2020 - A challenging year yet a satisfying year, professionally

2020 has remained a challenging year for the world around and I was no exception.  Personally, it was a trying year with a lot of dislocations.  Nevertheless, it has been a satisfying year, professionally speaking.  

In March 2020, I was offered to join the Perth USAsia Centre as part of their inaugural Indo-Pacific Fellow programme for a period of nine months.  While I represented India, there were colleagues, one each from Australia, Japan, Indonesia and Vietnam.  It was a very fulfilling experience.  As part of the fellowship, I did a number of essays and webinars: Towards A Quad-Plus Arrangement?; Uneasy Contradictions Continue in India's Strategic Engagements; Countering ChineseAssertiveness: India’sChanging Posture in the Indian Ocean; and a forthcoming one, looking at how India-Australia relations will continue to get stronger in the face of an aggressive China.  

I got a peer reviewed journal article, "India's Emerging Space Assets and Nuclear-Weapons Capabilities" published in The Non-proliferation Review in March 2020.  In this article, I argue that over the last five decades, India’s nuclear and space programs have gone through several phases, from collaboration to divorce to supportive. An interplay of two factors determined the nature of the relationship. One was the state of India’s nuclear-weapon program. The second was international conditions, especially India’s relationship with the nuclear-nonproliferation regime. In the early decades, because of the rudimentary nature of India’s nuclear and space programs, the relationship was collaborative, since the rocket technology being developed was a necessary adjunct to the nuclear-weapon program. Subsequently, as India’s rocketry capabilities and nuclear-weapon program began to mature and concerns about international sanctions under the non-proliferation regime began to grow, the two programs were separated. The Indian rocketry program was also divided, with the civilian-space and ballistic-missile programs clearly demarcated. After India declared itself a nuclear-weapon state in 1998 and the programs matured, the relationship has become more supportive. As the two programs mature further, this relationship is likely to deepen, as the nuclear-weapon program requires space assets to build a robust and survivable nuclear deterrent force.  

In May 2020, the Office of Principal Scientific Adviser to the Government of India and the Department of Science and Technology invited me to be part of the process of formulating India's new Science, Technology, and Innovation Policy (STIP 2020).  As part of the STIP 2020 policy drafting exercise, 21 thematic groups (TGs) were constituted and I was asked to be a member and Co-Chair of the TG-Strategic Technologies.  It was such an honour and privilege for me to part of this exercise, discussing and coming up with recommendations on India's strategic technologies.  The report should be out within a few months, I guess.  

In October 202, I was invited to be part of the Editorial Board of Asian Security.  It is one of the top ranking journals on various aspects of national and international security in Asia.  I am honoured and delighted to be joining the journal in this capacity.  

In November 2020, I was part of the Bloomberg-Intelligence Squared US debate, "That's Debatable - Is A U.S.-China Space Race Good for Humanity?".  The debate was aired on November 7, 2020 and it is available at: https://www.intelligencesquaredus.org/debates/us-china-space-race-good-humanity.  American theoretical physicist, Prof. Michio Kaku and I argued against the motion, and Prof. Avi Loeb and Bidhushi Bhattacharya argued for the motion, and so well-moderated by John Donvan.  This was so much fun and we won the debate.  

I thought I will highlight some of my professional activities here but I have updated my blog with most of these developments on a reasonably regular basis.  

India-Russia Relations Face More Trouble - The Diplomat, 31 December 2020

In my last essay for the year, I wrote a short essay on India-Russia relations for The Diplomat.  The immediate context of course was the cancelled annual bilateral summit, a first in two decades. Was Covid-19 the reason or did the China factor influence the decision?  

India and Russia have gone through several ups and downs in their decades-old bilateral relationship. The two appear at present to be going through a tricky phase. The two-decade old India-Russia annual summit was cancelled for the first time. A news report in India suggested that the postponement was the result of “severe reservations on New Delhi joining the Indo-Pacific initiative and Quad.” India’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) spokesperson responded by saying, “The India-Russia Annual Summit did not take place in 2020 because of the COVID pandemic. This was a mutually agreed decision between the two Governments. Any imputation otherwise is false and misleading. Spreading false stories on important relationships is particularly irresponsible.” The Russian side also responded with a statement saying that it is in “close touch” with its counterparts in India to finalize new dates for the summit, “postponed due to epidemiological reasons.” 

But such denials are unlikely to entirely remove speculation about the state of bilateral relations, especially considering that India has taken part in a large number of bilateral and multilateral talks virtually, even if the pandemic has prevented physical meetings.  

For the full essay, click here.  

Moreover, overall speculation about difficulties in the relationship is not exactly new.  There has been a lot of it, especially because of comments from senior Russian officials, such as Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, on India’s Quad and Indo-Pacific policy. Russian officials have repeatedly criticized the idea of the Indo-Pacific and the Quad, arguing that it is meant to contain China. Lavrov publicly stated so at the annual Raisina Dialogue in New Delhi in January 2020. More recently, Lavrov returned to the theme, saying at the general meeting of the Russian International Affairs Council in Moscow on December 8 that “India is currently an object of the Western countries’ persistent, aggressive and devious policy as they are trying to engage it in anti-China games by promoting Indo-Pacific strategies, the so-called ‘Quad’ while at the same time the West is attempting to undermine our close partnership and privileged relations with India.”

Indian officials and public commentators are increasingly miffed at this lack of sensitivity to Indian concerns about China, especially coming after China’s intrusion in Ladakh this year, which led to a bloody clash and Indian casualties. Even the normally cautious Indian foreign ministry was forced to respond, with the MEA spokesperson stating that India has always had an independent foreign policy based on its own national interests, that India’s Indo-Pacific approach was not directed at any particular country, and that India stands for a free, open and inclusive Indo-Pacific. He also added, for good measure, that “India’s relationship with each country is independent of its relations with third countries. We hope that this is well understood and appreciated by all our partners.” 

All of this is coming at a time when the India-China relationship is in one of its worst phases. India’s External Affairs Minister Dr. S Jaishankar while speaking at an Australian think tank, the Lowy Institute, commented that India and China are “at the most difficult phase of our relationship” in the last three or four decades and that the relations between the two were “very significantly damaged” over the past year.  

These damages are unlikely to be undone easily. It took several decades to rebuild relations after the 1962 Sino-Indian border war, but the progress made since 1988 has been entirely lost with the current Galwan clash, provoked by China in an effort to unilaterally change the status quo on the border.   

Russian comments have led to some criticism in India of Moscow’s position and are increasingly eroding public support that the relationship always had. But there are contrarian voices too. In fact, Rahul Gandhi, leader of India’s main opposition party, the Indian National Congress, criticized the government’s decision to cancel the annual summit with Russia in a tweet saying, “Russia is a very important friend of India. Damaging our traditional relationships is short-sighted and dangerous for our future.” It should be noted, of course, that it was the Congress-led UPA government that joined the Quad the first time, back in 2007. It was the same UPA government that has also strengthened the strategic partnership with the United States, including by signing the U.S.-India civil nuclear deal.  

While Russia’s dependence on China is understandable considering its worsening relations with the West, Moscow cannot expect India to ignore its national security concerns regarding China. And as I have written previously, a China-India crisis invariably puts Russia in a tight spot, with difficult choices between India, a traditional partner and also a lucrative defense market, and its newfound but mighty partner, China. For India, it will be increasingly difficult to see China as a partner. Finding common ground and partnering with a neighbor that has aggressively pursued a salami slicing strategy at India’s expense will be difficult. In order to build appropriate diplomatic and defense response against its aggressive eastern neighbor, India will need to partner with like-minded states that have also borne the brunt of Chinese aggressive behavior.  Moscow will either have to understand this reality or risk further hurting its ties with India.