How China Strengthens the Quad - The Diplomat, 4 September 2020

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I wrote on the future of the Quad, looking at the challenges to the group because of Abe's sudden resigning and a possible political change in the US following the November elections. Despite some minor headwinds, I argue that Chinese belligerence further strengthens the motivation for Australia, India, Japan, and the United States to keep the Quad together.

The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue or the Quad has regained strength in the face of an aggressive China. The foreign ministers of the four countries – Australia, India, Japan, and the United States – are scheduled to meet in Delhi for a face-to-face meeting in late September. That New Delhi is playing host to the Quad ministerial meeting amid the COVOD-19 pandemic is particularly noteworthy. The countries are reacting to increased bullying by China. The grouping has gained greater traction since early 2020 because of Beijing’s role in the COVID-19 pandemic and the manner in which it has attempted to hijack multilateral institutions, such as the World Health Organization (WHO) and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). The four countries are also concerned about global supply chain problems, recognizing the vulnerability of their dependence on China. The upcoming in-person foreign ministers meeting appears, at the least, aimed at sending a strong message to China about the resoluteness of the Quad.

For the full essay, click here.

That said, the Quad does face some minor headwinds, which are likely to be easily overcome, due to political changes in both Japan and the United States.

Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo’s sudden resignation was a blow to the Quad because Abe was one of the major proponents of this minilateral initiative, even if his departure does not shift Japan’s policy. Under Abe’s leadership, Japan had become a driving force for the Quad. His strategic vision and determined leadership in the face of China’s belligerent behavior will be missed by Japan’s Quad partners. Although Abe was not successful in changing Japan’s pacifist constitution, he has been instrumental in bringing important changes to Tokyo’s approach to regional and global security.

For New Delhi, Abe was a reliable pillar of support. Takenori Horimoto says that the big push for Japan to build closer relations with India happened in 2004-05 because of anti-Japan protests taking place in China, leading Tokyo to reduce the risks to its investments by moving to other countries. Thus, although India-Japan ties had been gaining momentum even before Abe came into office, the Abe-Modi dynamic helped a great deal. It led to strengthened military and security ties, including military exercises across all the branches of the military, and a civil nuclear agreement. With Abe leaving office, it remains to be seen how bilateral India-Japan relations as well as Japan’s broader strategic engagement in the Indo-Pacific will play out with a new leader in office.

Second, the coming presidential elections in the United States in November also raises some concerns about a possible change in leadership. While Joe Biden and the Democrats are not against the Quad or the free and open Indo-Pacific strategy, a change in the political powers that be could introduce short-term policy turbulence. It will take a few months for a new administration to settle into office before addressing some of the political and strategic issues in the Indo-Pacific region. That said, China’s aggressive behavior will invariably draw any administration’s attention. A Biden administration may differ from the Trump administration more in terms of style and rhetoric than actual policy when it comes to China. Indeed, the two parties are competing over who is harsher on China.

Set against these small challenges is China’s behavior, which serves to promote the Quad. India and Australia, the other two Quad parties, have recently faces even greater aggression from Beijing.

Since early May, China has crossed into Indian territory and engaged in violent clashes, including the one at Galwan in June that resulting in the deaths of 20 Indians and an unknown number of Chinese troops. Since then, there have been several military and diplomatic discussions between India and China, but with no progress. Over the past few days, there has been further activity, with India reportedly occupying areas south of the south bank of Pangong Tso (Lake); the military talks that followed, as usual, have been inconclusive. China claimed that India violated the consensus and crossed the Line of Actual Control (LAC). In India, both the foreign ministry and army put out statements blaming China. The expectation appears to be that the border confrontation will escalate further. India, for good measure, has also banned another 118 Chinese apps.

Similarly, Australia has been under strident Chinese attack almost from the beginning of 2020. China has been using coercive trade practices to target Australia for asking for an independent investigation into the origin of the novel coronavirus. In the latest move, China targeted Australian barley in response to Prime Minister Scott Morrison’s announcement of a new Australian legislation that would “tear up” the Belt and Road Initiative agreements with the state of Victoria that run into billions of dollars. A few days earlier, China targeted Australian beef exports. Prior to this, it was the Australian wine that was banned by China. But Jeffrey Wilson of the Perth USAsia Centre says it is not that the Chinese government cares about wine, beef, or barley, but “the real game is to create societal splits that pressure the Government to change foreign policy toward China.”

China’s crude attempts to put pressure on other countries have met with increasingly stiff resistance, of which the Quad is a clear manifestation. In India, there have even been suggestions for the Quad to assume a military role. Thus, whatever minor headwinds the Quad faces are likely to be easily overcome by the rapidly changing attitudes in the region because of China’s unrelenting pressure on others.

India Under Strain Across South Asia - The Diplomat, 7 August 2020

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I look at India's strained relations with almost all its neighbours in South Asia. I argue that India’s regional relations are almost all in states of distress and that’s a big problem for New Delhi.

India’s standing in its South Asian neighborhood is under some strain. New Delhi is facing trouble not only in its relations with its traditional adversary, Pakistan, but also Nepal, Bangladesh and possibly Sri Lanka, too, just as it is facing pressure from China along the Tibet border. The Maldives is possibly the only relatively bright spot for India in the region at present.

For the full article, click here.



In May this year, Nepali Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli surprised India by releasing a new political map claiming a part of Indian territory. The new map shows the Kalapani, Limpiyadhura, and Lipulekh areas in the Indian state of Uttarakhand as belonging to Nepal. These areas are shown as part of Byas rural municipality in Nepal’s Sudurpaschim province. Speaking to the media, Padma Kumari Aryal, the minister for land management, cooperatives, and poverty alleviation, said that the map will come into effect immediately and added that “The areas including Gunji, Navi and Kuti near Kalapani, which had been left out in earlier maps, are also included in the new map.”

India’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) responded by calling it a “unilateral act” that “is not based on historical facts and evidence.” The Indian statement rejected the claim, calling “contrary to the bilateral understanding to resolve the outstanding boundary issues through diplomatic dialogue.” Nepal’s action followed large protests in Kathmandu after Indian Defense Minister Rajnath Singh opened an 80-kilometer road between Dharchula and Lipulekh in Uttarakhand, part of India’s effort to improve its infrastructure along the Tibet border. Indian Army Chief General M.M. Naravane suggested that Nepal was possibly acting on behalf of “someone else,” a not-so-veiled reference to China, creating more anger in Nepal.

The new map has now been endorsed by Nepal’s Parliament and the Oli government is planning to send the map to the United Nations and other multilateral institutions. Meanwhile, Oli appears to be making a bad situation worse by talking about India’s efforts to remove him from office. This escalation has worried even members of his own party, with one saying that if India asks for concrete evidence “we will have to prove it or face the consequences.” Oli has made other controversial anti-India statements recently including a reference to the “Indian virus” being “more lethal than the Chinese or Italian viruses.” Although he was talking about workers carrying the virus from India to Nepal and trying to suggest a possible difference in the strain of the virus, it was an inelegant formulation that has not gone down well in New Delhi.

Following the India-Nepal map row, Pakistan is testing the waters by issuing a new political map of its own. On the eve of the first anniversary of India’s revoking the special status of Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistan released a new political map, containing the whole of Jammu and Kashmir as well as parts of Gujarat. Calling it a “historical occasion,” Prime Minister Imran Khan said, “The political map reflects our national aspiration and supports our principled stance on Kashmir dispute.”

This has clearly irked India and New Delhi dismissed it as “ridiculous assertions” with “neither legal validity nor international credibility.” The Indian MEA in a statement called it “an exercise in political absurdity” and that it “confirms reality of Pakistan’s obsession with territorial aggrandisement supported by cross-border terrorism.” Manish Tewari, a member of parliament from the opposition Congress party, said in a tweet that this is essentially “a Geostrategic statement by China.” He added that, “Coming as it does after Nepal’s new map it is China’s way of rubbing in India’s isolation in it’s Neighbhourhood (sic). Wouldn’t be surprised if one or two others in neighbourhood walk down this absurd street.”

India is facing difficulties with Bangladesh, too. India had managed its relations with Bangladesh quite well during Modi’s first term, but that is not the case anymore. The India Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA), which is seen as targeting Muslims, especially migrants from Bangladesh, has cratered relations. The Sheikh Hasina government has been clear about how Bangladesh views CAA, and the reference to Bangladeshi migrants as “termites” by India’s home minister created understandable anger. Demonstrating Dhaka’s displeasure, a scheduled visit by Bangladesh Foreign Minister A.K. Abdul Momen was cancelled by Dhaka at the very last minute. The CAA has put Bangladesh, a predominantly Muslim country that was friendly to India and the Modi government, in a difficult position. Bangladesh also worries about possible reverse migration, because there could be an exodus of Muslim migrants escaping persecution in India, especially from the northeastern state of Assam.

With the Rajapaksas back in office, Sri Lanka, another South Asian neighbor, may also be a cause for worry in New Delhi. The Rajapaksas are seen to be close to China, and there are reports suggesting that China is keen for Sri Lanka to distance itself from India and its other partners such as Japan. Austin Fernando, former Sri Lankan high commissioner to India, argued in a recent essay that India’s over-cautious approach is partly to blame for the situation. The Sri Lankan government’s recent decision to halt a Japan-funded light rail project is one indicator that all is not well. Bandula Gunewardene, Sri Lanka’s information minister, stated that it was an expensive proposition with low returns. Similarly, the India-Japan collaboration on Sri Lanka’s East Container Terminal (ECT) project in Colombo is on shaky grounds. The three countries had signed an Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) only a year ago but there is no guarantee that this project will go ahead, at least with India and Japan as partners.

With much of its neighborhood relations in various degrees of distress, India is making its pitch in the Maldives to restrict China’s growing influence. According to Indian media reports, India is planning to announce a “substantial financial assistance package” to the Maldives in order for Male to address the economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. The real goal appears to be strategic: to curtail China’s growing footprint. In July, Sunjay Sudhir, Indian high commissioner in the Maldives, gave the country a symbolic check for carrying out nine projects in the Maldives through the High Impact Community Development Projects (HICDP) scheme. Under this scheme, India has signed several MoUs to develop fish-processing units, set up tourism zones, and establish a bottled water plant. The current package comes after India had given the Maldives $400 million under an extended currency swap arrangement to help manage its liquidity crisis. India has also provided the Maldives with an additional $1.4 billion as budgetary aid to battle the economic impact from the COVID-19 pandemic.

Whether these assistance packages will sustain India’s role and influence in the Maldives remains to be seen. For the moment, it appears to be so. India enjoys considerable goodwill in the country after the 2018 elections, with the election of Ibrahim Mohamed Solih. India does have friends in the Maldives. Mohamed Nasheed, speaker and former president, recently said in Male that the Maldives must be wise in making smart choices, and “join hands with India” for growth and prosperity. Highlighting the Maldives’ important geographical importance, he added, “I am also certain that Maldivians and their elected leaders will be wise and make shrewd and sensible decisions regarding our foreign policy and our relationship with our closest allies and neighbors, the closest and dearest of whom is India.”

New Delhi will try hard to improve its relations with other neighbors, but for now, it has to be satisfied with just the Maldives.

US-India Ties Amid the Eastern Ladakh Crisis and the Pandemic - The Diplomat's Asia Geopolitics Podcast, 29 July 2020

Earlier this week, I had a chat with Ankit Panda, Editor-at-Large at The Diplomat on US-India ties amid the Eastern Ladakh crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic, for the Diplomat's Asia Geopolitics podcast. In the podcast, we looked at how the US-India ties have evolved in the middle of the Sino-Indian border crisis in Ladakh crisis and the pandemic.

You can listen to The Diplomat’s Asia Geopolitics podcast on iTunes here; if you use Windows or Android, you can subscribe on Google Play here, or on Spotify here.

This podcast is a take-off from my latest column for The Diplomat's Asia Defense Blog, where I focused on the open and public support for India in its border conflcit with China. Unlike during the Doklam confrontation, this time around, there has been much larger visible and open US support for India. It is possible that this has the tacit approval of New Delhi, which would be one more indicator that the two sides are getting much more comfortable in their partnership.



I have a weekly column with the Asia Defense Blog of The Diplomat where I focus on a range of Asian strategic issues, including major power politics, nuclear security, outer space and global governance aspects. You can check out my articles here.

This Time the US Is Taking India’s Side Against China - The Diplomat, 23 July 2020

In my column for The Diplomat last week, I looked the US positioning on the India-China border conflict, where I argue that this time around, the US is taking India’s side against China. Unlike in 2017, U.S. support for India at a time of confrontation with China is much more pronounced this time around.

As India and China confront each other across the Himalayas, it also clearly appears to have driven India and the United States closer. The two have conducted joint military exercises and seem to have been in regular contact, including regarding the Sino-Indian confrontation. What is more surprising is a series of high-profile statements from senior U.S. officials and lawmakers supporting India. In contrast to the present tensions, during the 2017 Doklam confrontation, there were no standalone statements, although U.S. government spokespeople and unnamed officials did comment on it in a manner that fit Indian objectives. It is also possible that India may not have wanted public expressions of U.S. support at the time, viewing them as potentially complicating its negotiations with China.

For the full essay, click here.



This time, the situation appears different. The consultations between the two sides are much more open, and the United States has publicly and repeatedly supported India. Even prior to the Galwan clash that resulted in the deaths of 20 Indian Army personnel, senior Indian and U.S. officials appear to have been in contact. In one of the first conversations amid the border stand-off, Indian Defense Minister Rajnath Singh and U.S. Secretary of Defense Mark T. Esper spoke on the phone on May 29. The two sides discussed the state of bilateral defense ties and agreed to keep up with their efforts “for a strong and enduring U.S.-India defense partnership.” The readouts of the call did not mention China specifically but the statements issued by the U.S. Department of Defense and the Indian Ministry of Defense said that the two discussed regional security issues, which suggest they talked about the border stand-off. In mid-July as well, Singh and Esper held a telephone conversation where they talked about bilateral defense cooperation and issues of mutual interest, which would likely have included China and the continuing border stand-off.

A few days later, on June 2, Prime Minister Narendra Modi and U.S. President Donald Trump had a telephone call. The readout of the call stated that the two leaders talked about the Sino-Indian border tensions as well as World Health Organization reforms (in May India became the new head of the WHO’s executive board). Trump also talked about the possibility of expanding the G-7 to include countries like Australia, India, South Korea, and maybe Russia, too. It is noteworthy that China is not part of the G-7 grouping or the expansion Trump floated.

An even more stark indicator of the growth in ties is the flurry of statements from U.S. officials in support of India, unlike during the Doklam standoff. Just this week, while speaking at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London, Esper criticized China for engaging in “systematic rule-breaking, coercion and other malign activities.” To a question on the Sino-Indian border situation, he said that the U.S. is “monitoring it very closely and what’s happening along the Line of Actual Control (LAC).” Esper later retweeted a media story reporting his remarks that the U.S. was following the situation “very closely,” adding the comment, “Very closely indeed.”

This followed a steady stream of comments from senior U.S. officials condemning the Chinese aggression while extending support to India. In one of the first statements, days after the June 15 clash, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo tweeted, “We extend our deepest condolences to the people of India for the lives lost as a result of the recent confrontation with China. We will remember the soldiers’ families, loved ones, and communities as they grieve.”

Barely a week after that, Pompeo was speaking to the German Marshall Fund’s Brussels Forum where he once again reiterated criticism of China’s habit of breaking international commitments and bullying its neighbors – India, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines. With these threats from the Chinese Communist Party, he said, “We’re going to make sure we’re postured appropriately to counter the PLA. We think that’s the challenge of our time, and we’re going to make sure we have resources in place to do that.”

Just a week ago, Pompeo said, “India has been a great partner. They are an important partner of ours. I have a great relationship with my foreign minister counterpart. We talk frequently about a broad range of issues. We talked about the conflict they had along their border with China.”

In the context of the Indian decision to ban 59 Chinese apps, Pompeo said, “We’ve talked about the risk that emanates from China, Chinese telecommunications infrastructure there, you’ve seen the decision they made to ban some several dozen Chinese software firms from operating inside of the country on phones of people operating inside of India.”

He emphasized that the “whole world is coalescing around the challenge that we face,” saying that “Democracies, free nations of the world, will push back on these challenges together. I’m very confident of that.”

This week while doing a joint press briefing along with the British foreign secretary, Pompeo once again slammed China, saying, “You can’t go make claims for maritime regions that you have no lawful claim to. You can’t threaten countries and bully them in the Himalayas. You can’t engage in cover-ups and co-opt international institutions like the World Health Organization.”

Lower level officials have taken up the refrain. In mid-July while speaking at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), David Stilwel, assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, compared Chinese behavior in the Himalayas with similar actions elsewhere: “When Beijing uses coercion, empty promises, disinformation, contempt for rules, bad-faith diplomacy, and other underhanded tactics in the South China Sea, it is drawing on a playbook that it uses worldwide. We see it in the East China Sea and around Taiwan, where Beijing has expanded its maritime provocations and threatening sorties. We see it in the Himalayas, where Beijing recently took aggressive action on its frontiers with India.” Even earlier, in May, outgoing U.S. Secretary for South and Central Asia Alice Wells, referring to the Sino-Indian border stand-off, said that it is a “reminder of the threat by China.”

Senior lawmakers have also come out strongly in support of India. On the floor of the Senate, Majority Leader Mitch McConnell said, “for the sake of grabbing territory, the [People’s Liberation Army] appears to have instigated the most violent clash between China and India since those nations went to war in 1962.” Senator Marco Rubio, a Florida Republican, also tweeted that he had spoken to Indian Ambassador in the U.S. Taranjit Singh Sandhu “to express our solidarity with the people of #India as they firmly confront unwarranted & lawless armed aggression by the Communist Party of #China. India has made it clear, they will not be bullied by Beijing.” Around the same time, Senator Tom Cotton, a Republican from Arkansas, characterized the Chinese action as an invasion of India, “an ally of ours.”

In the other chamber of the U.S. Congress, Representative Lance Gooden of Texas tweeted that, “As more news comes out about the deadly conflict between China and India, once again CHINA appears to be an aggressive bad actor. The #CCP cannot be taken at their word, EVER.”

Reflecting bipartisan support for India, Democratic lawmakers have also come out slamming China and supporting India. Even prior to the Galwan clash, the House Foreign Affairs Committee chairman, Democrat Eliot Engel, called out Chinese aggression, saying, “I am extremely concerned by the ongoing Chinese aggression along the Line of Actual Control on the India-China border. China is demonstrating once again that it is willing to bully its neighbors rather than resolve conflicts according to international law.”

After the clash, others Democrats including Ami Bera, chair of the House Foreign Affairs subcommittee on Asia, tweeted concern about “continued Chinese aggression along its border with India.” The Indian decision to ban the Chinese apps also received support from some U.S. lawmakers such as Republican Representative Jim Banks of Indiana.

Clearly, this time around, there has been much larger visible and open U.S. support for India compared to the Doklam confrontation. It is possible that this has the tacit approval of New Delhi, which would be one more indicator that the two sides are getting much more comfortable in their partnership.

How Is COVID-19 Reshaping China-India Relations? - The Diplomat, 02 April 2020

Earlier in the month, I wrote about the impact of COVID-19 on India-China relations, for The Diplomat. The global pandemic has hit amid the 70th anniversary mark for relations and affected perceptions and realities in ties.

India was the first non-communist country in Asia to establish diplomatic ties with the People’s Republic of China on April 1, 1950. But the plans for celebrating the 70th anniversary of the event have been hit by the coronavirus pandemic.

For the full post, click here.



Despite the cancellation of 70th anniversary events, a senior Chinese official is reported to have said that the two countries “will emerge stronger and their relationship can scale new heights after the pandemic.” The presidents and the premiers on both sides have exchanged congratulatory messages and have made the expected euphoric statements about the two working together to “bring more benefits to the two countries and peoples and contribute more positive energy to Asia as well as the world.”

The Chinese Ambassador to India, Sun Weidong, tweeted Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s reference to the Panchsheel principles, “the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, which is a historic contribution to the promotion of a new type of intl relations.” Considering Sino-Indian history, the Panchsheel may not have been the best reference, considering that Indian officials rarely invoke it because it is associated in Indian perceptions with the Sino-Indian war of 1962 and what is widely seen as Chinese betrayal. That aside, there are also questions about how the coronavirus pandemic will affect Sino-Indian ties.

Responding to a question during the daily press briefing, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying sounded quite jubilant. The spokesperson pointed out that during the second informal Sino-Indian leaders summit in Chennai, Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping had agreed to host 70 activities commemorating the 70 years of diplomatic relations, which will contribute to significant progress on the bilateral ties, and highlighted the “deep historical connection between two ancient civilizations.” The planned activities were supposed to cover an entire gamut of areas including legislature, business, culture, and defense.

Also, the foreign ministries of both countries announced detailed plans for celebrations in October 2019. Hua went on to say that with the 70th anniversary celebration “as an opportunity, we would like to work with India to elevate our bilateral relationship to a new height.” On another question about whether China would send help India in fighting address the pandemic by supplying ventilators, the spokesperson said that it would do what it can once the domestic demand is met.

As of now, the Indian government has been careful not to blame China for the coronavirus or its propagation because of China’s actions. Indeed, External Affairs Minister Dr. S Jaishankar tweeted saying he had discussed with both State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi in addressing the corona virus and build collaborative efforts in this regard. China has tried to woo India by saying that it “stands ready to share its experience in epidemic prevention and control and diagnosis and treatment, and provide further support and assistance to the best of our capability.” But there is likely to be some wariness in Delhi, based on the kind of Chinese assistance provided to a number of countries including Italy, Czech Republic, and Spain, where even the testing kits sent from China showed faulty results.

Moving forward, China’s role in the pandemic is likely to have a negative impact on Sino-Indian relationship. If China had been transparent, the pandemic could have been tackled much more efficiently, and this is clear for all to see including India. Not only has China been not transparent about the level of spread within the country and the human transmission issues, but more importantly it had silenced the World Health Organization and other international organizations from raising concerns about the Wuhan virus.

That WHO went one step ahead with its Director General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus praising China for its “transparency” and added that China is a model to follow as far as the response to the virus management is concerned made this clear for all to see. This is despite the fact that there were ample number of reports pointing to the Chinese state efforts to cover up the extent of the virus’ outbreak and silencing of whistleblowers. It should be noted that the current Director General came to office in 2017 with China’s backing.

Though India has so far managed to control the spread of the coronavirus within the country with a national lockdown, the economic costs are going to be large, and it is likely that public perception in India is likely to blame China for the damages this has caused, once the pandemic itself is under control. Though India is unlikely to officially blame China, Beijing’s behavior will deepen the general public distrust of China and it will impact Indian domestic debate about Sino-Indian ties. Thus, for all the polite words and mutual congratulations about the anniversary, the pandemic once again seems to indicate to New Delhi that China is likely to be an irresponsibly selfish actor, deepening the concern that India already had about China’s behavior.

Will India Now Finally Invite Australia to the Malabar Exercise? - The Diplomat, 31 January 2020

In my last column for the month for The Diplomat, I looked at the question if India is going to finally invite Australia to the Malabar exercise. New reports have surfaced regarding a previously headline-grabbing, controversial development.

In a significant development that has been through multiple rounds of headlines and controversy, India might be finally getting ready to invite Australia to the Malabar naval exercise, according to media reports. The next edition of the exercise is scheduled to take place around July or August this year.

For the full post, click here.



The question of inviting Australia to the exercise, which currently includes India, Japan and the United States, has been controversial. India has for several years resisted bringing Australia on board, reportedly because of possible negative reactions from China. The fact is that the first and only time Australia has been part of this exercise was in 2007, when both Australia and Singapore were invited to join India, Japan and the United States.

Nonetheless, if India finally agrees to invite Australia for the 2020 Malabar naval exercises, it will be a welcome break and would suggest the growing seriousness and synergy among four key Indo-Pacific powers – Australia, India, Japan, and the United States.

The India-U.S. Malabar series of naval exercises go back to 1992 and became a regular annual feature since 2002, after it was suspended following India’s nuclear tests in 1998. The initial series of exercises were held off the coast of Malabar, and hence the name of the series but these naval engagements have been held in other areas as well including the Arabian Sea, Bay of Bengal and in the Western Pacific.

In 2007, there were two editions of the Malabar exercise – one held in the Western Pacific along with Japan in April 2007 and a second one in the Bay of Bengal with the participation of Australia, Japan and Singapore in September 2007. That year also saw the first meeting of the Quadrilateral group – India, Japan, Australia and the United States.

China’s displeasure at the forming of the group – it sent a demarche to all four countries – ended the Quadrilateral group and also ended the practice of such naval exercises. Neither India nor Australia was willing to cross China. So, for the next few years, Malabar reverted to being a U.S.-India naval exercise.

Japan has joined Malabar sporadically for several years before becoming a permanent member in 2015. Bringing Tokyo into the mix was an important strategic signaling itself. It indicated the growing strategic convergence among the three nations on the one hand, while also illustrating the fact that the three countries recognized the need to undertake joint exercises to make interoperability a viable proposition.

Around the same time, relations between New Delhi and Canberra too were improving, but the apprehension of Australia’s dependability (after the 2007 experience) made India cautious. But other reasons could have played into this as well, including the fact that India wanted to first be confident of the durability of the existing trilateral exercise before expanding it.

In truth, neither of these explanations can satisfactorily account for India’s reluctance to move on this front if New Delhi were serious enough. If India were serious about strategic messaging to China, it would not waste any opportunity because fearing Chinese negative reaction and appeasing China has not brought India any goodwill previously. China’s behavior does not automatically call for any restraint; equally, if not more important, was New Delhi’s own reluctance to antagonize Beijing.

But as the Quad diplomatic group has revived, Australia has sought to be part of the Malabar exercises. Indeed, Australia appears to have pushed hard for an invite. This is not entirely surprising: It also fits with the growing strategic interaction between India and Australia that now includes on both bilateral as well as multinational military engagements. Kakadu, AUSINDEX, and the Black Carillon military exercises are illustrative of this. In January 2019, a defense source is reported to have said that including Australia and engaging in a Quad naval exercise would lead to sending a political message to China, something for which India apparently is not ready.

A year later, India now reportedly appears to be more confident about inviting Australia to the naval exercise. Several recent developments could have contributed to this development. One, the upgrading of the Quad engagements to the foreign minister level is reflective of a growing seriousness with which Quad members are treating each other. This can be viewed as part of that wider strategic development.

Two, India’s bilateral strategic partnership with Australia has improved dramatically in recent years. The 2+2 strategic dialogue, the military exercises, and the regular political and security conversations between India and Australia have strengthened India’s confidence about Canberra as a security partner. There were as many as 39 bilateral interactions in 2019 alone.

Three, despite two informal summits between India and China, the two sides do not appear to have made any substantial progress in improving their relations. Indeed, China has continued to make inroads into South Asia with little consideration for India’s concerns. Beijing’s Belt and Road push in Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Myanmar has given it a greater foothold in Indian Ocean, Arabian Sea and Bay of Bengal.

Four, India’s own comfort level in building strategic relationships has grown and it is evident in the manner in which India has gradually expanded Malabar to include Japan first and now possibly Australia. India also engages Australia through another trilateral – India, Indonesia and Australia. Therefore, India’s ease of doing business with Australia in the strategic realm has gone up several notches even in the last three years since the quad has made a comeback.

Five and lastly, the shared concerns among the four countries about the future of the Indo-Pacific has possibly been the biggest factor pushing India to expand the trilateral. The convergence around these notions of broader regional order have reinforced the shared interests between them and also acted as another boost for developing ties.

An expanded Malabar series of exercises is obviously important in terms of developing coherent strategic approaches to addressing many of the region’s security challenges. On the diplomatic side, a useful first step was the Quad ministerial level consultations. And on the defense side now, further engagement in naval exercises could strengthen interoperability among the four partner navies, which ultimately will be important in addressing the very issues they are speaking about.

Modi-Xi Summit: A More Balanced China Policy? - ORF, 11 October 2019

I wrote a second piece on the second informal summit between Modi and Xi, and this was published by the Observer Research Foundation yesterday.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping are meeting for their second informal summit. Irrespective of the rhetoric of a Wuhan spirit, the relationship is facing difficulties, reflected in a number of disputes between the two countries. This is only a manifestation of the larger strategic problems that exists between India and China, which is rooted in the changing balance of power dynamics in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. While this is not new, the difference now is that India is also displaying greater willingness to respond to China’s pressure more firmly or at least to not let efforts to improve ties with China come in the way of stopping efforts to counter China.

For the full post, click here.



This has become evident in a number of different ways. While India has engaged China in informal summits and joined platforms such as the Russia-India-China (RIC), Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa (BRICS), and Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), India is also stepping up its diplomatic and security engagements with other countries and minilaterals. The recent upgradation of the quadrilateral (Quad) engagements between Australia, India, Japan and the US, suggest the seriousness within this grouping in giving more teeth to the initiative. India’s military engagements with a number of countries in the Indo-Pacific is again a testament to the fact that New Delhi will seek to improve its ties with Beijing but it will also build and nurture a network of strategic engagements that will go on to provide India with greater strategic maneuverability.

While the MEA statement said that the two leaders will discuss bilateral, regional and global issues and share ideas and perspectives for deepening India-China partnership, the two sides, have also tried to keep expectations low. The problems that face the bilateral relationship is not for lack of understanding or lack of high-level political attention, clearly, but because of intractable real differences of interest. This means that finding compromises and accommodation will be harder.

China is unlikely to give up on using Pakistan to balance India. Only a few days before the summit, the Chinese ambassador to Pakistan, Yao Jing endorsed Pakistan’s stand on the Kashmir dispute by stating that “We are also working for Kashmiris to help them get their fundamental rights and justice. There should be a justified solution to the issue of Kashmir and China will stand by Pakistan for regional peace and stability.” India, understandably, protested the statement and sought clarification on China’s changing position on Jammu and Kashmir. Beijing’s stated position so far had been that Kashmir was a bilateral issue that needs to be resolved between two concerned parties. Moreover, this comes in the backdrop of China taking India to the UN Security Council on behalf of Pakistan, which sought a meeting on the Jammu and Kashmir issue following India’s decision to remove the special status to the state of Jammu and Kashmir through Article 370. India maintained that this is purely an internal matter and other countries like China and Pakistan had no locus standi. China can be expected to continue to support Pakistan, and attempt to bolster its economic and military capability, and this will continue to provoke New Delhi.

Similarly, China has found other ways to undermine India, especially in multilateral forums. China has, for all practical purposes, opposed India’s efforts to reform and expand the UN Security Council and find a permanent seat on the body. China has also opposed India’s inclusion in the Nuclear Supplier’s Group (NSG). Though there are some areas of common interests – climate change, or trade, for example – there are sufficient disagreements even on these areas. And where there are disagreements, expect Beijing to undermine India. This is not so much because China has any particular dislike of India, but simply because of the nature of international politics, but New Delhi has long been dismissive of this.

It is possible that New Delhi’s attitude is changing. In the face of such stiffening positions by China, India has joined a web of networks including the Quad, trilateral groupings such as Japan, India and the US (JAI). India could also upgrade the track II trilateral engagements among countries like Japan, India and Australia, and India, Indonesia and Australia. Reluctantly, New Delhi seems to be coming around to the view that even as it tries to keep the relations with China steady, and do as much as possible to prevent serious downturn or tensions in ties, India will also have to expect that such efforts will not be sufficient or fully successful. Thus, India seems to be now unwilling to stop efforts at alternative arrangements to counter China, while seeking to improve ties with it.

Behind the Second Modi-Xi Informal Summit, the Wuhan Spirit Is Fraying - The Diplomat, 10 October 2019

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I write on the second Modi-Xi informal summit scheduled to begin later in Mamallapuram today and conclude by tomorrow.

The second informal summit between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping is set to take place in Mamallapuram, a coastal town in south India from October 11-12. The meeting between the leaders of the two Asian giants will be closely watched, with consequences not only for their countries but the wider Indo-Pacific region and the world as well.

The Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) made a formal announcement of the visit just a couple of days before the visit. The statement added that the agenda was discussing “issues of bilateral, regional and global importance and to exchange views on deepening India-China Closer Development Partnership.” The two sides appear to be setting expectations low, with good reason.

For the full essay, click here.



Prior to the announcement, the Indian media was full of speculation that the summit could even be cancelled. Despite the Wuhan Summit in 2017 and the so-called “Wuhan spirit,” India-China relations have been characterized by a growing number of disputes.

The most serious of these, at least from Delhi’s perspective, is the strengthening Chinese support for Pakistan. Just days before the summit, the Chinese ambassador in Pakistan, Yao Jing, expressed strong support for Pakistan’s position on the Kashmir dispute, saying, “We are also working for Kashmiris to help them get their fundamental rights and justice. There should be a justified solution to the issue of Kashmir and China will stand by Pakistan for regional peace and stability.” This was a red flag for India and led to India lodging a strong protest with China and seeking clarification on what appears to be a change in Beijing’s stated stand on Jammu and Kashmir.

Beijing’s official stand has always been that Kashmir was a bilateral issue between India and Pakistan, left over from history, that needs to be resolved directly by the two countries. So, the change in China’s position was surprising and was seen by official New Delhi as an effort to interfere in India’s internal affairs. Moreover, this came after the strong Chinese support for Pakistan on Article 370 issue, when Beijing forced a UN Security Council discussion on the issue. China also took an unusually strong position on India effectively removing Article 370 (which had ensured local autonomy for the Indian state of Jammu Kashmir) and creating a separate Union Territory (a province directly ruled from New Delhi) in Ladakh. This was despite India’s foreign minister S. Jaishankar travelling to Beijing to explain that the Indian actions in Kashmir had no additional or negative or implication for the Sino-Indian border dispute.

After several strong statements on India by Chinese officials, there was a thawing of the tensions with a Chinese Foreign Ministry statement on October 8. While responding to a question, the Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson said, “China’s position on the issue of Kashmir is consistent and clear. We call on India and Pakistan to step up dialogue on disputes including the Kashmir issue to enhance mutual trust and improve relations. It serves the common interests of both India and Pakistan and represents the shared expectation of regional countries and the international community.” Earlier references to UN resolutions, which irritated India, was missing from this statement.

But the thaw, to the extent that it existed, was short-lived. Not only did China host a visit by the Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan just days before the Xi-Modi summit, the joint China-Pakistan press release also brought back language in reference to Kashmir that India had objected to, asking that the dispute be “resolved based on the UN Charter, relevant UN Security Council resolutions and bilateral agreements.”

Beijing, of course, has its complaints too. China had raised objections to the Indian military exercise Him-Vijay in Arunachal Pradesh, executed by the Indian Army’s 17 Corps. The Indian government is reported to have clarified that the ongoing exercise is part of the routine familiarization and orientation exercises and has nothing to with Xi’s visit to India.

This is not the first time that China has objected to military exercises or movements in Arunachal Pradesh. China has continued to maintain that Arunachal Pradesh is “southern Tibet” but India has always countered such statements by saying that Arunachal Pradesh is an integral part of India. Moreover, India had also participated in an elevated foreign minister-level meeting of the Quad countries in the sidelines of the UN General Assembly annual meeting, despite China’s objections to all such Quad meetings.

Clearly, Modi and Xi have a lot to discuss. But with new issues piling up, it is unclear if such ‘informal’ summits can do much to improve ties. Personal reassurances are unlikely to overcome growing real disagreements between the two sides, especially considering that the two sides do not seem to care very much to even hide their disagreements anymore.

Sino-Indian Relations: Wuhan Spirit Under Growing Strain - The Diplomat, 19 August 2019

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I write on the Sino-Indian relations and how the "Wuhan Spirit" is quickly fading. The already tenuous effort by both sides to manage their ties has been further complicated by contemporary developments.

Last week, in his typically dramatic fashion, Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced India was changing its relationship with the State of Jammu and Kashmir, withdrawing the provisions of Article 370 of the Indian constitution that gave the state special rights in the Indian Union. The move included also splitting the state into two, making Ladakh, the eastern part of the state that abuts Tibet, a separate “Union Territory” that will be administered directly from New Delhi.

The decision appears to have wide popular support in India (outside of the State of Jammu and Kashmir), though the manner in which it has been implemented has been severely criticized. In particular, elected local leaders of the state have been detained, telecommunication facilities in the state have been completely cut off and the population itself has been subjected to repeated curfews and other restrictions. Some of these restrictions are now being slowly lifted though as of this writing, political leaders have not been released.

While the internal situation itself is troubling, there are potentially international ramifications to this move. One casualty could be the “Wuhan Spirit,” which refers to the informal summit between Prime Minister Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping that reset the India-China relationship after the Doklam crisis in 2017.

For the full essay, click here.



India’s move was immediately opposed by Pakistan, with the Pakistani foreign minister flying to Beijing to seek China’s support. The Chinese statement of that meeting did not appear to indicate much change in China’s position. Indeed, it was fairly neutral. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi noted “China is seriously concerned about the latest escalation of tensions in Kashmir” and that “unilateral actions that will complicate the situation should not be taken.” The foreign minister also noted that “Pakistan and India are both China’s friendly neighbors” and called “on the two sides to proceed from their national development and peace in South Asia, properly resolve historical grievances, get rid of the zero-sum mindset, avoid unilateral action and seek a new path to peaceful coexistence.”

This was far less than what Pakistan had appeared to have hoped for and was only obliquely critical of the Indian actions. In fact, China’s position appeared to be quite confused. While one spokesperson had identified the issue on August 6 as one between India and Pakistan and one that was an issue “left from the past,” another reportedly criticized India giving special status to Ladakh, stating that it “challenged China’s sovereign interests.”

The Chinese position appears to have solidified in the next few days, by the time India’s Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar reached Beijing on a pre-arranged visit on August 12. Though the Chinese statement of that meeting noted a number of areas of cooperation between the two sides in the evolving global political and trading systems, China’s position had also settled on the harsher of the two statements from August 6. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi told Jaishankar “the Chinese side’s principled position” on what was characterized as India’s unilateral move on the Kashmir issue.

Another statement issued on the same date titled, “Wang Yi States Clear Position on the Kashmir Issue” was even harsher. It noted that “the constitutional amendment of the Indian side will change the current situation in Kashmir and give rise to tensions in the region.” This statement went well beyond stating China’s worries about India-Pakistan tensions. As the statement said, “the Indian side’s measures also challenge the sovereign rights and interests of the Chinese side and go against the agreements between the two countries on safeguarding peace and stability in border areas, about which the Chinese side is seriously concerned.” The statement went on to say that “Such practice of the Indian side is neither valid in relation to the Chinese side nor will it change the status quo that the Chinese side exercises sovereignty and effective administrative jurisdiction over the territory.” In brief, China’s position went from calling on both India and Pakistan to resolve historical grievances and get rid of zero-sum mindsets to not only blaming India directly for creating tensions, but also questioning the sovereign rights and interests of China.

The Indian side does appear to have pushed back. The Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) statement on the meeting between Jaishankar and Wang Yi not only reiterated that this was an internal matter, but also noted that “There was no implication for either the external boundaries of India or the Line of Actual Control (LAC) with China. India was not raising any additional territorial claims. The Chinese concerns in this regard were therefore misplaced.” When the Chinese foreign minister referred to the rising tensions between India and Pakistan, the MEA statement noted that the Foreign Minister Jaishankar stated that “Where India Pakistan relations are concerned, Chinese side should base its assessment on realities.”

There is little doubt that both sides are trying hard to maintain the Wuhan Spirit: indeed, Jaishankar’s visit itself was meant to prepare the ground for a second informal summit between Modi and Xi to be held in October in India. But there is also little doubt that the Article 370 issue has created a fresh bone of contention between India and China.

Things have possibly gotten worse because China has also pushed for a discussion on India’s actions in the UN Security Council. The discussion was originally sought by Pakistan but it was rejected by the Polish Permanent Representative, who is currently chairing the UN Security Council. But China put its shoulders behind Pakistan’s request and forced a discussion in the UN Security Council, though it was a closed-door “informal consultations” rather than an open one which China had originally wanted. It appears that during the consultations, the United States and France strongly supported the Indian position that the issue was an internal matter while China was of the opinion that what India had done was a unilateral action that should not have been undertaken.

India is unlikely to take kindly China’s behavior. It is clear that both India and China want to maintain the Wuhan Spirit especially given the multiple tensions and uncertainties that both countries face internationally and domestically. But there is also little doubt that though the Wuhan spirit may continue, it is under serious strain.

India Must Keep Its Eye on the China Challenge in Modi’s Second Term - The Diplomat, June 20, 2019

In my column for The Diplomat last week, I focused on Modi 2.0 and China. I argue that in Modi’s second term, India needs to be pragmatic and cleareyed about the challenge that Beijing poses for its interests.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi is back in office for a second term with an even bigger mandate. But this also means that the expectations on him to deliver are that much greater, and foreign and defense policy are no exceptions to this. As New Delhi deals with a range of priorities, it will be important to keep an eye on its China challenge in the coming years.

For the full essay, click here.



On the foreign and security policy front, India faces several different challenges, from cross-border terrorism and insurgencies of varying magnitude to the rise of China. Ensuring a stable and secure neighborhood is, rightly so, an important priority for the new government, as has been evident even at the swearing-in ceremony of the Modi government (during his first swearing-in in 2014, Modi had invited the SAARC leaders, and, for his second one, the BIMSTEC leaders were invited as guests). Terrorism is also a critical issue given Pakistan’s behavior. In his address at the 5th CICA Summit in Dushanbe last week, new Minister of External Affairs S. Jaishankar said terrorism was “the gravest threat that we face in Asia today.”

Even though neighborhood and terrorism priorities are important, India also faces a serious strategic challenge from China. But on this front, New Delhi appears to be getting carried away by China’s efforts to woo India against the backdrop of Beijing’s growing trade frictions with Washington. As a scholar of the Indo-Pacific recently noted, “With Washington full of anti-China sentiment and an Indo-Pacific Strategy to match, prying India away from the US becomes increasingly important geostrategically for Beijing. And it’s doing pretty well so far—Wuhan spirit/reset has lasted over a year now.”

Modi’s foreign policy approach as far as China is concerned appears to be immersed in the 2018 Wuhan Summit. He is now preparing for a follow-up informal summit in Varanasi later in the year. On the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Summit, Modi held a separate bilateral meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping, where Modi remarked “There has been much improvement in our relations since [the] Wuhan Informal Summit. We have also become sensitive to each other’s interests and concerns. We are also showing better understanding of each other’s stance.”

Indian Foreign Secretary Vijay Keshav Gokhale, briefing the media on the bilateral meeting, said that the meeting was a brief one but “very substantive and the atmosphere was very positive.” He underlined the fact that the Wuhan spirit was very much there and this is the beginning of a series of meeting between the two leaders, with the next meeting slated to be on the sidelines of the G-20 Summit in Japan. The two leaders will also meet for the BRICS Summit later in the year.

So far, Jaishankar’s induction as India’s foreign minister appears to have had little impact on India’s China policy. Certainly, China has been smart at throwing a few bones in India’s direction in a timely fashion, with China’s change of heart with regard to Masood Azhar just before the Indian elections being one case in point. It appears that there was a quid pro quo, possibly on the Belt and Road Initiative. While India is still opposed to it on account of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), New Delhi appears to have softened its criticism. According to one Indian news report, India agreed not to raise objections to BRI in return for China dropping its hold on adding Azhar to a UN terrorism-based sanctions list.

In the face of the changing global balance of power dynamics, India’s foreign policy challenges will get even more daunting. But India’s foreign policy has to approach national security considerations with utmost pragmatism. New Delhi must realize that it has few long-term common interests with China, and that partnering with Beijing even for short-term gains carries considerable risks.

Will the Masood Azhar Listing Improve Sino-Indian Relations? - The Diplomat, May 7, 2019

In this week's column for The Diplomat, Rajesh and I wrote a joint article, "Will the Masood Azhar Listing Improve Sino-Indian Relations?," examining if China's decision on Masood Azhar is likely to have any positive impact on India-China relations. But we believe there are reasons to be skeptical.

Masood Azhar, a Pakistani national who heads the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) terrorist group, has now been placed in the United Nations Security Council 1267 Sanctions List. This was long sought by India, who blamed Azhar and the JeM for various terror attacks in India. The issue was also a major irritant in Sino-Indian relations because China had for several years placed a “technical hold” that prevented the listing.

The Indian government was jubilant, and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who is fighting national parliamentary elections, immediately claimed credit. Though the Indian government welcomed China’s decision, they have been cautious about whether this by itself would move the relationship forward, stating that there are “many things” which have contributed to the “Wuhan Spirit” and “it is difficult to point out one single incident or instance which will contribute to a better India-China relationship.”

The caution is well-founded. Sino-Indian relations have improved since the Doklam confrontation in 2017. The Wuhan “spirit,” the supposed positive outcome of the informal summit at Wuhan between Modi and Chinese leader Xi Jinping, is credited with improving relations between the two countries. A follow-up informal summit is slated for later this year. China’s move on Azhar should add to the positive spirit. Still, fundamental problems remain in the relationship and they are unlikely to be easy to resolve.

For the full essay, click here.



The most important is the consequence of the changing balance of power between the two countries. From rough parity in the 1980s, China’s economy has pulled away from India at a dizzying speed, and it is now about five times as large. This has created a gross imbalance between the two sides that is likely to persist for some time to come, even if India’s marginally faster economic growth rate of the last couple of years continues into the future. This imbalance also leads to a military imbalance, as China’s military budget grows along with its wealth. Though China’s military spending as proportion of its GDP is still quite low, that should be of little comfort because in absolute terms, it is almost four times that of India’s.

More importantly, the effect of this imbalance is likely to be felt more in the political clout that it brings to China than in a test of arms. Over the last decade, China has become bolder in wielding its economic clout, as Evan Feigenbaum has pointed out. But even without such direct exhibitions of its power, China’s clout gives it political capacities in international settings that will be difficult to ignore. New Delhi will find that when it comes to many issues where its interest conflicts with that of China’s, China will be able to garner greater international political support than India. This is already very visible among India’s neighbors in South Asia, and its effect is possibly much more diffuse but far more potent than New Delhi yet realizes. This represents a pressure on India that will not yield in the near future, and it will limit the possibilities of Sino-Indian ties.

Of course, the older problem of the disputed border also remains, despite decades of negotiations. Neither side can compromise very much on this. The best that can be hoped for is that neither side will attempt to settle it by force, but misperceptions and local misunderstandings are likely to periodically recur. The Doklam confrontation was possibly the result of something along these lines; the next time, it could become more serious.

But one consequence that can be dismissed is any effect of the current general elections on the future course of Sino-Indian relations, even though China’s move comes in the midst of a hot campaign. As Vipin Narang and Paul Staniland have noted, foreign policy has fairly low electoral salience in India. Though the ruling BJP’s campaign is pushing strategic issues in an unusually heavy manner, it is unclear what effect this will have. But even if this has some limited effect (and it will be difficult to decide this even after the election results are announced, though exit polls may give at least some clues) on the elections, its effect on subsequent Indian foreign policy may be limited. Whoever wins these elections will still have to deal with the context of China’s power and its effects on India’s options, and these are fairly limited.

New Delhi is thus correct to be cautious about the effects of the Masood Azhar listings. And while it is at it, India should equally cautious about the so-called “Wuhan spirit” because it is not likely to last very much longer either.

China Shows its True Colors by Blocking India’s Terror Blacklist Bid Again - The Diplomat, March 15, 2019

In this week's column for The Diplomat, "China Shows its True Colors by Blocking India’s Terror Blacklist Bid Again", I argue that Beijing’s move, though unsurprising, is not without significance.

Earlier this week, for the fourth time, China has blocked India’s efforts to designate Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) chief Masood Azhar as a global terrorist under the United Nations (UN). Beijing’s effort represents just the latest blow to New Delhi’s efforts in this vein. While India has been making global efforts to isolate Pakistan diplomatically, its efforts at placing Azhar under the 1267 Al Qaeda Sanctions Committee of the UN Security Council has been yet again blocked by China.

To be sure, China’s action should not obscure the fact that the broader support base for India has gone up on this score. This is reflected in the number of co-sponsors of the proposal this time. The current proposal was initiated by France, the UK and the United States and co-sponsored by countries including Germany, Poland, Belgium, Italy, Bangladesh, Maldives, Bhutan, Equatorial Guinea, Japan and Australia.

Nonetheless, Beijing’s response is significant. China justified its action by saying that “our action is to make sure that the committee will have enough time to study the matter so that the relevant sides will have time for dialogue and consultation. Only a solution that is acceptable to all sides could fundamentally provide a chance for a lasting solution to the issue. China is ready to communicate and coordinate with all sides including India to properly handle this issue.”

For the full essay, click here.



India’s official response was disappointed but calm. The Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), in a statement, said, “The ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee (1267 Sanctions Committee), upon completion of the no-objection period on 13 March 2019, was not able to come to a decision on the proposal for listing Mohammed Masood Azhar Alvi under the UN Sanctions regime, on account of a member placing the proposal on hold. We are disappointed by this outcome. This has prevented action by the international community to designate the leader of Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), a proscribed and active terrorist organization which has claimed responsibility for the terrorist attack in Jammu and Kashmir on 14 February 2019.”

Irrespective of what India says publicly, this is proof, yet again, that China is not going to abandon its ironclad relationship with Pakistan. Neither is Beijing going to succumb to pressure from others such as the United States, France, the UK, Russia, and India to change its tack on Pakistan. About an hour before the expiry of the deadline for any member to raise objections, China put in place a “technical hold” meaning that the proposal will be on the hold for the next six months. Member countries can supply information over the next nine months for lifting the hold and Masood Azhar can be listed.

In the past, China has argued that there is “no contradiction” in its policies on terrorism such as in supporting the BRICS declaration against terrorism and its policy to Masood Azhar designation as a global terrorist because the BRICS declaration was addressing terrorist groups and not individuals. And to be sure, there is some logic to Beijing’s position: It is premised on balancing India by supporting Pakistan. Pakistan has remained China’s all-weather ally through more than five decades, and both Islamabad and Beijing worry about and balance against India.

From Pakistan’s perspective, India represents an existential threat. Pakistan’s primary strategic objective since the two nations were born has been to weaken India by any means necessary. For Beijing, India represents one of the few potential challengers to China’s dominance of Asia. Both have been clear and single-minded in their pursuit to weaken and balance India, which has made for one of the most durable and deepest strategic alignments since the 1950s. There is little likelihood that this will end any time soon, a reality that seems lost on India’s foreign policy elite.

It is unlikely that India will respond in any extreme, escalatory manner toward Beijing in the short term. The general elections next month occupy much of the government’s attention. Foreign policy issues are unlikely to play a big part in the campaign except for the ruling BJP chest-thumping on the Balakot strike against Pakistan. Moreover, India’s opposition parties, all to the left of the nationalist BJP, have few foreign policy ideas or critiques that have any traction. Calling Modi “weak” and “scared of Xi”, as Rahul Gandhi, the leader of the opposition Congress party has charged, is unlikely to suffice.

On the other hand, there is significant and vocal criticism in the Indian media of the “Wuhan spirit,” and the broader Sino-Indian reset in the aftermath of the Doklam confrontation in 2017. The Hindustan Times, a leading English-language national daily, editorialized that “the Wuhan exercise seems to have failed. Not just Pakistan-backed terrorism, China has not yielded ground on anything else.” Another newspaper has warned that bilateral ties could suffer because New Delhi feels betrayed. This has been matched on social media sites in India such as Twitter where #BoycottChineseProducts and #ChinaBacksTerrorism have been trending. Whether and how this will affect Indian policy towards China after the coming elections remains to be seen.

How Long Can India’s China Juggle Last? - 16 January 2018

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I looked at the changing dynamics in India-China relations. In this piece, "How Long Can India’s China Juggle Last?," I argue that while New Delhi continues to walk a fine balance, its ability to sustain this approach remains to be seen.

India’s China policy is going through a bit of a strange time. Since the Wuhan Summit in April 2018 the two countries have been making great efforts to demonstrate that all is well in their relationship and that both sides expect the relationship to warm up further in the coming years. On the other hand, there is little indication that India’s concern about China’s military and political pressure is declining. It is unclear how long India can stay on these diverging tracts.

For the full essay, click here.



At the diplomatic level, New Delhi has been doing its best to keep the smile on its face. As an indicator of this, the number of diplomatic engagements between the two sides has been in the spotlight and has seen officials convey words of warmth to reaffirm the state of ties. In late December in particular, in addition to official bilateral exchanges, there was also an India-China High-Level Media Forum as well as an India-China Think Tank Forum.

Addressing the Media Forum, India’s External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj called Wang Yi, the foreign minister of China, “my close friend and my brother” before going onto emphasize the need for people-to-people, cultural, and educational exchanges. She noted the “Wuhan Spirit,” thanked China for the “concrete steps” taken by the “Chinese side” to find a solution to the increasing trade deficit, and listed the various multilateral forums where India and China are cooperating. A day earlier, in a message to the Think Tank Forum, she noted the “civilizational bonds” between the two countries and highlighted the expectations that India and China will lead Asia and usher in a new Asian century.

As important as what was said was also what was left unsaid. Hosting the newly elected prime minister of Bhutan, Lotay Tshering on his inaugural state visit, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi waxed eloquent about Indo-Bhutanese relations and Indian assistance as a “trusted partner and friend in the development of Bhutan” with space science becoming a “new dimension” in India-Bhutan relations. Despite the fact that months-long Doklam confrontation had taken place on Bhutanese territory, there was little indication of any international issue and certainly not China in his speech.

While these issues are almost certain to have come up during the discussions, India’s reluctance to raise them publicly fits with much of the public signaling by India on other issues as well. For example, in a speech at the recently concluded Raisina Dialogue, Swaraj outlined the critical challenges that confront India as terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and climate change. Again, there wasn’t even a hint of the potentially more serious challenges that India is facing on the international front.

On the other hand, India’s concerns about China’s inroads especially in the maritime domain continue to grow. Speaking at the same Raisina Dialogue, Indian Navy Chief Admiral Sunil Lanba stated that there are six to eight Chinese navy warships in the northern part of Indian Ocean at any given point of time, putting one quantitative metric down around India’s rising concerns about Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean. He also supported the Quad idea, stating that it stood for inclusive, free, rules-based order. He predicted that the Quad — a grouping consisting of India, Australia, Japan, and the United States — will grow with time. Considering India’s official reluctance on the Quad question, especially its military component, this was undoubtedly a surprising statement.

Lamba particularly noted the presence of Chinese submarines in the area, wondering about their use in supposed Chinese anti-piracy operations. He is not alone; the Indian Navy’s worries about Chinese submarines are growing. It is about to award Cochin Shipyards a contract for building eight new anti-submarine corvettes. The Navy also just inaugurated the Information Fusion Center, based in Gurugram in the National Capital Region, to coordinate maritime intelligence with multiple countries. India has also just opened a new airbase, INS Kohasa, on the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, which host India’s only triservice command center and are located at a critical spot close to Indonesia and the Malacca Straits.

There is little doubt that New Delhi is doing its best to calm the tensions in its relations with China, but there is also little doubt that the pressure on India is growing. Whether these two can be reconciled remains to be seen.