India-Russia Relations Face More Trouble - The Diplomat, 31 December 2020

In my last essay for the year, I wrote a short essay on India-Russia relations for The Diplomat.  The immediate context of course was the cancelled annual bilateral summit, a first in two decades. Was Covid-19 the reason or did the China factor influence the decision?  

India and Russia have gone through several ups and downs in their decades-old bilateral relationship. The two appear at present to be going through a tricky phase. The two-decade old India-Russia annual summit was cancelled for the first time. A news report in India suggested that the postponement was the result of “severe reservations on New Delhi joining the Indo-Pacific initiative and Quad.” India’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) spokesperson responded by saying, “The India-Russia Annual Summit did not take place in 2020 because of the COVID pandemic. This was a mutually agreed decision between the two Governments. Any imputation otherwise is false and misleading. Spreading false stories on important relationships is particularly irresponsible.” The Russian side also responded with a statement saying that it is in “close touch” with its counterparts in India to finalize new dates for the summit, “postponed due to epidemiological reasons.” 

But such denials are unlikely to entirely remove speculation about the state of bilateral relations, especially considering that India has taken part in a large number of bilateral and multilateral talks virtually, even if the pandemic has prevented physical meetings.  

For the full essay, click here.  

Moreover, overall speculation about difficulties in the relationship is not exactly new.  There has been a lot of it, especially because of comments from senior Russian officials, such as Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, on India’s Quad and Indo-Pacific policy. Russian officials have repeatedly criticized the idea of the Indo-Pacific and the Quad, arguing that it is meant to contain China. Lavrov publicly stated so at the annual Raisina Dialogue in New Delhi in January 2020. More recently, Lavrov returned to the theme, saying at the general meeting of the Russian International Affairs Council in Moscow on December 8 that “India is currently an object of the Western countries’ persistent, aggressive and devious policy as they are trying to engage it in anti-China games by promoting Indo-Pacific strategies, the so-called ‘Quad’ while at the same time the West is attempting to undermine our close partnership and privileged relations with India.”

Indian officials and public commentators are increasingly miffed at this lack of sensitivity to Indian concerns about China, especially coming after China’s intrusion in Ladakh this year, which led to a bloody clash and Indian casualties. Even the normally cautious Indian foreign ministry was forced to respond, with the MEA spokesperson stating that India has always had an independent foreign policy based on its own national interests, that India’s Indo-Pacific approach was not directed at any particular country, and that India stands for a free, open and inclusive Indo-Pacific. He also added, for good measure, that “India’s relationship with each country is independent of its relations with third countries. We hope that this is well understood and appreciated by all our partners.” 

All of this is coming at a time when the India-China relationship is in one of its worst phases. India’s External Affairs Minister Dr. S Jaishankar while speaking at an Australian think tank, the Lowy Institute, commented that India and China are “at the most difficult phase of our relationship” in the last three or four decades and that the relations between the two were “very significantly damaged” over the past year.  

These damages are unlikely to be undone easily. It took several decades to rebuild relations after the 1962 Sino-Indian border war, but the progress made since 1988 has been entirely lost with the current Galwan clash, provoked by China in an effort to unilaterally change the status quo on the border.   

Russian comments have led to some criticism in India of Moscow’s position and are increasingly eroding public support that the relationship always had. But there are contrarian voices too. In fact, Rahul Gandhi, leader of India’s main opposition party, the Indian National Congress, criticized the government’s decision to cancel the annual summit with Russia in a tweet saying, “Russia is a very important friend of India. Damaging our traditional relationships is short-sighted and dangerous for our future.” It should be noted, of course, that it was the Congress-led UPA government that joined the Quad the first time, back in 2007. It was the same UPA government that has also strengthened the strategic partnership with the United States, including by signing the U.S.-India civil nuclear deal.  

While Russia’s dependence on China is understandable considering its worsening relations with the West, Moscow cannot expect India to ignore its national security concerns regarding China. And as I have written previously, a China-India crisis invariably puts Russia in a tight spot, with difficult choices between India, a traditional partner and also a lucrative defense market, and its newfound but mighty partner, China. For India, it will be increasingly difficult to see China as a partner. Finding common ground and partnering with a neighbor that has aggressively pursued a salami slicing strategy at India’s expense will be difficult. In order to build appropriate diplomatic and defense response against its aggressive eastern neighbor, India will need to partner with like-minded states that have also borne the brunt of Chinese aggressive behavior.  Moscow will either have to understand this reality or risk further hurting its ties with India.  

How China Strengthens the Quad - The Diplomat, 4 September 2020

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I wrote on the future of the Quad, looking at the challenges to the group because of Abe's sudden resigning and a possible political change in the US following the November elections. Despite some minor headwinds, I argue that Chinese belligerence further strengthens the motivation for Australia, India, Japan, and the United States to keep the Quad together.

The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue or the Quad has regained strength in the face of an aggressive China. The foreign ministers of the four countries – Australia, India, Japan, and the United States – are scheduled to meet in Delhi for a face-to-face meeting in late September. That New Delhi is playing host to the Quad ministerial meeting amid the COVOD-19 pandemic is particularly noteworthy. The countries are reacting to increased bullying by China. The grouping has gained greater traction since early 2020 because of Beijing’s role in the COVID-19 pandemic and the manner in which it has attempted to hijack multilateral institutions, such as the World Health Organization (WHO) and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). The four countries are also concerned about global supply chain problems, recognizing the vulnerability of their dependence on China. The upcoming in-person foreign ministers meeting appears, at the least, aimed at sending a strong message to China about the resoluteness of the Quad.

For the full essay, click here.

That said, the Quad does face some minor headwinds, which are likely to be easily overcome, due to political changes in both Japan and the United States.

Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo’s sudden resignation was a blow to the Quad because Abe was one of the major proponents of this minilateral initiative, even if his departure does not shift Japan’s policy. Under Abe’s leadership, Japan had become a driving force for the Quad. His strategic vision and determined leadership in the face of China’s belligerent behavior will be missed by Japan’s Quad partners. Although Abe was not successful in changing Japan’s pacifist constitution, he has been instrumental in bringing important changes to Tokyo’s approach to regional and global security.

For New Delhi, Abe was a reliable pillar of support. Takenori Horimoto says that the big push for Japan to build closer relations with India happened in 2004-05 because of anti-Japan protests taking place in China, leading Tokyo to reduce the risks to its investments by moving to other countries. Thus, although India-Japan ties had been gaining momentum even before Abe came into office, the Abe-Modi dynamic helped a great deal. It led to strengthened military and security ties, including military exercises across all the branches of the military, and a civil nuclear agreement. With Abe leaving office, it remains to be seen how bilateral India-Japan relations as well as Japan’s broader strategic engagement in the Indo-Pacific will play out with a new leader in office.

Second, the coming presidential elections in the United States in November also raises some concerns about a possible change in leadership. While Joe Biden and the Democrats are not against the Quad or the free and open Indo-Pacific strategy, a change in the political powers that be could introduce short-term policy turbulence. It will take a few months for a new administration to settle into office before addressing some of the political and strategic issues in the Indo-Pacific region. That said, China’s aggressive behavior will invariably draw any administration’s attention. A Biden administration may differ from the Trump administration more in terms of style and rhetoric than actual policy when it comes to China. Indeed, the two parties are competing over who is harsher on China.

Set against these small challenges is China’s behavior, which serves to promote the Quad. India and Australia, the other two Quad parties, have recently faces even greater aggression from Beijing.

Since early May, China has crossed into Indian territory and engaged in violent clashes, including the one at Galwan in June that resulting in the deaths of 20 Indians and an unknown number of Chinese troops. Since then, there have been several military and diplomatic discussions between India and China, but with no progress. Over the past few days, there has been further activity, with India reportedly occupying areas south of the south bank of Pangong Tso (Lake); the military talks that followed, as usual, have been inconclusive. China claimed that India violated the consensus and crossed the Line of Actual Control (LAC). In India, both the foreign ministry and army put out statements blaming China. The expectation appears to be that the border confrontation will escalate further. India, for good measure, has also banned another 118 Chinese apps.

Similarly, Australia has been under strident Chinese attack almost from the beginning of 2020. China has been using coercive trade practices to target Australia for asking for an independent investigation into the origin of the novel coronavirus. In the latest move, China targeted Australian barley in response to Prime Minister Scott Morrison’s announcement of a new Australian legislation that would “tear up” the Belt and Road Initiative agreements with the state of Victoria that run into billions of dollars. A few days earlier, China targeted Australian beef exports. Prior to this, it was the Australian wine that was banned by China. But Jeffrey Wilson of the Perth USAsia Centre says it is not that the Chinese government cares about wine, beef, or barley, but “the real game is to create societal splits that pressure the Government to change foreign policy toward China.”

China’s crude attempts to put pressure on other countries have met with increasingly stiff resistance, of which the Quad is a clear manifestation. In India, there have even been suggestions for the Quad to assume a military role. Thus, whatever minor headwinds the Quad faces are likely to be easily overcome by the rapidly changing attitudes in the region because of China’s unrelenting pressure on others.

Business Now Asia Pacific (BNAP) Today Interview on India-China relations post-Galwan and other developments including Quad- July 15, 2020

On July 15, I did an interview with Australia-based Business Now Asia Pacific (BNAP) Today on the India-China Galwan clash, where I argued that the Galwan clash is pushing a major shift in India’s security and foreign policies and how the changing Sino-Indian relationship is influencing India’s relations with QUAD and QUAD Plus countries.

For the full interview, click here.



Some of the major points I made include:

1. Difficult to imagine that it will be business as usual after Galwan.

2. India has shown growing commitment to groupings such as the Quad, which has now been upgraded to ministerial level engagements; Quad Plus in the Covid context; Australia could be invited to the Malabar naval exercises.

3. India is yet to make a decision on the 5G but in all likelihood, Huawei will be blocked. Even prior to the Galwan clash, India had its apprehensions but after the last month clash, signing up with China is extremely unlikely.

4. India’s pharma industry will be affected for instance because we still buy a lot of the chemicals from China. Like I said, India will need to bite the bullet and go through some hard times because the economic impact will be significant.

5. Here is the need for the Indo-Pacific powers to come together to take decisions to consciously diversify their over-dependence on China and engage with each other even in the face of some difficulties.

US-India Ties Amid the Eastern Ladakh Crisis and the Pandemic - The Diplomat's Asia Geopolitics Podcast, 29 July 2020

Earlier this week, I had a chat with Ankit Panda, Editor-at-Large at The Diplomat on US-India ties amid the Eastern Ladakh crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic, for the Diplomat's Asia Geopolitics podcast. In the podcast, we looked at how the US-India ties have evolved in the middle of the Sino-Indian border crisis in Ladakh crisis and the pandemic.

You can listen to The Diplomat’s Asia Geopolitics podcast on iTunes here; if you use Windows or Android, you can subscribe on Google Play here, or on Spotify here.

This podcast is a take-off from my latest column for The Diplomat's Asia Defense Blog, where I focused on the open and public support for India in its border conflcit with China. Unlike during the Doklam confrontation, this time around, there has been much larger visible and open US support for India. It is possible that this has the tacit approval of New Delhi, which would be one more indicator that the two sides are getting much more comfortable in their partnership.



I have a weekly column with the Asia Defense Blog of The Diplomat where I focus on a range of Asian strategic issues, including major power politics, nuclear security, outer space and global governance aspects. You can check out my articles here.

This Time the US Is Taking India’s Side Against China - The Diplomat, 23 July 2020

In my column for The Diplomat last week, I looked the US positioning on the India-China border conflict, where I argue that this time around, the US is taking India’s side against China. Unlike in 2017, U.S. support for India at a time of confrontation with China is much more pronounced this time around.

As India and China confront each other across the Himalayas, it also clearly appears to have driven India and the United States closer. The two have conducted joint military exercises and seem to have been in regular contact, including regarding the Sino-Indian confrontation. What is more surprising is a series of high-profile statements from senior U.S. officials and lawmakers supporting India. In contrast to the present tensions, during the 2017 Doklam confrontation, there were no standalone statements, although U.S. government spokespeople and unnamed officials did comment on it in a manner that fit Indian objectives. It is also possible that India may not have wanted public expressions of U.S. support at the time, viewing them as potentially complicating its negotiations with China.

For the full essay, click here.



This time, the situation appears different. The consultations between the two sides are much more open, and the United States has publicly and repeatedly supported India. Even prior to the Galwan clash that resulted in the deaths of 20 Indian Army personnel, senior Indian and U.S. officials appear to have been in contact. In one of the first conversations amid the border stand-off, Indian Defense Minister Rajnath Singh and U.S. Secretary of Defense Mark T. Esper spoke on the phone on May 29. The two sides discussed the state of bilateral defense ties and agreed to keep up with their efforts “for a strong and enduring U.S.-India defense partnership.” The readouts of the call did not mention China specifically but the statements issued by the U.S. Department of Defense and the Indian Ministry of Defense said that the two discussed regional security issues, which suggest they talked about the border stand-off. In mid-July as well, Singh and Esper held a telephone conversation where they talked about bilateral defense cooperation and issues of mutual interest, which would likely have included China and the continuing border stand-off.

A few days later, on June 2, Prime Minister Narendra Modi and U.S. President Donald Trump had a telephone call. The readout of the call stated that the two leaders talked about the Sino-Indian border tensions as well as World Health Organization reforms (in May India became the new head of the WHO’s executive board). Trump also talked about the possibility of expanding the G-7 to include countries like Australia, India, South Korea, and maybe Russia, too. It is noteworthy that China is not part of the G-7 grouping or the expansion Trump floated.

An even more stark indicator of the growth in ties is the flurry of statements from U.S. officials in support of India, unlike during the Doklam standoff. Just this week, while speaking at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London, Esper criticized China for engaging in “systematic rule-breaking, coercion and other malign activities.” To a question on the Sino-Indian border situation, he said that the U.S. is “monitoring it very closely and what’s happening along the Line of Actual Control (LAC).” Esper later retweeted a media story reporting his remarks that the U.S. was following the situation “very closely,” adding the comment, “Very closely indeed.”

This followed a steady stream of comments from senior U.S. officials condemning the Chinese aggression while extending support to India. In one of the first statements, days after the June 15 clash, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo tweeted, “We extend our deepest condolences to the people of India for the lives lost as a result of the recent confrontation with China. We will remember the soldiers’ families, loved ones, and communities as they grieve.”

Barely a week after that, Pompeo was speaking to the German Marshall Fund’s Brussels Forum where he once again reiterated criticism of China’s habit of breaking international commitments and bullying its neighbors – India, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines. With these threats from the Chinese Communist Party, he said, “We’re going to make sure we’re postured appropriately to counter the PLA. We think that’s the challenge of our time, and we’re going to make sure we have resources in place to do that.”

Just a week ago, Pompeo said, “India has been a great partner. They are an important partner of ours. I have a great relationship with my foreign minister counterpart. We talk frequently about a broad range of issues. We talked about the conflict they had along their border with China.”

In the context of the Indian decision to ban 59 Chinese apps, Pompeo said, “We’ve talked about the risk that emanates from China, Chinese telecommunications infrastructure there, you’ve seen the decision they made to ban some several dozen Chinese software firms from operating inside of the country on phones of people operating inside of India.”

He emphasized that the “whole world is coalescing around the challenge that we face,” saying that “Democracies, free nations of the world, will push back on these challenges together. I’m very confident of that.”

This week while doing a joint press briefing along with the British foreign secretary, Pompeo once again slammed China, saying, “You can’t go make claims for maritime regions that you have no lawful claim to. You can’t threaten countries and bully them in the Himalayas. You can’t engage in cover-ups and co-opt international institutions like the World Health Organization.”

Lower level officials have taken up the refrain. In mid-July while speaking at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), David Stilwel, assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, compared Chinese behavior in the Himalayas with similar actions elsewhere: “When Beijing uses coercion, empty promises, disinformation, contempt for rules, bad-faith diplomacy, and other underhanded tactics in the South China Sea, it is drawing on a playbook that it uses worldwide. We see it in the East China Sea and around Taiwan, where Beijing has expanded its maritime provocations and threatening sorties. We see it in the Himalayas, where Beijing recently took aggressive action on its frontiers with India.” Even earlier, in May, outgoing U.S. Secretary for South and Central Asia Alice Wells, referring to the Sino-Indian border stand-off, said that it is a “reminder of the threat by China.”

Senior lawmakers have also come out strongly in support of India. On the floor of the Senate, Majority Leader Mitch McConnell said, “for the sake of grabbing territory, the [People’s Liberation Army] appears to have instigated the most violent clash between China and India since those nations went to war in 1962.” Senator Marco Rubio, a Florida Republican, also tweeted that he had spoken to Indian Ambassador in the U.S. Taranjit Singh Sandhu “to express our solidarity with the people of #India as they firmly confront unwarranted & lawless armed aggression by the Communist Party of #China. India has made it clear, they will not be bullied by Beijing.” Around the same time, Senator Tom Cotton, a Republican from Arkansas, characterized the Chinese action as an invasion of India, “an ally of ours.”

In the other chamber of the U.S. Congress, Representative Lance Gooden of Texas tweeted that, “As more news comes out about the deadly conflict between China and India, once again CHINA appears to be an aggressive bad actor. The #CCP cannot be taken at their word, EVER.”

Reflecting bipartisan support for India, Democratic lawmakers have also come out slamming China and supporting India. Even prior to the Galwan clash, the House Foreign Affairs Committee chairman, Democrat Eliot Engel, called out Chinese aggression, saying, “I am extremely concerned by the ongoing Chinese aggression along the Line of Actual Control on the India-China border. China is demonstrating once again that it is willing to bully its neighbors rather than resolve conflicts according to international law.”

After the clash, others Democrats including Ami Bera, chair of the House Foreign Affairs subcommittee on Asia, tweeted concern about “continued Chinese aggression along its border with India.” The Indian decision to ban the Chinese apps also received support from some U.S. lawmakers such as Republican Representative Jim Banks of Indiana.

Clearly, this time around, there has been much larger visible and open U.S. support for India compared to the Doklam confrontation. It is possible that this has the tacit approval of New Delhi, which would be one more indicator that the two sides are getting much more comfortable in their partnership.

Is India Ready to Play the ‘Tibet Card’ in Its Battle With China? - The Diplomat, 16 July 2020

I am a bit behind in updating my blog but here is the column I did for The Diplomat a couple of weeks ago, looking at the 'Tibet Card' in India's battle with China. While the talk of a “Tibet card” in India’s hands is not new, the key question is if New Delhi is likely to play it?

In the month since 20 Indian Army personnel were killed as a result of the clash at Galwan on the Sino-Indian border, public anger at China is palpable. There have been growing calls for a strong response from the Indian government, including a strengthened partnership with Taiwan. There have also been similar calls for enhanced support for Tibet and the Dalai Lama.

For the full essay, click here.



About 10 days after the Galwan clash, Pema Khandu, chief minister of Arunachal Pradesh, referred to the Line of Actual Control dividing India and China as the India-Tibet border. Several points are noteworthy here: He was speaking at an Indian Army meeting at the Bumla border post; he is from the BJP, the party that also holds power in New Delhi; and his state is entirely claimed by China, which calls it “southern Tibet.”

Coming against the backdrop of the Galwan clash, this could appear to be an attempt at rekindling the Tibet issue, which India has done every now and then when there is a conflict with China. This was of course music to the ears of Tibet activists, who have been seeking active Indian support for a long time. Tenzin Tsundue, a Tibetan writer and activist, during a recent media interview, echoed Khandu and said that the border must be called “the Tibet border and not the China border.” Not surprisingly, Chinese media has commented on such Indian views and opposed them.

There is ongoing debate about how India should respond to the Tibet question in the light of China’s increased pressure. Some Indian public commentators support playing the Tibet card while others are somewhat cautious. Well before the current conflict, in 2018, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), the Hindu nationalist organization out of which the BJP emerged, had argued for a reappraisal of India’s Tibet policy. Prominent BJP ideologues have supported reopening the Tibet issue, even supporting the right of Tibetans to live “as a free nation.”

Such voices have become louder. A retired senior Army officer wrote about the strategic importance of Tibet, and argued that time has come “to challenge the very legitimacy of the Chinese claim over Tibet.” In another opinion piece in Business World, Krishan Varma, a former head of India’s foreign secret service, made a case for a fresh assessment of India’s Tibet policy. He argued that a new Indian policy approach on Tibet “has the real potential of causing major turbulence in China’s underbelly.” He added that India might do well to “align its policy on the issue with the U.S. and support the ‘Tibet Policy and Support Act (2019)’ that has been passed by the U.S. Congress and is pending U.S. Senate approval before being promulgated into law through due process.”

Similarly, an editorial in Hindustan Times, a national newspaper, called for a rethink of India’s Tibet policy. Stating that India has had an inconsistent approach to Tibet, it said, “Delhi now needs to shed its hesitation, not just because Tibet is a ‘card’, but is intertwined with the values of freedom and peace central to the vision to resist China.” The editorial added that although India has continued to respect to China’s core interests, Beijing has not reciprocated. The editorial argued for honoring the Dalai Lama with the Bharat Ratna, India’s highest civilian honor, and for India to take up the rights of Tibetans in international platforms and build deeper links with the younger generation of Tibetan activists who are the face of the new resistance. Finally, it also recommended that India make a statement on the Dalai Lama’s successor indicating that India will respect the Dalai Lama’s wishes on the succession issue. Others have argued that China’s paranoia about the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan presence in India ensures that India continues to have a Tibet card to play at all.

The idea of the “Tibet card” is not new, of course. And various Indian commentators have previously warned against such a strategy. For example, Suhasini Haidar, a prominent foreign policy correspondent, had argued in 2018 that the idea of the Tibet card is “out of step” with shifting ground realities in Tibet and cautioned the Indian establishment against using “the Tibetan population in India as a strategic tool,” a point others have also made.

Similarly, Sudha Ramachandran, writing also in 2018, asserted that India never did have a Tibet card, considering that India and the even the Tibetans have accepted the One China formulation and India’s efforts to keep the Tibet card has only angered China, “without yielding tangible dividends.” Echoing Ramachandran’s sentiments, P. Stobdan, a China analyst who had previously argued that the idea of a Tibet card is a folly, declares in a recent book that China’s slow invasion tactic has been successful in dealing with India whereas New Delhi, even after 60 years, has made no significant gains in its China policy. Instead, he argues that India is now “worryingly and helplessly entangled in a Tibetan quagmire with serious implications for the stability of its frontier region.” What is noteworthy is that arguments against using the so-called Tibet card have been rare during the current crisis.

Part of the problem is the inconsistency in the Indian approach to Tibet under the Modi government. In December 2016, the Dalai Lama was invited to the Rashtrapati Bahavan, India’s presidential palace in New Delhi, for an event in honor of Nobel Peace prize winners, which raised objections from China. In March 2017, the Dalai Lama was also allowed to travel to Tawang, which was again questioned by China. In July that year, in the middle of the Doklam conflict, Lobsang Sangay of the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA), the Tibetan government-in-exile, was allowed to unfurl the Tibetan flag at Pangong Tso in Ladakh, one of the points of the current stand-off. But since the 2017 Doklam confrontation, New Delhi has attempted to play down the Tibetan presence in India, even preventing government officials from attending the 60th anniversary of the Dalai Lama’s exile.

Ultimately, it is unlikely that the Modi government will really play any “Tibet card,” despite the frequency and prominence of those arguing for it in the Indian debate. Even these opinions are more likely a reflection of the general anger toward China, rather than carefully thought out policy proposals.

Calls for India to Play the Taiwan Card Grow Louder - The Diplomat, 9 July 2020

In my column for The Diplomat last week, I looked at the growing calls for strengthening India's relations with Taiwan. I argued that as tensions simmer between New Delhi and Beijing, some have called for India to focus on developing stronger relations with Taiwan.

Amid the continuing border standoff, there is increasing public antagonism toward China in India. This matches growing anger among Indian elites toward China and India’s current China policy, which I wrote about last week. This is leading to more public discussion about possible asymmetric diplomatic strategies to challenge China, such as altering India’s “one China policy” to enhance India’s relations with Taiwan.

For the full essay, click here.



For example, a prominent Indian national newspaper, Indian Express, editorialized in May that India should be pragmatic in considering the question of Taiwan’s observer status in the World Health Assembly: the decision “should not be made either out of peevishness or fear.” The editorial argued that New Delhi should judge the issue on “apolitical appreciation of the specific technical issues involved.” Thus, though the paper did not call for changing India’s general policy on China and Taiwan, it was a reflection of the growing debate about the general unhappiness with India’s ultra-cautious policy when it comes to China.

Other opinions have been much more insistent. The Times of India, editorializing on the same issue, asked the government to “not shy away from supporting Taiwan.” The editorial went one step further than the Indian Express by saying that this should remain an important aspect of the reform of the World Health Organization (WHO). It also argued that India should stop being “overly deferential to Beijing” when China has routinely worked against Indian interests in the UN and other multilateral organizations. The Times of India concluded that “if Delhi is to get itself taken seriously, it must demonstrate that it can stand up and be counted.”

It should be noted that this is not the first time that the Times of India has taken such a stand on Taiwan. In 2019, in the wake of Chinese threats to Taiwan, the paper put out an editorial arguing that India should step up its cooperation with Taiwan. It also made reference to a 2018 Indian Parliamentary Standing Committee report on India-China relations, which called for stronger partnership between India and Taiwan, adding that it was strange that India has shied away from cooperating with Taiwan, whereas Taipei and Beijing had active trade and investment ties despite their political disagreements.

Such views are finding greater traction. Sana Hashmi, formerly a consultant with India’s Ministry of External Affairs and currently a Taiwan Fellow at the Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University in Taipei, argued for a stronger role for Taiwan in India’s Indo-Pacific strategic construct. She suggested that the recent Sino-Indian border clash in Galwan was an apt moment for India to start engaging with Taiwan more seriously. She cautioned, however, that India-Taiwan ties should not be approached just through the China angle, but that Beijing’s recent behavior has provided an opening for developing greater traction in relations between New Delhi and Taipei.

Echoing similar sentiments, Namrata Hasija, a research associate at the Delhi-based Centre for China Analysis and Strategy, asserts that India must stop seeing Taiwan through the China lens that gets activated every time there is tension in Sino-Indian ties. Instead, she argues that it is time for India to develop independent ties with Taiwan across economic and strategic sectors.

Highlighting that Taiwan was one of the first countries to send medical equipment to India, former diplomat G. Parthasarathy also made the case for India to strengthen its relations with Taiwan. He added that Taiwan offers opportunities for cooperation in several key sectors, especially in India’s semiconductor industry, which could also possibly reduce India’s reliance on China in the electronics and communication industries. He added that this also fits well with the general objective of other Indian strategic partners such as the United States, Japan, and South Korea in diversifying global supply chains.

This, of course, is music to the ears of Taiwanese electronic industry giants such as Foxconn, which have wanted a stronger presence in India. Amid the border standoff, Foxconn’s Chairman Liu Young-Way, while speaking at its annual general meeting, portrayed India as a “bright spot” for the company’s growth and expansion. He said that the Foxconn is “fully pushing ahead with next steps there, and maybe in a few months’ time we can reveal on our website the next steps and report back to everyone. We’ll have further investment there.” Currently, Foxconn has most of its factories in China and possible entry into India will form part of the recent plans of many industries to shift their base out of China. Others are less sanguine and worry about the consequence of Sino-Indian tensions on their businesses.

Understandably, Taiwanese opinion supports closer ties with India. For example, Taipei Times called on Taiwan to “deepen ties with India, in particular economic, military and intelligence ties, to contain Chinese expansionism and put Xi back into his box.” This also fits well with President Tsai Ing-wen’s New Southbound policy which has a particular focus on India.

It is unlikely that the extremely cautious Modi government will accept such suggestions. But the calls for greater engagement with Taiwan are a clear sign of popular and elite Indian anger and frustration in dealing with China.

Darkening Mood in Delhi Over China - The Diplomat, 3 July 2020

In my column for The Diplomat last week, I look at the changing moods and perceptions on China in Delhi. I note that opinions in New Delhi are hardening, even among sections of elite opinion-makers who are not seen as hyper-nationalists.

The Sino-Indian border confrontation may fundamentally alter Sino-Indian relations, if the darkening mood in New Delhi is any indication. Diplomatic and military negotiations have been ongoing since the June 15 clash at the Galwan River, but they do not appear to be yielding much progress. Not only has there been no troop disengagement on the border, both India and China appear to be sending more troops to the border.

For the full essay, click here.



China is also reported to be building up forces opposite the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, hundreds of kilometers to the east of the current confrontation. Adding to an already complex situation, Pakistan is sending almost 20,000 troops to territories it controls on India’s western flank opposite Ladakh, confronting India with a possible two-front problem. Pakistani radars are also reported to be active. Citing military sources, reports say that the Skardu air base in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) has been active as well. China is reportedly in talks with cadres of terrorist groups such as Al Badr to possibly stir-up violence in Jammu and Kashmir. The Indian Air Force and the Navy are also reportedly on high alert.

The so-called areas of “friction” under discussions include the north bank of Pangong Tso, Galwan Valley and the Gogra Post-Hot Springs pockets. Meanwhile, there has also been the meeting of the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination (WMCC) on June 24 and according to news reports, this will be done on a more regular basis. At the 15th meeting held on June 24, it was reportedly decided that the WMCC will be active in finding terms of disengagement, non-violation of the current but differing perceptions of the LAC, and adherence of the existing border mechanisms such as the 1993 and 1996 agreements.

Reports quoting Indian Army sources say that the “Army is preparing for the long haul and the standoff is expected to continue well into the winter.” Commenting on the last meeting of the military officials on June 30, the Indian Army Public Affairs Directorate is reported to have said that both sides “have emphasised the need for an expeditious, phased and step wise de-escalation as a priority.” With the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) and the Ministry of Defense (MoD) making no formal statements, “army sources” paint a rather a gloomy picture of the meeting.

The crisis has impacted the broader Sino-Indian relationship. Several Indian infrastructure projects in which China won the contract have been revoked or cancelled. Examples include the Shanghai Tunnel Engineering Company of China which received a contract to build the underground portion of the rapid rail project between New Delhi and Meerut, a city about 60 kilometers away. Similarly, the Bihar government cancelled a deal for the construction of a new mega bridge because two out of the four contractors had Chinese partners, China Harbour Engineering Company and Shaanxi Road Bridge Group Company (JV), even though they had earlier been cleared by the Central Cabinet Committee on Economic Affairs. There are also calls by the Maharashtra government to boycott Chinese investment. For instance, memorandum of understanding (MoU) worth 50.2 billion Indian rupees (INR) ($670 million) signed with three Chinese firms, Hengli Group (2.5 billion INR), Great Wall Motors (37.7 billion INR), and PMI Electro Mobility Solutions, a joint venture with Foton (10 billion INR) is already on hold.

Opinions in New Delhi are hardening, even among sections of elite opinion-makers who are not seen as hyper-nationalists. Ajai Shukla, a prominent defense analysts usually critical of the Modi government, tweeted that “India’s military has to fight this out, or New Delhi becomes vassal to Beijing and the Middle Kingdom.” Another moderate voice, Lt. Gen. H.S. Panag argues that with diplomacy reaching a dead end, “it is logical that India may have to exercise the military option to restore status quo ante April 2020.”

Similarly, Shivshankar Menon, National Security Adviser under the previous Congress party-led government of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, noted that China’s behavior today is different, something that has not been seen in a very long time. As he put it, this crisis “is serious . . . And it is even more serious because it is a part of a broader Chinese behaviour, not just vis a vis us, but with other people as well.” India’s deterrence appears not to be working, he suggests. The question then becomes “how do you then deal with it politically because this is more than just a military problem, this is diplomatic, political, it’s a much broader challenge.”

Gautam Bambawale, former Indian Ambassador to China, also argues that the current PLA offensive is different because China has come in large numbers up to areas of their perceived Line of Actual Control (LAC). He charges that China’s PLA has violated “all the principles, norms, standard procedures which have evolved over the past 25 years to maintain peace and tranquility in the border areas. They have displayed how little store it sets by agreements signed by its own government.” In an earlier interview, he said that “For minor tactical gains on the ground, China has strategically lost India.” More pertinently, he makes a clear call for “India as a country, as a people, including, of course, the government in the lead” to do “a fundamental reassessment of its China policy, make changes in it, and then implement it at the earliest.”

What is important is that these are voices that had usually supported stronger, mutually beneficial even if clear-eyed, relations with China. Whether these opinions will necessarily lead to changes in India’s long-term policy remains to be seen. C. Raja Mohan, one of India’s most important foreign policy commentators, has suggested that “the potential direction of the Sino-Indian relationship is likely to depend on how the current military confrontation in Ladakh is resolved.” But there is little doubt that, much like the Sino-Indian war of 1962, fundamental questions are being asked in New Delhi of India’s China relations.

The Sino-Indian Clash: Russia in the Middle - The Diplomat, 25 June 2020

Once again, I am lagging with my blog updates. A couple of weeks ago, I wrote a piece for The Diplomat on the Sino-Indian border clash and how Russia has positioned itself on the same. Clearly, the Sino-Indian clash puts Russia in an awkward position.

In the midst of a border crisis with China, Indian Defense Minister Rajnath Singh is away in Moscow. At the same time, India’s foreign minister joined his Russian and Chinese counterparts online for an Russia-India-China (RIC) meeting. The Sino-Indian crisis potentially puts Russia in a difficult position, having to choose between its traditional partners in India, which also represents a lucrative arms market, and its new but much more powerful friend in the east, China.

For the full essay, click here.



The ostensible reason for Singh’s visit to Russia was to attend the rescheduled Victory Day Parade. The annual parade commemorating the end of World War II was supposed to be held on May 9, but was postponed due to the pandemic. A 75-member tri-service Indian military contingent participated in the parade.

The Chinese defense minister was also in Moscow to attend the same parade. However, the Indian side made it clear that there would be no meeting between the two ministers. All negotiations between India and China on the border crisis are taking place bilaterally either through diplomatic channels or through local military commanders. The fact that the RIC meeting was an online affair also helps to ensure that Russia is not forced to mediate between the two sides.

Indian anger at China is palpable. In fact, Indian Foreign Minister Dr. S. Jaishankar in his speech at the RIC pointedly stated that “the challenge today is not just one of concepts and norms, but equally of their practice. The leading voices of the world must be exemplars in every way.”

India’s interests in Russia are obvious. A significant part of Indian military equipment comes from Russia. In the midst of the crisis with China, the Indian Air Force has asked for 33 new fighter aircraft including 21 MiG-29s and 12 Su-30 MKIs from Russia. This is an old acquisition plan, but it has been pushed for accelerated delivery. The deal is worth over 60 billion Indian rupees ($793 million) and is expected to be approved by the Ministry of Defense in the coming days. In addition, India had already ordered 272 Su-30 MKIs spread over a 10 to 15-year time frame.

Meanwhile, India has also asked Russia for the expedited delivery of the S-400 anti-missile system. The two sides signed a contract for the S-400s in 2019. The original delivery was scheduled for 2021. There were reports that because of COVID-19, the delivery would be delayed. Singh was expected to seek an expedited delivery of the system.

Singh was also seeking assurances that the spare parts supply for Russian equipment that India already has in its arsenal will not be delayed during any crisis with China. Specifically, he was referring to the issue of spare parts for Russian-origin fighter aircraft (including the Su-30MKIs and MiG-29s of the Air Force and the MiG29Ks of the Indian Navy), the T-90 battle tanks for the Army, and the Navy’s Kilo-class submarines.

The Sino-Indian clash puts Russia in an awkward position as a recent analysis in The Wall Street Journal by Yaroslav Trofimov and Thomas Grove pointed out. There is growing recognition in Moscow about pressure from Beijing. But as the report pointed out, Russia is also stuck with China because of pressure from the West. Russia’s difficulties in improving relations with Europe have left Moscow with few options.

In the current crisis, Russia appears to have little interest in mediating between China and India. As Konstantin Kosachev, a senior lawmaker and chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Russian Federation Council, told the Indian media that Russia should not interfere in the India-China dispute and that these should be dealt with through bilateral channels.

At the recent RIC meeting, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov also maintained that India and China do not need any help in resolving their bilateral issues. Although Russia might want to keep its head down in the current crisis, Russian reactions are also being closely watched by the Indian public. Russia has a reservoir of support in India because of its traditional support, including during the 1971 India-Pakistan War. This support glosses over the fact that Russia was neutral during the 1962 Sino-Indian War because it occurred simultaneously with the Cuban missile crisis. Russia’s relations with China had become increasingly rocky – in fact, closer Soviet relations with India were one factor in the Sino-Soviet rift – but the need for Beijing’s support during the Cuban missile crisis forced Moscow to be neutral. That removed an important leg of India’s diplomatic strategy at the time. Almost 60 years later, New Delhi is probably worried that history will repeat and Russia might lean toward China simply by staying neutral.

The Galwan Valley India-China Skirmish Is a Gamechanger for New Delhi - The Diplomat, 18 June 2020

In my column for The Diplomat last week, I looked at the continuing border crisis between India and China in Galwaan, in Ladakh in the western sector of the border. Given the significant violence and brutality of the clash in Galwan including the killing of 20 Indian army personnel, I argue that this time around, it is probably fair to say that no “Wuhan spirit” can salvage bilateral relations.

The killing of 20 Indian army men at the Galwan river confrontation on June 16 is a gamechanger in India’s national security and foreign policy strategy. For more than a month now, Indian and Chinese military forces have been engaged in a border stand-off in Ladakh on the western sector of the Sino-Indian border. For 45 years, India and China took pride in the fact that there had been no fatalities on the Line of Actual Control (LAC), and that there had been peace and tranquility to a reasonable extent, despite occasional flare ups. That changed with this violent clash in which the dead included the commanding officer of the battalion. This changes the dynamics in India-China relations for the worse. As Ashley Tellis commented perceptively: “Sino-Indian relations can never go back to the old normal. They will reset with greater competitiveness and in ways that neither country had actually intended at the beginning of this crisis.”

There will be pressure on the Indian government to not go back to business as usual after this. New Delhi may also not be able to afford to continue its ambivalent and uncommitted foreign policy approach, generally characterized as “hedging.” India’s attempts at straddling multiple camps is likely to come under pressure. India has shown growing commitment to groupings such as the Quad, which has now been upgraded to ministerial level engagements. At the same time though, Prime Minister Narendra Modi has also made efforts to engage again with the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM), attending a virtual summit in early May. This was the first time he attended a NAM summit, a group he has largely ignored for years. Although India has emphasized its role in the Russia-India-China (RIC) and the Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa (BRICS) groupings, there are likely to be questions raised about the utility of groups that are largely run according to Beijing’s wishes and which are unlikely to contribute much value to New Delhi.

For the full essay, click here.



On the clashes itself, there is still confusion about what happened over the last couple of days, except about the fatalities on the Indian side. There is an even a bigger question about the rationale behind China’s provocative actions. Both the Indian Army and the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) have issued statements. The MEA stated that subsequent to “a productive meeting on 6th June 2020” wherein a process for de-escalation was agreed upon by the two sides, there were additional meetings of ground commanders “to implement consensus to respect the Line of Actual Control in the Galwan Valley.” The MEA spokesperson also added that “our expectation [was] that this [the de-escalation process] would unfold smoothly, [but] the Chinese side departed from the consensus to respect the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the Galwan Valley.” On a phone call with the Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi this afternoon, India’s External Affairs Minister Dr. S Jaishankar claimed to have categorically stated that “this unprecedented development will have a serious impact on the bilateral relationship.” He further called on China “to reassess its actions and take corrective steps.”

The Chinese readout was very different, with Wang reportedly telling Jaishankar that India must investigate and “severely” punish those responsible and ensure that such incidents do not happen again. “The Indian side must not misjudge the current situation and must not underestimate China’s firm will to safeguard territorial sovereignty.”

India-China flare ups have seen an uptick since Xi Jinping came into office in 2012. Repeated border incidents – Depsang (2013), Chumar (2014), and Doklam (2017) – had already strained the relationship, but they pale in comparison to the current border crisis. Following the downturn after the Doklam, the two sides attempted to build greater confidence in each other and build a certain amount of predictability in order to manage crises through informal summits like the ones in Wuhan and Mamallapuram. This time around, it is probably fair to say that no “Wuhan spirit” can salvage bilateral relations.

There has not been much cooperation in bilateral security relations to start with (except for some limited-scale military-to-military exercises) but economic relations between India and China are deep. Driven by market factors, China had made some gains in the power, infrastructure and telecom sector but that could come to a grinding halt. However, the biggest loser is possibly China’s Huawei in its efforts to enter the Indian 5G market. Even as there was skepticism about the company and its links to Chinese intelligence, there was a chance that China would be given a fair opportunity in the Indian 5G market, but Beijing has most likely dashed that hope. India could also impose additional economic costs that will further limit China’s entry into the Indian market, though this will hurt both sides.

There will be pressure on India to recalibrate its strategic engagements. If China thought that putting pressure on India for building closer ties with the United States, Australia and Japan was going to work, it has rebounded badly. The Galwan crisis will likely push India to build much closer strategic ties with the Quad and the Quad Plus and with the US and its allies in the Indo-Pacific.

India Expands Diplomatic Efforts Amid Border Standoff With China - The Diplomat, 5 June 2020

In this week's essay for The Diplomat, I looked at India's strengthened diplomatic outreach amidst border standoff with China. I argue that New Delhi has been sending Beijing signals via its diplomatic interactions with the U.S., Taiwan, and Australia in recent weeks.

As India’s border confrontation with China deepens into a crisis, New Delhi appears to be using a combination of military power and diplomacy. According to reports in the Indian media, India has already begun moving troops from other sectors, including those facing Pakistan along the Line of Control (LOC), toward the Line of Actual Control (LAC) that separates India and China in Ladakh. At the same time, in a move that could be seen as a signal to China, India has stepped up its diplomatic efforts. In the last week, India has reached out to the United States, signaled a warning on Taiwan, and is set to strengthen security ties with Australia.

For the full essay, click here.



The United States remains the most critical of India’s partners. On May 29, U.S. Defense Secretary Mark T. Esper and Indian Defense Minister Rajnath Singh spoke on the phone, taking stock of their defense cooperation, and vowed to continue their efforts “for a strong and enduring U.S.-India defense partnership.” Even though the China matter was not specifically mentioned, both official statements, one released by the U.S. Department of Defense and other by the Indian Ministry of Defense, mentioned Esper and Singh discussing regional security issues. It would be highly unlikely that they discussed “regional security issues” without touching on the current Sino-Indian border confrontation.

In addition, on June 2, there was a telephone conversation between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and U.S. President Donald Trump. Unusually, the readout of their conversation specifically stated that they discussed the Sino-Indian border standoff and the need to reform the World Health Organization (WHO). The WHO has been much criticized for being too cozy with China. Trump also wants to expand the G-7 grouping (which China is not a part of) to include Australia, India, South Korea, and possibly Russia, thus making it a G-10 or G-11, which Modi also supported.

The messaging was not lost on Beijing: Promptly after the call between the two leaders, China’s foreign ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian said that there was “no need for any third party to intervene.” He added that “at present, the overall situation in the China-India border areas is stable and controllable.”

At the same time, India made another unusual diplomatic play, this time with regard to Taiwan. In an extraordinary move, two Members of Parliament (MPs) — Meenakshi Lekhi and Rahul Kaswan — from the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) virtually attended President Tsai Ing-wen’s swearing-in ceremony online. The two MPs also sent congratulatory messages to Tsai on the start of her second term, highlighting how India and Taiwan are bound by their shared belief in democratic values. Reportedly, in addition to the two MPs, Sohang Sen, the acting director general of India-Taipei Association, joined the ceremony, representing India in Taipei. In a separate video message, which was played at the ceremony, Lekhi emphasized the “continued strengthening of the comprehensive relations between India and Taiwan.”

This was a departure from India’s traditional stand on the Taiwan issue and the contrast to India’s decision in 2016 is striking. After naming two parliamentarians to attend Tsai’s first swearing-in ceremony in 2016, the government backtracked at the last moment, leading to much disappointment in Taipei. Many suspected that it was worry about China’s reaction that led to the last minute cancellation then, with one official saying that India possibly “bound itself up tightly in its own policies.” It was even more puzzling for many Taiwanese as to why India accepted the invitation in the first place and then cancelled, which made the disappointment bigger.

The third recent move worth taking into account regards Australia. Modi and Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison just concluded their first virtual India-Australia summit meeting. Though the summit had originally been scheduled for February, but postponed because of the Australian bushfires and then the pandemic, China continues to very much be on the minds of both leaders. Australia is feeling China’s wrath for pushing for an investigation into the origins of the pandemic, while Indian troops are confronting Chinese forces directly at the border. Not surprisingly, the meeting appears to have been a successful one, with several agreements and MOUs on strategic issues concluded between the two countries. Given the progress made in bilateral relations over the last few years, the two leaders decided to elevate their Strategic Partnership status reached in 2009 to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP).

The Joint Statement issued at the end of the meeting is carefully worded, with several important messages. It noted that “the CSP is based on mutual understanding, trust, common interests and the shared values of democracy and rule of law.” Further, it said that both India and Australia “share the vision of an open, free, rules-based Indo-Pacific region supported by inclusive global and regional institutions that promote prosperous, stable and sovereign states on the basis of shared interests.” The emphasis on maritime security and defense cooperation is significant. On regional and multilateral cooperation, the statement said that the two countries “share a vision of a free, open, inclusive and rules-based Indo-Pacific region to support the freedom of navigation, over-flight and peaceful and cooperative use of the seas by adherence of all nations to international law including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and peaceful resolution of disputes rather than through unilateral or coercive actions.” There were press reports in India that New Delhi was finally going to invite Australia to the Malabar naval exercise, though that has not been confirmed.

Among the nine agreements signed or announced, some were particularly significant: the Joint Declaration on a Shared Vision for Maritime Cooperation in the Indo- Pacific; Arrangement concerning Mutual Logistics Support (MLSA); an MOU on cooperation in the field of mining and processing of “critical and strategic” minerals; and the Implementing Arrangement concerning cooperation in Defense Science and Technology to the MOU on Defense Cooperation. These have the potential to deepen India and Australia’s bilateral defense and strategic cooperation for navigating the turbulent Indo-Pacific. While China has not been named specifically, many of the agreements as well as the joint statement appear clearly driven by the shared concern about China.

It is unclear how India’s diplomatic moves will be interpreted in Beijing, but it is clear that in New Delhi the pressure from an unrelenting China is pushing India farther away and leading it to deepen its security partnerships.

BORDER CLASHES WITH CHINA: DOES INDIA FACE A FAIT ACCOMPLI? - 9DashLine, 26 May 2020

Last week, I published a short essay for the 9DashLine.com on the current India-China border standoff.

There is still a lot of difficulty in understanding what is happening on the Sino-Indian border because of patchy and contradictory reporting, mostly based on sources in New Delhi Thus any analysis has necessarily to be quite preliminary and tentative. As of today, citing government sources, one media report said, “there are close to 10,000 soldiers of China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) on Indian territory.” It should be noted though that other reports have suggested fewer numbers.

For the full essay, click here.



The current series of incidents started on 5 May, when around 250 Indian and Chinese military personnel clashed at Pangong Tso, a large lake in eastern Ladakh region. These were reportedly violent clashes, injuring several soldiers on both sides. Quoting a senior bureaucrat, one Indian media report said that some Indian troops were detained, but then released. But the Indian Army promptly denied this, though the detention story has continued.

In addition to Pangong Tso, there is also reported to be Chinese forces crossing the Line of Actual Control (LAC) further to the north, near the junction of the Shyok and Galwan rivers, though there have been no reports of confrontations here. A newly constructed Indian road runs along the Shyok river to the north, a critical supply line for Indian forces. Quoting an unnamed military source, China’s state-run newspaper, Global Times, said that it was India who crossed the boundary in Galwan and entered Chinese territory. Meanwhile, on 9 May, clashes also reportedly took place at Naku La Pass in North Sikkim, much farther to the east.

If China has indeed moved forward and built roads and checkposts beyond where it has traditionally had such facilities, India faces a fait accompli. New Delhi faces the choice of either escalating or accepting the new reality on the ground.

Initially, even the government assumed that these were merely fisticuffs and that the two sides were possibly engaged in the usual stand-offs that happen between these forces every summer. The Indian Army Chief even said, possibly to reduce tensions, that “aggressive behaviour by both sides resulted in minor injuries to troops post which both sides disengaged.” But it seems clear now that three different confrontations, hundreds of kilometres apart, is unlikely to be an accident. The large number of Chinese forces included also suggest some prior planning. In fact, a knowledgeable former Indian ambassador to China, Ashok Kantha, referred to these “incursions at multiple locations” as “worrisome.” He argued that China appears “to be physically changing the ground situation.”

Indian analysts are at a loss to understand China’s behaviour. A former Indian Foreign Secretary, Shyam Saran, suggests that China was warning India about its policies on COVID, Taiwan and foreign investment (India had recently changed foreign investment rules that may affect Chinese investments). Ambassador Gautam Bambawale, who was formerly Indian ambassador in Beijing, meanwhile argued that the current incidents could be related to India’s actions with regard to Jammu and Kashmir in 2019, when India split the Jammu and Kashmir state to form a new province for the Ladakh region, administered directly from Delhi. Ambassadors Saran, Bambawale and Kantha appear to also suggest the closer India-US strategic engagement as a factor. Most Indian analysts also suggest that China’s response was at least partly a response to India’s faster infrastructure building along the LAC. China has already built excellent infrastructure on its side, and India’s is still wanting, though it has dramatically improved in the recent past.

There have not been much of an formal response from India to the ongoing crisis. Commenting on the situation, on 14 May, India’s Ministry of External Affairs spokesperson Anurag Srivastava said that both countries see enormous importance in maintaining peace and tranquillity along the entire border. The spokesperson added that the problem is the difference in perception of the alignment of the LAC, suggesting that this “could have been avoided if we had a common perception of the LAC.” India has long suggested this, but China has balked, apparently fearing that this could lead to additional problems. What is worrying is that existing mechanisms to resolve such disputes do not appear to be working.

India and China have signed several agreements, including the Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas (September 1993), the Agreement on Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas (November 1996), and most recently, the Border Defence Cooperation Agreement (2013), none of which appear so far to have helped in the current tensions. Even though these agreements are significant, there have also been problems with their implementation because many clauses in these agreements require both sides to limit their activities in reference to the LAC. In the absence of clarity on where the LAC is, it is very difficult to execute these agreements, even in the best of times.

India’s options are also severely constrained in dealing with this crisis. In the Doklam crisis, India moved to block China’s actions, forcing China to choose to either escalate or back down. China backed down, helped by India also backing away on the promise that China would desist from continuing with its road-building. This time, the shoe is on the other foot: if China has indeed moved forward and built roads and checkposts beyond where it has traditionally had such facilities, India faces a fait accompli. New Delhi faces the choice of either escalating or accepting the new reality on the ground, or possibly offering concessions (halting infrastructure development in the region, for example) in order to get China to recall its forces. New Delhi is not going to be happy with any of these choices. Irrespective of how this plays out, one thing is certain: India’s attitude towards China will only harden.