Wednesday, May 22, 2019

Deepening US-India Maritime Ties in Focus with Navy Chief Visit - The Diplomat, May 15, 2019

In last week's column for the Diplomat, "Deepening US-India Maritime Ties in Focus with Navy Chief Visit," I examined the deeper engagement between Indian and the US navies in the face of growing maritime threats in the Indo-Pacific. A recent interaction highlighted this aspect of relations between the two countries.


Admiral John Michael Richardson, the chief of naval operations of the U.S. Navy, has just wrapped up a visit to India to explore additional areas of naval cooperation between the Indian and U.S. navies. Richardson’s trip provided the opportunity for both sides to deepen their naval collaboration as part of their broader defense ties.

For the full essay, click here.



During his visit, Richardson met with a number of Indian officials, including Indian naval chief Admiral Sunil Lanba, who is also chairman of India’s Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC), as well as Indian Defense Secretary Sanjay Mitra and other senior officials. They are reported to have discussed all issues covering operations and exercises, training interactions, as well as capacity building and enhancement.

The visit comes against the backdrop of U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s statements that the United States is reorienting its ties with like-minded partners in nurturing “a free and open order” in the Indo-Pacific. He said that the United States is “banding together with the likeminded nations like Australia, India, Japan, and South Korea to make sure that each Indo-Pacific nation can protect its sovereignty from coercion.”

Like this one, many of the recent initiatives have been in the backdrop of a more muscular China that has been using infrastructure investment and other economic tools to further its narrow interests, even when China understands the economic non-feasibility of these projects.

A particular concern, as Admiral Richardson’s visit shows, is China’s growing naval power, a concern to both India and the United States. The PLA has traditionally been a land-focused force, but this is no more the case. Both the specific need of protecting China’s sea routes of commerce – vital for a nation as dependent on foreign trade as China – and China’s larger ambition to return to its traditional great power role, require China to expand its naval power.

The Chinese naval base in Djibouti established in 2017 is a case in point. It has also established a firmer foothold in the Indian Ocean by acquiring Sri Lanka’s Hambantota part for 99 years. (Interestingly, possibly to demonstrate its control over the port, Sri Lanka held a week-long exercise with the United States known as Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) in Hambantota). China also has access to Pakistan’s Gwadar port, which adds to its growing maritime footprint.

China’s naval push is leading India and the United States to do a lot more together, especially in the seas. Even though India has been trying to improve relations with China, New Delhi has also stepped up its security engagements with Washington. India’s recent decision to join the United States, Japan, Australia, and the Philippines in sailing through and conducting a naval exercise in the South China Sea demonstrated India’s growing concerns with a belligerent China and the need to cooperate and coordinate with other like-minded partners in the region.

The United States, too, has changed, with the Trump Administration, in particular, taking a much more strategic and longer-term approach to India that is more clearly directed at China. The United States granted the ‘Major Defense Partner’ status to India in 2016 and the ‘Strategic Trade Authorisation-1’ (STA) rank to India in 2018, evidence of the changing view in Washington regarding India’s role in the region. The 2+2 Strategic Dialogue between the two sides also had its inaugural edition in September 2018 and the signing of the Communications, Compatibility, Security Agreement (COMCASA) have added more substance and depth into the defense and strategic cooperation.

The recent U.S. decision to approve the sale of two dozen multi-role MH-60R Seahawk maritime helicopters to India for around $2.6 billion is important in the context of having strengthened anti-submarine warfare capabilities against China. These helicopters can operate from a number of different platforms including frigates, destroyers, cruisers and aircraft carriers and can be used for multiple missions including anti-surface and anti-submarine warfare operations along with secondary missions including vertical replenishment, search and rescue, and communications relay. Other important developments in this respect include the Seahawk helicopters to be armed with Hellfire missiles. These are capable of undertaking multiple missions with anti-submarine warfare missions being a critical one.

The two sides have also strengthened education, training and joint exercises in recent years – the two navies recently concluded a joint submarine-hunting exercise in the Indian Ocean, with the goal of having more reinforced and coordinated maritime patrol and reconnaissance missions in the region. The United States has sold India a number of major non-naval items also, underlining the broader nature of military ties. Earlier, India took possession of four of the 15 Boeing-made Chinook heavy-lift helicopters ordered in 2018. In addition, India has placed orders for 22 Apache attack helicopters from the United States, the first of which was handed over to the Indian Air Force last week.

Richardson’s visit will help in furthering the growing cooperation between the two sides. Because this cooperation is being driven by external pressures that both the United States and India feel, it is likely that it will deepen, irrespective of the outcome of the current national elections in India.

Friday, May 10, 2019

India’s Space Program: The Commercial Domain - The Diplomat, May 10, 2019

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I write on the Indian space programme, focusing on the commercial aspects of it. The establishment of a new private institution has spotlighted New Delhi's ongoing efforts to build out the commercial aspect of its space programme.

In the beginning of March this year, the Indian Cabinet cleared the establishment of a private institution, the Newspace India Limited (NSIL), under the Department of Space. While the development may not have received as much international attention as some of the other space- and defense-focused developments in India, it bears careful watching as it is in line with New Delhi’s ongoing efforts to build out the commercial aspect of its space program.

India’s focus on the commercial aspect of its space program in general and moves such as the establishment of NSIL are not entirely new or surprising. This follows from the Narendra Modi government’s plan to make space a major industry focus under the government’s Vision 2030 announced in this year’s interim budget. The 10-point agenda in Vision 2030 included making India “the launchpad of the world and placing an Indian astronaut in space by 2022.”

For the full essay, click here.



With respect to NSIL itself, the new entity has been set up with a paid-up capital of around $1 million. NSIL will function under the directorship of Radhakrishnan Durairaj and Suma Devaki Ram, who have been Indian Space Research Association (ISRO) directors of launch services and operations respectively. They also serve on the management team of Antrix.

The new institution is the second commercial arm of the ISRO after the Antrix Corporation, which was set up in 1992 primarily to facilitate ISRO’s commercial launch of foreign satellites. The major goal for the NSIL will be to facilitate the transfer of ISRO technologies to private industries as well as aid in marketing space-based products and spin-off technologies.

Reports citing official documents suggest that in order to facilitate transfer of technology, NSIL will take license from ISRO before sub-licensing them to the commercial players. The technology transfer envisaged through the NSIL will include India’s small satellite program, the small satellite launch vehicle (SSLV) program and the Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV). This would mean that services including launching of satellites can be undertaken by private entities once the license is procured by the NSIL.

Speaking to Times of India, Dr. Sivan, head of the ISRO, said that the NSIL will essentially become the connecting link for ISRO with commercial players to aid in technology transfer for a fee. As he put it: “We wanted a mechanism to transfer the technologies of our new projects like SSLV and even lithium-ion cells. With this company, ISRO will be able to smoothly transfer these technologies after charging fees. Once companies start mass production of small satellites and launchers, ISRO will be charging them for using its launch services.” In another interview, he had stated that he expected a demand for 2-3 SSLV rockets per month.

A January 2019 notice on the ISRO website had already shortlisted ten domestic industries for the technology transfer with regard to lithium-ion cell technology. The ISRO had already decided to transfer the PSLV rocket to the private sector more than a decade ago, though this has not yet been accomplished. The NSIL can possibly help do this quicker. On the regulatory aspects, the ISRO Chairman added that a separate “space law” is being readied, which will soon be with the Indian cabinet for its approval. It will manage all aspects of the regulation of space ventures and will “also have provisions related to the accountability of manufacturers for its space components.”

The ISRO has a proven track record in launching small satellites with the success of the PSLV. The development of the SSLV will give India a further boost in this segment. SSLV will offer an even more cost-effective option than the existing PSLV. The Chairman and Managing Director of Antrix, Rakesh Sasibhushan has said that with the SSLV, they expect to hit “a much lower cost than the PSLV” and that they were “also looking at a large increase in our revenues.” Besides the cost factor, the SSLV can also be assembled in 3-4 days as against the 40 days for a normal size rocket (Other reports suggest 15 days to assemble the SSLV).

The first test flight of SSLV is scheduled for July-August this year. ISRO has plans to launch two defense satellites of 120 kg each during the first test slight itself. The SSLVs will carry payloads between 300-500 kgs to Low Earth Orbit, thus eyeing a specific market that has not been tapped into much as yet.

ISRO’s approach to privatization and commercial engagements has come a long way, driven by the need to stay competitive at a time when there are fast emerging competitors including China and foreign commercial players who have been eyeing the global commercial space. The competition is likely to be stiff, especially in the small satellite segment given the global trend to break the big satellite constellation into smaller ones. Small satellites offer many advantages, the cost to manufacture and launch being a major consideration. ISRO’s opening to bring commercial entities into India’s space trajectory is likely to have several spin-off benefits, including for national security purposes.

Thursday, May 9, 2019

Will the Masood Azhar Listing Improve Sino-Indian Relations? - The Diplomat, May 7, 2019

In this week's column for The Diplomat, Rajesh and I wrote a joint article, "Will the Masood Azhar Listing Improve Sino-Indian Relations?," examining if China's decision on Masood Azhar is likely to have any positive impact on India-China relations. But we believe there are reasons to be skeptical.


Masood Azhar, a Pakistani national who heads the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) terrorist group, has now been placed in the United Nations Security Council 1267 Sanctions List. This was long sought by India, who blamed Azhar and the JeM for various terror attacks in India. The issue was also a major irritant in Sino-Indian relations because China had for several years placed a “technical hold” that prevented the listing.

The Indian government was jubilant, and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who is fighting national parliamentary elections, immediately claimed credit. Though the Indian government welcomed China’s decision, they have been cautious about whether this by itself would move the relationship forward, stating that there are “many things” which have contributed to the “Wuhan Spirit” and “it is difficult to point out one single incident or instance which will contribute to a better India-China relationship.”

The caution is well-founded. Sino-Indian relations have improved since the Doklam confrontation in 2017. The Wuhan “spirit,” the supposed positive outcome of the informal summit at Wuhan between Modi and Chinese leader Xi Jinping, is credited with improving relations between the two countries. A follow-up informal summit is slated for later this year. China’s move on Azhar should add to the positive spirit. Still, fundamental problems remain in the relationship and they are unlikely to be easy to resolve.

For the full essay, click here.



The most important is the consequence of the changing balance of power between the two countries. From rough parity in the 1980s, China’s economy has pulled away from India at a dizzying speed, and it is now about five times as large. This has created a gross imbalance between the two sides that is likely to persist for some time to come, even if India’s marginally faster economic growth rate of the last couple of years continues into the future. This imbalance also leads to a military imbalance, as China’s military budget grows along with its wealth. Though China’s military spending as proportion of its GDP is still quite low, that should be of little comfort because in absolute terms, it is almost four times that of India’s.

More importantly, the effect of this imbalance is likely to be felt more in the political clout that it brings to China than in a test of arms. Over the last decade, China has become bolder in wielding its economic clout, as Evan Feigenbaum has pointed out. But even without such direct exhibitions of its power, China’s clout gives it political capacities in international settings that will be difficult to ignore. New Delhi will find that when it comes to many issues where its interest conflicts with that of China’s, China will be able to garner greater international political support than India. This is already very visible among India’s neighbors in South Asia, and its effect is possibly much more diffuse but far more potent than New Delhi yet realizes. This represents a pressure on India that will not yield in the near future, and it will limit the possibilities of Sino-Indian ties.

Of course, the older problem of the disputed border also remains, despite decades of negotiations. Neither side can compromise very much on this. The best that can be hoped for is that neither side will attempt to settle it by force, but misperceptions and local misunderstandings are likely to periodically recur. The Doklam confrontation was possibly the result of something along these lines; the next time, it could become more serious.

But one consequence that can be dismissed is any effect of the current general elections on the future course of Sino-Indian relations, even though China’s move comes in the midst of a hot campaign. As Vipin Narang and Paul Staniland have noted, foreign policy has fairly low electoral salience in India. Though the ruling BJP’s campaign is pushing strategic issues in an unusually heavy manner, it is unclear what effect this will have. But even if this has some limited effect (and it will be difficult to decide this even after the election results are announced, though exit polls may give at least some clues) on the elections, its effect on subsequent Indian foreign policy may be limited. Whoever wins these elections will still have to deal with the context of China’s power and its effects on India’s options, and these are fairly limited.

New Delhi is thus correct to be cautious about the effects of the Masood Azhar listings. And while it is at it, India should equally cautious about the so-called “Wuhan spirit” because it is not likely to last very much longer either.

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