Towards A Quad-Plus Arrangement? - Perth USAsia Centre, 21 April 2020

As I mentioned in previous blog, along with my regular work at the Observer Research Foundation as a Distinguished Fellow and head of the Nuclear and Space Policy Initiative, I am also a Non-Resident Indo-Pacific Fellow at the Perth USAsia Centre for a period of 9 months starting in April. As part of this, I will be doing a series of papers, video blogs and webinars. The first of my papers is this: Towards a Quad-Plus Arrangement? which came out in the third week of April (I have been late in updating my blog).

It is probably too early to sense the shape of the post-COVID world. But there are some early hints of how international partnerships might be shaped by the crisis. Recently, senior officials of the four “Quad” countries (Australia, India, Japan and the
United States) teleconferenced about how to respond to the pandemic.

Quad meetings are no longer unusual. But this one was special because it included three additional Indo-Pacific powers:NewZealand, South Korea and Vietnam. The call, reportedly initiated by the US Deputy Secretary of State Steve Beigun, was intended to exchange notes on how these powers were tackling the COVID-19 pandemic.

But it also raises a broader question: Is this is a sign of possible expansion of the Quad mechanism, and how might such an expansion be feasible?

For the full essay, click here.



I concluded the essay with the following thoughts. Efforts to coordinate responses to COVID-19 by the Quad-Plus countries may be a means to expand the original formulation at a pace that would be comfortable to potential new members and without eliciting a Chinese rebuke. It would be hypocritical for China to oppose countries collaborating on COVID-19 when it has itself made precisely such calls. But such cooperation
also sets the stage for further Quad dialogue on other problems these countries face, potentially including security problems.

Indeed, a Quad-Plus expansion makes sense for a number of reasons. One is the common security concern these countries share regarding China’s behaviours. Each have faced Chinese pressure plays in recent years, and harbor concerns regarding China’s military and political expansion into areas they consider their ‘neighbourhood’. Additionally, none are in a position to effectively challenge China on a bilateral basis,
making minilateral cooperation with likeminded partners a better approach.

Together, these factors provide a pragmatic path to greater security cooperation via a Quad-Plus arrangement in future years. Expanding the Quad is not going to be easy, and will bring with it challenges of divergent concerns and burdensharing problems. But there is clearly an impetus for Quad expansion that will begin to find expression in coming months.

Where Is Japan in Its Military Push Under Abe?, my column for The Diplomat this week...

In this week's column for The Diplomat, "Where Is Japan in Its Military Push Under Abe?," I write about Japan's efforts in building up its capabilities as it confronts regional security threats.

Amid continuing tensions in the Korean Peninsula and China’s rising power and aggressive behavior, it is no surprise that Japan has been taking a whole host of steps to boost its own military capabilities over the past few years under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s leadership. While the most often cited manifestation of this is Abe’s effort to reform the Japanese Constitution, there is also a wider range of measures being undertaken both in terms of what Tokyo is doing on its own as well as what it is doing with allies and partners.

The past few weeks have offered indications of where Japan is on a couple of these fronts. Just last week, Abe spoke about constitutional revision at the ruling Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP) annual convention in an effort to develop the required consensus to take this process forward. After the speech, the LDP decided to follow Abe’s direction to amend Article 9 and include “an explicit reference to the Self-Defense Forces.” This step has been seen as a requirement; several constitutional experts have called the SDF unconstitutional because “it violates the war-renouncing Article 9 of the Constitution.”

Abe went on to add that the proposed amendment will bring about clarity to the SDF’s status under the constitution but “it will not alter in any way Japan’s national security policies.” Also, in an effort to secure broader public support, Japan’s Defense Minister Itsunori Onodera asserted that civilian control over military will be maintained “based on prewar lessons.”

Following these deliberations and the continuing threats from China and North Korea, Japan has also undertaken a major organizational revamping of its Ground Self-Defense Forces (JGSDF) with the creation of a centralized command and amphibious forces, which we have been hearing more about of late. The reorganization constitutes the largest since JGSDF was formed in 1954.

Instituting the new Command for the GSDF is meant to create abilities to undertake seamless and flexible operations across the country whereas the amphibious forces are meant for defending remote islands, particularly relevant in the context of China’s assertive maritime posturing.

In the face of the North Korean threat, a unified command for the GSDF will bring about greater synergy and coherence among the five regional armies. The defense minister, while addressing the media, stated that there will be situations in the future where the Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces have to coordinate nationwide in a quick reaction against ballistic missile launches, attacks on islands, and natural disasters.

The GSDF Command, headquartered at Camp Asaka in Tokyo, will be headed by Lt. Gen. Shigeru Kobayashi, former head of the GSDF’s Central Readiness Force. The Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade will be headed by Maj. Gen. Shinichi Aoki, who was the former deputy chief of staff of the Western Army.

The naval and air wings of the SDFs already had a central command center, and now, with all the three services having their own central commands, the defense ministry believes that there will be better coordinated joint operations among the three arms of the SDF. This could also possibly create better communication linkages with the U.S. military based in Japan.

While both North Korea and China are major threats to Japan, Beijing’s aggressive policy in the maritime domain has been of particular concern to Tokyo. Japan has been mindful of the kind of tactics China employed in the South China Sea to alter the status quo. Thus, the amphibious brigade that has been created will have an important role in retaking islands if they are unlawfully taken.

The brigade will cover southwest, from Kyushu to Taiwan, and will include Miyako Island, about 210 km from the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea. This is an area that has seen increased Chinese military activity in the recent past – the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) has become particularly active in the airspace between Okinawa and Miyako Islands. Additionally, Chinese naval vessels have been frequenting these waters, increasing tensions there.

But amid the hype around all this, it is worth noting that the amphibious brigade is still being set up, and it could be some time before the full capacity is in place. For instance, there is uncertainty around the deployment of the U.S.-made V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft, which will be key in transporting troops. The government’s plans to deploy 17 of the newly procured Osprey aircraft have not gained local approval.

There are broader uncertainties too. Amending the constitution is no easy task. Even as LDP lawmaker Hiroyuki Hosoda has developed consensus on the revisions on the constitution, other members of the ruling coalition are not entirely happy. Junior coalition partners like Komeito are not entirely on board with Abe’s plans, and since a two-thirds majority is required in both houses of the Diet to make these constitutional changes, the math means that LDP likely needs the support of Komeito in the Lower House and the support of other smaller opposition parties in the Upper House to effect these changes.

As for the support from the public, different surveys have produced different results, but those variations in and of themselves suggest that public perception is a variable that ought not to be left out in this discussion. A survey conducted by Kyodo News revealed 48.5 percent of respondents against the constitutional changes whereas 39.2 supported the amendments. Another survey conducted over telephone had shown only 33 percent of respondents supporting Abe’s moves and 54.8 opposing the revisions. These numbers certainly look better than a few years ago, but Abe still faces many challenges in terms of public perception, whether it is linked to defense issues or other domestic concerns.

There is opposition also within some parts of the bureaucracy. Media accounts have already surfaced citing sources from the defense ministry who criticized the move as “useless,” saying it will only delay the decision-making process that is required to get things done on the defense side.

Beyond these internal challenges, there are also external concerns as well. Among those are how these moves, including constitutional changes, may be perceived by China and South Korea, which have their own respective concerns about a militarized Japan.

Despite all this, Abe shows few signs of easing on his military push for Japan. That is no surprise given his own personal commitment to this goal as well as the regional trends that are impacting Japan’s security. Whether or not that will change, and to what extent all this lasts once he leaves office, remains to be seen.

China's Stealth Fighter: Implications of the J-20

Here's the link to an article of mine on the recent test flight of the Chinese fifth generation fighter aircraft, J-20. The article published by ORF can be found here.

The PLAAF (PLA Air Force) conducted the test flight of its new generation stealth fighter J-20 on January 11, 2011, just days before US Defence Secretary Robert Gates landed in Beijing on a mission to repair the bilateral defence ties. The timing of the test flight was curious. Was this itself a message for the US as also the rest of the world? Or is this another demonstration of the lack of coordination at the highest levels of the Chinese government?



J-20 will rival for the latest US stealth fighter - the F-22 Raptor. Russia is also in the process of developing one - the Sukhoi T-50 that made its flight test in January 2010 - although it is going to be another decade before it gets inducted into service. The fact that China has been able to develop the J-20 prototype demonstrates the ability of the PLA to make steady progress in an area where it is otherwise considered weak.

Having said that, it remains to be seen as to how good the new aircraft is. Comparing it with the F-22 or the Russian T-50 is going to be mere speculation. Whether it actually makes it into the fifth generation category or not is also an issue. It will depend on the kind of avionics & communication gear, sensor performance and low radar reflectivity, speed, how advanced it is in terms of the composite material used and a variety of other parameters. But it should be borne in mind that China has been encountering serious problems as far as developing jet engines are concerned. They have not been able to produce a good engine indigenously even for their fourth generation aircrafts.

Several unofficial Chinese and foreign defence-related websites have published pictures of the J-20 prototype doing high-speed taxi test, a step closer to being readied for actual flights. The J-20 has been presumably developed at the Chengdu Aircraft Design Institute,1 although there has been no concrete evidence of such a system being developed until these pictures popped up. While the Chinese authorities have not commented upon the new aircraft, General He Weirong, deputy head of PLAAF had stated in 2009 that China was readying to do the test flight of its first stealth fighter and that it would be operationalised in "eight or 10 years."2

Aviation experts and China watchers have said that the photos seem genuine. Gareth Jennings of the Jane's Defence Weekly noted that since "the nose wheel is off the ground in one picture suggest[ing] that this was a high-speed taxi test." He added that "all the talk we've heard is that this could happen some time the next few weeks".

There are also doubts about whether the technology has been developed indigenously and if not, where they got the technology from. Xu Yongling, one of the top test pilots stated that the J-20 "is a masterpiece of China's technological innovation."3 He added that the jet has advanced supersonic cruise capabilities.

There have been several reports suggesting that US technology that is the foundation for the new fighter. In January 2011, an Indian-American engineer (who worked at the Northrop Grumman, where he worked from 1968 to 1986) was sentenced 32 years imprisonment for selling military secrets to China. Noshir S Gowadia who called himself a father of the technology that protects the B-2 stealth bomber from heat-seeking missiles was originally arrested by the FBI in 2005.4

A second potential source would have been the US F-117 Nighthawk stealth fighter, the world's first operational stealth fighter, which was shot down by a Serbian anti-aircraft missile during the Kosovo War in 1999. The US hardly took any step to obtain the wreckage of the downed F-117 and several critical elements appear to have made its way into the Chinese hands. In fact, a RAND study titled, Friction and Operational Problems, notes that the US did not go about destroying the wreckage as the site attracted large number of people including government officials and journalists.. General John M Loh, a former commander of Tactical Air Command said, "I'm surprised we didn't bomb it, because the standing procedure has always been that when you lose something of real or perceived value - in this case real technology, stealth - you destroy it."5 The report stated that the initial thinking within the military was to destroy the wreckage but they were forced to reconsider "because they could not have located it quickly enough to attack it before it was surrounded by civilians and the media." It said, "For the record, it should be noted that USAF F-15Es were immediately put on alert to destroy the wreckage with AGM-130s after the F-117 downing was confirmed, but by the time the wreckage location could be positively determined, CNN was on the scene and collateral damage issues precluded the attack."6An Aviation Week and Space Technology report on September 27, 1999 noted that while Moscow obtained some parts from the wreckage, a significant size of the airframe found its way into China.7

Admiral Davor Domazet-Loso, who was the head of the Croatian military during the Kosovo War, stated, "At the time, our intelligence reports told of Chinese agents crisscrossing the region where the F-117 disintegrated, buying up parts of the plane from local farmers. We believe the Chinese used those materials to gain an insight into secret stealth technologies … and to reverse-engineer them."8

The US has played down the Chinese stealth achievement. The Pentagon spokesman Col. David Lapan suggested that while the Chinese are working on a fifth generation fighter, the progress has been uneven.9 Another spokesman Geoff Morrell was sceptical about the stealth capabilities of the new aircraft.10 Although the US has known of the Chinese stealth aircraft, they have given different estimates as to when such a system would be ready: from 2018 to 2025.

The new Chinese fighter appears to be modelled around the F-22, a heavy twin-engine fighter about the same size as that of Lockheed's F-22. F-35, which has currently gone into the production mode, is a single engine fighter aircraft, smaller in comparison to the F-22. There have been speculations as to which one the J-20 will be modelled around and the pictures now suggest that it is closer in appearance to that of the F-22. Some reports suggest that J-20 is possibly and larger and heavier than the Russia T-50 or the US F-22.11 The large size indicates the ability to carry heavy weapon load as well as the long range of the aircraft.

The US, which has stopped the production of the expensive F-22 Raptor, preferring the cheaper F-35, may now be confronted with a new rival. Given the size of the new stealth fighter, as mentioned before, it appears closer to the F-22 and therefore the Chinese test-flight of the J-20 will likely trigger some re-thinking within the US defence community. F-22 is far superior to the F-35 and the Pentagon may be forced to re-start the production, which was halted in 2009 after the originally produced 187 were given to the US Air Force. Although both are of the current generation, the F-22 is clearly a superior fighter that ensures air superiority whereas F-35 is intended primarily as a ground attack aircraft. One such analyst commented that there could be a new consensus developing for "the resurrection of the F-22."12

There are important implications for Asian countries that look at these developments with wariness. Japan, for one, has been arguing for an F-22 Raptor but had been asked by the US to settle for F-35. Analysts in Washington have argued that exporting F-22 stealth fighters could potentially impede the "strategically important Sino-US relations." Accordingly, Japan is believed to be developing its own stealth fighter, called Shinshin, meaning the heart of God. Japan had allocated about 8.5 billion yen in 2010 for the purpose. Japan plans to spend a total of a total of 39.4 billion yen for the fighter programme until the fiscal year 2015.13

It remains to be seen as to how India will respond to this latest development. New Delhi has already tied up with Moscow for the joint design and development of a fifth generation fighter aircraft and the Indian Air Force plans to induct into service 300 of them by 2017-18.14 Meanwhile, South Korea plans to speed up its procurement of an advanced fleet of stealth fighters, ready for induction anywhere between 2016 and 2020. The EADS Eurofighter jets, Lockheed F-35 and the Boeing F-15 are in the fray for the Korean order.15

Whether the J-20 matches the F-22 or not, the Chinese flight-test has spot-lighted the spiralling arms race in Asia and beyond.

(Dr. Rajeswari Rajagopalan is a Senior Fellow at the Institute of Security Studies, Observer Research Foundation)
________________________________________

1Reports in 2002 (Jane's Defence Weekly and New Scientist) talked about Shenyang Aircraft Corporation being selected for heading the R&D for the new fighter. An article later in Military Technology in 2006 brought out three designs - J-12 and J-14 by Shenyang Aircraft Corporation and J-13 by Chengdu Aircraft Corporation. For more details see, "China's 5th Generation Stealth Fighter Programme," Asian Defence News, October 12, 2010, available at http://asian-defence.blogspot.com/2010/10/chinas-5th-generation-stealth-fighter.html.
2Jeremy Page, "A Chinese Stealth Challenge," The Wall Street Journal, January 05, 2001, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703808704576061674166905408.html.
3Press Trust of India, "China Denies Stealing US Stealth Technology," Hindustan Times, January 26, 2011, available at http://www.hindustantimes.com/China-denies-stealing-US-stealth-technology/Article1-654833.aspx.
4The B-2 is a strategic, long-range stealth bomber capable of flying more than 6,000 miles without stopping for refuelling and has a carrying capacity of 40,000 pounds of conventional or nuclear weapons. For details on the espionage case, see Arun Kumar, "NRI Engineer of B-2 Bomber Gets 32 Years for Selling Secrets to China," NRI Internet, January 25, 2011, available at http://www.nriinternet.com/NRI_terrorist/USA/Noshir_Gowadia/Index.htm; and "Former B-2 Engineer Convicted of Selling US Secrets," New York Times, Associated Press, August 11, 2010, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C03EFDA1639F932A2575BC0A9669D8B63.
5Vago Muradian, "Stealth Compromised by Not Destroying F-117 Wreckage," Defense
6Daily, April 2, 1999, cited in Benjamin S Lambeth, NATO's Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment, (RAND: Santa Monica, 2001), p. 119.
7Benjamin S Lambeth, NATO's Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment, (RAND: Santa Monica, 2001), pp. 119-20.
8Cited in Peter Lee, "The Tearful Origins of China's Stealth," Asia Times Online, January 29, 2011, available at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/MA29Ad01.html. This account goes onto greater details as to how China took away critical components from the wreckage site. It said, "The navigation system, fuselage fragments with the Stealth coating, and high temperature nozzle components of the engine were spirited into the basement of the Chinese Embassy. Unfortunately, according to this story, there was a locator beacon inside the INU powered by a battery and, before the Chinese could discover and disable it, the US military was alerted to the location of the F-117 fragments and executed the [Chinese embassy] bombing."
9"Chinese Stealth Fighter Jet May Use US Technology," The Guardian (UK), Associated Press, January 23, 2011, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jan/23/china-stealth-fighter-us-technology.
10Jeremy Page, "A Chinese Stealth Challenge," The Wall Street Journal, January 05, 2001, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703808704576061674166905408.html.
11Tony Capaccio, "Pentagon Still Learning China Stealth Jet Details, Morrell Says," Bloomberg, January 26, 2011, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-01-26/pentagon-still-learning-china-stealth-jet-details-morrell-says.html.
12Reports suggest that the J-20 is about 75 ft long with a wingspan of 45 ft and weighs around 80,000 lb, without any external aid, indicating large size fuel tank. For details see, "China 'Leaks' Sneak Peek of its First Stealth Aircraft Going for A Test Run," Daily Mail, January 06, 2011, available at http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1344115/J-20-stealth-fighter-China-leaks-sneak-peek-latest-aircraft-test-run.html.
13Tony Capaccio, "Pentagon Still Learning China Stealth Jet Details, Morrell Says," Bloomberg, January 26, 2011, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-01-26/pentagon-still-learning-china-stealth-jet-details-morrell-says.html.
14For details see, Kosuke Takahashi, "Japan Frets over the US's F-22s," Asia Times, February 05, 2009, available at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/KB05Dh01.html; Dennis Sevakis, "Killing the F-22," American Thinker, April 11, 2009, available at http://www.americanthinker.com/2009/04/killing_the_f22.html.
15The idea of the joint production of the fifth generation fighter aircraft was reached in 2007 and the agreement was signed during the visit of President Dmitry Medvedev to New Delhi in December 2010. The fighter aircraft is jointly being developed by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited from India and the Sukhoi Design Bureau and Rosoboronexport from Russia.
16For details see, "S Korea to Speed Up Combat Fighter Purchase - Yonhap," Reuters, January 29, 2011, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/30/korea-defence-fighter-idUSTOE70T00720110130.

North Korean Crisis and China

Here's an article of mine on the North Korean crisis, looking specifically at the role of China. The article was published on the ORF website and can be accessed here.

China has to recognise the pitfalls of its approach as it deals with North Korea. China has to recognise that North Korean actions are triggering several developments that are not necessarily in the interests of China. For instance, it has triggered major debates on defence in Japan about becoming proactive in defending themselves, including the option of nuclearisation. Can a nuclearised East Asia be ruled out in the next decade if Pyongyang is to continue on the same path?



North Korea appears to be in an aggressive mode with its second attack this year against South Korea, provoking the world at large, and certainly its neighbours, to respond. In March this year, Pyongyang had sunk the 1,200 ton South Korean corvette Cheonan in the Yellow Sea, which prompted the United Nations to issue a resolution condemning the incident, although it did not blame Pyongyang for the incident. This week Pyongyang shelled a South Korean fishing community and military base in Yeonpyeong, a disputed island, on Nov.23 with highly inflammable ammunition that killed four people, including two civilian construction workers, and blew the windows out of a school and torched houses. As of November 29, the US and South Korea had completed their third day of naval exercises off the Korean Peninsula’s west coast, although Seoul has cancelled the live firing drill at Yeonpyeong.

Meanwhile, Pyongyang has also clarified that it is pursuing its nuclear programme vigorously. It recently stated that it has a uranium-enrichment facility with thousands of centrifuges, to provide for a light water reactor, for “peaceful purpose of meeting electricity demand.” Quoting an editorial from the ruling communist party’s newspaper, Rodong Sinmun, media reports said, “Our nuclear energy development, which is for peaceful purposes and to solve the electricity demand, will be more active.” In fact, this was the first time that Pyongyang has openly talked about its nuclear programme. The existence of the modern enrichment facility was disclosed by Stanford University professor and scientist Siegfried S Hecker, who was given a tour of the site on November 12.1

What has prompted Pyongyang to adopt such hardline measures in the recent years? The “military-first politics” of Kim Jong Il, the expansion of DPRK military capabilities and its increasing defence budget continue to be an area of concern. Pyongyang has continued to argue that nuclear weapons and missiles along with their conventional capabilities are required as deterrents against possible South Korean, Japanese and American military aggression against North Korea. The North Korean leadership has also maintained that this is one possible way that it can get the international attention and that the world will engage it only under such conditions. This argument is difficult to sell anymore given that the international community, and the US in particular, have been engaged with Pyongyang on a bilateral basis as well as through the Six Party talks format.

Second, is there a message for the world that the new leadership in North Korea is as hardline as the old one? In fact, continuity can be visualised as far as Pyongyang’s future trajectory is concerned, given that Kim Jong Il chose the youngest son and not the older one (who is considered a peacenik) to carry on with the Kim Jong Il legacy in Asian affairs.

What has been the role of China in this regard? The Chinese interests, while they seem congruent on the surface with that of the US and other regional powers, are actually different and incongruent. For instance, the Chinese and American perspectives about the issue of North Korean stability are very different. For the regional powers as well as the US, what they want is a denuclearised North Korea at peace with its neighbours, and also a country that protects the human rights for its own people, whereas Chinese interests are to ensure that there is no crisis that might prompt the influx of large number of refugees into China and that there are no US troops on the Chinese borders, say if South Korea takes over the North after a collapse. Therefore, the Chinese interests are driven by narrower perceptions of North Korean stability.

Pyongyang has adopted a defiant attitude in its dealings with its neighbourhood, with the possible exception of Beijing. Beijing has become almost the only friend of the Kim Jong Il regime, extending the crucial economic, political and moral support. China remains North Korea’s largest trading partner as well as an important source of food, fuel and arms.2 Given that Pyongyang’s relations, particularly with Seoul, have declined drastically after the two nuclear tests, Beijing’s bargaining power with the North Korean leadership should have increased dramatically.

Some analysts argue that the US is dependent on China to put any serious pressure on North Korea. While this may be partly true, it is also possible that China has not put any serious pressure on North Korea because they see it as a buffer state between itself and the US allies in its neighbourhood. Second, with the US having been preoccupied with Iraq and Afghanistan, China has managed to create a vital strategic space in Asia, particularly as the US deals with problem cases like North Korea or Myanmar. In both of these cases, China has emerged as the conduit for any dealing, be it the democracy, human rights or the WMD proliferation issues. Therefore, China does not want to lose that privileged position where the West has to route itself through Beijing to achieve some of their foreign policy objectives.

However, some have argued that the West has overestimated the Chinese hold on North Korea and that Beijing is unable to exercise that kind of influence on Pyongyang. There are experts who note that China is beginning to reach a point of frustration with North Korea on three issues: its increasingly belligerent behaviour; growing economic crisis; and the leadership succession issues. The recently-released WikiLeaks too suggested that China may have been re-thinking its policy towards North Korea, although the Cheonan incident and the recent shelling incident have established that Beijing has not altered its policy towards North Korea. There have been undoubtedly subtle changes in the last few years in China’s approach towards Pyongyang, evident from the support lent by China in imposing sanctions on North Korea post-nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009.3 There were reports which noted that after the Cheonan incident, although China did not issue any action against North Korea despite strong evidence, President Hu Jintao is believed to have directed the leadership to be less provocative and avoid confrontations.4 Nonetheless, the subtle change that one witnessed is clearly reversible, which was evident in the recent crises.

Whether there is a change or not, China’s role in finding a solution to the North Korean crisis is critical. However, like any other country, China will get on board with an effective response only if it sees that its interests are affected or its interests can be served better by an active role. For China, there are three issues that could drive a more active role. As mentioned earlier, one of the major imperatives for China keeping Pyongyang as an ally is because it is a buffer state between the pro-west US-allies and Beijing. The Chinese have been paranoid about the US troops on its border. Second, in the case of any instability in North Korea or a serious conflict, there could be a huge refugee influx into China -- a nightmare scenario becoming a reality for Beijing. Lastly, any serious crisis on the Korean Peninsula can also weaken the Chinese standing and hurt its leadership, exposing its inability to deal with a problem successfully in its neighbourhood. This will seriously damage the image of the global leader-in-the-making.

In conclusion, China has to recognise the pitfalls of its approach as it deals with North Korea. China has to recognise that North Korean actions are triggering several developments that are not necessarily in the interests of China. For instance, it has triggered major debates on defence in Japan about becoming proactive in defending themselves, including the option of nuclearisation. Can a nuclearised East Asia be ruled out in the next decade if Pyongyang is to continue on the same path?

My book, Uncertain Eagle: US Military Strategy in Asia, is out ....

Uncertain Eagle: US Military Strategy in Asia is a book that has essentially looked into the military strategy of the United States in Asia and how the changing strategies might impact on India and other countries in Asia. While the US continues to be the sole superpower, major rising powers such as China, Russia, Japan and India have begun to exert greater influence and challenge the United States in Asia as well as globally. However, rising powers are not the only American concern. Other challenges include terrorism threat from al Qaeda and its associates, threat of nuclear proliferation and ‘loose nukes’ in Iran, North Korea, and even Pakistan. Thus the US strategy has to respond to a wide range of perceived threats. Whether the US will remain an active player in the Asian military rivalries or choose to be an offshore balancer will be a key question. These choices have implications for both the Asian stability and the Indian security.



The Unites States' commitment to and involvement in the Asia-Pacific in the coming decades is a reality that Washington has firmly come to grips with, given the nature of emerging threats and challenges that it faces. The long-term security of the region will certainly depend on the US continuing to extend its deterrence mechanism, because if US allies as well as friends are not convinced of US commitment, a possibility of Japan and even South Korea going nuclear cannot be ruled out.