India's strategy in space is changing. Here's why - The World Economic Forum, 14 August 2019

After a gap of more than a year, I wrote a short essay for The World Economic Forum. In this essay, I focused on India's geopolitical strategy in space.

Half a century after humans first walked on the Moon, space is still as much about scientific discovery as it is about strategic competition.

As was the case during the Cold War, outer space is an arena of terrestrial geopolitics. We can see this in the increased impetus for competition in various achievements in outer space, such as Moon landings, Mars exploration and, more directly, in the creation of space forces in various countries – France being the latest to announce it intends to establish a space command to improve defence capabilities.

For the full essay, click here.



Yet, despite outer space being once again a field of power competition, there are also some differences from the Cold War years. First, and most significantly, there are many more countries and actors involved: in Asia itself, China, Japan and India are major spacefaring nations, and smaller players such as South Korea, Australia and Singapore are developing their own space programmes.

Added to the increase in countries is the entry of the private sector into space. A key difference in the new geopolitics of space is that both terrestrial competition – and its reflection in outer space – is now along multiple axes, rather than just the single U.S.-Soviet one.

Today, there is increasing power competition in Asia, particularly between China and its neighbours - India, Japan and Australia. Some of this is also reflected in outer space. As a corollary, we are also beginning to see greater cooperation between some countries in outer space, including India and Japan, both of which are concerned about the rise of China.

India also cooperates in space with the US, Russia and France. Much of the competition India has on land, on the other hand, is with China. Therefore, India has negligible cooperation with China in space, and equally, little competition with the other space actors.

A competitive chain reaction that (sometimes) reaches space

What occurs in space can be the result of a geopolitical chain reaction. For instance, consider the US-China-India relationship: China often takes action because of its strategic competition with the United States.

This has an impact on India, forcing India to respond. But India’s response to China has an effect on Pakistan, which then responds to India. This cascade can be seen on land, and at times, in space. For example, China’s first successful anti-satellite (ASAT) test in January 2007 was to demonstrate a catch-up effort with the United States. But once China tested its ASAT in 2007, India had little choice but to develop its own ASAT because of the need of deterrence.

But in the space arena, the competitive cascade does not travel all the way to Pakistan because Pakistan’s space programme is underdeveloped. While Pakistan has expended considerable national wealth in keeping pace with India in its nuclear and missile capabilities, it has not done so with regard to outer space.

On the other hand, there might be a security incentive for Pakistan to demonstrate that it also has an ASAT capability.

Pakistan could also develop other counterspace capabilities, including cyber and electronic means to target India’s space assets. While this remains speculative so far, the history of India-Pakistan competition suggests that this remains a possibility.

Evolution of strategy

India had long maintained a rather doctrinaire approach toward space security, emphasising the peaceful uses of outer space and opposing the weaponization and militarization of space. Thus, India had opposed the US Strategic Defense Initiative programme and other efforts to build ballistic missile defences, let alone deploying ASAT systems. The reasons for such an approach was fairly clear: India did not house these capabilities.

But by the early 2000s, India’s position had begun to change as Pakistan began acquiring long-range missiles. India felt the need to build ballistic missile defences, leading New Delhi to take a sympathetic view of the George W. Bush administration’s decision to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty in late 2001. By the end of the decade, as India’s own capabilities increased, it was clear that India was becoming more discriminating in its attitude towards space security.

China’s ASAT test in 2007 helped advance India’s process of revaluating its space strategy. India realised that its growing investments in outer space - until then largely civilian in nature - were now under threat from China’s new security capabilities. India also started thinking more about how to manage outer space for security purposes. As a result, India established a space cell under its Integrated Defence Headquarters shortly after China’s ASAT test.

In April 2019, India established the Defence Space Agency (DSA) as an interim measure to command the military’s space capabilities. All of this meant that India had to have a much more nuanced position than a blanket approach that opposed any militarization or weaponization of outer space.

However, the consequences of unbridled militarization and the weaponization of outer space has negative implications for India. Therefore, while India is pursuing a strategy that satisfies its own security interests, it still wants some international control on the militarization and weaponization of outer space.

Mangalyaan Mission Plays Vital Role in New Delhi’s Development Plans, my OpEd on India's Mars mission published in yesterday's Global Times

Here's my OpEd on India's Mars mission published by Global Times (China) yesterday.

My core argument is that India's space program was not originally driven by big ambitions. As noted by Vikram Sarabhai, one of India's space pioneers, India did "not have the fantasy of competing with the economically advanced nations in the exploration of the moon or the planets or manned space-flight."

But this has changed. India is no longer as poor and backward as it was in the 1960s when Sarabhai spoke. The increasing intensity of international competition means that India needs to show off its abilities once in a while.

India successfully launched a Mars mission, the Mangalyaan, on November 5. The mission is a major demonstration of India's technological capabilities, and a reflection of the growing competition in the Asian space race.

At $73 million, this is one of the most cost-effective Mars missions. But the political and security considerations are also important. Being the first Asian country to conduct such a mission must also have been an important factor in India's calculations.

Despite being one of the most cost-effective missions yet, questions have been raised as to why India spends money on such efforts when it is faced with dire poverty and developmental issues at home.

There has been criticism, both in India and outside, about the waste of resources on spectacle while developmental needs remain unmet.

It is undoubtedly true that India has significant developmental challenges on which it needs to spend money and effort. Nevertheless, there are at least three important reasons for conducting such missions.

First, while India has poverty and developmental issues, it also has to develop its scientific and technological base. It would be foolish to suggest that India should ignore scientific and technological advances until all developmental issues are resolved.

High technology projects such as the moon mission in 2008 and now its Mars mission are important both for technology development as well as to motivate the scientific community and the general populace.

Space technology and assets are needed for everything from communications to weather forecasting. No nation, especially a developing one, can ignore such technologies. But such technologies and capacities cannot be developed without also developing India's space capabilities in general, which is why the Mangalyaan is important.

Space is a vital aspect of India's security. India does not live in a benign neighborhood and it has had to balance between its development and security needs. No major power can afford to ignore the importance of space technology for its military needs.

India has launched its first dedicated military satellite for the Indian navy, in recognition of the increasing geopolitical and military rivalry in the Indian Ocean. Staying in the space race is thus an important consideration for India because it affects other aspects of India's security.

There are increasing worries that space itself might become a direct security threat. The threat of the militarization of space is gaining greater momentum. And the idea of establishing an Indian aerospace command has been gaining greater traction.

Given its experience in the nuclear arms control area, India has to come to understand the importance of crossing a certain technological threshold if it wants to sit at the high table.

In the nuclear arena, India did not conduct an atomic test in the 1960s even though it had the capacity to do so and therefore found itself left out of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and various other aspects of the NPT regime.

Today, world powers are debating a regime to regulate outer space activities. India cannot let itself be left out of any space regime as happened over nuclear weapons.

But in order to be heard in the discussions of any new rule-making effort, India needs to demonstrate its capabilities in space research and technology, something that the Mangalyaan amply did.

IRNSS: India's Own Satellite Navigation System, a short essay of mine on the July 01 launch of India's satellite-based navigation system...

Here's a short essay of mine on India's new satellite-based navigation system to be launched on July 01, 2013...

India's own satellite-based navigation system, similar to the well-known American Global Positioning System (GPS), is being readied. The first satellite of the seven satellite constellation is to be launched on July 01, 2013 aboard a XL-size Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV) - C22 from the Satish Dhawan Space Centre near Sriharikota. The Indian system is called the IRNSS for 'Indian Regional Navigation Satellite System'. Previously, PSLV XLs were used for some of the other important missions, including Chandrayaan-1 and RISAT-1.

For the full post, click here.

The American GPS-system is of much larger scale covering the entire globe using 24 satellites in addition to several networked ground stations. IRNSS, on the other hand, is being undertaken on a much smaller scale. The Indian system is intended as an independent regional system providing "position accuracy better than 10m over India and the region extending about 1500 kms around India."

The IRNSS, with a total of seven satellites, placed at a height of about 36,000 kms, and using two microwave frequency bands, L5 and S, will relay information 24x7 for two types of services: Standard Positioning Service (SPS) for general use and Restricted Service (RS) meant for special authorised users - military and other government actors. Three satellites will be placed in the geostationary equatorial orbit, matching earth's rotation and the other four (pair of two) will be placed in two inclined geosynchronous orbits. Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) Chairman K Radhakrishnan says (according to The Hindu) that the coverage, if necessary, could be improved with an addition of four more satellites.

Cost has been an important consideration. For nine years, the ISRO has been exploring ways to develop a navigation system for India. The IRNSS project, involving a cost of Rs. 1,420 crores, was approved by the government in June 2006.

The significance of IRNSS cannot be underplayed. Navigation systems, once used by the most powerful militaries around the world, are also being used by civilians through their smart phones. In addition, many militaries are using them for a wide range of applications. India's ability to develop its own system without having to rely on any external source will go a long way in securing itself. An ISRO official has said that "It will be our own system. It will make us independent in the area of navigation. At the moment we depend on US' GPS or Russia's GLONASS system. They can block signals anytime if they want."

The US-managed GPS became available for large-scale use a decade ago or so, although the importance of location precision technologies in the military arena with an emphasis on accumulating hard power has prompted many countries, particularly in Asia, to develop their own versions of GPS and other space-based navigation systems. Some of the proven and more popular systems include the Chinese Beidou, Russian Glonass and Japanese Quazi-Zenith Satellite System (QZSS) that is making slow progress.

China's Beidou satellite navigation system, that launched its first navigation satellite in 2000, plans to have a full global coverage by 2020. China has already launched 16 satellites and four experimental ones onto space as part of the Beidou system. Ye Peijian, chief commander of Chang'e-3, China's lunar probe mission, recently stated that Beidou will have an additional 40 satellites, enhancing the coverage capabilities.

In spite of the sovereignty and territorial disputes, including recent flare-ups with several Southeast Asian countries, China has been successful in selling its system in many countries in the region. Among other countries, Thailand, Laos and Brunei have already subscribed to the Beidou navigation system. Pakistan and Sri Lanka in South Asia have also opted for the Chinese navigation system.

In terms of the Chinese domestic market, growth for the Beidou system has been at a slow pace. By 2015, China expects to capture a domestic market share of 15-20 per cent, predicted to go up to 70-80 per cent by 2020. The forecast is that it potentially will have a market worth 22 bn yuan. Meanwhile, China has plans to create strategic industries around the navigation system, evincing interest among the business community to invest big time in this area. The Chinese central government is expected to make a total investment of 7 bn yuan, and according to official figures, it has already invested 3.5 bn yuan to strengthen industry presence in the space arena. China foresees that with the entry of industry, Beidou system will spur economic growth in a big way.

Russia's GLONASS was a response to the US' GPS, and the GLONASS is run by Russia's space forces. It has a 24 satellite-constellation, with 21 in operation and 3 as back-ups. Placed at an altitude of 19,000 km, each of the satellites orbit the earth in 11 hours and 15 minutes. The satellites are positioned in a manner to allow at least five satellites to be in view at any given time. India entered into a pact with Russia on satellite navigation collaboration way back in 2005 although it took them another six years to sign an agreement for India to receive military signals from Russia. In fact, though there have been several agreements signed in this regard, the Russian government has been unwilling to part with "precision codes" (which provides data to navigate up to one metre).

Japan is set to be making progress with a few important decisions taken this year. Japan is developing the navigation system in order to enhance the GPS navigation signals and data availability in the Asia-Pacific region. Speaking to the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, Japanese space officials are believed to have said that currently, data is available only 90 per cent of the time in Japan whereas the QZSS will improve it to a 99.8 per cent level, in addition to improving the accuracy.

The first Quazi-Zenith satellite, Michibiki, was launched on September 11, 2010. Earlier in 2013, the Cabinet Office decided to expand the Japanese satellite system, ordering an addition of three satellites, making it a four-satellite constellation. The government sanctioned a $526 mn contract with Mitsubishi Electric for building the additional satellites, to be launched by 2017. Two will be positioned in inclined orbits, whereas a third one will be placed at geostationary equatorial orbit. The government has reportedly sanctioned another contract worth $1.2 bn, with "a special-purpose company led by NEC Corp." This contract obligates NEC Corp. to operate QZSS for 15 years, including design, verification and maintenance of the ground system for the QZSS. Japan has plans to invest in seven satellites by the next decade although the first four constellation system is set to be in operation by 2018.

Given the growing importance of location data for a variety of purposes including in the civilian, disaster management and military domain, India cannot be lagging behind. A decision by the ISRO to involve Indian industry in developing communication satellites and PSLVs will lighten the burden on the ISRO while helping to refocus their attention on some big science projects and remote sensing satellites. This move will also step up the process of establishing a much-needed strategic industry around outer space.