Will the End of the INF Treaty Start an Arms Race? - The Diplomat, 1 August 2019

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I write on the global impact of the end of the INF Treaty, "Will the End of the INF Treaty Start an Arms Race?." I argue that the end of INF will have strategic implications well beyond Russia and the United States.

On August 2, the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), a bilateral arms control treaty originally signed between the United States and the Soviet Union (now Russia), will end. U.S. President Donald Trump had announced the U.S. withdrawal from the Treaty six months back, and the withdrawal period is about to end.

While the focus of the INF Treaty itself was on the United States and Russia, is likely to have a much broader impact than just between the two countries. The INF Treaty was seen as having the ability to bring about a semblance of stability much beyond Washington and Moscow. Now there are growing concerns that this will give rise to a new arms race.

For the full essay, click here.



The 1987 INF Treaty saw the United States and the Soviet Union agree to remove an entire class of weapons – nuclear and conventional ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers, including Soviet SS-20s and the U.S. ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) and Pershing II ballistic missiles. Based on the commitments made in the treaty, the two countries destroyed a total of 2,692 short-, medium-, and intermediate-range missiles by June 1, 1991, the treaty implementation deadline. This is the only nuclear arms control treaty that eliminated an entire class of existing weapons.

The Trump announcement of the U.S. intent to leave the treaty came about after repeated reports of Russian breaches of its INF commitments. The Russian breaches are not new. The complaints had been around under the Obama administration, for instance, when Russia developed a new cruise missile, the 9M729 (NATO name: SSC-8). NATO has also remained concerned about the treaty breaches. In fact, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg stated that “the ‘ongoing Russian violation’ was the only reason the 1987 treaty was under threat.”

Russia of course denied that they were violating any commitment made under the INF Treaty. A senior Russian official is reported to have said that it is not in violation of any commitment and that the missile 9M729 is within the INF range limit of 500 kilometers. In fact, a Russian commander, General Mikhail Matveyevsky has reportedly stated that its maximum flight range is 480 km.

There are concerns within the United States and outside about the impact of the treaty withdrawal. U.S. Senator Bob Menendez (a Democrat from New Jersey), the ranking member on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, has said that withdrawing without a follow-on treaty taking the place of the INF is a recipe for an arms race. Menendez argues that “Russia will clearly spend money on updating and amplifying its weapons systems.”

Yes, Russia might respond by building more INF-range missiles. But it is important to identify another key reason for the U.S. walkout from the treaty — China. One key problem facing the INF Treaty has been the development and deployment of a large number of missiles by China, which is not a member of the treaty and therefore not bound by its terms. That has had the effect of changing the military balance in East Asia and beyond. In fact, in October last year, Trump had said, “We’ll have to develop those weapons, unless Russia comes to us, and China comes to us, and they all come to us and they say ‘let’s really get smart and let’s none of us develop those weapons.’ If Russia’s doing it, and if China’s doing it, and we’re adhering to the agreement, that’s unacceptable.”

There is substance to all of this. A recent U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Report detailing the Chinese missile inventory highlights that it has “more than 2,000 ballistic and cruise missiles, approximately 95 percent of which, according to US officials, would violate the INF Treaty if China were a signatory.” So, there are genuine security concerns that have driven the U.S. withdrawal, which will also mean that any future arms control initiative can get off the ground under the Trump administration only if China actively participates in it.

China remains concerned about the ending of the INF Treaty. Their worries stem from the fact that this could lead to the United States deploying conventional ground-launched missiles in East Asia, which could further force China to increase its own inventory. Experts warn that with the United States becoming free to now deploy INF-range missiles in Asia, “the development of Chinese missiles is likely to rapidly accelerate.” But as long as China continues its unimpeded development of missiles, the United States, Russia, and even India might be compelled to build up their own inventories, which points to the possibility of a budding arms race.

Japan, which will also be affected by such an arms race, had suggested a multilateral successor to the INF, but China is categorical that it will not be party to such initiatives. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying, said that the INF “is a bilateral deal between Russia and the United States. If the agreement becomes multilateral, this will influence a whole range of complex political, military, and legal issues…. The Chinese side does not give its consent.” As for suggestions on a possible trilateral agreement involving the U.S., Russia and China, Beijing was once again firm in saying no. China is reported to have said that “the premise and basis for trilateral arms control negotiations do not exist at all, and China will never participate in them.”

To be sure, this might just be an initial bargaining tactic. But if not, a new post-INF arms race may be in the offing, this time encompassing Asia too. That will have implications for the wider Indo-Pacific region, and developments in this regard will be critical to watch.

Where Would India Fit in a Missile Defense Partnership in the Indo-Pacific? - 24 January 2019

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I examined India's evolving missile defense choices and partnerships. This was done in the backdrop of the US Missile Defense Review (MDR) which identified as a partner in the Indo-Pacific. In this piece, "Where Would India Fit in a Missile Defense Partnership in the Indo-Pacific?," I analyse as to how India was compelled to appreciate the utility of missile defense to what the different options for India are, whether it should be an indigenous system or something that is developed in partnership with other countries such as the US.

Last week, U.S. President Donald Trump announced the 2019 Missile Defense Review (MDR), outlining the rapidly evolving threats and the U.S. measures and capabilities that are required to protect the homeland, bases abroad and U.S. allies and partners around the world. The document, the latest among a series of strategy documents released under the Trump administration, bears noting in terms of what it means for India and the wider Indo-Pacific.

The Indo-Pacific factors significantly in the MDR. There is a mention of threats such as North Korea, Iran, Russia, and China, the advancements in missile defense and anti-satellite (ASAT) advancements in a few countries that could negatively impact the United States, and references to the importance of working with U.S. allies and partners including Japan, South Korea, Australia, and India.

The references to these like-minded states in particular bears noting. Both Japan and South Korea are already working with the United States in developing their respective missile defense shields which are also “increasingly interoperable” with U.S. systems. Australia also plays an important role in strengthening the regional missile defense cooperation through a trilateral engagement with the United States and Japan. Where does India fit into this emerging missile defense partnership in the Indo-Pacific?

For the full essay, click here.



India is no stranger to this conversation: It has been trying to manage growing missile threats in its neighborhood for about two decades now. China-Pakistan collaboration in this regard has been a significant driver in pushing New Delhi in developing certain limited missile defense capabilities. In the early 1990s, proliferation of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles such as the M-9 and M-11 from China to Pakistan pushed India to explore missile defense options. India had learned to live with China’s inventory of long-range missiles, but Pakistan was always a more prominent and unpredictable rival for India, and thus India has felt compelled to respond with greater swiftness.

India’s missile defense options included both indigenously developing missile defense technology as well as procuring it from the outside. At the time, this effort represented a major shift in India’s policy on missile defenses: India had vociferously criticized the U.S. “Star Wars” missile defense programs of the 1980s. A changing missile threat perception along with a strategic reorientation toward the U.S. enabled these policy shifts in India.

In recognition of this fact, the MDR makes a pointed reference to the “advanced and diverse range of ballistic and cruise missile capabilities in South Asia.” The review further notes that this is a potential area of cooperation between India and the United States especially given the convergence of strategic interests between the two sides and sees this as “a natural outgrowth of India’s status as a Major Defense Partner and key element of our Indo-Pacific Strategy.”

There is certainly some indication of a greater weight being placed on India in Washington’s calculations about how it deals with U.S. alliances and partnerships in the region. To take just one example, the United States had, just a few months ago, granted India a “Strategic Trade Authorisation-1 (STA-1)” status, that was previously given only to Japan and South Korea in Asia. But in reality, though India has a growing interest in missile defenses, whether it will be able to partner with the United States is open to question.

For instance, interestingly, this comes in the backdrop of India’s decision to buy the Russian S-400 air defense system for $5 billion. The Indian decision to proceed with the S-400 systems is indicative of the scale of the missile threats in India’s neighborhood. But it also means it is unclear whether India will look to the United States for BMD systems: a U.S. and Russian defense system could be complicated in terms of interoperability, though some analysts argue that it is a sensible option to have different radars and different encryption systems to deal with an array of threats.

Another problem is that India’s DRDO is already developing its own two-tiered BMD system. In addition, at the lower end, India is purchasing the U.S.-Norwegian NASAMS-2 system, as well as the Indo-Israel MRSAM (a land version of the Barak-8 naval system). Given all this, whether or not there is space for further operational cooperation with the United States within the Indian ballistic missile defense architecture remains to be seen.

China-Iran Military Ties

Here's the link to an article of mine on the China-Iran military ties. The Occasional Paper has been published (August 09, 2010) by the Middle East Institute, New Delhi (MEI@ND).

While China may agree with the US that a nuclear Iran may contribute to regional instability, it does not want to hamper its own goals vis-à-vis Iran or other countries in the Middle East per se. These goals are: Iran’s oil and gas resources; gaining access to Central Asia; and ensuring the emergence of an anti-Western regional power in the Middle East. Given these potential benefits, China seems to solidifying the relationship with Iran. As far as Iran is concerned, three major drivers appear to be pushing its ties with China – becoming self-reliant, attaining regional power status and establishing strong deterrence against any attacks.

What has been most critical in Iran-China military ties is not the actual transfer of weapon units and other systems as much as the Chinese assistance in setting up and aiding their indigenous production capabilities. While these may be difficult to monitor and track, they have been more useful to Iran than simple transfer of units and have created a dangerous situation wherein the country can develop these systems on its own without any outside help. The kind of self-sufficiency that Iran has been able to achieve in a few decades, mostly due to the Chinese assistance, is significant.

For the full paper, click here.



Type rest of the post here