What Does the New Counterterrorism Exercise Mean for the Quad? - The Diplomat, December 6, 2019

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I looked at the recently concluded counter-terrorism exercise of the Quad. Certainly, the recent development again put the minilateral arrangement in the headlines.

The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (“Quad”) between the U.S., Japan, India and Australia has often been questioned about its purpose and capacity. For critics, other than occasionally irritating Beijing, the Quad did not appear to have much purpose. And, at times, even these expressions of occasional irritation from China had been sufficient to send one or the other Quad countries into a funk.

But in the last two years, the Quad has slowly become somewhat sturdier, with the level of interaction between the countries improving, and the members themselves becoming less skittish when Beijing criticizes the venture. Now, the Quad countries have taken a new step, holding a table-top counter-terrorism exercise together. What can we make of this?

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Details are skimpy. India has hosted the first counter-terrorism table-top exercise (CT-TTX) among the Quad countries in New Delhi on November 21-22. India’s National Investigation Agency (NIA), which hosted the TTX, is reported to have said the exercise is meant to assess and validate counter-terror mechanisms against a range of existing and emerging terrorist threats at both the regional and global levels.

At the most basic level, the CT-TTX is not surprising considering India’s concern about the issue. India’s own insufficient military capabilities are well-known, and New Delhi has been open to cooperation in this regard. This is clearly an important reason why India has shown willingness to tie up with the Quad on counter-terrorism.

The exercise was also aimed at sharing best practices in terms of preparedness, mitigation strategies and in developing coordinated strategies, and to expand the areas for strengthened cooperation among the four Quad countries. Seen from that perspective, the exercise would help highlight the interagency coordination issues within each of the countries and also bolster the multi-agency coordination between security and counter-terror agencies among the four countries.

The exercise is significant because this was the first concrete joint security initiative by the four countries. The TTX also reflected the shared resolve among the Quad countries in addressing a major challenge they all face. Importantly, though this was a security exercise, it did not target China. But still, it is a step up from the usual HA/DR type of exercises that many of these countries, especially India, prefers. The fact that the Quad has been upgraded to foreign ministerial platform is also an important indicator of the significance the four participating countries attach to the Quad.

That said, one should not exaggerate the significance of this development. The Quad’s revival and the carrying out of the exercise reconfirms the fact that the original concerns that led to the Quad were valid and getting more serious. But the level of commitment of different countries within the Quad has been suspect, and their mutual trust is still a work in progress.

India is no exception to this. On the one hand, India has been open to the Quad as one of several mechanisms that allows it to build on partnerships without entering into alliances, and China’s behavior and its hostility (despite the Chennai informal summit) towards India has pushed New Delhi to be less reluctant about the Quad. But on the other hand, for the time-being, India’s willingness to participate in the Quad is limited to testing out non-military alliance initiatives such as the CT-TTX to assess the possibilities and limitations.

Tiger Triumph: US-India Military Relations Get More Complex - The Diplomat, 15 November 2019

In my column for The Diplomat last week, I wrote on how the maiden joint tri-services humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) exercise between the Indian and the US militaries will further deepen the ties between the two countries in general and the two militaries in particular.

The Indian and U.S. militaries are engaged in their maiden joint tri-services humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) exercise, which they are calling “Tiger Triumph,” in Visakhapatnam and Kakinada in the southern Indian state of Andhra Pradesh. This represents an improvement over the type of joint military exercises that the two countries have held to date, and is an indication that defense relations between the two sides are steadily deepening.

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The U.S. and Indian militaries have been engaged in a number of different military exercises since the early 1990s, including Yudh Abhyas and Vajra Prahar (army), Malabar and RIMPAC (multilateral, navy) and Red Flag (air force). This followed the big boost to U.S.-India defense relations with the Kicklighter proposals in 1991, which included service-to-service exchanges between India and the United States.

The first India-U.S. military exercise codenamed “Teak Iroquois” took place between the two armies in February 1992; the first naval exercise named Malabar-I in May 1992. In addition to generating interoperability, these exercises have been great familiarization opportunities for the two militaries to understand each other’s strategic and security perspectives. With each iteration, these exercises have grown in terms of the number of personnel and platforms involved, and the exercises themselves have become much more complex and useful.

This week, we saw another indication of the increasing complexity of U.S.-India exercises with the holding of Tiger Triumph, the maiden tri-service HADR exercise. The exercises, which started on November 13, should last a week. It is taking place on the India’s eastern seaboard with the participation of all three Indian services along with the U.S. Navy and Marines.

Indian naval ships Jalashwa, Airavat, and Sandhayak; Indian Army troops from 19 Madras and 7 Guards; and Indian Air Force MI-17 helicopters and Rapid Action Medical Team (IAF-RAMT) are participating in it from the Indian side. The United States has sent the USS Germantown and troops from the U.S. 3rd Marine Division. The U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific, is leading the efforts on the U.S. side. There are a total of 1,200 Indian and 500 U.S. men and women from different services participating in the first-ever U.S.-India tri-service exercise.

The exercise, focused on HADR aspects, is meant to be an annual event from now on, bolstering the already-strong military-to-military collaboration between India and the United States.

The exercise is aimed at building and nurturing better and more effective interoperability between the services of the two militaries. It is because the two militaries have held specific service-led military exercises for more than a decade that the Indian and the U.S. militaries were able to respond to the 2005 Indian Ocean tsunami in a prompt and coordinated fashion. Interoperability is the mantra, especially for a region that is characterized by a high number of natural disasters on a fairly periodic basis to which multiple countries respond.

According to an Indian government press release, the exercise will begin with a Harbor Phase at Vishakapatnam, which will be followed by a Sea Phase conducted in Kakinanda, where “the landing of Relief Forces would be undertaken to the Exercise scenario.” A Joint Command and Control Centre will be established by the Indian Army and U.S. Marines. The HADR area will also have a medical facility camp, established by the IAF-RAMT and the U.S. Navy Medical team, that will cater to the “victims” who would have been shifted to the facility by air and road. The exercise, with a goal of helping capacity-building for both the militaries, will simulate a full scenario involving field training and moving humanitarian assistance and disaster relief from ship to shore. The exercise will end with a closing ceremony on board the U.S. naval vessel Germantown on November 21.

Beyond Tiger Triumph itself, the trend of increasing complexity of U.S.-India exercises is rooted in broader strategic dynamics. These exercises are the result of the growing convergence between American and Indian strategic interests with the changing strategic dynamics in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. In this context, there is a recognition on both sides that more capable powers such as India and the United States have to join forces to prevent the possibility of a hegemonic Asia.

This has manifested itself in how both sides have been talking about each other within their broader strategic approaches. There have been repeated assertions from the United States on the importance of India in their Indo-Pacific strategy, and this is asserted in the U.S. National Security Strategy document as well as the U.S. Department of Defense’s 2019 Indo-Pacific Strategy Report. India does not bring out formal, official strategy papers, but statements by senior government officials and the upgrading of the Quad talks to ministerial level are a demonstration of similar sentiments on the Indian side too. And the idea of a free, open, and inclusive Indo-Pacific was reiterated by Prime Minister Narendra Modi at the Shangri La Dialogue in 2018.

Engagements such as Tiger Triumph are also a demonstration of the fact that despite the occasional irritants in the relationship, U.S.-India ties are still deepening amid these wider strategic dynamics.

India and Australia Defense Relations: Towards a Common Vision of an Open Indo-Pacific Region? - The Diplomat, 20 September 2019

I have been a little behind in updating my blog but I am trying it up to date. Two weeks ago, in my column for The Diplomat, I focused on the growing closer defence relations between India and Australia and the potential for the two countries in stabilising the Indo-Pacific. I argue that despite differences that remain, there is clear evidence of growing strategic convergence by both countries in the security realm.

After decades of being indifferent to each other, India and Australia have recently emerged as close strategic partners in the Indo-Pacific. This is evident in the number of high level visits and the number of joint military exercises between the two countries. Indian Navy Chief Admiral Karambir Singh was in Australia in early September, and the Indian Defense Minister, Rajnath Singh, is slated to visit Australia in November.

The shift in the relationship, both in terms of the tone and direction, is remarkable. This is primarily led by a common concern about a rising China and its strategic consequences on the Indo-Pacific strategic order. But there have been concerns about whether the two countries are on the same page: as Frederic Grare says in a 2014 paper, it is not clear if the common concerns have materialized into a shared approach in addressing the China factor.

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Clearly, even as different countries have concerns about China, their concerns have been defined by local and often differing national interests and perspectives. Australia worries about China’s role and presence in the Pacific whereas India’s concerns are more to do with China’s increasing influence and activities in the Indian Ocean. And on the Indian Ocean, Australian analysts see little convergence and alignment of thinking with India. David Brewster for one, argues that “Australia is likely to be less willing to recognize any Indian claims of a ‘predominant’ maritime role in the Indian Ocean, much less any Indian sphere of influence in the north-east Indian Ocean.” But it is more important for India and Australia to come together in upholding rule of law, rules based order, respect human rights and establish norms of responsible behavior.

Despite this apparent mismatch in the thinking between the two capitals, maritime security concerns about the broad Indo-Pacific region has been gaining greater traction. The joint naval exercise, AUSINDEX, is a manifestation of this synergistic approach to maritime security. The third iteration held in April this year was the biggest so far between the two navies. Held off the coast of Visakhapatnam in southern India, it saw the participation of the highest number of units of the two countries so far including four frontline ships with integral helicopters, one submarine and a variety of aircraft including P8I and P8A long-range Maritime Reconnaissance Anti-Submarine Warfare aircraft. The exercise involved all three dimensions comprising anti-submarine warfare exercises, air defense exercises, and anti-surface warfare exercises. In a first, fifty-five American and twenty New Zealand military personnel were present to witness the exercise. According to an Indian government statement, “the increased scale of participation signifies the importance attached to the exercise by both countries while the enhanced complexity is indicative of the interoperability between the two navies.”

Therefore, it is clear that both New Delhi and Canberra have come a long way in their strategic engagements in a very short span of time, even if it has not advanced as fast as some observers would like to see. But this relationship will only further intensify in the coming years given that the common threat of a hegemonic China is unlikely to disappear anytime soon. It is quite likely that both countries will come to appreciate the increasing relevance of working together on a number of areas including maritime security, the establishment of a blue economy, infrastructure and connectivity initiatives, and strategic industry collaboration. The security dialogue, political consultations and bilateral and multinational military exercises can be expected to gain further depth and appreciation in both capitals. In addition, developing a common approach to certain ideas and principles like free, open and transparent Indo-Pacific is important.

Such strategic engagements will receive a major fillip with the visit of the Indian defense minister to Australia later this year. Reports suggest that India and Australia are likely to sign a number of important agreements including the mutual logistics support agreement, an information exchange agreement and a broader maritime agreement. A report citing diplomatic sources said that “These will lead to greater interoperability and help in elevating the strategic partnership.”

The logistics agreement has been in the discussion phase for a few years now and Australia is reported to have given India a draft text in 2016. It should be noted that India took more than a decade to finalize and conclude such an agreement with the United States. Ever since the LEMOA was concluded with the United States in 2016, it appears that India is getting a lot more comfortable with such agreements. Since 2016, India has signed two such agreements, one with France and a second one with South Korea, just a few weeks ago. These agreements go to enhance the interoperability between the militaries of the two countries, and simplify the process of using each other’s military facilities.

Maritime security cooperation, especially the information sharing arrangement, will help both sides to gain a better strategic awareness picture of the Indo-Pacific region. These have been on the bilateral agenda for some time – these were identified as elements in the India-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation signed during Prime Minister Kevin Rudd’s visit to India in 2009 as well as the Framework for Security Cooperation between India and Australia of 2014.

It is clear that the India-Australian strategic relationship has some way to go yet. But despite understandable disappointments about the slow pace, there are also advances being made.

Modi's Japan Visit: Security, the Key Driver

Here's my short essay on Modi's Japan visit... While economic and trade aspects are vital for a relationship to flourish, it should not be forgotten that there are strong security imperatives that are becoming the drivers of this relationship. These include a mutual desire for a stable Asian strategic framework, security of the Sea Lanes of Communications (SLOCs) in the region, and concern about the fickleness of US policy when it comes to balancing China. These core interests along with shared ideals of democracy, rule of law and free and independent media call for a close partnership between New Delhi and Tokyo. Japan has taken the extra step in assigning special importance to India, reflected in its offer of the U-2 amphibious aircraft to India. It is time for India to reciprocate and show that Japan matters to India....

Prime Minister Narendra Modi will be on his way to Japan this weekend, making this the second major summit level visit he is undertaking since he took over in May. The visit, which was postponed on account of the budget session of the Indian parliament, is being watched with a lot of eagerness and anxiety, depending on which of the world capitals one is watching it from.

Both in India and Japan, there is wide spread expectation from this visit in terms of economic and trade relations as well as defence and strategic engagement. The personal rapport between Modi and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is likely to be a catalyst in deepening and broadbasing this relationship.

Several commentaries on the Modi visit have focused on the economic aspects of India-Japan relationship or how they may be developed without a China factor. While economic and trade aspects are vital for a relationship to flourish, it should not be forgotten that there are also strong security imperatives that are becoming the drivers of this relationship. These include a mutual desire for a stable Asian strategic framework, security of the Sea Lanes of Communications (SLOCs) in the region, and concern about the fickleness of US policy when it comes to balancing China. These core interests along with shared ideals of democracy, rule of law and free and independent media call for a close partnership between New Delhi and Tokyo.

It is true that the India-Japan relationship should not be based on an external factor such as China and that there should be independent driving factors that take forward this relationship. However, enabling a stable Asian strategic framework to the mutual benefit of both New Delhi and Tokyo should be a compelling factor for both Modi and Abe. The emerging Asian strategic framework is being held hostage by China and its aggressive posturing in the recent years. The long-held regional view that China may come to assume a more accommodating and benign posture has been put to rest by Beijing's own actions in its neighbourhood. Thus, there is a concerted effort by countries in the region - both big and small - to form new friendships and partnerships that may provide them with some cushion and a shield in the face of a belligerent China.

Security, the key driver

Asia is going through an unprecedented churning, characterising in many ways the 19th century European theatre. It is after several centuries that we are witnessing the simultaneous rise of three Asian powers - China, Japan and India. This itself is a perfect recipe for competition, rivalry and conflict. But compounding this is the yet unresolved boundary and territorial issues and the baggage of history that weighs down these Asian great power relations. While the territorial issues have been around for decades, Chinese behaviour in recent years in the South China Sea, East China Sea and the Sino-Indian border have led to fresh anxieties about the Chinese intentions and capabilities.

Given this backdrop, there are uncomfortable questions as to what kind of power China would become as it grows stronger in both economic and military terms. Thus, much of the Asian uncertainty that one witnesses today is a direct result of China's rise. Many argue that this is nothing different or unique about China and that China's rise needs to be understood within the larger processes of power transitions and changing balance of power equations. While there is merit to such arguments, the reality is that Asian countries in particular are faced with a tough and unsettling neighbourhood. This will set in motion both diplomatic maneuvering and acquisition of hard power, which are inherently destabilizing but have become inevitable.

A strengthened India-Japan relationship needs to be placed in this context if we have to understand and appreciate the changing dynamics in their bilateral ties. It is a fact that India-Japan relations have enjoyed a strong economic relationship, with Japanese ODA (Overseas Development Assistance) forming an important component of that. Japanese share in India's infrastructure story is also phenomenal and set to grow. Even as this is the case, the growing partnership between the two is the outcome of new regional security dynamics. Commitment to the annual summits and periodic dialogue between the foreign and defence ministries is a reflection of the increasingly synergetic approach towards Asian security in general.

Therefore, while there are several outstanding issues between the two countries including on trade and FDI and on a bilateral nuclear deal that needs to be improved or fixed, it will be unfortunate if New Delhi let these become the determining factor in the bilateral relationship. Some Indian analysts have argued that India should bargain hard with Tokyo and conclude the nuclear deal at the earliest. But India should learn to do hard bargaining with those that are hostile to India, not potential partners such as Japan. Early conclusion of the nuclear deal is important but India should not lose sight of the bigger strategic picture that drives this relationship. Japan has taken the extra step in assigning special importance to India, reflected in its offer of the U-2 amphibious aircraft to India. It is time for India to reciprocate and show that Japan matters to India.