Vietnam Confronts China, Alone - The Diplomat, 26 September 2019

In this week's column for the Diplomat, Vietnam Confronts China, Alone, I looked at the slow boiling stand-off in the South China Sea that has not received sufficient attention.

Vietnam and China are engaged in a slow boiling stand-off in the South China Sea that has not received sufficient attention. China has reportedly sent one survey vessel and at least four Chinese maritime vessels; Vietnam has responded by deploying its Coast Guard vessels.

According to Vietnamese news reports citing its Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the stand-off is taking place in Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone and continental shelf in the south of the East Sea (as Vietnam calls it) since July this year. The exclusive economic zones have been drawn in accordance with the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which both Vietnam and China are party to. Vietnam is finding itself in a tough spot, without very much support beyond words, as it faces a determined China.

For the full post, click here.



The most recent troubles began in mid-July, when the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lê Thị Thu Hằng claimed that the “Chinese geological survey vessel group Haiyang Dizhi 8 recently violated Việt Nam’s exclusive economic zone and continental shelf in the south of the East Sea.” Vietnam asserts that it has repeatedly reached out to China “to protest the violations.”

In addition, Vietnam has asked all the major powers to make efforts at bringing peace and order back in the region by saying “maintaining order, peace and security in the East Sea is a common interest of countries both inside and outside the region. Việt Nam wants concerned countries and the international community to protect and maintain this joint interest.” Toward the end of July, the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry spokesperson reaffirmed its stand asking that “China immediately withdraw all of its vessels from Việt Nam’s waters and… respect Việt Nam’s sovereign right and jurisdiction, for the sake of the relations between the two countries and for regional stability and peace.” Vietnam asserts that it has repeatedly reached out to China through several different channels.

Taking the issue to the ASEAN in late-July, the Vietnamese Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Pham Bình Minh “expressed his grave concern over the recent developments in the East Sea, with Chinese geological survey vessel group Haiyang Dizhi 8’s activities violating Việt Nam’s exclusive economic zone and continental shelf in the waters.” He added that such activities “seriously threaten legitimate rights of coastal countries, erode trust, and worsen tensions, thus hurting peace and stability in the region.”

Noteworthy too is that this time around, China has followed a different deployment pattern. The author has learnt from Vietnamese analysts that unlike in the past, when Chinese vessels stayed for a couple of months in the same area, this time China deployed its survey ships for a few weeks before withdrawing, only to come back again into the same Vietnamese exclusive economic zone areas later. In the beginning of August, the Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson announced that “the Haiyang Di Zhi 08 (Marine Geology 8) survey vessel has halted its geological mission and left Việt Nam’s Exclusive Economic Zone and southeastern continental shelf.” A few days later, however, the Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson stated that “the Chinese vessel group and a number of escort ships came back to Việt Nam’s territorial waters.” Vietnam once again appealed to the international community to respond to the situation in order to maintain regional peace and stability. Meanwhile, China has also reportedly begun fresh military exercises near Hoàng Sa (Paracel) Islands.

Despite the continuing protests by Vietnam, the stand-off has continued, and is now in its third month. A few days ago, Nguyễn Mạnh Đông, head of the maritime affairs department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ National Border Committee, in a detailed interview to the Vietnam News Agency, maintained that “Disputes are inevitable in interpretation and application of the [UNCLOS] Convention, but all countries have the obligation to settle these disputes in a peaceful manner via measures stipulated in Article 33 of the UN Charter and Article 279 of UNCLOS.”

China has become much more aggressive in the region in the last couple of years. A month before the current stand-off with Vietnam began, a Chinese ship sank a Philippines fishing boat in Bai Co Rong (Recto Bank). Earlier in May 2019, a China Coast Guard vessel, Haijing 35111, reportedly prevented Malaysia’s oil rig operation near Luconia Shoals off the coast of the Sarawak State. In another move to assert its claims, China organized the seventh Sinan Cup Regatta in Duy Mộng island, part of the Hoàng Sa archipelago.

Meanwhile, Vietnam has reached out to India, the United States, Russia, Australia and other Indo-Pacific countries. But the regional and global reactions to these developments have been muted. Malaysia in its new foreign policy document has said, “the South China Sea should be a sea of cooperation, connectivity and community-building and not confrontation or conflict. This is in line with the spirit of Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN). Malaysia will actively promote this vision in Asean.” Further, a joint statement issued on August 27 between Vietnam and Malaysia “emphasized the importance of self-restraint, non-militarization and observance of international legal obligations in good faith, respect for sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction of the coastal states, and rule of law in accordance with the 1982 UNCLOS and avoidance of activities that may escalate tensions.”

Extraregional powers have also made similar statements but not much beyond. Testifying in front of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, David Stilwell, Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs said, “through repeated illegal actions and militarization of disputed features, Beijing has and continues to take action to prevent ASEAN members from accessing over $2.5 trillion in recoverable energy reserves.”

Other powers have stopped with reiterations of the importance of freedom of navigation, such as the India-France joint statement during Prime Minister Modi’s recent visit to France. The recently-held conference on Indian Ocean in the Maldives on September 3-4, where the prime minister of Sri Lanka and foreign ministers of Singapore, Maldives were present, also stressed the freedom of navigation but again there was no mention of South China Sea.

Japan has been slightly firmer, with the foreign minister saying that “South China Sea is an important sea lines of communications for Japan and many other countries. It is directly related to the stability and the peace of the region, and the international community, including Japan, pay serious attention to the situation in South China Sea. Japan opposes to any actions by anybody to increase the tension in South China Sea.” Similarly, India has emphasized that it “has an abiding interest in the peace and stability in the region. India firmly stands for the freedom of navigation and over-flight, and unimpeded lawful commerce, in the international waters, in accordance with international laws, notably UNCLOS.”

It appears unlikely that Vietnam will be able to get any stronger support from its partners in the region and outside. It is also unlikely that Vietnam will be able to resist China on its own. Beijing appears to have correctly calculated that it does not have to fear any serious, united opposition.

India and Australia Defense Relations: Towards a Common Vision of an Open Indo-Pacific Region? - The Diplomat, 20 September 2019

I have been a little behind in updating my blog but I am trying it up to date. Two weeks ago, in my column for The Diplomat, I focused on the growing closer defence relations between India and Australia and the potential for the two countries in stabilising the Indo-Pacific. I argue that despite differences that remain, there is clear evidence of growing strategic convergence by both countries in the security realm.

After decades of being indifferent to each other, India and Australia have recently emerged as close strategic partners in the Indo-Pacific. This is evident in the number of high level visits and the number of joint military exercises between the two countries. Indian Navy Chief Admiral Karambir Singh was in Australia in early September, and the Indian Defense Minister, Rajnath Singh, is slated to visit Australia in November.

The shift in the relationship, both in terms of the tone and direction, is remarkable. This is primarily led by a common concern about a rising China and its strategic consequences on the Indo-Pacific strategic order. But there have been concerns about whether the two countries are on the same page: as Frederic Grare says in a 2014 paper, it is not clear if the common concerns have materialized into a shared approach in addressing the China factor.

For the full post, click here.



Clearly, even as different countries have concerns about China, their concerns have been defined by local and often differing national interests and perspectives. Australia worries about China’s role and presence in the Pacific whereas India’s concerns are more to do with China’s increasing influence and activities in the Indian Ocean. And on the Indian Ocean, Australian analysts see little convergence and alignment of thinking with India. David Brewster for one, argues that “Australia is likely to be less willing to recognize any Indian claims of a ‘predominant’ maritime role in the Indian Ocean, much less any Indian sphere of influence in the north-east Indian Ocean.” But it is more important for India and Australia to come together in upholding rule of law, rules based order, respect human rights and establish norms of responsible behavior.

Despite this apparent mismatch in the thinking between the two capitals, maritime security concerns about the broad Indo-Pacific region has been gaining greater traction. The joint naval exercise, AUSINDEX, is a manifestation of this synergistic approach to maritime security. The third iteration held in April this year was the biggest so far between the two navies. Held off the coast of Visakhapatnam in southern India, it saw the participation of the highest number of units of the two countries so far including four frontline ships with integral helicopters, one submarine and a variety of aircraft including P8I and P8A long-range Maritime Reconnaissance Anti-Submarine Warfare aircraft. The exercise involved all three dimensions comprising anti-submarine warfare exercises, air defense exercises, and anti-surface warfare exercises. In a first, fifty-five American and twenty New Zealand military personnel were present to witness the exercise. According to an Indian government statement, “the increased scale of participation signifies the importance attached to the exercise by both countries while the enhanced complexity is indicative of the interoperability between the two navies.”

Therefore, it is clear that both New Delhi and Canberra have come a long way in their strategic engagements in a very short span of time, even if it has not advanced as fast as some observers would like to see. But this relationship will only further intensify in the coming years given that the common threat of a hegemonic China is unlikely to disappear anytime soon. It is quite likely that both countries will come to appreciate the increasing relevance of working together on a number of areas including maritime security, the establishment of a blue economy, infrastructure and connectivity initiatives, and strategic industry collaboration. The security dialogue, political consultations and bilateral and multinational military exercises can be expected to gain further depth and appreciation in both capitals. In addition, developing a common approach to certain ideas and principles like free, open and transparent Indo-Pacific is important.

Such strategic engagements will receive a major fillip with the visit of the Indian defense minister to Australia later this year. Reports suggest that India and Australia are likely to sign a number of important agreements including the mutual logistics support agreement, an information exchange agreement and a broader maritime agreement. A report citing diplomatic sources said that “These will lead to greater interoperability and help in elevating the strategic partnership.”

The logistics agreement has been in the discussion phase for a few years now and Australia is reported to have given India a draft text in 2016. It should be noted that India took more than a decade to finalize and conclude such an agreement with the United States. Ever since the LEMOA was concluded with the United States in 2016, it appears that India is getting a lot more comfortable with such agreements. Since 2016, India has signed two such agreements, one with France and a second one with South Korea, just a few weeks ago. These agreements go to enhance the interoperability between the militaries of the two countries, and simplify the process of using each other’s military facilities.

Maritime security cooperation, especially the information sharing arrangement, will help both sides to gain a better strategic awareness picture of the Indo-Pacific region. These have been on the bilateral agenda for some time – these were identified as elements in the India-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation signed during Prime Minister Kevin Rudd’s visit to India in 2009 as well as the Framework for Security Cooperation between India and Australia of 2014.

It is clear that the India-Australian strategic relationship has some way to go yet. But despite understandable disappointments about the slow pace, there are also advances being made.

Growing India-South Korea Strategic Synergy: The Defense Domain - The Diplomat, 13 September 2019

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I wrote on the growing strategic synergy between India and South Korea and how that is beginning to impact upon the defence domain.

In the first week of September, Indian Defense Minister Rajnath Singh was on a five-day tour of Northeast Asia, making South Korea his second stop after Japan. During the visit, the Indian minister met his counterpart, Jeong Kyeong-doo, with the two leaders highlighting the potential for expanding their cooperation in the defense and security sectors.

After undertaking a comprehensive review of the defense relations, the ministers signed two agreements, one to extend logistical support to each other’s navies, and a second one to deepen defense educational exchanges. The agreement on naval logistics sharing is particularly a significant one, given that India has such arrangements so far only with the United States and France. India is currently negotiating such an agreement with Japan.

For the full essay, click here.



While it is a clear demonstration of the deepening strategic partnership between India and South Korea, the military logistics agreement will also go a long way in enhancing India’s strategic reach in the Indo-Pacific. India’s limited naval presence in the Pacific can be addressed by the agreement as the Indian military will be in a position – to take just one example – to use the South Korean military facilities if needed.

In another important development, the two countries have developed a roadmap that will strengthen India-South Korea defense industry collaboration. This is a key area given that the Indian government has decided not to use Chinese systems and components in the broad defense electronics sector and India is yet to develop indigenous capability to fill in this gap.

Given the high-end and sophisticated nature of the South Korean defense electronic capabilities, this offers itself as an ideal win-win opportunity for Seoul and New Delhi. A defense ministry statement noted that Rajnath Singh, at a meeting of the CEOs of Korean and Indian defense industries in Seoul, listed a number of possible areas for cooperation including land systems, aero systems, naval systems, R&D co-operation and collaboration in testing, certification, and quality assurance.

Elaborating on the defense trade potential in India, the minister went on to add that “India offers tremendous business opportunity to Korean defense industries in India with liberalized licensing regime, attractive FDI provisions, strong and skilled industrial work force, single window clearances and establishment of Defense Investor Cell to facilitate investors and various other industry friendly initiatives.”

Other lines of effort also bear noting in this regard. For instance, the defense minister also invited the Korean defense industry to participate in the next DefExpo — DefExpo 2020 — that will be held in Lucknow in February 2020. The Indian defense minister has also established a joint task force to identify military systems and hardware that can be produced in India through the participation of Korean defense industries, which will be useful in avoiding the import costs of these systems.

India’s push for stronger defense cooperation comes against the backdrop of the Indian Army’s induction of the K-9 Vajra self-propelled howitzers, which is a version of the South Korean K-9 Thunder. South Korean defense industry, Samsung-Techwin, and India’s Larsen & Toubro had entered into an agreement for the sale of 100 howitzers in May 2017.

The first batch of these howitzers entered service in November 2018, with the second batch to be supplied in November 2019 and the final batch of 50 is to be delivered in November 2020. The South Korean Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) announced in 2016 that it is working on a new fully automatic projectile-and-charge loading system that will be retrofitted to the K9, fitting the howitzers with a robotic turret, thereby reducing the role of crew operating the howitzers. Partnership between the Indian Larsen & Toubro and the Samsung-Techwin could strengthen indigenous effort to develop and strengthen remote control systems in India’s defense sector.

According to the defense ministry statement, the minister had also said that “We are progressing towards becoming a manufacturing hub of defense equipment and investors can use India as a spring board to export defense equipment manufactured in India to various friendly countries in South East Asia, Middle Asia, Middle East Asia, South Asia and Africa.”

The broader push for India-South Korea defense and strategic collaboration was taken during Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Seoul in February this year. There is a growing synergy and complementarity between South Korea’s New Southern Policy and India’s Act East Policy, both of which seek to establish a stable, secure and prosperous Indo-Pacific order. Recalling President Moon Jae-In’s visit to India in 2018, Modi said during his Korea visit that “the coordination of India’s Act East Policy and Korea’s New Southern Policy is giving a strong platform to further deepen and strengthen our Special Strategic Partnership.” He further added, “we have made significant progress in our relations in a very short time. This is based on our shared vision of progress and roadmap of our relations in future, people, peace and prosperity.”

While India’s relations with South Korea are improving, it remains to be seen how New Delhi will maneuver around a couple of trouble spots. One is the worsening tensions between South Korea and Japan, another of India’s vital strategic partners in the region. A more critical one is Seoul’s closeness to China (despite South Korea’s own occasional difficulties with Beijing). Both require careful and sensitive handling.

What’s Next for India-Japan Defense Relations? - The Diplomat, 6 September 2019

In this week's column for the Diplomat, I write on the Indian defence minister Rajnath Singh's visit to Japan as part of a 5-nation East Asian trip. While the impetus for closer alignment is clear, much work remains to be done on the security side and within the wider bilateral relationship.

India’s Defense Minister Rajnath Singh is on a five-nation East Asian tour, starting with Japan, one of India’s increasingly important strategic partners. India’s ties with Japan have grown tremendously in the last decade, though there are still many areas that remain untapped in this relationship.

In Tokyo, Singh co-chaired the annual Defense Ministerial Dialogue with his Japanese counterpart Takeshi Iwaya, and his trip had several other interactions as well including a call with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. Concerns about the strategic consequences of a rising China in the Indo-Pacific is providing greater momentum to the India-Japan partnership. This annual ministerial dialogue is one more platform for strengthening the defense and security bonds between the two countries.

For the full essay, click here.



India and Japan have grown particularly close since the Modi government took office in 2014. The personal chemistry between Abe and Modi has had a positive impact. Earlier this year, the two countries agreed to hold a two-plus-two ministerial dialogue with the ministers of defense and foreign affairs of the two countries. This will be the second such dialogue that India will be engaged in after the India-U.S. 2+2 strategic dialogue.

The India-Japan 2+2 dialogue is set to take place prior to the summit meeting between Abe and Modi this year, although no details are available as yet. Nevertheless, the commitment to hold such a dialogue is noteworthy as it reflects the growing desire and determination on the part of the political leadership of both countries to deepen their partnership in the security arena. This will also add to the existing dialogue platforms such as the Annual Defense Ministerial Dialogue, Defense Policy Dialogue and the National Security Adviser’s Dialogue.

After the meeting, Singh in a tweet said that he and his counterpart Iwaya had a fruitful discussion covering the entire gamut of issues in the defense and security realm. Commenting on the overall visit, the minister added that it was a remarkable one, taking forward the vision spelled out by the two prime ministers in achieving a stable and inclusive Indo-Pacific region.

While specific details of the dialogue are not known, one issue that was expected to be discussed was the sale of ShinMaywa US-2i amphibious aircraft to India. The debate on the amphibious aircraft has gone on for a while now but the deal was reportedly stuck because of pricing issues. Given the greater engagement of the Indian Navy and Coast Guard in stabilizing the Indo-Pacific, India is thought to be keen on this platform, if pricing issues can be resolved. The Japanese company developing these aircraft has offered India complete transfer of technology, besides agreeing to manufacture them in India.

Speaking to the media, the Japanese ambassador to India, Kenji Hiramatsu was very upbeat about the partnership, stating that “Mr (Rajnath) Singh’s visit to Japan is very significant to compare notes on various aspects of Japan-India defense cooperation, including some joint exercises, defense equipment cooperation and some senior-level exchanges. We are very excited to have a good discussion on opening the Pacific also. We are on the same page on various aspects of international affairs.”

The strategic rationale and context of the India-Japan relationship are clearly important, but the two countries have to move beyond dialogues and meetings to engage in some concrete efforts to cooperate in the region. One area that requires immediate attention is strategic infrastructure, an area in which China has performed very well through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Giving fillip to this agenda, India and Japan announced the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC) at the 52nd Annual Meeting of the African Development Bank (AfDB) summit in India in May 2017. The concept took off from the joint declaration issued by Modi and Abe in November 2016.

But though it has been a few years now, there is little indication that the AAGC is moving forward. The Partnership for Quality Infrastructure suggested by Japan is again an important initiative that could provide alternatives to China’s BRI. But unless these initiatives are operationalized and given the necessary momentum, India and Japan will not be able to compete with China.

Though there are clear strategic reasons for the two powers to cooperate, there are also some important difficulties the partnership faces. One is geography: the two countries are just too far away from each other to be of much use to the other. The other is the particularities of their interests: while both have a common interest in standing up to China, the specific disputes they have with China are bilateral and territorial, and it is not clear that India and Japan can support each other on these.

But on the positive side, cross service agreements that are being negotiated between the two sides will give access to each other’s military facilities and could foster much closer mil-to-mil relations. Ultimately, the reality is that while this is a partnership that still requires a lot of work, the impetus and drive to foster closer ties is clearly seen and is likely set to endure.

Will the Chandrayaan-2 moon landing be India’s biggest scientific achievement? - The Print, 6 September 2019

In today's Print, I write on India's Chandrayaan 2 mission in The Print's TalkPoint. What makes this mission historic is that India will be the first country to achieve a soft landing on the south pole of the moon. Choosing an unexplored area like the south pole of the moon for landing shows ISRO’s confidence.

For the full piece, click here.

Independent India has had a number of scientific achievements, including the Chandrayaan-1 mission, and it will be difficult to rank them because they are all equally impressive in the context of India’s development.

The Indian space programme itself has had impressive achievements like the successful launch of the SLV-3 in 1980. The recent anti-satellite (ASAT) test is also a significant achievement in the science and technology realm. India has had significant achievements in the nuclear realm too – the nuclear test in 1974 and the setting up of the fast-breeder test reactor. The Chandrayaan-2’s success will definitely earn the mission a place in this group of scientific and technological achievements.

Any landing on the lunar surface or indeed on any extra-terrestrial surface will be difficult, but landing on an unexplored area like the south pole of the moon much more so. It says a lot about the self-confidence of the ISRO and its leaders that they chose the south pole of the moon for their first attempt in extra-terrestrial soft landing. While we can all hope for Chandrayaan-2’s success, what has been achieved so far is remarkable for a country like India.

Chandrayaan 2 Moon Landing: The sign of a mature space mission - The Hindustan Times, 6 September 2019

In today's Hindustan Times, I write on India's Chandrayaan 2 mission. The fact that the Chandrayaan spacecraft will be landing on the south pole, a region that has been unexplored before makes it even more special. The fact that the exact spot for landing will be determined right before the landing makes it an extremely complex mission for India.

If all goes as planned, India’s Chandrayaan 2 will become the first Indian space craft to land on a non-terrestrial surface. Others such as the US, Soviet Union/ Russia and China have done human and rover landings on the Moon previously. India has previously undertaken orbital missions around the Moon and Mars, the Chandrayaan 1 and Mangalyaan respectively. The fact that the Chandrayaan spacecraft will be landing on the south pole, a region that has been unexplored before makes it even more special. Thefact that the exact spot for landing will be determined right before the landing makes it an extremely complex mission for India. Even China, which has built sophisticated space capabilities, made its first attempt to land on the near side of the Moon, although it did land on the far side of the lunar surface earlier this year.

For the full piece, click here.



While ISRO traditionally did not look at interplanetary or complex missions such as the Chandrayaan or Mangalyaan, this has become necessary as India’s space programme evolves into a more mature programme. This is also a reflection of the growing geopolitical competition that is now beginning to play out in space. The space competition that one saw during the Cold War had somewhat faded by the early 1980s, after both the US and Soviet Union demonstrated their own “firsts” in various accomplishments. In fact, the bragging rights also began to lose their value after a point of time because such endeavours were not seen as having much scientific or technological value-addition. But these have begun to make a comeback, except that the main actors are primarily in Asia with China leading in some of the endeavours, quickly followed by other players like India and Japan as well. There are also newer activities in outer space that is sparking the competition. For instance, space mining is beginning to gain a lot of interest in both the West and in Asia. Even the small city state, Luxembourg, is making significant investments in this regard. Asteroid mining, lunar mining and general advances in technology that aid in-situ resource utilization is pushing the countries to explore the practical value of space exploration.

There is also the security driven push to this competition. The US and Soviet Union were locked in major space competition for a couple of decades but the end of the Cold War had slowed down the pace to a large extent. The renewed space competition has China at the centre of it and Beijing has ambitions to catch up with both the US and Russia. But Beijing’s own actions have sparked major reactions in Asia and beyond. For instance, the first successful Chinese anti-satellite (ASAT) test in January 2007 sparked a new competition, pushing India to finally demonstrate its own capability earlier this year. This parallels other types of aggressive behaviour by China in its neighbourhood that has triggered new cooperation between those threatened by such actions and further competition with China. For instance, China’s behaviour has made the India-Japan strategic partnership a lot stronger in recent years, including in outer space. China’s actions have led to competition with the US, India and Japan, to a limited extent too. Because of the growing sophistication of China’s space programme, especially with regard to counter-space capabilities, other states have been driven to try and play catch-up with China. Of course, given the growing penetration of space for security and military purposes by all the major powers, India cannot afford to ignore these developments. China has marched ahead in many areas but India has to develop its own deterrent capabilities in space to remove some of the vulnerabilities that may persist in the bilateral and regional context. So, India will have to do a bit of catching-up with China for a while. While the Chandrayaan 2 mission may not have a direct social or economic benefit, demonstration of the growing sophistication of India’s space capabilities is much required for strengthening its credentials when it comes to debates about global governance of space. Moreover, highlighting India as a major space player makes it an attractive destination for launching satellites for a number of emerging players. All of these benefits and necessities makes India’s space ventures such as this worthwhile.

A New India-France Alliance? - The Diplomat, 03 September 2019

Earlier this week, I wrote for the Diplomat on the increasing convergence of interests between the two strategic partners, France and India.

Late last month, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi traveled to France for the annual bilateral summit which lasted from August 22-23. He was also invited by the French President Emmanuel Macron to the G-7 summit, which occurred from August 25- 26 at Biarritz, a reflection of the growing depth of the partnership between India and France.

The consolidation of this strategic partnership could not have come at a better time for New Delhi. India has just taken a major political gamble by removing the special status of the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir, a state that is the focus of a long dispute between India and Pakistan. But India and France are also coming closer because of other common interests, and because India is looking for more options when it comes to its international partners.

For the full essay, click here.



India’s decision on Kashmir created some diplomatic difficulties, with Pakistan demanding UN Security Council debate and China supporting that demand, putting in question the slowly warming ties between India and China. Russia’s position also raised some concerns in Delhi: Its support for India was lukewarm, with Russia clearly feeling squeezed between China (with which Russia has increasingly become closer) and India (its traditional friend). After Russia climbed on the fence and adopted a somewhat ambiguous stand, India needed to nurture its relationship with other important strategic partners such as France and the United States.

Despite India’s traditional discomfort with being an ally, Modi during his speech at UNESCO in Paris said, “Today in the 21st century, we talk of INFRA. I would like to say that for me it is IN+FRA, which means the alliance between India and France.”

Whether this play of words was important or not, India’s strategic engagements with France has grown by leaps and bounds. Backing India within the UN Security Council was the ultimate demonstration of France’s firm resolve to stand with India. Among the UN Security Council members, France has remained one of the steadiest partners of India in recent decades, a place that used to be reserved for the Soviet Union/ Russia in the past.

By contrast, UK-India ties have always been dodgy, given the old political baggage as well as the influence of the Pakistani diaspora in the UK. The UK’s inability or unwillingness to curb anti-India activities in the UK has always been a sore point in the relations. India’s other partners do not have any clout in forums like the UNSC. For example, though Germany has remained an important trading and even political partner to India, there is very little Berlin can do in platforms like the UNSC. And the less said about groups like the BRICS, the better.

All of this makes France’s strong support for India particularly welcome in New Delhi. France and India already have a fairly multifaceted relationship spanning multiple domains from defense, civil nuclear, and space, to climate change, clean energy, and urbanization. During Macron’s visit to India last year, the two countries signed 14 agreements covering these areas.

Their vision and plan of action for maritime security and outer space stand out as particularly important. With regard to maritime security (with a focus on the Indian Ocean), India and France have reiterated the importance of respecting international law by all states, in maintaining freedom of navigation and overflight, piracy, weapons and human trafficking, illegal fishing and smuggling. There can be little doubt who they are referring to.

The two countries also have a vision to use outer space assets in a proactive manner in developing maritime domain awareness in addition to focusing on areas of cooperation including high resolution earth observation, space domain and situational awareness, satellite navigation, space transportation, and human exploration of space. Strengthened space situational awareness and high-resolution earth observation imagery will have a significant impact in their ability to monitor the Indian Ocean maritime space.

In addition, the two countries also have a Joint Action Plan on Indian Ocean. Their joint plan envisages greater use of space assets to gain a more useful appreciation of the maritime environment that the two countries operate in and the two have pledged to strengthen information sharing on the emerging maritime dynamics in the Indian Ocean.

Indian Ocean dynamics have undergone major shifts since the Modi Government came into office in 2014. Making a significant departure from the erstwhile policy of opposing for extra-regional powers in the Indian Ocean, Modi asserted that “Indian Ocean Region is at the top of our policy priorities” and New Delhi has also made it clear that it will be working with all the friends in the region, especially those of the maritime neighbors and island states. Modi added that “collective action and cooperation will best advance peace and security in our maritime region,” a space that India extends to partners like France and the United States in ensuring a stable maritime order while strengthening their ability to respond to natural disasters.

France, of course, also remains a vital source of arms supply to India. The French Rafale fighter won India’s Medium Multi-role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) competition. Though India bought only about three dozen Rafale’s instead of the 126 originally envisaged, there are continuing rumors that India will buy additional ones. India is also a customer for the Scorpene submarines and a host of other items.

Clearly, the roiling of India’s strategic partnerships has increased France’s importance to New Delhi. France is likely to remain important to New Delhi for some time to come, irrespective of the chatter about the actual label that best applies to the growing ties between the two countries.

India Bets Big on Kashmir - Handelsblatt (German Newspaper), 30 August 2019

Last week, I wrote an essay on I write on the internal and external dynamics of India’s recent decision on Jammu & Kashmir for a prominent German newspaper, Handelsblatt. Originally, this was a longer essay, as asked by the newspaper editors but they had to cut it short as the newspaper changed the format to include an editor's note and another piece providing a Pakistani perspective. If anyone is interested, I am happy to share the longer version.

Article 370 was a recognition of the India-Pakistan dispute over the State and the conditions of its accession to the Indian Union that made this state different from others in India. Eliminating the provisions of Article 370 means that Jammu and Kashmir loses this special status. Indeed, the current move makes Jammu and Kashmir’s status even lower than other Indian states because the State has also been downgraded to a Union Territory. In the Indian federal structure, Union Territories are provinces that are directly administered by the central government in Delhi and thus have even less autonomy than other Indian states. Furthermore, the State was divided into two, hiving off the Ladakh region which will become another Union Territory.

Given the potentially dire consequences of this action, why did the Indian government decide on this course of action? One reason is ideology: the BJP has for long argued that Article 370 should be removed, and Jammu and Kashmir fully integrated within the Indian Union. This was even listed in the BJP election manifesto.

For the original essay in German, click here.



A more immediate reason may have been worries about the US withdrawal from Afghanistan and its consequences. Pakistan has significant control over the Taliban, which makes the US beholden to Pakistan because the US wants a semblance of stability as its forces prepare to withdraw. India has bad memories of Pakistan using Afghanistan as a base for training terrorists and sending them into India. An Afghanistan that once again falls under the Taliban – and indirectly under Pakistan and its murderous Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) – is not a happy prospect for India.

Whatever New Delhi’s reasons, this move will likely be deeply unpopular in sections of the State, especially in the predominantly Muslim areas such as the Kashmir Valley. If any such protests are not handled with care, there is also the likelihood that Kashmiri anger could boost the simmering insurgency within the State.

This is one of the immediate dangers: that the insurgency and terrorism in the State will intensify. Indian security forces have been engaged in fighting this war for over three decades now. Though the insurgency has not ended, the Indian security forces have so far managed to keep it under control. A renewed insurgency and increased violence will have obvious grim consequences and it will deepen India’s internal security problems at a time when external security threats are growing.

These external security threats are serious. Pakistan, which never abandoned its claim on all of Kashmir, has already protested India’s moves, though Islamabad itself had assimilated the territories it occupies. It is unlikely that Pakistan will deliberately engage in a direct military assault on India because it is a far weaker power – Pakistan’s GDP at about $250 billion is less than a tenth of India’s at $2.85 trillion. But it could always miscalculate. Pakistan has sponsored terrorist groups that operate in Kashmir and in other parts of India, and terrorist attacks by such groups have repeatedly pushed India and Pakistan to the brink of war. And Pakistan’s possession of a substantial arsenal of nuclear weapons makes the consequences of any such miscalculation far more dangerous, a worry for both India and the international community.

Another problem is China. China has taken a strong stand against the Indian move because Beijing says that it affects China’s claim over a part of Ladakh called Aksai Chin. China currently occupies Aksai Chin but it is part of India’s claim. Beijing forced a discussion at the UN Security Council on India’s action (…). In any case, China’s actions have antagonized India, and it seriously weakens a spluttering effort by the two sides to improve their ties after their last serious military confrontation, less than two years back.

New Delhi appears to be betting that the fallout from its decision can be managed and that the actual consequences may prove to be far less dire. (…) Whether India’s bet pans out remains to be seen but this much is clear: it’s a big one.