Saturday, April 28, 2018

What Does the Modi-Xi Summit Mean for Sino-Indian Relations?, my this week's column for The Diplomat

"What Does the Modi-Xi Summit Mean for Sino-Indian Relations?," my this week's column for The Diplomat published on Thursday, a day before the informal summit between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping. Though the interaction between the two leaders is notable, there is reason for skepticism and managing expectations.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi is set to travel to Wuhan in central China for an “informal summit” with the Chinese President Xi Jinping. The visit comes against the backdrop of nearly two years of friction between India and China over a whole host of issues including the Doklam standoff, India’s Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) bid, and China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

What will the summit between the two leaders produce? Of course, there is no set agenda and it may be a fairly free-wheeling conversation. Given the deep hostility that exists and the anti-India rhetoric that was on display last year during the Doklam crisis, it is not certain that such negative sentiments can be brushed under the rug that quickly.

For the full essay, click here.



The bilateral relationship plummeted to an all-time low in the wake of friction on multiple fronts. But in December last year, two high-level visits from China suggested the need for a fresh review of the relationship. Within a few weeks of each other, both the Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and State Councilor Yang Jiechi visited India.

Since early February this year, there have been efforts from the Indian side too – the cancellation of the Dalai Lama’s events in Delhi marking the occasion of 60 years in exile of the Dalai Lama, was the first indication of the Indian outreach to China. In a note to Cabinet Secretary PK Sinha, India’s Foreign Secretary Vijay Gokhale said it is a “very sensitive time” in India’s bilateral relations with China and therefore, it is “not desirable” for government officials and other leaders to take part in the celebrations of the Tibetan government in exile.

Several weeks later, it was reported that the Indian government had actually informed China about this before advisory was sent out. Informing China appears to have been undertaken to earn some brownie points with Beijing. India’s overtures to China seems like a one-way process as yet, because China is yet to take any reciprocal steps.

The idea of an informal summit was first floated during the visit of the Indian Foreign Secretary Vijay Gokhale to China on February 23. Modi agreed to the summit in principle when he called Xi to congratulate him on the extension of his tenure in March. Since then, there have been visits by other officials, including India’s National Security Adviser Ajit Doval and Minister of External Affairs Sushma Swaraj, who have fine-tuned various details in preparing for Modi’s summit in Wuhan. In fact, it was Sushma Swaraj, in a joint press conference with the Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, who announced that Modi will visit China. Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Kong Xuanyou too travelled to India in April to finalize the summit details.

Even though Modi will be traveling to China for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Summit on June 9-10, the Indian leadership took the bold decision to make another earlier visit for the summit. The idea of an informal meeting is not to have a set agenda and engage in a free-flowing conversation between the two leaders. The conversation could include the domestic political and economic climate in both the countries, regional developments like the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), and international ones such as the U.S.-China trade war. While it is impossible to predict the outcome of this meeting, the importance and consequence of the state of Sino-Indian relationship for Asian security and stability cannot be ignored.

There is disquiet in New Delhi because China has not demonstrated any reciprocal efforts to pacify India. On the contrary, China has engaged in additional efforts to boost its military forces in the Doklam area, as well as in other areas along the disputed Sino-Indian border. Construction of a new road and military posts (at least two) in Shaksgam Valley, north of Siachen Glacier, in the past few months also raises concerns. Shaksgam Valley is located in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and was ceded by Pakistan to China in 1963, although India does not acknowledge this and treats the Valley as part of the state of Jammu and Kashmir.

This may not yet pose itself as a direct threat to Indian armed forces deployed in Siachen Glacier, Nonetheless, the Chinese action was described by the former Indian army Northern Army Commander Lt. Gen. DS Hooda as a “provocative” step.

There is thus considerable skepticism in India about the summit. Progress on the bilateral front will be judged on whether Beijing shows some sensitivity to Indian concerns on the BRI and CPEC, on India’s NSG bid, and on terrorism. China’s rising influence and growing footprint in South Asia and Indian Ocean are of concern to India and China has not acted to reassure India about China’s long-term intentions.

Nevertheless, China appears to believe that India has agreed to the Wuhan summit because New Delhi has recognized the follies of the so-called Indo-Pacific partnership with the United States and Japan and the ill-effects of that strategy on Sino-Indian relations. Some Chinese analysts suggest that many of the frictions in India-China relations are a result of “lack of trust” or “Western instigation.”

But so far, there is also little indication that India will bend. For instance, on the BRI, India has officially stated that “the so-called ‘China-Pakistan Economic Corridor’ violates India’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. “No country can accept a project that ignores its core concerns on sovereignty and territorial integrity,” the statement continues. “We are of firm belief that connectivity initiatives must be based on universally recognized international norms, good governance, rule of law, openness, transparency and equality, and must be pursued in a manner that respects sovereignty and territorial integrity.”

Indeed Sushma Swaraj reiterated this at the SCO Foreign Minister’s meeting and stated: “Connectivity with SCO countries is India’s priority. We want connectivity to pave the way for cooperation and trust between our societies. For this, respect for sovereignty is essential. Inclusivity, transparency and sustainability are imperative. India has cooperated extensively with the international community for enhanced connectivity.” India has once again refused to endorse the BRI.

All of this, as well as the efforts on both sides to lower expectations, suggest that not much should be expected out of the informal summit. Indeed, beyond some general and temporary stabilization of ties, it is not exactly clear what either side will get out of this meeting.

Monday, April 23, 2018

How India Can Beat China in Nepal, my essay for The Diplomat, April 12, 2018

How India Can Beat China in Nepal, this was my essay for The Diplomat published on April 12, 2018, where I analysed Nepal Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli's visit to India. The visit comes in the wake of a troubled phase in the last couple of years. The recent visit provides an opportunity for India to begin delivering on its bilateral ties with Kathmandu amid growing competition from Beijing.

Nepal’s newly elected Prime Minister, KP Sharma Oli, in keeping with tradition, made his first foreign trip to India last week. Considering that he is generally considered “pro-China,” this must come as a relief to the Indian government.

Moreover, going by his press briefing after his return, it appears that the visit went well, which is yet another surprise. He said that the visit “has increased confidence between India and Nepal and bilateral relations will move forward in a new direction on the basis of equality, mutual respect and interest and enhance cooperation.” He also claimed that the visit has “helped in clearing misunderstanding and mistrust and strengthening mutual trust and understanding.”

The optics during the meeting were also suggestive of a successful meeting. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, congratulating Oli on the successful elections in recent months, said that his principle of “Sabka Saath, Sabka Vikas” (Together with all, development for all) and Oli’s vision of “Samruddha Nepal, Sukhi Nepal” (Prosperous Nepal, Happy Nepal) were complimentary in nature. Modi went on to say that, India will cooperate with Nepal in its journey towards greater prosperity but also thoughtfully added that such cooperation “will be based on the priorities and requirements set by the Government of Nepal.”

For the full essay, click here.



New Delhi must be hopeful that this successful visit will undo the damage done by the “unofficial blockade” of 2016. The multi-month blockade resulted in significant hardships for the people of Nepal – it affected everything from petroleum to medicines and earthquake relief material, leading to huge price rise for basic commodities in Nepal. The Indian government, taking up the cause of Madhesis in an aggressive manner and asking Nepal to amend the constitution, created huge resentment towards New Delhi.

Complicating this complex relationship is the China factor. In the face of rising anti-India sentiment, China has only been too happy to step into the role that India played earlier. Further, Nepal’s support for China’s Belt and Road Initiative widened the trust gap between Kathmandu and New Delhi.

Nevertheless, Oli’s visit may be the first step towards repairing the damage generated in the last few years. Oli’s second tenure in office is also seeing a far stronger leader who has been able to consolidate his power, although traction was initially gained on an anti-India platform. Since coming to office, he has taken some populist and smart decisions that affect the people, for instance on the power situation within the country. Parts of Nepal used to witness 16-20 hours if power cuts everyday, but Oli was able to take action on this and improve the situation. If India wants to win over Nepal and let it not slip into China’s grasp entirely, this is the time and Oli might be the man to deliver, despite his alleged pro-China leanings.

Unlike Oli’s previous visit to India when no joint statement was issued, this time around, not only was one issued but it outlines a bilateral cooperative agenda across three key sectors of rail connectivity, developing inland waterways, and agriculture. There were three separate joint statements issued on each laying out in detail the tasks ahead. Cross-border rail connectivity in particular will be significant in strengthening people-to-people and economic linkages between the two countries. During Oli’s visit, the two prime ministers decided to construct a new electrified railway line, linking Raxaul in India and Kathmandu in Nepal. India has agreed to finance this project.

Similarly, the agreement on inland waterways is vital in establishing access to sea for the landlocked Nepal. The joint statement specifically noted the two prime ministers’ agreement “to develop the inland waterways for the movement of cargo … providing additional access to sea for Nepal.” The third key sector, agriculture, also offer big promises, with collaborative ventures in a number of areas. The two sides have also agreed to encourage exchanges between the Indian Council for Agricultural Research (ICAR) and the Nepal Agricultural Research Council (NARC).

New Delhi is clearly concerned about China’s growing clout in Nepal. It must be noted that Beijing has also focused on regional connectivity and hydropower projects in its dealings with Kathmandu, and therefore India’s ability to deliver on the three key sectors will be assessed against those of China, however fair or unfair that might be. China’s involvement for a couple of decades in mini hydropower projects is noteworthy.

To China, Nepal is a strategic buffer. Nepal’s importance to China comes more from the thousands of Tibetans living in the country and therefore, “controlling Tibetan activism there is a priority for Beijing.” The India angle comes as a close second political objective, even though it is often presented as a singular or the dominant one.

Oli’s visit offers India an opportunity to repair the damage it caused in recent years. India has to focus on implementation and delivery on the three key sectors identified during the visit. That means India must rectify the terrible track record that it suffers in project implementation. The four Integrated Check Posts (ICP) on the India-Nepal border is a case in point. Several problems from both sides may have caused the delays, but India’s overall record in completing projects does not bode well. If it wants to truly address growing competition from China in its neighborhood in general and Nepal in particular, India will have to perform better this time around.

India's Evolving Strategic Response to China, my presentation at the Institute of Chinese Studies, New Delhi

On Wednesday, April 11, 2018, I spoke on India's Evolving Strategic Response to China at the Institute of Chinese Studies' Wednesday Seminar. I focused on the following issues: Why India worries about China and these include China’s increasing military budget, lack of transparency around its military spending as well as the strategies, impact of this military spending on the military balance between India and China, especially on the Sino-Indian border, China’s nuclear force deployments in Tibet and China’s ambitions in the Indian Ocean region. This was followed by India's evolving posture and response -- its evolving nuclear posture, its naval policies, strengthened strategic partnerships with the US, Japan, Australia, India outreach to Southeast Asia. While dealing with China, India has so far adopted a twin policy, it appears that focuses on beefing up its defence capabilities and diplomatic manoeuvring that would result in certain deterrent capability against China.

Clearly, the shifting balance of power in Asia and beyond is an important reality. Given this changes including in Asian military balance, there is a renewed emphasis on hard power. Other important contextualising factors include the declining US power, North Korea’s nuclear and missile advancements and future Japanese reactions, Internal factors in each of these power centres - but different for each power. The implications of all of these are difficult to predict but certainly of strategic consequence.

As for the way ahead, here are some of my thoughts:

1. China’s rise a source of significant concern and its aggressive behaviour over the last decade intensified these concerns
2. Hedging is no more a strategy; open balancing
3. US remains a critical factor; all else put together will not have the capacity to balance China without the US
4. India – building up its military strength incl. strategic capabilities and engaged in diplomatic manoeuvring
5. Troubling phase in Asian strategic matters – phase of competition, rivalry and conflict cannot be ruled out – land and maritime spheres



Type rest of the post here

What Does India’s Satellite Trouble Mean for its Space Ambitions?, my essay in The Diplomat, April 4, 2018

I missed posting a couple of my recent articles and other updates but hoping to catch up...

Here's an essay I wrote for The Diplomat on April 4 on the failure of the Indian communication satellite, GSAT 6A. Losing communications with the satellite - how serious is the problem and what does it signify? Clearly, the reported problems with the new communications satellite have once again placed New Delhi’s space capabilities under scrutiny.

India’s space organization, the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO), launched its heaviest communication satellite, the GSAT 6A, on March 29. The satellite was carried on GSLV-F08 rocket from the second launch pad at the Satish Dhawan Space Center at Sriharikota in South India.

GSLV-F08 rocket itself was on its 12th mission, and the sixth using an indigenously developed cryogenic engine. Putting the satellite into the right orbit (a geosynchronous orbit above 36,000 kilometers) was to take place subsequently in what is called an “orbit raising operation.” The first of the three such operations took place on March 30, and the second operation was successfully conducted on March 31.

But then the ISRO confirmed on April 1 that it had lost communication with the satellite, four minutes after the second orbit raising operation. Even several hours after losing the communication with the satellite, ISRO officials maintained that they may still be able to reconnect, saying that they know the “approximate location of the satellite in space by using other satellites and other resources.”

For the full article, click here.



It is suspected that the loss of communications links is due to a power failure. This could have been something like a short-circuit, leading to what the experts call “‘loss of lock’ or loss of contact with the ground station.” The Chairman of ISRO, Dr. Sivan, too, pointed to a recent similar incident in Russia, when the Russians lost links with a communication satellite that they were launching for Angola (Angosat-1).

To be sure, this is not entirely new: there had been a number of incidents in the 1980s and 1990s where Indian satellite launches have experienced power failures. Since then, however, the ISRO appeared to have fixed the problem.

The latest incident with the GSAT 6A suggests this might not be the case. This is not without consequence. Reports suggest that if ISRO is unable to establish communication links with GSAT 6A, it could end up floating in space as debris but fully loaded debris, with fuel for its orbit raising and for its full life cycle of 10 years.

The GSAT 6A satellite, built at a cost of 2.7 billion Indian rupees ($41.5 million), was to last 10 years and was meant as a backup for the GSAT 6, which was launched three years ago. GSAT 6A is a communication satellite meant to offer mobile communication for India with multi-band coverage facility – five beams in S-band and one in C-band.

There were high hopes placed on GSAT 6A. With a 6-meter unfurlable S-band antenna, the biggest used yet by the ISRO, GSAT 6A was supposed to offer better capacity and thereby strengthen the communication system. The satellite was also to help mobile communication throughout the country, particularly in India’s remote areas. Beyond this, the satellite was also important for the Indian military, which was hoping to enhance its own communication network.

This launch itself was also important because it tested the ISRO’s modified, High Thrust Vikas booster engines, which generated about six percent more thrust than previous Vikas engines. This time, the new Vikas engines were used only in the second stage; in the future, the four first stage booster engines will also be the high thrust boosters.

How significant is this failure given all of this?

Media accounts have noted that this is technically the second major failure in the last six months, and the first since Dr. Sivan took over as the ISRO Chairman. The launch was certainly scheduled prior to his taking office. The previous failure involved a PSLV C-39 carrying India’s navigation satellite, IRNSS-1H, due to a problem with the heat shield. The next navigation satellite IRNSS-1I, the eighth satellite to join the NavIC navigation satellite constellation, will be launched on April 12 as per schedule.

The deeper question, beyond the one of blame and individuals, is whether the failure of the GSAT 6A will have a longer-term impact on ISRO’s credibility as a reliable satellite launcher. Considering that there do not appear to have been any problems with the launch itself, or the new high-thrust Vikas booster, the ISRO can salvage something even if they are not able to re-establish communication with the satellite. Hopefully, this will mean that the GSLV can achieve the kind of reliability that the PSLV has achieved, which has made the latter a tried and tested workhorse of the ISRO.

This failure, however, is not without its costs. The first part of this is the simple reality that the ISRO, which itself works on a shoestring budget, cannot afford failures. Beyond that, the Indian military will also now have to wait longer to upgrade its communications. But most of all, failures like these hurt the ISROs reputation as a credible space agency that can launch satellites in a cost-effective manner. That is what will worry it the most.

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