Modi-Putin Summit: What’s on the Agenda for India-Russia Defense Ties? - October 4, 2018

In last week's column, I wrote on the Modi-Putin Summit, which took place on 5 October. In the "Modi-Putin Summit: What’s on the Agenda for India-Russia Defense Ties?," I focus as to how both India and Russia remain focused on defence trade to keep the relations on an even keel.

As Putin arrives in New Delhi, there is both excitement and uneasiness around the visit and what might come of it. There is excitement on both sides about a couple of important defense deals and there are plans to strengthen and streamline civil nuclear cooperation between the two countries. But there is also anxiety in New Delhi about the growing Russia-China ties and what that could mean for India.



On October 5, Russian President Vladimir Putin is to hold the India-Russia annual summit meeting with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in New Delhi. The last summit meeting took place in St. Petersburg in 2017, and Putin and Modi met last for an informal summit in Sochi in May this year.

The summit process between India and Russia started way back in 2000 and since then, the relationship has been elevated to a “Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership.” The India-Russia strategic partnership is important for a number of reasons, but the two countries also face significant challenges. The relationship in the last few years have undergone some big changes, not all of them positive. The key question therefore is to see if the age-old bilateral relationship is sturdy enough to withstand some of the current turbulence.

As Putin arrives in New Delhi, there is both excitement and uneasiness around the visit and what might come of it. There is excitement on both sides about a couple of important defense deals and there are plans to strengthen and streamline civil nuclear cooperation between the two countries. But there is also anxiety in New Delhi about the growing Russia-China ties and what that could mean for India.

On the other hand, Moscow remains anxious about India’s changing strategic orientation, particularly its relationship with the United States, and New Delhi’s defense trade diversification policy, among other issues. Russia has failed to appreciate the Indian strategic calculation behind its closer strategic engagement with the United States and other partners such as Japan and Australia.

From India’s perspective, Russia remains an important strategic partner for a number of different reasons. The historical character of the bilateral relationship aside, there are several strategic factors that impinge on the Russia-India dynamic. For one, Russia remains the only partner that is still willing to give India critical technologies, such as a nuclear submarine. Two, the emerging Russia-China strategic relationship has important security consequences for India. Even as India is diversifying its defense trade partners, Russia still dominates the Indian defense inventory to the tune of about 70 per cent. This raises worries in India because of the changing nature of the Russia-China defense relationship.

To take just one example, Russia’s sale of Su-30 and especially the Su-35 fighter puts India’s security at some risk. Russia’s sale of advanced Kilo-class submarines is another instance. These are illustrations of the important changes in the Russia-China security dynamics because Beijing for a long time was not given access to the best and most modern Russian technology and there was no technology transfer. The Russia-China oil and gas deals over the last few years also is a testament to this new closer partnership.

On the other hand, there are positive elements also in India-Russia relationship. Civil nuclear cooperation and defense and technology collaboration will dominate the Putin-Modi Summit meeting. The two sides are believed to be formalizing an action plan on nuclear cooperation. The two sides are also expected to sign an agreement for the purchase of the advanced S-400 Triumf air defense systems worth more than $5 billion.

This deal has been under threat because of the US’ CAATSA (Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act) legislation, which seeks to sanction any country that does significant business with Russia in the defense or intelligence domains. Even though U.S. Defense Secretary James Mattis has sought an exemption for India, and the U.S. Congress has given the U.S. administration the authority to waive CAATSA, it is up to the president to decide on whether such a waiver will be granted.

Irrespective of how the CAATSA sanctions may play out, India appears quite certain that it wants the S-400 because of the technological superiority of the system. India has explored a financial mechanism where India can make the payment in rupees rather than in U.S. dollars. Though the United States has not indicated how it will react to the S-400 deal, Washington has been somewhat understanding because India over the last few years has diversified its defense procurement and reduced its dependency on Russia to some extent, which is one of the conditions for gaining a CAATSA waiver.

Russia, for its part, appears quite confident that the deal will go through. Igor Korotchenko, head of the Moscow-based Centre for Analysis of World Arms Trade noted that “the U.S. won’t impose sanctions on them because they don’t want the Indians to refuse to purchase American weapons in the future.”

There are reports suggesting that there may be an agreement also for the sale of four frigates to India. Under the deal, two of the advanced Talwar-class frigates will be directly purchased from Russia’s Yantar Shipyard and delivered in two years’ time, while the next two will be built at the Goa Shipyard. Although of an earlier previous generation, the Indian Navy already operates six of the Talwar-class frigates. Defense analysts add that the newer frigates will be equipped with the Brahmos missiles.

There is also the possibility of Russia-India cooperation on Amur-class submarine. Andrei I Baranov, Deputy Director General for Foreign Activities at Rubin Design Bureau which builds these submarines, promised that India will be able to have 80 percent indigenization. The potential for collaboration to jointly develop Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) is also a possibility.

Such defense deals and nuclear energy cooperation should keep the India-Russia relationship afloat for the time being. But they will not assuage New Delhi’s long terms concerns about the increasingly close Russia-China strategic partnership.

What Does the Trump-Putin Summit Mean for India’s US-Russia Worry? - 19 July 2018

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I wrote on the Trump-Putin summit in Helsinki and what it means for New Delhi.

While some of America’s allies and partners were aghast at U.S. President Donald Trump’s performance during the recent Helsinki summit with Russian President Vladimir Putin, reaction in India was somewhat different. There was actually greater hope than dread leading up to the summit, and in its aftermath somewhat greater disappointment at the reaction in the United States to the summit than in Trump’s performance.



The reasons are not that difficult to understand. India’s traditional and continuing security relationship with Russia and its growing partnership with the United States meant that there was a desire in India that Russia and the United States would patch up their deteriorating ties. This troubled relationship was clearly putting Russia on the defensive and pushing Moscow to seek closer ties with China and even Pakistan, leading to consternation in New Delhi.

Much of this was obviously the result of Russia’s tensions in its relations with the West in general and the United States in particular. But that tension also meant that India had to balance its relationships with two of its closest security partners. This is not a place that India wants to be in, especially as it faces growing pressure from China.

Ideally, India would like to have both Russia and the United States in its corner to deal with China. After all, both of these countries are worried about China. China’s rise is threatening to push the United States out of the Indo-Pacific, while creating a powerful potential adversary on Russia’s eastern front. They should be natural partners with each other and with India, except that they appear unwilling to recognize their clear common interest sufficiently to bury their differences. The hope was that Trump and Putin might begin to reverse course.

For the full essay, click here.



This consideration shaped much of the response of Indian commentators, although there has been no official comment from the government. Prior to the meeting, the expectation was that “any thaw in U.S.-Russia relations would come as a relief.” Analysts were also concerned about the impact CAATSA (Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act) would have if the U.S.-Russia relations did not improve.

Some also believe that the Trump-Putin meeting provides a window of opportunity “to establish clear lines of understanding” and seek an exemption for the Indian government to procure the S-400 air defense system from Russia. Others fear a much larger dynamic could be at play and that this could set in motion the dismantling of the Eurasian geopolitical order that the United States had built and nurtured for decades. Arguments were also made highlighting the stabilizing effects of improved U.S.-Russia ties for not just the two countries but for the broader global order as well.

Indian commentators were thus both excited and nervous about the Trump-Putin meeting. An overall improvement in relations between Washington and Moscow could possibly ease the strain in Indian diplomacy. On the other hand, worsening of the U.S.-Russia ties post-Helsinki meeting could have multiple adverse reactions. For one, it will make India’s choices in the defense and security realm quite challenging. Indian interest in buying the S-400s is just one instance. Even as India has diversified its defense procurement, its defense inventory is still Russia-dominated. Additionally, there are technologies and platforms that no other country is willing to part with to India as yet, at least in the immediate time frame and therefore India will continue to be dependent on Russia for a number of important technologies, as well as spare parts and the upkeep of its existing defense infrastructure.

But more importantly, further deterioration of Russia’s ties with the West and isolationism will drive Moscow further into the China’s arms, which will exacerbate the strategic challenges for India and restrict the choices for India. A close Russia-China strategic partnership also creates real worries in the security sector. For instance, the Russian sale of advanced weapon platforms to China such as the Su-35 and the Kilo-class submarines only serve to widen the disparity in the military balance between India and China.

Furthermore, while Russia continues its diplomatic support for India in various forums for now, this could also potentially change in the future. The Russian keenness to build political and military relations with Pakistan has also raised concern in New Delhi not as much for the scale of the relations (at least for the time being) as an indicator of how far away Russia has moved away from India. The fact that the emerging Moscow-Islamabad ties could be an afterthought of the strategic ties between Russia and China offers little comfort.

Tensions between Russia and the United States might make Moscow uncomfortable with the growing ties between India and the United States, even if this is not directed at Russia. But New Delhi also sees little choice, considering the challenge it faces from China. The harsh bipartisan domestic reaction in the United States to President Trump’s performance, and his back-peddling on some of his comments with President Putin, means that there is little hope that there will be much improvement in U.S.-Russia ties in the immediate future. So, New Delhi will likely have to continue to worry about any fallout that might affect India.

Why Postponing the New US-India Dialogue Matters, my essay for The Diplomat on the postponement of the 2+2 Dialogue, June 29, 2018

This week, I published a second essay for The Diplomat on why postponing the New US-India 2+2 Dialogue matters. The postponement may have been entirely a scheduling issue but such developments only exacerbate the challenges of managing differences in an important, complex relationship.



Speaking in New Delhi recently, Nikki Haley, U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, characterized the U.S.-India relationship as a high priority one saying, “Perhaps no other partnership has as much potential for global peace and prosperity over the next 10, 20, or 50 years.”

In reality, despite being a high priority, significant challenges remain for the relationship that require both sides to address, and recent developments have only compounded some of these. That was most recently demonstrated by the fact that even a supposedly regular mechanism such as the U.S.-India inaugural “2+2 dialogue” was postponed.

The U.S. Embassy in India issued a short statement saying that the dialogue postponement was “prompted by reasons entirely unrelated to the bilateral relationship.” As this article went to publication, reports indicate that Secretary of State Mike Pompeo will be travelling to North Korea next week, which suggests a possible reason for the postponement.

Irrespective of the details, the big picture is clear: even as Trump administration officials have reiterated that India is a priority country and high on the agenda, this is the second time that this new dialogue has been postponed within a year of its formulation.

For the full essay, click here.



This new dialogue initiative between India and the United States was agreed upon by the two sides during the visit of Prime Minister Narendra Modi to the United States in June 2017. Before the postponement, India’s Foreign Minister Sushma Swaraj and Defense Minister Nirmala Sitharaman were to travel to Washington, D.C. for this inaugural dialogue, where a number of tricky but significant issues were to be taken up.

The dialogue was meant to re-energize the relationship against the backdrop of a possible downward trend in trade and economic ties. It was also critical in the context of possible strains over the CAATSA (Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act) issue – a law passed by the United States in August 2017 and which came into effect in January this year. CAATSA penalizes entities that undertake significant transactions with Russia in the intelligence or defense sectors. New Delhi engages Moscow on both these fronts, with the defense sector being more critical.

While U.S.-India relations have broadly been on the right track, there are clearly some troubles ahead. The postponement will add one more issue to the mix, particularly with respect to the ever-lingering perception that the United States is not giving sufficient importance to India. It will also add to the existing issues that were already slated to be discussed. Rescheduling the dialogue is not an insignificant task because a number of bilateral issues need attention now and could exacerbate if they are not addressed soon.

As an example, on the economic front, India announced last week that it will impose retaliatory tariff on 29 U.S. products that will take effect on August 4, in response to unilateral U.S. imposition of higher import duties on steel and aluminum from India. India had earlier asked the U.S. government to make an exemption for India but Washington did not heed the request.

The U.S. duties will increase the cost of steel exports to the United States by $198.6 million and aluminum exports by $42.4 million. India in this regard is also reported to be taking the United States to the World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement mechanism. This could galvanize support from other countries as well, including the European Union (EU) and China. After a month of verbal retaliation, the EU has also begun taking more concrete steps. Japan, Mexico, Canada, and other countries are also considering similar responses to the U.S. imposition of duties. China has already imposed a series of measures targeting the United States, to which President Donald Trump has already threatened to retaliate.

The overall impact of these measures is unpredictable but potentially quite dangerous. More worryingly, the trade war is also bringing China and U.S. allies and partners together, thus strengthening Beijing and weakening efforts to counter its other more aggressive political and military tendencies.

Another reason for a quick rescheduling of the 2+2 dialogue is because of the CAATSA headache. Though New Delhi has diversified its defense trade partners, Moscow continues to dominate the Indian defense inventory to the tune of about 70 percent. Further, India’s plans to acquire important platforms including the S-400 air defense systems could run into serious problems.

Even as the CAATSA sanctions are not aimed at India, its security implications for India will be significant given the continuing Indian dependence on Russia for defense equipment. Congressman Joe Crowley, the House Democratic Caucus chairman recently ousted in a primary, while speaking at a U.S.-India Friendship event stated that CAATSA “is a serious issue that needs to be dealt [with]. There needs to be a dialogue between the U.S. and India. Our goal is not to sanction India.” He added that “understanding the needs that India has as a nation for self-defense as well … has to be taken into consideration.”

Given that the S-400 deal with Russia is an important one for New Delhi from a national security perspective, this is likely to be an issue at the 2+2 dialogue. Acknowledging this, Nisha Desai Biswal, the former assistant secretary of state for South and Central Asia and the current president of the U.S.-India Business Council said, “It is something that we are all mindful of and looking at very very carefully. But I do think that we need to acknowledge and address the continuing importance for India of its relationship with Russia and how we how we manage the way forward on that issue.”

If the United States wants a strong India as its partner, Washington cannot come up with such blanket sanctions that might hamper its defense capacity-building. This could also increase some of the fears that the United States is not a credible and secure defense partner.

A third issue that needs attention is the Communications, Compatibility, Security Agreement (COMCASA), an agreement that will offer a legal framework for India to obtain more secure, encrypted, and advanced communication equipment from the United States. This would in turn create better interoperability between the two militaries as also with other militaries that use U.S.-origin platforms with similar communication links.

The framework agreement, originally called the Communication and Information on Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA) was changed to COMCASA to suit India-specific requirements. This is part of the three foundational agreements that the United States has sought with India in order to further the India-U.S. defense partnership. India in August 2016 signed the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA), which was earlier called the Logistics Services Agreement (LSA).

Looking at the slow pace with which India approached the LEMOA and the negotiations underway for signing the COMCASA, the third agreement, Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geospatial Cooperation (BECA) will be a long off. Reports indicate that India and the United States are closer to signing the COMCASA, and officials familiar with the negotiations say that it only needs the political will to sign. A lot of ground was believed to be covered during the visit of Foreign Secretary Vijay Gokhale and Defense Secretary Sanjay Mitra to the United States earlier in April.

These agreements are significant because they are critical for aspects of cooperation to go forward. As an example, India’s plans to buy Guardian Avenger armed drones from the United States cannot be expected to progress if COMCASA is not signed.

It is unclear if there are technical glitches to India signing the agreement. Some reports indicate that India is concerned about possible “intrusive American access to Indian military communication systems, and about the violation of Indian sovereignty due to visits by U.S. inspectors to Indian bases to inspect the COMCASA-safeguarded equipment.” It is also argued that India’s Russian dominant defense inventory “may not be compatible” with COMCASA. But like LEMOA, the Indian opposition is almost entirely political in nature.

While each of these issues can be problematic, both New Delhi and Washington need to be mindful of the larger Asian strategic issues that have brought the two closer in the first place. If the United States wants to see a capable India that is able to balance China in an effective manner, Washington has to become more understanding of some of India’s choices. Equally, New Delhi needs to be more pragmatic about which fights it wants to pick with the United States on what issue and what it stands to lose.

Whether the two sides can accomplish this is the question. Postponing the dialogue may have been unavoidable, but it does not help either India or the United States in working out a path forward.