India-Japan Defense Ties to Get a Boost With Modi-Abe Virtual Summit - The Diplomat, 20 August 2020

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I looked at the upcoming virtual summit meeting between India and Japan. I argue that despite some disappointments on both sides, the India-Japan relationship looks set to further deepen in the face of an aggressive China.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his Japanese counterpart Shinzo Abe will meet for a virtual summit in September. This will be Modi’s second virtual summit this year, after one with the Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison in June. According to Indian media reports, citing India’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), the two sides are expected to sign an important military logistics agreement, the Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA). While this remains an important milestone moment for New Delhi and Tokyo, it also remains key for both countries to take stock of what has been accomplished so far.

For the full essay, click here.



India and Japan missed their planned 2019 summit because of protests against the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) in Guwahati, in the northeastern Indian state of Assam, where the meeting was supposed to be held. Although the Modi government was reportedly keen to shift the meeting venue to Delhi, the Japanese side insisted that the focus of the 2019 summit was on Japanese investment in India’s Northeast infrastructure development and therefore, as a Japanese diplomat said, “The venue is the message.” Since then, India and Japan have been trying to reschedule the summit, but the COVID-19 pandemic further delayed their plans.

The current summit meeting comes against the backdrop of Chinese aggression against both countries, along the Sino-Indian border and the East China Sea. The Abe government is reportedly also keen to explore the possibility of shifting some Japanese manufacturing to India as part of its efforts to shift such operations out of China. This is part of a concerted effort of several countries to shift their manufacturing out of China in order to reduce their dependency on Beijing. The two leaders are also reportedly working to strengthen the Quad agenda in this regard.

The ACSA should also boost the geographical reach and influence of both countries’ militaries. India has so far signed such logistics agreement with the United States, South Korea, and Australia. Such logistics agreements are meant to simplify the processes involved in using each other’s facilities. It took India more than a decade to sign the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) with the U.S. on account of several misperceptions, but since its signing in 2016 it has become easier for India to negotiate such deals with other countries. Probably to maintain some semblance of balance, India is negotiating a similar agreement with Russia. The Russian agreement is named differently, the Agreement on Reciprocal Logistics Support (ARLS).

The India-Japan ACSA got a big push during the last summit in Japan in October 2018. India’s MEA in a statement at the time said, “The two leaders welcomed the joint exercise between each of the three services and the commencement of negotiations on the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA), which will enhance the strategic depth of bilateral security and defense cooperation.” The inaugural 2+2 dialogue, the India-Japan Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting, also noted “the significant progress” made in the negotiations of ACSA and their desire “for early conclusion of the negotiations” which would “further contribute to enhancing defense cooperation between the two sides.”

The India-Japan ACSA would provide the two militaries with access to each other’s military facilities for repair and replenishment of provisions as well as overall improve the scope and sophistication of military-to-military cooperation. In fact, the India-Japan ACSA is reported to be broader in scope, encompassing overall defense cooperation between the two countries, with logistics as one important leg in the expanding defense partnership. Japan could get access to India’s key naval bases, including in the Andaman and Nicobar islands, close to the Malacca Straits, a key international sea lane. The agreement will also enhance India’s own operational reach, most specifically for the Indian Navy. India could gain access to Japanese bases such as in Djibouti. Some of the agenda items for broader India-Japan defense cooperation could include stepping up defense trade and technology cooperation under existing mechanisms, such as the Joint Working Group on Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation (JWG-DETC). There is already cooperative research work being done on areas such as unmanned ground vehicle (UGV)/robotics under this framework, but it could be expanded to an entire range of existing and emerging technologies.

It is also possible that Japan would like to see more discussion on the Japanese-built US-2 amphibious aircraft, which India has been soft-pedaling for a while now. Capacity-building for better maritime security and maritime domain awareness (MDA) are also high on the agenda for India and Japan. Establishment of the Information Fusion Center – Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR) by India in December 2018 has been deemed an important step in this regard and Japan will have a liaison officer at the IFC-IOR. Other Indo-Pacific powers such as Australia, France, and the United States will also have their officers at this center.

While ACSA and the defense agenda are forward-looking in furthering cooperation between India and Japan, there are also some difficulties in the relationship. Japan seems to have been considerably disappointed with the Indian decision to walk out of the regional trading agreement, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). The fact that Abe was not even informed before New Delhi made the announcement appears to have been a jolt to the Abe administration. Japan was counting on India to be a powerful player within the RCEP to push back on China’s aggressive economic agenda. Tokyo is also possibly disappointed about the lack of enthusiasm in New Delhi about pursuing the defense trade agenda, with the US-2 being a case in point. On the other hand, although India was keen on considering the Soryu-class submarine, Japan has been somewhat cautious, and indeed has not bid for India’s submarine contract.

Nevertheless, Japan has remained a steadfast partner to India. For instance, after the Galwan Valley clash in mid-June, the Japanese ambassador to India strongly supported India, tweeting that “Japan opposes any unilateral attempts to change the status quo.” This suggests that the pressure from China will continue to strengthen India-Japan ties, despite some disappointments on both sides.

Growing India-South Korea Strategic Synergy: The Defense Domain - The Diplomat, 13 September 2019

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I wrote on the growing strategic synergy between India and South Korea and how that is beginning to impact upon the defence domain.

In the first week of September, Indian Defense Minister Rajnath Singh was on a five-day tour of Northeast Asia, making South Korea his second stop after Japan. During the visit, the Indian minister met his counterpart, Jeong Kyeong-doo, with the two leaders highlighting the potential for expanding their cooperation in the defense and security sectors.

After undertaking a comprehensive review of the defense relations, the ministers signed two agreements, one to extend logistical support to each other’s navies, and a second one to deepen defense educational exchanges. The agreement on naval logistics sharing is particularly a significant one, given that India has such arrangements so far only with the United States and France. India is currently negotiating such an agreement with Japan.

For the full essay, click here.



While it is a clear demonstration of the deepening strategic partnership between India and South Korea, the military logistics agreement will also go a long way in enhancing India’s strategic reach in the Indo-Pacific. India’s limited naval presence in the Pacific can be addressed by the agreement as the Indian military will be in a position – to take just one example – to use the South Korean military facilities if needed.

In another important development, the two countries have developed a roadmap that will strengthen India-South Korea defense industry collaboration. This is a key area given that the Indian government has decided not to use Chinese systems and components in the broad defense electronics sector and India is yet to develop indigenous capability to fill in this gap.

Given the high-end and sophisticated nature of the South Korean defense electronic capabilities, this offers itself as an ideal win-win opportunity for Seoul and New Delhi. A defense ministry statement noted that Rajnath Singh, at a meeting of the CEOs of Korean and Indian defense industries in Seoul, listed a number of possible areas for cooperation including land systems, aero systems, naval systems, R&D co-operation and collaboration in testing, certification, and quality assurance.

Elaborating on the defense trade potential in India, the minister went on to add that “India offers tremendous business opportunity to Korean defense industries in India with liberalized licensing regime, attractive FDI provisions, strong and skilled industrial work force, single window clearances and establishment of Defense Investor Cell to facilitate investors and various other industry friendly initiatives.”

Other lines of effort also bear noting in this regard. For instance, the defense minister also invited the Korean defense industry to participate in the next DefExpo — DefExpo 2020 — that will be held in Lucknow in February 2020. The Indian defense minister has also established a joint task force to identify military systems and hardware that can be produced in India through the participation of Korean defense industries, which will be useful in avoiding the import costs of these systems.

India’s push for stronger defense cooperation comes against the backdrop of the Indian Army’s induction of the K-9 Vajra self-propelled howitzers, which is a version of the South Korean K-9 Thunder. South Korean defense industry, Samsung-Techwin, and India’s Larsen & Toubro had entered into an agreement for the sale of 100 howitzers in May 2017.

The first batch of these howitzers entered service in November 2018, with the second batch to be supplied in November 2019 and the final batch of 50 is to be delivered in November 2020. The South Korean Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) announced in 2016 that it is working on a new fully automatic projectile-and-charge loading system that will be retrofitted to the K9, fitting the howitzers with a robotic turret, thereby reducing the role of crew operating the howitzers. Partnership between the Indian Larsen & Toubro and the Samsung-Techwin could strengthen indigenous effort to develop and strengthen remote control systems in India’s defense sector.

According to the defense ministry statement, the minister had also said that “We are progressing towards becoming a manufacturing hub of defense equipment and investors can use India as a spring board to export defense equipment manufactured in India to various friendly countries in South East Asia, Middle Asia, Middle East Asia, South Asia and Africa.”

The broader push for India-South Korea defense and strategic collaboration was taken during Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Seoul in February this year. There is a growing synergy and complementarity between South Korea’s New Southern Policy and India’s Act East Policy, both of which seek to establish a stable, secure and prosperous Indo-Pacific order. Recalling President Moon Jae-In’s visit to India in 2018, Modi said during his Korea visit that “the coordination of India’s Act East Policy and Korea’s New Southern Policy is giving a strong platform to further deepen and strengthen our Special Strategic Partnership.” He further added, “we have made significant progress in our relations in a very short time. This is based on our shared vision of progress and roadmap of our relations in future, people, peace and prosperity.”

While India’s relations with South Korea are improving, it remains to be seen how New Delhi will maneuver around a couple of trouble spots. One is the worsening tensions between South Korea and Japan, another of India’s vital strategic partners in the region. A more critical one is Seoul’s closeness to China (despite South Korea’s own occasional difficulties with Beijing). Both require careful and sensitive handling.