Why the US Needs India's Air Force ... my take on US-India military ties ... in today's The Diplomat

Here's an article of mine on US-India military ties, arguing for greater engagement between the Indian Air Force and the US Air Force. This has been published today as the lead article in The Diplomat.

Until now, the flag-bearers of U.S.-Indian military cooperation have been the two countries’ navies, a point that was highlighted during the response to the 2005 tsunami and subsequent reconstruction operations. In contrast, while there have been some joint exercises between their two air forces, the rationale for air force-to-air force cooperation appears to be neither understood nor appreciated in either capital.



During his visit to India last November, U.S. President Barack Obama characterized relations with India as “one of the defining and indispensable partnerships of the 21st century.” Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, in turn, stated that India had “decided to accelerate the deepening of our ties and to work as equal partners in a strategic relationship that will positively and decisively influence world peace, stability and progress.” Arguing that cooperation extended to India’s immediate neighborhood, Singh said the two countries “have a shared vision of security, stability and prosperity in Asia based on an open and inclusive regional architecture.”

But if the bilateral relationship really as is important as the two leaders suggest, then there’s undoubtedly a need for greater strategic synergy. In particular, the two countries’ militaries need to understand each other better if they are to work together for regional and global peace.

Until now, the flag-bearers of U.S.-Indian military cooperation have been the two countries’ navies, a point that was highlighted during the response to the 2005 tsunami and subsequent reconstruction operations. In contrast, while there have been some joint exercises between their two air forces, the rationale for air force-to-air force cooperation appears to be neither understood nor appreciated in either capital.

Indian strategic planners seem to be in broad agreement with their U.S. counterparts in identifying the big strategic challenges in the Asia-Pacific region, yet New Delhi has been reluctant to develop joint approaches in addressing many of these challenges.

The hope is, of course, that even if India is hesitant now, that it may change its mind over the next decade. After all, India’s interests, and its incapacity to address the challenges it faces on its own, seem bound to drive it towards the United States and Asian partners such as Japan and Australia.

Certainly, former U.S. President George W. Bush saw India as a significant pole in Asia, and close ties with India as being in U.S. interests – something that the Obama administration also seems to have recognized. Such views have prompted the United States to develop more formal defense cooperation and to talk about India in terms reserved for U.S. allies (something that causes some discomfort in New Delhi).

The most frequently cited reason for Washington’s interest in India is as a balancer to China, but this view is more complicated than many assume. For a start, the United States has a stake in the ongoing Sino-Indian border dispute. Although the U.S. is yet to take a position on the broader boundary and territorial dispute between the two countries, it certainly wouldn’t be in the interests of the United States to see a conflict break out – and especially to see India lose face in a military confrontation. China decided to teach India a lesson in their brief war in 1962. If this were repeated today, though, the U.S. would also be adversely affected as India’s perceived value as a regional ally would be diminished. A Chinese victory would also raise the question in the minds of smaller states over what hope they have in standing up to China if the United States stood by and watched as a major ally such as India was picked on. Such worries would undoubtedly undermine the United States’ position in Asia, and make China’s neighbors more susceptible to coercion.

But it’s not just about the negatives – India’s airpower can help underpin U.S. Pacific forces indirectly. For a start, a strong Indian Air Force would likely prompt China to focus at least part of its air power away from the Pacific and on the Tibet region. In addition, the Indian Air Force could also tip the scales in the Indo-Pacific by reducing the burden on the U.S. Air Force and providing security in the global commons. For instance, with a single air refueling, India’s SU-30MKI’s combat radius can include either the Straits of Malacca or the Persian Gulf.

Of course, it’s an open question whether India is willing to take such proactive steps. But co-operating more with the United States will help India feel more comfortable with future joint operations.

The reality is that both countries’ air forces face common threats, meaning it would benefit both to share data on a more regular basis and plan joint responses to any problems. The Indian Air Force, for instance, faces threats in its Northeastern sector similar to those facing the United States in the Western Pacific, namely ballistic missiles, advanced integrated air defense systems (IADS), 4th and 5th generation fighters, and increasingly sophisticated Chinese air-to-air missile and electronic warfare capabilities. All these developments increasingly impinge on both India and the United States, and it makes sense for the two to boost co-operation and learn lessons from each other’s experiences in the region.

Similarly, given the growing trend of India procuring U.S. weapons and equipment, greater engagement between their air forces would be particularly beneficial. Joint operations on democracy promotion, humanitarian missions, post disaster management and reconstruction are all ideal areas for joint operations.

But for any of this to occur, India must first recognize the potential for it to become a net provider of constructive airpower in the Indian Ocean Region. If India’s procurement plans go as planned, it could have a modern air force that will be highly capable of anything from disaster relief and humanitarian assistance to providing lethal combat air support.

At the end of the day, if India wants to sit at the high table of international diplomacy, it should be prepared to shoulder greater responsibilities and shed its risk averse foreign policy. Ramping up its air force co-operation seems a good place to start.

McChrystal's Exit: What Does It Mean for Afghanistan?

Here's the link to an article of mine published by ORF on the exit of Gen. McChrystal and what it means for Afghanistan.

Indiscretion is the one thing that General Stanley McChrystal could be blamed for. It is not the COIN strategy, also now known as the McChrystal strategy that was at fault, but the manner in which he dismissed some members of the political or diplomatic class that was at fault. Should he have been sacrificed on account of that? What about punishing Ambassador Eikenberry and others for leaking secret cables to the media and bringing out in the open the country's divisiveness in its AfPak strategy? What does McChrystal's exit mean for the war on terror in Afghanistan?


President Obama opting for General Patraeus to take charge of Afghanistan appears to be not a bad option given that both he and General McChrystal had worked together in developing and implementing the current COIN strategy in Afghanistan. Even Obama's statement that replacing McChrystal with Patraeus was not “based on any difference in policy with General McChrystal” makes one believe that there is going to be continuity in the strategy and the manner in which the war will be taken forward. This is not to suggest that Patraeus and Obama have an excellent equation. A story in Time brought out their problems which seem to have begun in Obama's first meeting with Patraeus in Baghdad in 2008 during the presidential campaign. Apparently, the Obama-Patraeus disagreement was over Obama's intention to pull out all combat troops from Iraq by 2010.

Eikenberry's argument that the surge strategy, which has been a critical component of the current strategy, was not going to be effective was little premature. McChrystal's strategy was being criticized as a failure even before it could take off. The facts on the ground may appear to support such criticism because of the sharp spike in the violence level in Afghanistan in the last few months. But this spike was expected. In fact, the violence level in Iraq went up before it started coming down. The fact of the matter is that McChrystal had a dedicated team of men with him to do what had to be done.

More importantly, the General was liked by President Hamid Karzai. And Eikenberry is wrong about Karzai too. Instead of ridiculing Karzai, as evident in Eikenberry's cable message, he should have realized that the US has to go with the best choice it has. It is also wrong to sit and pass judgment at Karzai making deals with Taliban given that the US has made it clear that it will be packing its bag in a year's time. Karzai was left with no option but to make peace with the good/bad Taliban. It is naïve to assume that he would sacrifice his government and see Taliban in power in Afghanistan again. In the absence of a clear policy from Washington, Karzai can be seen to be doing more peace jirgas and gain some kind of recognition from the Taliban even at the cost of US unhappiness.

If the current COIN strategy continued, McChrystal was going to request for another 30,000 soldiers for Afghanistan. It remains to be seen whether such a request will be made by General Patraeus and whether it will be accepted by Washington. But Eikenberry's argument that increased strength of US forces in Afghanistan will only increase Afghan dependence on the US instead of developing their own forces is a bit of a stretch.

The more fundamental issue after having thrown McChrystal out is whether there is clarity in Washington about what they want to do in Afghanistan and what kind of an outcome they would like to see in Afghanistan. What kind of a message is Washington sending to Karzai and even Pakistan for that matter? Is there any agreement between the political and diplomatic sections in Washington as to what they want to achieve in Afghanistan? Or is the superpower ready to take a beating and leave Afghanistan?

Lastly, it is unclear what this episode says about President Obama. Obama's approach has left even coalition partners wondering on the AfPak strategy. Sir Sherard Cowper-Coles, Britain's special envoy to Afghanistan, has already gone on an extended leave – an indication of his disagreement over the US policy. The Obama Administration has to recognise that Afghanistan is not a war that can be fought easily or alone; the US has to build in a larger coalition of nations, particularly the neighbours, to make long-lasting changes in Afghanistan. Until then, Obama is going to be taken for a ride by Pakistan by making piece-meal arrangements that have kept the Americans happy all this while.

1.However, there are significant differences between Iraq and Afghanistan. In the case of Iraq, most of the war was fought in urban centres, which is not the case in Afghanistan. Afghan is much larger and given the mountainous terrain, it is a much harder task. Therefore, the kind of force level that is needed to clean up an area and then hold is going to be significantly larger. There was also the application of full-spectrum warfare – to use all the available tools in the kit – in Iraq which needs to be replicated in Afghanistan.

US-India Deal Clouds Nuclear Summit

Here's a link to a story on India-US Nuclear Deal and the Nuclear Security Summit by Peter Brown that has quoted me. The story appeared today (April 13) in Asia Times Online.

For India's Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, who was on Sunday tapped by US President Barack Obama for his first major one-on-one meeting at the sidelines of this week's Nuclear Security Summit in Washington DC, much has changed since his visit to the US capital last November.

The two-day summit, which is focusing on making atomic sites and materials safer from terrorists, comes after last week's release of the latest US Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and the signing in Prague of the US-Russia START nuclear arms control treaty. In May, there is also the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference.



There are sub-plots to the US-India engagement, including the continuing dispute over Indian access to David Headley, the Mumbai terror suspect being tried in the US, relations with Pakistan and the situation in Afghanistan. Still, Singh's superb salesmanship is once again on display thanks to the US announcement in late March of a nuclear reprocessing agreement with India.

The deal will allow India to acquire spent nuclear fuel from the US, and as a result, places India in an elite group along with Japan and several European nations.

"At a time when overall relations have been under something of a cloud, the reprocessing agreement, and its timely completion, suggests that a bipartisan commitment at the highest levels of the US government on the single most consequential issue area in bilateral relations for New Delhi - high-technology trade - remains intact," said Sourabh Gupta, senior research associate at Samuels International Associates in Washington, DC.

This was billed as one of the expected outcomes of the broad "123 Agreement" - the name commonly used for the 2008 civilian US-India nuclear deal officially known as the US-India Agreement for Cooperation Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy. But it has faced a barrage of criticism especially from domestic opponents in the US.

Unlike the new START treaty between Russia and the US, and the recent release of the NPR, the US-India deal has not captured everyone's attention as the curtain rises on the summit. Along with the summit's focus on the threat of nuclear terrorism, Iran and North Korea - though not officially on the agenda - are likely to feature heavily in Obama's talks with leaders.

In discussions with Chinese President Hu Jintao, Obama is likely try to cement China's commitment to pressuring Iran over its nuclear program through sanctions, as well as cool recent Sino-US tensions. The summit of 47 nations in Washington comes ahead of an alternative international nuclear disarmament conference in Tehran on April 17-18.

China has kept silent on the US-India nuclear reprocessing deal. The visit to China by India's Foreign Minister S M Krishna a fortnight ago may be one reason. China also advocates the right of all nations to pursue civilian nuclear programs and the peaceful uses of nuclear power in general. China probably prefers to mask its displeasure, since China will sit down with India again at the latest of the increasingly important BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China) summits, to be held in Brasilia on April 16.

"From the day this agreement passed muster at the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in September 2008 - despite their non-constructive role in the NSG at the time, Beijing has known that this was a done deal,'' said Gupta, referring the US-India nuclear reprocessing agreement. ''To their credit though, they have thereafter chosen to pursue their interest in somewhat stabilizing the political relationship with New Delhi, rather than publicly nurse their grievances about an arrangement that became the capstone of the US-India bilateral partnership."

While Beijing would like the US and the international community to accord a similar set of civilian nuclear arrangements to Pakistan, that is not going to happen, Gupta said. ''And Beijing is not likely to facilitate such bilateral cooperation either to the extent that it calls into question its treaty and norm-based commitments to the international non-proliferation regime."

On the other hand, China has taken the opportunity to send a strong signal both to India and the US via its critique of the NPR, which China's views as deliberately distorting China's nuclear intentions at time when the US's strategy involves surrounding China with nations that have rapidly evolving nuclear capabilities of their own.

"It is publicly known that the US once had hundreds of nuclear warheads aimed at China. Even today, it has numerous naval vessels deployed carrying nuclear weapons that can be retrained on China swiftly," said an editorial in China's Global Times newspaper in early April. "In Asia, China is surrounded by countries that have signed nuclear pacts with the US. It is the US, not China, that should provide more transparency regarding its nuclear intentions." [1]

The reference to "nuclear pacts" applies to both India and Japan equally.

"I wouldn't be happy if I were [President Jintao], but China is also to blame for not blocking the original Nuclear Security Group waiver for India which was approved by consensus," said Miles Pomper, senior research associate at the California-based James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. "Still, I am not sure how much it will affect the tone of the summit, which is more focused officially on dealing with nuclear terrorism and, on the sidelines, on dealing with Iran."

India walks away the clear winner here. The Obama-Singh meeting further reinforces the perception that the US wants to highlight its strong relationship with India no matter how strong this relationship might be at present, especially in India's eyes.

"It is not the reprocessing capability right now that is the danger. India had sufficient capability to reprocess material in its existing unsafeguarded reactor facilities to build upon its stockpile," said Pomper. "It is what the agreement says about the willingness of the US to stand up to India, particularly when it comes the possibility of an Indian nuclear test such as one that clearly shows ability to develop a two-stage thermonuclear weapon. That is what I would worry about if I were China."

Pomper said the real problem with the deal is that it gives India a better deal in terms of reprocessing rights from the US than both Japan, which is a non-nuclear state, and Euratom, which is a mix of European nuclear and non-nuclear states.

"Not to mention those countries are closer allies to the US as well," said Pomper. "Those deals laid out explicit criteria under which the US could suspend the agreement. The most important of which that is in Euratom's [deal], for example, but is missing from the India deal is if the other party tests a nuclear device. This seems to open the door to further Indian nuclear tests. Also missing is a provision that it could be suspended in the case of a safeguards violation by Euratom and that was missing from this [agreement]."

Yes, there is a provision that if the agreement is suspended for more than six months, the US will have to enter into consultations on compensating India for its loss, too.

"For India, this is too good to be true, but US negotiators seem to have a congenital predisposition to giving away the store when they negotiate with India," said Pomper.

India is not changing any of its previously held positions with respect to nuclear issues as a result of signing this agreement. It will not be signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty anytime soon, for example. The same is true for the NPT.

Gupta emphasizes that the assurances that India has given here are contained "mainly within the understandings that were reached during negotiation of the umbrella 123 Agreement.

"Though the 123 Agreement, as read, leaves a degree of ambiguity as to what are the criteria for termination (so as to make ratification, then, of the deal palatable in both legislatures), a private communication from the State Department to then-chairman Lantos of the House Foreign Affairs Committee in January 2008 - and presumably known to the Indian side - explicitly lays out these criteria," said Gupta. "They are: detonation of a nuclear weapon; material violation of the 123 Agreement; or violation or termination by New Delhi of its IAEA-negotiated safeguard agreement. These are assurances communicated by India."

Furthermore, as part of the arrangement and procedures of the March 2010 agreement, New Delhi has provided written bilateral undertakings on end-user guarantees as well as non-diversion of nuclear materials.

"All overseas-supplied reactors, fuel, as well as facilities reprocessing such irradiated fuel are also to remain under IAEA safeguards. The [arrangement and procedures] also specifically list the number of facilities to be covered and the procedure for 'consultation visits' to such facilities by US officials," said Gupta.
India is very firm and relishes engagement in tough negotiations. These US visits may occur only every five years, for example. India makes no excuses, and retains its consistent hard-edged approach both in bilateral and multilateral forums.

"As far as the CTBT is concerned, our position is very well-known. It has been reiterated on a number of occasions. We are committed to a voluntary moratorium on nuclear explosive testing. That remains our position. That has been very clearly articulated to all our friends and partners," said India's Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao in response to a question at a press conference in New Delhi in early April.

India played trump card after trump card in this instance. The US wanted only a single reprocessing facility in India, but India prevailed after citing the 123 Agreement, and in the end, multiple reprocessing facilities were approved.

"According to the final agreement, the reprocessing of spent fuel is meant to be done at two dedicated stand-alone facilities, with India allowed to make additions and modifications without going back to the US for additional negotiations," said Rajeswari Rajagopalan, a senior fellow in security studies at the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi. "In fact, India could take up the lead in setting up an international reprocessing center in India for the whole region. Such a facility could possibly aid Iran in getting reprocessed spent nuclear fuel for its civilian energy programs."

Iran will be a formal agenda item at the BRIC Summit for the first time. However, regardless of what does or does not happen in Brazil, the reprocessing agreement is behind schedule - and that it surfaced just before the Nuclear Security Summit is little more than a coincidence.

"The timing is not terrible, to start with. This agreement was meant to be concluded between India and the US way back in November 2009 during Singh's visit to Washington. However, the negotiations went on for several more months," said Rajagopalan. "It is up to the Obama administration to ably justify this to the Chinese leadership and the larger international community."

At a time when jobs are scarce and unemployment is high, the economic ramifications of this deal are not to be overlooked.

"This important step is part of the great, win-win narrative of the US-India global partnership, affirming the commitment of our two countries to realize the full potential of our landmark civil nuclear agreement [in 2008]," said US Ambassador to India Timothy Roemer. "These arrangements will help open the door for US firms in India's rapidly expanding energy sector, creating thousands of jobs for the citizens of both our countries. We applaud India's outstanding track record on non-proliferation issues, and we look forward to our continuing cooperation in this area." [2]

In addition, the US has watched as Russian and European companies have become more active in the India nuclear energy sector. While the final passage of India's Nuclear Liability Bill is still an obstacle, it is expected that differences will be ironed out.

"France and Russia have been more enthusiastic about working with India in its civilian nuclear energy sector. In fact, the India-Russian agreement signed during Prime Minister Putin's visit envisages building up 16 nuclear reactors in three different locations, of which six are to be finished by 2017," said Rajagopalan. "If the US does not get its act together, Russia and France will clearly have a head start. It is quite certain that commerce and big business are issues that the US will understand and accordingly tailor its policies. In fact, conclusion of this agreement facilitates early participation by US firms in India's rapidly expanding civil nuclear market."

The politics of job creation and politics of nuclear non-proliferation are two different things entirely. In this instance, India enjoys such a unique status that the lines are easily blurred when it comes to figuring out exactly where the US is heading.

"Reprocessing is the Holy Grail for non-proliferation advocates,'' said Subrata Ghoshroy, senior associate in the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. ''It is not such a bad idea as long as the facilities are under safeguards. Under the NPT, each nation has a right to technology for peaceful development of nuclear energy. So, we cannot deny specific technologies to countries. Now, it is true that India is not an NPT member state. So, it does not have that right. But, the US has branded India a 'responsible' nuclear state. So, how can we deny them this technology?"

By the way, India considers Iran to be a "responsible state" too in this regard.

"When we talk about nuclear security and the threat of nuclear terrorism, we are referring to it in a global context. All responsible members of the world community, international community, have a stake in ensuring that we have comprehensive nuclear security," said Rao in a recent news conference. "Iran is a country with which we have bilateral relations which go back many many years. It is a substantive relationship. We regard Iran as a very important country in the region and a country with which we have had, as I said, extensive bilateral relations and dialogue and cooperation. It is a responsible country."

As for the Russians, they benefit enormously in India from the inability of the US to establish and maintain firm policies.

"The Russians are not hampered by the liability issues as the US firms are. Russians are also cheap and they have maintained a long-standing relationship with the Indian [nuclear sector], when the US had sanctions on India. So, they do have a leg up," said Ghoshroy. "However, the Indians are interested in better technology, which the US could provide. The Russian presence continues to be significant, and as long as US equivocates perhaps of necessity between India and Pakistan, the Russian presence will continue."

As for the sense that things will simpler and less complicated as time moves along, well, there is little chance of that happening. The highway to nuclear energy nirvana features numerous large potholes.

"The Chinese also want reprocessing technology from the US. Pakistan may try to raise it, but it has lot on its plate given the continued controversy around the Khan network. It also wants a nuclear deal like India's," said Ghoshroy. "The main topics [at the Nuclear Security Summit] will be, of course, Iran and North Korea, which the administration wants and Israeli nukes, that both Israel and Obama do not want to discuss. Well, Netanyahu nixed that plan by not coming. The administration will also have a lot to defend about its new NPR."

Notes
1.) US nuclear review misreads China, Global Times, April 2010.
2. US - India Nuclear Deal, Voice of America, April 12, 2010
Peter J Brown is a freelance writer from Maine USA.

Shelving of US Missile Defence in Europe: How Does it Impact on US-Russia Relations?

On September 17, 2009, President Barack Obama decided to do an overhaul of the US missile defence in Europe. The missile defence shield in Poland and the Czech Republic is going to be replaced with a revamped project, after a careful reconsideration of the threat from Iran. Obama, making a statement on the subject, said, "This new approach will provide capabilities sooner, build on proven systems and offer greater defenses against the threat of missile attack than the 2007 European missile defense program."

While the two East European allies are not entirely happy with the development, Russia has appreciated what the US has done, with the Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, saying "We value the US president's responsible approach towards implementing our agreements ... I am ready to continue the dialogue." He went further to say that there are "good conditions" on the ground to start joint anti-missile projects. Konstantin Kosachev, a prominent MP and Chairman of the International Affairs Committee, State Duma of the Russian Federation, said: "The Obama administration is starting to understand us. Now we can talk about restoration of the strategic partnership between Russia and the United States."

How does Obama's temporarily shelving of the missile defence programme affect US-Russia relations? Will Russia come on board on Iran sanctions? Will Russia become far more cooperative on the Afghan front?



The decision was taken after a careful reading of the situation, noting that the threat from Iran's long-range missiles was not so immediate. The decision was also based on advances in US missile defense technology, particularly with land and sea based interceptors. Elaborating on the revamped programme, Defence Secretary Robert Gates said that interceptor missiles would be initially deployed on ships in order to enable easy transportation from one region to the other. He added, "The second phase, about 2015, will involve fielding upgraded land-based SM-3s. Consultations have begun with allies, starting with Poland and the Czech Republic, about hosting a land-based version of the SM-3 and other components of the system."

While the programme has been been put on hold for sometime, it is not being scrapped entirely. As Gates pointed out, the first stage does not include fielding of those interceptors in Europe, but a second stage, may be in 2015 will deploy the upgraded land-based SM-3s in Poland and the Czech Republic. It is quite apparent that the Russians are aware of this. For instance, one of the scholars on NATO at the Russian Foreign Ministry's Diplomatic Academy, Vladimir Shtol pointed out, "I don't believe the US would ever fully back out of the missile shield, because it is in their long-term interests and closely connected with their strategy in Europe." Similarly, Fyodor Lukyanov, editor of Russia in Global Affairs, says that the issue if never off the table. It may be off the agenda temporarily. He said, "Nothing has been canceled, missile defense has just been postponed. For a while this topic is off the agenda, but later it will return. So, for now the political situation may improve, but the underlying pattern of relations is unlikely to change in any basic way." However, there are Russian specialists in India like Nandan Unnikrishnan who believe that missile defence in Europe is a closed issue and that Obama's current posture is not temporary, but a permanent move. However, he added on to say that the missile defence issue will be a closed one, at least for the next couple of years.

While the US looks the change in posture as a major concession to Moscow, what does Washington expect in return? Tougher actions on Iran by Moscow may be one, better cooperation in the war on terror in Afghanistan may be another one. Renewal of START talks with lesser number of conditionalities (from Russian side) could be another expectation. Will Russia be able to deliver on all these major issues?

While tough action on Iran by Moscow is conceivable, it is not certain. If one has to go by what the Russian Foreign Minister Sregei Lavrov said last week, Iran issue is not going to be an easy one. He said, "I do not think these sanctions will be approved by the United Nations Security Council ... They [Iran] need an equal place in this regional dialogue. Iran is a partner that has never harmed Russia in any way." He went on to addd that the US cannot expect to have a timetable as far as the Iran issue is concerned. In fact, Lavrov went a step ahead to say that the changed US posture is not necessarily a concession, but merely a correction of the past mistake. A Christian Science Monitor report on the subject says that while the changed US posture on missile defence issue may contribute to a warmer dialogue between the US and Russia, Washington should not expect major concessions on some of the issues of key concern to the US like Iran. If Moscow has to extend some reciprocal concessions to Washington, the US will have to be more accomodative to Russian concerns on NATO expansion into the Russian backyard. In fact, as the US National Intelligence Strategy 2009 noted, Russia "may continue to seek avenues for reasserting power and influence in ways that complicate US interests." For instance, on September 15, 2009, Russian Defence Minister Anatoly Serdyukov has signed agreements on cooperation in the military sphere with heads of the military departments of Abkhazia and South Ossetia Merab Kishmaria and Yuri Tanayev. As per the agreements, the headquarters of the Russian military base in Abkhazia will be in the Black Sea port of Gudauty, and in South Ossetia -- in Tskhinvali. The strength of the personnel of each of the military bases will be around 1,700. The agreements are signed for a period of 49 years, with an automatic prolongation for five years. These moves may come to compete with the US interests in the Russian backyard. Again, there are Russian experts in India who argue that the US is going to slow on the NATO expansion and that it will not pursue inclusion of Georgia and Ukraine into NATO in the near future.

Howevers, what appears certain is progress on arms control measures such as the START. The 1991 START that is expiring in December 2009 is likely to be replaced by a new arms reduction treaty. In fact, Lukyanov says, "Now we can be sure the new START agreement will be completed on time, because the vexing issue of missile defense and how it affects the strategic balance has been removed for the time being. “That’s quite an important matter."

Lastly, how does the changed posture affect Russian position on the war on terror in Afghanistan. Russia may possibly come around assisting the US significantly in the war in Afghanistan. However, what Obama has to do for long term stability in Afghanistan should include not just Russia, but also other regional powers such as Iran, India, China, Japan and some of the Central Asian states. The US has to become proactive to establish a larger colaition of states on Afghanistan if there has to be peace and stability in the Af-Pak region.

CD Proceedings on FMCT Comes to A Standstill

Efforts by Conference on Disarmament (CD) to start negotiations on Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty reached a standstill as Pakistan raised objections saying that its security interests have not been taken into account.


Now that the talks are stalled, CD can restart negotiations only in January 2010.

After a 12-year gap, the CD was beginning to focus on issues such as nuclear disarmament with a renewed push from US President Barack Obama himself. The CD was also to take up two other issues -- prevention of an arms race in outer space and “negative security assurances,” in which countries promise not to use nuclear weapons on non-nuclear-weapon states. However, the next step of agreeing to implementation of the work plan in order that different working groups could start examining the various issues is proving to be difficult.

Pakistan, for instance, has said that implementation of these proposals will hurt its national security. Islamabad fears that all the focus will be on FMCT and in the process, other three issues will be neglected. Pakistani Ambassador Zamir Akram told Reuters, “We wanted to see a programme of work being implemented in a way that would set the stage for a balanced outcome on all the four issues.” Pakistan tried to demonstrate that it had the support of several Non Alignment Movement (NAM) countries as also the Russian and Chinese support for the ban of weapons in outer space. The ambassador further noted that the manner in which the US, Russia, France and Britain were navigating the entire FMCT negotiations also raised concerns in Pakistan. Pakistan’s fear is that these four countries’ approach to FMCT was through a non-proliferation lens that would essentially look at banning future production of fissile material.

Obama and Sino-US Ties

Here's a story that Dr. Satish Misra has done on Obama and Sino-US ties, where he has taken views from several experts, including me. Does US-China relations affect India-US ties?

Experts say that, notwithstanding the ongoing debate, the global economic crisis has created a situation in which the Sino-US ties are bound to get a constructive push.



Since the election of Barack Obama as the US President in last November, there has been considerable debate on how Sino-US relations would shape up.

While meeting traditional allies in East Asia, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton also made Beijing a port of call. Before leaving the Chinese capital, Ms Clinton set the tone for the relationship by stating that she was “encouraged by the possibilities of what a stronger relationship can mean for the Chinese and American people”.

The political battle between the ‘Red Team’—those who advocate stronger ties with People’s Republic of China (PRC)—and the ‘Blue Team’—those who wish to contain the regime in Beijing—continues unabated in the United States. But the global economic downturn seems to have given an edge to the former in the Obama Administration.

Experts say that, notwithstanding the ongoing debate, the global economic crisis has created a situation in which the Sino-US ties are bound to get a constructive push.

Affirming growing Sino-US ties, ORF Senior Fellow and US specialist Dr. Harinder Sekhon says that “there is a strong constituency within the United States that advocates the forging of close ties with China. They recognize that there is a strategic mistrust between the leaders but there is an urgent need to move beyond that and exercise what is now being termed as ‘smart power’ to reduce mutual tensions where leaders in both countries should adopt a broader and more practical approach to finding solutions to many of the global and bilateral issues that confront both the countries”.

“With the global meltdown having hit the US thoroughly,” says ORF Senior Fellow Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, “Obama’s view is that the US needs Chinese help in getting out of the economic mess. In February 2009, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton appealed to the Chinese government to continue buying US treasury bonds or be prepared for the fall of both economies.”

ORF Vice President Samir Saran, however, avers that “clearly a geo-economic moment (the financial crisis) is being used by certain sections of the American Polity to realign the mood and inclination of their citizenry in favour of engaging with China by overemphasizing on the financial imperatives to overcome issues of ‘freedom, liberty and human rights’ that have held back the bilateral relationship for so long”.

“The argument that Chinese investment in American Treasury has in any ways made
the US vulnerable (in relation to China) or dependent on it (China) is extremely simplistic” argues Mr. Saran, who sees the issue as “being played out in different ways in the US media. It is a classic case of ‘manufacturing consent’ and shaping public opinion for a geo-political objective”.

“On the contrary, the beneficiary of the investment, in this case the US will not only decide the fate (returns on the treasury bonds) but also can leverage this downturn to extract further investments in order to protect the Chinese investment” says Mr. Saran. The emphasis on economic ‘compulsions’ towards China is largely to conceal an underlying geopolitical realignment.

ORF Visiting Fellow Neil Padukone feels that the perception that the US is “kowtowing to China” is amplified by Indian fears. Mr. Padukone sees “Chinese exports and Treasury bonds ownership as just one part of US-China relationships, and US-China economic engagement as just one party of the overall financial recovery process.”

ORF Senior Fellow Nandan Unnikrishnan disagrees with the argument saying that the global meltdown has not pushed the US into Dragon’s lair.

***

Though Republican President Richard Nixon made the first step towards China, the Democratic Party is perceived to have a “tilt” towards China.

As Dr. Rajagopalan argues, “Democrats have generally tended to have a stronger partnership with China as compared to India. Democrats have sidelined issues such as democracy and human rights in its relationship with China. For instance, post-Tiananmen Square incidents, President George H.W. Bush had imposed sanctions, but by the time Clinton came into office, most of the sanctions were removed. In fact, President Clinton and President Jiang Zemin’s agreement in 1998 to “jointly manage South Asia” had angered India. It was President George W. Bush who managed to break that trend and establish a strategic partnership with India. Obama appears set to continue with Clinton’s pro-China policy.”

Mr. Padukone, however, confessing his “Democratic leanings,” contends that it is “difficult to make these sorts of generalizations. The ‘Red Team’ consists of both Democrats and Republicans that favor enhanced trade relations. Meanwhile, the ‘Blue Team,’ has members of both parties that find such engagement to be anathema for reasons of values (communism and human rights) as well as geopolitics.

“Moreover, different arms of the Executive Branch have different views of PRC, with the State Department pursuing diplomatic engagement, Treasury Department managing economic ties, while the Defense Department has remained wary of China since the late 1980s”, observes Mr. Padukone.

“Perhaps Clinton gave Democrats their reputation as ‘Panda Huggers’ with the disconnect between the 1992 campaign China-bashing in the wake of Tiananmen and Clinton’s enhanced trade with China. But even in the 1990s, the relationship was turbulent, with defense trade restrictions, the Taiwan Straits Crisis, and the Hainan Island incident. The George W. Bush administration, on the other hand, had a more laissez faire approach to relations with China, with some antagonism due to the primacy of Sec. Rumsfeld’s Department of Defense. At the same time, during Bush’s tenure, America’s twin deficits increased and America’s adversaries were dealt with through isolation—which ultimately benefited China, which owned a great deal of US debt and stepped into the political space with countries with which the US would not engage.”

“Most fundamentally, the United States as a whole does not have a coherent long-term China policy. Whether China will be a geopolitical rival or an economic partner remains unclear, with various factions of various parties and bureaucracies arguing various things. Even if China is both rival and partner, the paradox must be reconciled within a coherent strategy,” stresses Mr. Padukone.

***

Many accuse the US of sidestepping issues of freedom and human rights in order to push closer engagement with China. But Mr. Unnikrishnan partially agrees saying that “Not yet but it will.” If the pro-China sector has an upper hand in the ongoing debate, Mr. Unnikrishnan says the question whether they are winning is not relevant here, “but it appears rational for the Americans to want to reach accommodation with the second largest economy in the world, particularly one on which they have become dependent on.”

The first challenge, according to Dr. Sekhon, would be to cooperate to “advance mutual interests in a lasting economic recovery” by overcoming some of the irritants like trade issues, especially the trade imbalance between the two countries, placing human rights concerns on the backburner.

Mr. Padukone argues that while the Obama Administration may look beyond issues of human rights, “this may be part of a larger shift in diplomatic strategy. By engaging the governments of Iran, Sudan, Russia, China, possibly Myanmar and others, the Obama Administration is changing course in the way it deals with human rights and freedom in larger bilateral relations.

“The Administration’s view seems to be that American aims, both geo-strategic and political, will be served more effectively through proactive engagement than isolationism or confrontation,” points out the Visiting Fellow.

Mr. Padukone puts the whole debate on a wider canvas, saying that “in the wake of the Iraq and Afghan campaigns, diminished political capital globally, global recession that requires a reworking of a financial system that is based on a model of consumption that is largely supplied by China—the US needs to tread relatively carefully. Not to mention, a number of the geopolitical challenges that the United States faces— in Central Asia, the Middle East, Iran, Northeast Asia, and Africa—require multilateral approaches after years of failed unilateral methods. Given the political and economic leverages that China has in many of these areas (that other countries lack), a concerted effort with China may be necessary.

***

To a question about whether there is a substance in an argument that the US would like China to assume greater global influence and share in policing troubled regions such as Africa and the Indian Ocean, Mr. Unnikrishnan says that “the US will want it” and goes on to say that “they will do to the extent their strategic interests converge.”

Mr. Unnikrishnan dismisses the emergence of a G-2 (China and the US) in the conduct of international affairs as a “nightmare scenario”.

But Dr Sekhon views the question in a positive light saying, “A beginning seems to have been made where both nations have agreed to cooperate in the global fora on these issues.”

“But China’s increasing influence is in many ways inimical to US interests. If America is the “world’s sheriff,” a “deputy” with opposing worldviews and aims on human rights, proliferation, militarization, economics, resource acquisition, and so forth, is counter to US interests”, disagrees Mr. Padukone. “If the “other policeman” in the world were the UK, for example, there might be more credence to the argument.”

Rising Chinese influence in the Middle East and Africa “gives China access to energy resources that the US itself would rather control,” Mr. Padukone argues. “It diminishes any influence the United States would have in those countries: Iran or Burma remain unaffected by American sanctions because they can still trade with China; Sudan needn’t give up its military campaigns in Darfur, Southern Sudan, or Chad because Khartoum receives weapons, investment, and diplomatic support from Beijing.”

Dr. Rajagopalan agrees, arguing “the US will not like to see a more powerful China raising its influence beyond a certain point. On this issue, there could be agreement between the Democrats and the Republicans. Preventing the rise of regional hegemons—peer competitors—remains an objective common to both the Democrats and the Republicans. In fact, the 1992 formulation of the Defense Department remain an underlying principle in the US grand strategy. But China is also clear that its economic engagement with Washington is beneficial and it will continue. China appears to believe that American strategic presence in Asia is still necessary for stability in the region, as well as to prevent the rise of regional hegemons like Japan.”

Any shared policing, points out Mr. Padukone, “has more to do with China’s importance in global governance—in Iran, North Korea, Sudan, Pakistan, Myanmar, the economy, climate change—than with any notions of a ‘bilateral world police’.”

***

To bring this back to the Indian perspective, Dr. Rajagopalan argues that “India clearly does not want to see very close relations between the two countries as during the Clinton administration, where they wanted to jointly manage south Asia. On the other hand, we do not want to see them get into conflict situations, where India being a neighbor, may be forced to take sides. A serious US-China dispute will have wider security consequences throughout Asia and adversely affect India, too. While the two extremes should be avoided, there are increasing concerns about China and its rise, particularly on the military side.”

As for the prevailing view in India that the Obama Administration is ignoring India in favor of China, Mr. Padukone argues that, “if India isn’t necessary in global politics, then it can be ignored easily. India’s strategic culture remains reactive; it hasn’t made itself indispensable in global governance outside its own borders (and arguably Pakistan).”

“If India becomes pivotal in the resolution of global challenges, then neglecting India (to China’s benefit) will not be an option. But as of now, it is negligible, and there is no reason for American politicians to engage India rather than China.

Mr. Padukone argues that “Indian fears of the US ‘pandering to “the Panda”’ are exaggerated by (a) Indian hypersensitivities to Chinese strength, and more importantly, (b) displacement of blame: India needs to realize that to be treated like an important player, it must be one. India needs to get its own act together before it loses its voice complaining about the US and China.”

The Evolution of US Policy towards Kashmir

Here's a recent essay on the US policy towards Kashmir published in the Summer issue of the CLAWS Journal, published by the Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS).

The main argument is that American policy towards the Kashmir dispute has changed from active efforts to resolve the dispute in the 1950s and 1960s, to benign neglect in the 1970s, to a more proactive approach during the early Clinton period, to a more nuanced but hands-off approach subsequently. The US policy on the Kashmir dispute has changed because the US approach in Kashmir has changed, from attempting to solve the complicated dispute, a ‘broad’ approach, to ensuring that the conflict over Kashmir does not lead to instability and war in the region, a more narrow approach. How the Obama Administration wishes to take the issue further might be important to analyse what kind of a security-stability index might appear in the region.



Background
In 1947, at the time of Indian independence, the princely state of Kashmir was headed by a Hindu King, Maharaja Hari Singh, who ruled over a predominantly Muslim population. The Pakistan military attack on the western border of Jammu and Kashmir at the time, when the issue of accession of Kashmir to India or Pakistan came up, prompted Maharaja to seek Indian government support. Support was granted by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru but on the condition of Kashmir’s accession to India. Following the agreement, India deployed its forces to repel the invaders, leading to the first Indo-Pak war over Kashmir in 1947. When a cease-fire was eventually declared in early 1949, India controlled two-thirds of the territory, a position which has remained more or less constant over the last half-century, despite a war over Kashmir in 1965. After remaining dormant through the 1970s and 1980s, an insurgency, actively supported by Pakistan, began in the late 1980s, and continues to this day.

US Policy towards the Dispute
American position on the dispute has shifted several times in the last half-century. There appears to have been at least two broad approaches in recent American policy towards the Kashmir dispute, what may be referred to as the ‘narrow’ and the ‘broad’ approaches. Both were motivated by concern that the Kashmir dispute might lead to a new crisis and war, and possibly, nuclear escalation. The ‘narrow’ approach focussed on the core American concern -- the possibility of a crisis or war in the sub-continent, which the US tried very hard, and successfully, to prevent. The ‘broad’ approach sought to solve the Kashmir dispute itself, as a way of preventing the dispute from having any potential for escalation. These changes can be seen in the way Washington’s policy evolved throughout the 1990s.

When the Kashmir insurgency began in 1989, the (elder) Bush administration’s primary concern was to avoid a clash between the two countries. Several administration officials made clear the US position that it no longer supported the move for a plebiscite in Kashmir and the stated position was that the United States thought that the best framework for a resolution of the Kashmir dispute was through the 1972 Shimla Agreement, in which India and Pakistan agreed to resolve their dispute peacefully and through bilateral channels. US policy in fact was in complete endorsement of the Indian position on the dispute that the Kashmir dispute had to be resolved through bilateral negotiations. The primary Bush effort as regards the Kashmir dispute was directed at dampening down the 1990 crisis, which US intelligence believed had the potential for escalation.

US policy changed dramatically when the Clinton administration took over in 1993. It became much more pro-active, attempting to move towards the resolution of the dispute itself. However, after several mis-steps, and avoidable controversies, the US position became much more conservative, eventually returning to a posture that appeared similar to the earlier Bush approach of attempting to prevent a war or escalation rather than attempting to solve the dispute itself. This was best demonstrated by the US approach during the Kargil war in the summer of 1999.

The second Bush administration had taken a more conservative approach to the Kashmir dispute taking the position that the dispute needed to be solved through a bilateral framework between India and Pakistan. However, after the 9/11 terror attacks in the US, and with the war on terror emerging as a major foreign and security policy preoccupation, there was a general sense that this position would change as Pakistan, which has been a frontline state along with the US, could put pressure on the US to take on a more active role in the resolution of the dispute. Much to the disappointment of Pakistan, the US maintained its balanced approach in not dragging Kashmir as part of the Pakistan-Afghanistan problem. This is not to suggest that the US was not concerned about the problem. The US, particularly the Bush Administration obviously has had serious concerns that the Indo-Pak stand-off might escalate into full-fledged war in the sub-continent. Operation Parakram and the build-up of forces on both sides after the terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament in December 2001, saw a renewed US interest in Kashmir. The approach, however, was more similar to the Bush Senior’s approach of attempting to prevent a war or escalation rather than attempting to solve the dispute itself. In essence, both the exigencies of the situation (satisfying Musharraf’s desire for a more active American role), and a perception that Kashmir requires a fundamental solution could have led to a return to the ‘broad’ approach to the problem of the Kashmir dispute. But the Bush Administration’s position was much more nuanced. And, given Bush’s overall approach towards India and Pakistan’s double standard on the war on terror, there was no return to the broad approach in dealing with Kashmir.

Bush’s approach towards Kashmir was also conditioned by the 9/11 terror attacks in the US. There was a decisive shift after the terror attacks, which was reflected essentially in the definitional aspects of terrorism. The US has had to accept a broad definition on terrorism to include all forms of terrorism, and everywhere, and not just acts committed on US soil, and against US citizens or institutions. Again, although the US appeared willing to adopt a broader connotation to “terrorism,” it was still not clear whether the US was using the same yardstick to terrorism in the US and in other parts of the world, including India. For example, the US was reluctant to characterise as terrorism various acts of political violence that terrorist groups have indulged in various parts of India. Though the US did characterise the December 13 attack on the Indian Parliament as a terrorist act, they have been unwilling to accept the considerable quantity of evidence that suggest that Pakistan had, at the least, an indirect hand in the attack. Even the concern that the US had shown appeared more motivated by the desire to soothe Indian anger rather than the result of genuine concern. This suggests two different yardsticks to define and tackle terrorism. When terror strikes America, war and other military action is the immediate response, but when India faces with an attack on its Parliament or a 26/11, restraint is sought.

Another aspect of change in the US approach was about how the US views liberation movements and freedom struggles all over the world. For example, violence by terrorists in Kashmir was not considered terrorism until 9/11. Today, some of the active terrorist groups in Kashmir - Jaish-e-Mohammad, Lashkar-e-Toiba (the two groups responsible for the December 13 attack on Indian Parliament) - are designated Foreign Terrorist Organisations (FTOs) under US law. It is well known that these two groups have been nurtured by the Pakistan government and its intelligence arm, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). The Indian demand to Pakistan to take action against these two groups was not heeded by the Pakistan government until President Bush categorised these two groups as terrorist organisations. Hence, the US action on different terrorist groups and its overall approach to tackling terrorism has tremendous impact on several individual countries’ approach towards terrorism as well as the international counter-terrorism measures. India in fact has had its difficulties on the manner in which terrorism has been defined by the US. What constitutes terrorism for India has not been what the US characterised as terrorism.

It is however now appropriate to analyse how an Obama Administration would handle the Kashmir issue in his yearning to solve the Afghanistan problem and the war on terror. A few fundamental issues are to be borne in mind before analysing what Obama’s prescription for Kashmir would be.

The Democrats have generally tended to be more interventionist than the Republicans, as they are of the view that the US should play an active role in regional conflicts to both resolve these conflicts as well as to protect human rights during these conflicts. The Clinton Administration had intervened in a number of such conflicts including in Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia, Yugoslavia, Congo, Liberia, Albania, Iraq, Afghanistan and Yemen. Obama appears set to continue with that trend. Susan Rice, a key Obama advisor and US Ambassador to the UN, stated during her Senate confirmation hearing that the Obama Administration will continue with the traditional Democratic party policy of promoting democracy and human rights around the world.

The pro-interventionist strategy of the Democrats has caused problems in the Indo-US relations in the past. If Obama is to continue with such a strategy, this would involve the Obama Administration wanting to mediate and seek a solution to the Kashmir problem. Obama’s recent comments during interviews to Time magazine in October and December 2008 and the reported consideration (earlier) of former President Bill Clinton as a special envoy on Kashmir had created major stir in the Indian political and policy circles. Obama in his interview said, “We should probably try to facilitate a better understanding between Pakistan and India and try to resolve the Kashmir crisis so that they (Pakistan) can stay focused not on India, but on the situation with those militants.” Some analysts in India have tended to believe that a Kashmir-specific pro-active policy need not necessarily be bad, given Obama’s pro-India statements. However, it should be noted that his pro-India statements in the recent months had more to do with getting support from the Indian-American community.

The issue, however, is that Obama considers finding a solution to the Kashmir issue almost as a pre-requisite for getting Pakistan’s support for the war on terror in Afghanistan. Linking Afghanistan to the resolution of Kashmir dispute, as Obama did in his interview to Time magazine when he said that “working with Pakistan and India to try to resolve their Kashmir conflict would be a critical task for his administration’s efforts to try to counter growing instability in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” will be problematic. The tendency to link up Afghanistan’s security with terrorism in Kashmir is a dangerous trend and India must keep a close watch. The US has to focus on the problem, which is Pakistan, rather than get diverted by Pakistan’s diversions into Kashmir. As the chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. Mike Mullen, recently noted, it is the Afghan-Pakistan border region that is the ‘site of planning for the next attack’ on the United States; hence, the US should not lose sight of their target - Pakistan.

For the time being, the Obama Administration seems sensitive enough to India’s concerns in this regard. The recent news of the possible appointment of Richard Holbrooke as the special envoy on South Asia had created concern in India. Any individual would have been bad, but as one former US official noted in an article in Foreign Policy, “The Indians do not like Holbrooke because he has been very good on Pakistan ... and has a very good feel for the place.” However, thanks to Indian lobbying in Washington, India has been able to ensure that the official “Terms of Reference” of Holbrooke is limited: he has been appointed as “special representative for Afghanistan and Afghanistan.” This remains, as the Foreign Policy reported, “a sharp departure from Obama’s own previously stated approach of engaging India, as well as Pakistan and Afghanistan, in a regional dialogue.” South Asian analysts in Washington noted that it was prudent of the Obama Administration not to include India in Holbrooke’s official mandate, or else the special envoy’s mission could have been a “non-starter.” It might be true that the Obama transition team did not meet with any foreign representatives on the issue, but a meeting of the Aspen group in Washington was attended by some of the Obama team members where it was categorically stated that “India might pre-emptively make Richard Holbrooke persona non grata if his South Asia envoy mandate officially included India or Kashmir.” Among the Obama team members who attended the meeting were former Navy Secretary Richard Danzig; Kurt Campbell, the director of the Aspen Strategy Group who was later named as assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, and former Pentagon official and Harvard University professor, Ashton Carter,.

In conclusion, one might say that it will be prudent of Obama Administration not to meddle in the Kashmir imbroglio, not because India cannot withstand those pressures but because it might avoid an irritant in the otherwise prospering Indo-US bilateral relations. At some level, it can be concluded that India is comfortable with the ‘narrow’ approach towards Kashmir that the US has adopted from time to time, as was done during Kargil. It may not be correct to say that India does not seek US involvement in India-Pakistan issues. India does seek selective US intervention as is being witnessed currently too. After the Mumbai terror attacks, India has been unable to bring Pakistan to cooperate and so sought US intervention to put pressure on Pakistan. However, such intervention can only douse the occasional fire, not settle the matter once and for all.

Obama and India

This analysis on Obama and India appeared first on the IPCS website.

Now that Barrack Hussein Obama has been sworn in as the 44th President of the United States of America, what does it mean for India? Three factors are likely to determine how relations between the US and India will be under Obama.



Generally, Democrats have tended to be more interventionist than the Republicans, as they believe that the US should play a role in regional conflicts to both resolve such conflicts and to protect human rights during these conflicts. During the Clinton Presidency, the US militarily intervened in a number of regional conflicts including in Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia, Yugoslavia, Congo, Liberia, Albania, Iraq, Afghanistan and Yemen. Obama appears to want to continue with that trend. Susan Rice, a key Obama advisor and Obama's nominee as UN Ambassador, stated in her confirmation hearing that the Obama Administration will continue to see the promotion of democracy and human rights around the world as an important goal.
The pro-interventionist stance of the Democrats has tended to be a problem in Indo-US relations. In the India context, this would involve the Obama Administration wanting to intervene and seek to solve the Kashmir problem. Obama's recent comments in interviews to Time magazine in October and December 2008 and the reported consideration of former President Bill Clinton as a special envoy on Kashmir are indicative of this pro-interventionist stance that India will witness increasingly in the coming years. Obama had said that the US "should probably try to facilitate a better understanding between Pakistan and India and try to resolve the Kashmir crisis so that they (Pakistan) can stay focused not on India, but on the situation with those militants." Some analysts have tended to believe that a Kashmir-specific pro-active policy need not necessarily be bad, given Obama's pro-India statements. It should be remembered that his pro-India stance in the recent past had more to do with seeking the support of the Indian-American community. The concern however is that Obama believes that finding a solution to the Kashmir issue is almost a pre-requisite for getting Pakistan's support for the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), particularly in Afghanistan. New Delhi needs to be cautious of the US tendency of linking up Afghanistan's security with terrorism in Kashmir.
Obama's tough line against Pakistan might be heartening to Indian policy makers. The US has pledged huge military/financial aid to Pakistan, though this is conditional on Pakistan's cooperation on the war against terror. The Obama Administration, in its new foreign policy agenda document has made it clear that while the new administration "will increase nonmilitary aid to Pakistan," Pakistan will be held "accountable for security in the border region with Afghanistan." Earlier, Joe Biden, in his capacity as Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, had introduced a legislation proposing to triple non-military aid to Pakistan in the next five years. The legislation authorised US$7.5 billion over next five years, mainly for building schools, roads and clinics. The bill, however, called for greater accountability and effective cooperation from Pakistan in fighting the Taliban and Al Qaeda.
The second issue which could act as "spoiler" is nuclear non-proliferation. While the Democrats and Republicans have both adopted strong non-proliferation measures, the Democrats have tended to be much more rigid "non-proliferation ayatollahs." The policies during the Clinton Presidency are a pointer of this. India's Pokhran tests in 1998 proved to be a major issue for the Clinton Administration and it invoked a series of technological and economic sanctions on India. India not being a member of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) continues to be a major issue for the Democrats. Despite being a member of NPT, China has consistently violated the treaty and engaged in proliferation activities, especially with Pakistan, but the US appeared willing to overlook the issue because China is an NPT-member state.
The new foreign policy agenda document of the Obama Administration stated that it "will crackdown on nuclear proliferation by strengthening the NPT," while working simultaneously on nuclear disarmament. What is more important is how the US deals with states that are members of certain security architectures, yet engage in proliferation.
Thirdly, Indo-US relations will to a great extent depend upon how the US engages with China. Democrats have tended to have a more than favorable approach towards China, with Clinton's presidency being a case in point. A close Sino-US partnership, with South Asia being jointly 'managed' by the US and China, remains an unappealing thought, a US-China clash will have wider security consequences throughout Asia and will affect India also. We need neither. Lastly, how Russia is viewed by the Obama Administration will have serious consequences. Russia remains an important power in the emerging Asian strategic framework and it is important that both India and the US recognize this reality and adjust their policies accordingly.

Obama Presidency and India

This analysis on Obama Presidency and India first appeared on the ORF website.

With the results of the US Presidential elections out, Senator Barack Obama will become the 44th President of the United States, the first African-American to assume the highest office in the US. How does an Obama administration look to India and the region in general? There are three issues on which the Democrats can be thought to have a less pro-India policy as compared to the Republicans.



In general, Indo-US relations have not prospered much under Democratic presidents. More specifically, the pro-interventionist stance of the democrats could result in an Obama administration wanting to involve itself in trying to solve the Kashmir problem. Obama’s recent comments on the Kashmir issue and the reported consideration of Bill Clinton as special envoy on Kashmir are pointers to this pro-active stand that India has to be prepared for. He said, “We should probably try to facilitate a better understanding between Pakistan and India and try to resolve the Kashmir crisis so that they can stay focused not on India, but on the situation with those militants.”
The democrats have been more interventionists than republicans. Democrats have traditionally believed that the US should intervene in regional conflicts to protect human rights. During President Bill Clinton’s term, the US militarily intervened in a number of conflicts including Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia, Yugoslavia, Congo, Liberia, Albania, Iraq, Afghanistan and Yemen. More specifically, the Democrats have generally taken a more interventionist attitude towards Kashmir, and Obama seems set to continue that trend. The Bush administration has taken a less active approach to Kashmir, and McCain could have been expected to continue that policy. Obama has paid greater attention to India policy recently, if only to seek the support of the Indian-American community. Some believe that a Kashmir-specific pro-active policy need not be necessarily bad, given Obama’s pro-India statements. But because Obama believes that solving the Kashmir problem is a pre-requisite for getting Pakistan’s support for the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), New Delhi needs to be cautious.
Obama’s tough talk on Pakistan might be soothing to the ears of Indian policy makers. While Obama pledges huge military/financial aid to Pakistan in the war on terror, it is conditional. Pakistan has to prove that it is making considerable progress in eliminating training camps, evicting foreign militants/terrorists that are based on Pakistani soil, as well as preventing the Taliban/al Qaeda from using Pakistan as a base for attacks in Afghanistan. He was also categorical that if his administration has credible intelligence on the whereabouts of Taliban/al Qaeda in Pakistan, the US forces will be sent into Pakistan to hunt them down. It is too early to say whether Obama will carry forward his tough stand on Pakistan once he assumes office.
Second, for the Democrats, the issue of non-proliferation has been so important that it sets limits to Indo-US friendship. The policies during the Clinton administration were a pointer to this. India’s nuclear tests of 1998 proved to be a setback, as it invoked series of economic and technological sanctions on India by the US and its allies, including Japan and Australia. India not being a signatory to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) continues to be an important factor for the democrats. It does not seem to bother them that much that China violated the NPT, despite being an NPT member-state, especially with Pakistan. Though the US-India nuclear agreement received bipartisan support, most of the opponents were Democrats. Though he finally, reluctantly, supported the US-India nuclear deal, Obama had tried to introduce killer amendments to it. India should be prepared to see the Obama Administration and a Democratic-majority Senate reviving the CTBT issue, which has been comatose for a while, as well as the FMCT with vigour.
Third, the democrats have generally tended to have a stronger partnership with China as compared to India. This may not be palatable to India. In fact, President Clinton and President Jiang Zemin agreement in 1998 to “jointly manage South Asia” had angered India. It was President George Bush who managed to break that trend and establish a strategic partnership with India.
How the next administration would shape its policy towards Beijing will also influence the extent of India’s role in Asia. Obama has raised issues with regard to China, although his concerns are with regard to economic rather than military issues. Obama has said that while the US should have cooperative relationship with China, it should not hesitate from being “clear and consistent” if the US disagrees on issues such as manipulation of its currency, human rights violation, its economic and diplomatic policies with Sudan or Iran. However, trade troubles with China appear to be the focus and have emerged as a serious political issue in the campaign. Analysts believe that a bill aimed at levying punitive duties on Chinese goods supported by Obama indicates that the US would pursue a hardline approach towards Beijing on trade issues. Though close US-China relations, with South Asia being jointly ‘managed’ by the US and China, is an unappealing thought, a serious dispute or a US-China clash will have wider security consequences throughout Asia and will affect India also. We need neither.
On another important foreign policy issue, both candidates were critical of Russia, and this could put India in a tight spot. India does not want Russia to be written off; in fact, to the contrary, India believes that Russia will be one of the poles of power in the new Asian security framework.
Overall, though a Republican administration would have been better for India; New Delhi, however, needs to get ready to play with an Obama administration.