Monday, October 28, 2019

Russia-China Strategic Alliance Gets a New Boost with Missile Early Warning System - The Diplomat, 25 October 2019

In my column for The Diplomat last week, I looked at as to how the growing Russia-China strategic alliance gets a new boost with missile early warning system.

The Russia-China alliance – as Russian President Vladimir Putin has described it more than once recently – is getting stronger. Even though an alliance of short-term convenience, brought about by their shared conflict with the U.S. and the West, it is deepening in ways that have implications not only for the West but also Asia. The latest indicator is Russian assistance to China to build a strategic missile early warning system.


In the beginning of October, Russian President Vladimir Putin said at an international affairs conference that Russia will be “helping China build an early warning system to spot intercontinental ballistic missile launches, something only Russia and the United States possess at the moment.” Speaking at a Moscow-based think tank, Valdai Club, Putin added that “This is a serious thing that will drastically increase the defense capabilities of the People’s Republic of China.” Kremlin spokesman did not give any specific details such as when the system would be operational but reportedly said this move “highlighted Russia’s close ties with China.” This clearly is an indication of the growing strategic partnership and the nature of the special relationship that Russia and China enjoy.

For the full post, click here.



In recent years, the Russia-China strategic partnership has assumed more importance than any other relationship for Russia. Russia has gone on to characterize this relationship as an “alliance” first in Vladivostok on September 6 2019, in Sochi October 3 2019 and later at the Valdai Club in Moscow on October 7 2019. In the first instance at Vladivostok, Putin had stated, “We have developed special relations over the past decade, truly allied, strategic.” Later at the Valdai Club, Putin is reported to have remarked, “We have an unprecedentedly high level of trust and cooperation. This is an allied relationship, a multifaceted strategic partnership.”

According to Russian media reports, an around $60 million worth contract has been already signed to develop the software for the PLA early-warning system (Systema Preduprezdenya o Raketnom Napadenii—SPRN) network. SPRN will include both ground (using powerful stationary radars) and space segments. The report stated that much of the work will be undertaken by IAC Vympel and the Central Research Institute Comet (part of the Almaz-Antey Concern for Aerospace Defense. – Vedomosti). China already possesses the Russian S-400 air defense system which can also partly serve the missile defense functions. Russia is in the process of developing a more advanced S-500 system and Moscow believes that if Beijing were to buy it, that would facilitate Russia setting up the full architecture of an integrated PLA SPRN and a missile defense network.

There is also some speculation that the system will allow the two countries to warn each other of third-country launches, but this clearly needs to be considered with some skepticism. For example, a military analyst based in Hong Kong, Song Zhongping opines that the Russian offer would facilitate the development of a joint early warning system between Russia and China. He added that “If the U.S. wants to attack China [with its ICBMs], their missiles are likely to be launched from the Arctic, and that will be covered by Russia’s early warning system, and that means Moscow will have the capability to alert Beijing.” But it is doubtful that this would come to pass. Strategic early warning systems are among the most closely guarded and vital national security establishments because they – literally – could decide the survival of the nation. It is unlikely that such systems will be operated jointly with another state, especially considering the history of past conflicts between Moscow and Beijing, as well as their current suspicions of each other.

China appears to be the beneficiary of the worsening Russia-West relations. After the Ukraine crisis and the sanctioning of Russia, Moscow has felt the need to cultivate its own strong partnerships in Asia and China has benefited immensely from this Russian outreach. But the reverse is also true: worsening U.S.-China relations is also making Beijing more receptive to Russian overtures. Irrespective of the reasons for this deepening alliance, it has implications for others, including Asian powers such as India, which have their own reasons for worrying about this relationship.

Saturday, October 19, 2019

Xi’s Visit Exposes the Limits of China-Nepal Strategic Convergence - The Diplomat, 17 October 2019

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I looked at the Chinese President Xi Jinping's visit to Nepal. It appears that despite the interests both sides have for better ties, there are real limits and challenges to this.


Last week, as expected, Chinese President Xi Jinping stopped in Kathmandu, the capital of Nepal, for a state visit on his way back to China after an informal summit with the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi.

Xi’s Nepal trip itself came as no surprise: China has been attempting to woo India’s smaller neighbors in South Asia, and there is clearly interest among some including Nepal to use the Sino-Indian competition for their own benefits. But Xi’s trip also showed the limits of these converging interests. Indeed, the lack of progress on issues, with an extradition agreement not signed being a case in point, reinforces the fact that any alignment has its limits despite the strategic interests that both Nepal and China see in the wider relationship.

For the full essay, click here.



The mutual attraction between Nepal and China is easy enough to understand. From Beijing’s perspective, Nepal is important for a few strategic reasons. For one, Nepal borders China’s Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR). Though Tibet is relatively quiet, China always worries about the possibility of a resurgence of Tibetan nationalism. Though the largest chunk of Tibetan refugees lives in India, Nepal also hosts about 20,000 Tibetan exiles. Any disturbance in Tibet will likely have some reverberations in Nepal too.

Thus, China is concerned about ensuring that the Tibetan exile population in Nepal does not become an issue of concern. This appears to have been the primary reason why China was pushing for an extradition treaty with Nepal. This also makes good relations with Nepal an important means of managing any future problems in Tibet itself.

In addition to this direct linkage, China also has more general and obvious balance of power considerations in befriending Nepal. As a small South Asian neighbor of India, Nepal affords the opportunity to balance India within the region itself. Nepal’s relations with India, which had its ups and downs, makes Kathmandu a potentially attractive partner for Beijing. There is nothing unusual in this because this is at least part of the reason for Beijing’s outreach to all of India’s smaller neighbors. And of course, India returns the favor, trying to partner with China’s own smaller neighbors such as Vietnam.

A third reason for China’s interests in Nepal is China’s drive to develop the Belt and Road scheme, both as a means of exporting Chinese capital and labor but also expanding its interests. China has discussed several BRI projects with Nepal, including a railroad that would link Lhasa and Kathmandu as well as a Parliament building, National Defence University, and other infrastructure projects.

Nepal also has some interest in developing this partnership with China. For one, a closer relationship with China makes India a lot more receptive to Nepali concerns. Nepal, like India’s other neighbors, has complaints about the lackadaisical manner in which New Delhi approaches development projects in Nepal. Chinese help with infrastructure kills two birds with one stone. It potentially helps Nepal develop economic infrastructure – China has been very efficient in completing such projects, especially in comparison to India – while also putting pressure on India to pay greater attention to Nepali connectivity requirements. Seen from this perspective, having two great powers competing for Nepal’s attention will not be entirely unwelcome in Kathmandu.

In addition, Nepal, a small, landlocked country, also feels vulnerable to Indian pressures. India has been known to impose blockades on Nepal because much of Nepal’s international trade either originates in India or passes through Indian territory. The most recent of these blockades was in 2015, when India imposed an unofficial blockade in an ill-advised move to pressure Kathmandu over what was perceived by India to be discrimination against the Madhesi population in the new Nepali constitution. Though it appears somewhat impractical, Nepal would like to reduce its dependence on India by building trade and transit linkages through China. At the very least, closer linkages with China might make India more careful antagonizing Nepal.

But the strategic interests both sides have for better ties does not mean that there are not limits and challenges for relations. Indeed, if anything, Xi’s visit to Nepal, which saw the relative lack of substantive outcomes despite the hype, reinforced this reality. Despite the seeming attractiveness of the China partnership, there appears to be some disquiet within sections of the Nepali elite about getting too close to China as well as other dangers such as the potential debt-trap by way of involvement in the BRI. India’s unwillingness is also possibly an issue, because as Constantino Xavier, a close observer of India’s relations with its neighbors, has pointed out, one of the projects was meant to be a Sino-Nepalese-Indian, which India is now reluctant to pursue.

All this suggests that mutual interests by itself may not be sufficient to power China-Nepal relations. Negotiating the terms of actual deals, domestic national concerns, as well as the fear of getting dragged into the Sino-Indian competition, are all likely to limit how close India’s neighbors such as Nepal will get to China.

Thursday, October 17, 2019

Shaping Space Diplomacy, my podcast with Carnegie India's Interpreting India - Carnegie India, 10 October 2019

Earlier in the month, I did a podcast with Carnegie India's new podcast series called, Interpreting India, where I discussed India's evolving space policy, global governance aspects and India's role in it. Of course, space diplomacy was a running theme despite the fact that competition is beginning to dominate this realm.

To listen to the podcast, titled, Shaping Space Diplomacy, click here.




Saturday, October 12, 2019

Modi-Xi Summit: A More Balanced China Policy? - ORF, 11 October 2019

I wrote a second piece on the second informal summit between Modi and Xi, and this was published by the Observer Research Foundation yesterday.


Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping are meeting for their second informal summit. Irrespective of the rhetoric of a Wuhan spirit, the relationship is facing difficulties, reflected in a number of disputes between the two countries. This is only a manifestation of the larger strategic problems that exists between India and China, which is rooted in the changing balance of power dynamics in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. While this is not new, the difference now is that India is also displaying greater willingness to respond to China’s pressure more firmly or at least to not let efforts to improve ties with China come in the way of stopping efforts to counter China.

For the full post, click here.



This has become evident in a number of different ways. While India has engaged China in informal summits and joined platforms such as the Russia-India-China (RIC), Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa (BRICS), and Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), India is also stepping up its diplomatic and security engagements with other countries and minilaterals. The recent upgradation of the quadrilateral (Quad) engagements between Australia, India, Japan and the US, suggest the seriousness within this grouping in giving more teeth to the initiative. India’s military engagements with a number of countries in the Indo-Pacific is again a testament to the fact that New Delhi will seek to improve its ties with Beijing but it will also build and nurture a network of strategic engagements that will go on to provide India with greater strategic maneuverability.

While the MEA statement said that the two leaders will discuss bilateral, regional and global issues and share ideas and perspectives for deepening India-China partnership, the two sides, have also tried to keep expectations low. The problems that face the bilateral relationship is not for lack of understanding or lack of high-level political attention, clearly, but because of intractable real differences of interest. This means that finding compromises and accommodation will be harder.

China is unlikely to give up on using Pakistan to balance India. Only a few days before the summit, the Chinese ambassador to Pakistan, Yao Jing endorsed Pakistan’s stand on the Kashmir dispute by stating that “We are also working for Kashmiris to help them get their fundamental rights and justice. There should be a justified solution to the issue of Kashmir and China will stand by Pakistan for regional peace and stability.” India, understandably, protested the statement and sought clarification on China’s changing position on Jammu and Kashmir. Beijing’s stated position so far had been that Kashmir was a bilateral issue that needs to be resolved between two concerned parties. Moreover, this comes in the backdrop of China taking India to the UN Security Council on behalf of Pakistan, which sought a meeting on the Jammu and Kashmir issue following India’s decision to remove the special status to the state of Jammu and Kashmir through Article 370. India maintained that this is purely an internal matter and other countries like China and Pakistan had no locus standi. China can be expected to continue to support Pakistan, and attempt to bolster its economic and military capability, and this will continue to provoke New Delhi.

Similarly, China has found other ways to undermine India, especially in multilateral forums. China has, for all practical purposes, opposed India’s efforts to reform and expand the UN Security Council and find a permanent seat on the body. China has also opposed India’s inclusion in the Nuclear Supplier’s Group (NSG). Though there are some areas of common interests – climate change, or trade, for example – there are sufficient disagreements even on these areas. And where there are disagreements, expect Beijing to undermine India. This is not so much because China has any particular dislike of India, but simply because of the nature of international politics, but New Delhi has long been dismissive of this.

It is possible that New Delhi’s attitude is changing. In the face of such stiffening positions by China, India has joined a web of networks including the Quad, trilateral groupings such as Japan, India and the US (JAI). India could also upgrade the track II trilateral engagements among countries like Japan, India and Australia, and India, Indonesia and Australia. Reluctantly, New Delhi seems to be coming around to the view that even as it tries to keep the relations with China steady, and do as much as possible to prevent serious downturn or tensions in ties, India will also have to expect that such efforts will not be sufficient or fully successful. Thus, India seems to be now unwilling to stop efforts at alternative arrangements to counter China, while seeking to improve ties with it.

Behind the Second Modi-Xi Informal Summit, the Wuhan Spirit Is Fraying - The Diplomat, 10 October 2019

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I write on the second Modi-Xi informal summit scheduled to begin later in Mamallapuram today and conclude by tomorrow.


The second informal summit between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping is set to take place in Mamallapuram, a coastal town in south India from October 11-12. The meeting between the leaders of the two Asian giants will be closely watched, with consequences not only for their countries but the wider Indo-Pacific region and the world as well.

The Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) made a formal announcement of the visit just a couple of days before the visit. The statement added that the agenda was discussing “issues of bilateral, regional and global importance and to exchange views on deepening India-China Closer Development Partnership.” The two sides appear to be setting expectations low, with good reason.

For the full essay, click here.



Prior to the announcement, the Indian media was full of speculation that the summit could even be cancelled. Despite the Wuhan Summit in 2017 and the so-called “Wuhan spirit,” India-China relations have been characterized by a growing number of disputes.

The most serious of these, at least from Delhi’s perspective, is the strengthening Chinese support for Pakistan. Just days before the summit, the Chinese ambassador in Pakistan, Yao Jing, expressed strong support for Pakistan’s position on the Kashmir dispute, saying, “We are also working for Kashmiris to help them get their fundamental rights and justice. There should be a justified solution to the issue of Kashmir and China will stand by Pakistan for regional peace and stability.” This was a red flag for India and led to India lodging a strong protest with China and seeking clarification on what appears to be a change in Beijing’s stated stand on Jammu and Kashmir.

Beijing’s official stand has always been that Kashmir was a bilateral issue between India and Pakistan, left over from history, that needs to be resolved directly by the two countries. So, the change in China’s position was surprising and was seen by official New Delhi as an effort to interfere in India’s internal affairs. Moreover, this came after the strong Chinese support for Pakistan on Article 370 issue, when Beijing forced a UN Security Council discussion on the issue. China also took an unusually strong position on India effectively removing Article 370 (which had ensured local autonomy for the Indian state of Jammu Kashmir) and creating a separate Union Territory (a province directly ruled from New Delhi) in Ladakh. This was despite India’s foreign minister S. Jaishankar travelling to Beijing to explain that the Indian actions in Kashmir had no additional or negative or implication for the Sino-Indian border dispute.

After several strong statements on India by Chinese officials, there was a thawing of the tensions with a Chinese Foreign Ministry statement on October 8. While responding to a question, the Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson said, “China’s position on the issue of Kashmir is consistent and clear. We call on India and Pakistan to step up dialogue on disputes including the Kashmir issue to enhance mutual trust and improve relations. It serves the common interests of both India and Pakistan and represents the shared expectation of regional countries and the international community.” Earlier references to UN resolutions, which irritated India, was missing from this statement.

But the thaw, to the extent that it existed, was short-lived. Not only did China host a visit by the Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan just days before the Xi-Modi summit, the joint China-Pakistan press release also brought back language in reference to Kashmir that India had objected to, asking that the dispute be “resolved based on the UN Charter, relevant UN Security Council resolutions and bilateral agreements.”

Beijing, of course, has its complaints too. China had raised objections to the Indian military exercise Him-Vijay in Arunachal Pradesh, executed by the Indian Army’s 17 Corps. The Indian government is reported to have clarified that the ongoing exercise is part of the routine familiarization and orientation exercises and has nothing to with Xi’s visit to India.

This is not the first time that China has objected to military exercises or movements in Arunachal Pradesh. China has continued to maintain that Arunachal Pradesh is “southern Tibet” but India has always countered such statements by saying that Arunachal Pradesh is an integral part of India. Moreover, India had also participated in an elevated foreign minister-level meeting of the Quad countries in the sidelines of the UN General Assembly annual meeting, despite China’s objections to all such Quad meetings.

Clearly, Modi and Xi have a lot to discuss. But with new issues piling up, it is unclear if such ‘informal’ summits can do much to improve ties. Personal reassurances are unlikely to overcome growing real disagreements between the two sides, especially considering that the two sides do not seem to care very much to even hide their disagreements anymore.

Friday, October 4, 2019

The Trouble with India’s Slow Naval Buildup - The Diplomat, 4 October 2019

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I examine the trouble with India's naval modernisation. I argue that though India is trying hard to enhance its naval capabilities, it continues to be slow work.

India has been trying hard to enhance its naval capabilities over the past few years, both in recognition of its own needs as well as an understanding of evolving trends in the strategic environment. But despite New Delhi’s best efforts, doing so continues to be slow work.


A case in point is India’s submarine program, which was in the spotlight again recently when the second of the Indian Navy’s six Scorpene submarines, INS Khanderi, was inducted into service on September 28. The first Scorpene submarine, called INS Kalvari, was commissioned in 2017. The third submarine, INS Karanj, launched in January 2018, is undertaking sea trials now. INS Khanderi was manufactured by Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders Limited at a cost of 187.98 billion rupees (about $2.6 billion) under an India-France bilateral agreement in 2005 to build six Scorpene class submarines in India. Not including the Scorpenes, India currently has two other older types of diesel-electric submarine types, the Sindhughosh (Kilo) class and the Shishumar (HDW 209/1500) class diesel-electric submarines, and the nuclear-powered Arihant class (as well as the leased Chakra class nuclear submarine).

But the induction of the new submarine belies the fact that the size of India’s submarine inventory has been declining for years. The Scorpene acquisition has undergone significant delays – more than six years – even though it remains an important addition to the Indian naval capability. Even though there have been triumphant comments from many senior Indian officials on the significance of this induction, it is far from sufficient given the growing naval and maritime challenges in the Indo-Pacific.

For the full essay, click here.



Commissioning the submarine into service, the Indian Defense minister Rajnath Singh talked of the importance of the submarine and Indo-French defense cooperation, though he framed the acquisition primarily as a message to Pakistan. But the Scorpene submarines still do not have a modern torpedo, making do with the older SUT torpedoes. India cancelled a deal for the heavy-weight Black Shark torpedoes, built by the Finmecannica subsidiary WASS, as a result of an unrelated corruption scandal that involved another subsidiary of Finmecannica, Augusta-Westland. In a makeshift arrangement, the Indian government approached the German defense company, Atlas Elektronik to upgrade 64 torpedoes, which were procured in the 1980s and 1990s for the Indian Navy’s four Shishumar-class submarines. The already-insufficient number of torpedoes in the Indian Navy’s arsenal is to be now also shared with the Scorpene submarines.

An additional issue comes from the slow development of the air independent propulsion (AIP) system. AIP allows submarines to stay under water for longer periods of time without being detected. However, the development of the indigenous AIP system by Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) has been delayed, which should not come as much of a surprise given the history of DRDO’s tendency to over-promise and under-deliver. The last two of the Scorpene submarines were to be equipped with the indigenously developed AIP systems but because of the delay by the DRDO, the plan is now to have them in the next six submarines that will be developed under Project 75-I.

But Project 75I has also been very slow. Under Project 75I, India plans to build six additional advanced conventional submarines in collaboration with a foreign manufacturer. But this has also run into difficulties. The Swedish defense firm SAAB, which was seen as one of the top foreign contenders, pulled out its bid because of onerous conditions the India has imposed regarding indigenous partnerships and instead South Korea’s Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering has entered the fray.

The South Korean decision possibly flows out of the visit of the Indian Defense minister Rajnath Singh to South Korea in September where defense industry cooperation was a major highlight. South Korea joins four other contenders: Naval Group (France), Navantia (Spain), Rosoboronexport (Russia) and TKMS (Germany) who are all bidding for the 450 billion rupee (about $6.32 billion) contract. During the recent visit of Prime Minister Modi to Russia, the Russian President Vladimir Putin agreed to undertake a “joint design and development of conventional submarines through an Inter-Governmental Agreement (IGA).” But it has been more than a decade since Project 75I started, and it will be years more before these submarines enter Indian Navy service.

The long, hard work of building up India’s naval capabilities is not just limited to its submarine program. On the same day as the INS Khanderi induction, there were two other developments that are critical to the Indian Navy: the launching of the first of the P-17A frigates, ‘Nilgiri’ and inauguration of a dry dock, located within the Naval Dockyard in Mumbai. According to Rakesh Anand, head of Mazagon Dock Limited, the new frigates come with “new design concepts for improved survivability, sea keeping, stealth and ship manoeuvrability.” The new dry dock will be the Indian Navy’s biggest one, capable of holding India’s aircraft carrier, INS Vikramaditya. It is state of the art, made of 1.5 meter-thick reinforced concrete and almost 300 meters into the sea. But it has taken more than a decade to complete the dock.

The slow nature of India’s naval buildup is the product of broader trends that are well-known. Much of the Indian budget is focused on the Army, with the air force being a distant second and the navy a poor third. And with naval capability building proving time-consuming and capital-intensive, that leaves New Delhi stuck with a continued slow pace of development of its naval capabilities relative to other actors, even as competitors such as China forge ahead more quickly.

The solutions are also well-known. Some of them involve process: for instance, India needs to change its decision-making processes and its complicated acquisitions process to halt the slide in its relative capabilities. Others relate to outlook, with India needing to focus on the right threats to its national security rather than leaving itself looking broad but being overextended as a result. Whether or not these solutions will be adopted or not remains to be seen. Until then, developing India’s naval capabilities will likely continue to prove to be slow work irrespective of the incremental gains that are seen in the headlines.

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