head down in the current crisis, Russian reactions are also being closely watched by the Indian public. Russia has a reservoir of support in India because of its traditional support, including during the 1971 India-Pakistan War. This support glosses over the fact that Russia was neutral during the 1962 Sino-Indian War because it occurred simultaneously with the Cuban missile crisis. Russia’s relations with China had become increasingly rocky – in fact, closer Soviet relations with India were one factor in the Sino-Soviet rift – but the need for Beijing’s support during the Cuban missile crisis forced Moscow to be neutral. That removed an important leg of India’s diplomatic strategy at the time. Almost 60 years later, New Delhi is probably worried that history will repeat and Russia might lean toward China simply by staying neutral.

Sri Lanka’s Role in Sino-Indian Competition in South Asia - The Diplomat, 28 January 2020

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I examined the role of Sri Lanka in the Sino-Indian competition in South Asia. The country continues to be a prime area of competition for both Asian powers in the South Asia region.

How China and India will manage their bilateral relations, even as their competition intensifies, remains a major question, with implications for their ties as well as the wider region. At the Raisina Dialogue earlier this month, India’s external affairs minister, Dr. S Jaishankar, said that finding accommodation with China “is a must; it is not a choice… We have to get along with each other.” Jaishankar recognized, as he put it, that “it is work-in-progress and it will continue to be work-in-progress because both powers are very dynamic.”

Nowhere is this arguably more difficult than in the South Asian region, which has been so far dominated by India. China has tried hard to woo various neighbors of India including Sri Lanka, Mauritius, and Myanmar. These all are countries which have had closer ties with India but because of the proximity, have also felt dominated by New Delhi. Nevertheless, India has also tried hard to make sure that these countries did not fully fall under China’s sway.

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Sri Lanka is a prime area of competition. And we have seen this playing out over the past few weeks, particularly as senior officials from both countries made their way to Sri Lanka to woo the newly-elected government of Gotabaya Rajapaksa.

China’s growing role in Sri Lanka has been widely documented, particularly its significant investment in Sri Lankan infrastructure. But these have also been controversial even within Sri Lanka because some of the terms of China’s loans with which these infrastructure projects have been built has been quite unfavorable. Indeed, the Hambantota port has now become a prime example of the perils of what has come to be termed as China’s debt-trap diplomacy.

More broadly, China’s presence in Sri Lanka and the terms of its investments became a controversial issue in the last elections in Sri Lanka. Gotabaya campaigned that he would renegotiate the deal that allowed China to lease Hambantota for 99 years, a controversial deal that was made by the Sirisena Government, but one which had raised a lot of objections within the country. Despite such promises, once he was elected, Rajapaksa appears to have gone back in challenging China’s hold on Hambantota. Instead, he called upon other important players including India, Singapore, Japan, Australia, and ASEAN countries to invest in Sri Lanka.

How the new government balances India and China is clearly of importance to both New Delhi and Beijing. As if to illustrate that, China’s foreign minister Wang Yi visited Colombo last week. While it appears to have been more of a goodwill visit, Beijing will no doubt also continue to be concerned about Rajapaksa’s rhetoric during the election campaign. Seen from that perspective, Wang Yi probably wanted to ensure that there would be no damage to China’s political and financial investments under the new government.

If that is so, he has reasons to be satisfied. According to the Chinese foreign ministry statement, “China will continue to firmly support Sri Lanka in safeguarding its sovereignty and national dignity.” But at the same time, the statement also noted that “China-Sri Lanka cooperation has never targeted at any third party and also it should not be affected by any third party.” It doesn’t take much to guess which third party that China is referring to here.

Not to be outdone, India’s National Security Advisor Ajit Doval made a beeline for Colombo just a few days after Wang Yi left. The previously unannounced visit appears to have been cordial, with the two sides discussing strengthening bilateral cooperation on national security, intelligence sharing and regional cooperation. India and Sri Lanka have had several high-level exchanges even since Rajapaksa’s election in November 2019. His first foreign visit was to India in November. His brother and now Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa is to visit New Delhi in early February.

Both China and India are clearly attempting to ensure that they do not lose out to the other when it comes to currying favor with the new regime in Colombo. At the same time, is unlikely that Colombo will pick one side or the other because it makes more sense for it to get China and India continue to woo it with gifts and attention, which will stop if Sri Lanka makes a choice. Thus, even as India and China compete, Sri Lanka has every incentive to keep both parties in play so as to benefit from both.

China and India too certainly recognize the dynamic at play. But they will also recognize that they have little choice but to keep up the game given the broader geopolitical dynamics at play. Neither side can win unless they abandon the field, which of course neither side will do.