Why China’s Growing Military Might in Tibet Should Worry India - The Diplomat, 3 March 2020

Earlier in the week, I had a short essay for The Diplomat looking at the implications of China's growing military might in Tibet. I have tried to locate the importance of the PLA military exercise in Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) in January but the essay is also a shorter version of an Occasional Paper I co-authored with Pulkit Mohan, my colleague, for the ORF in February 2020. In this essay, I argue that the rising tempo of Chinese deployments in Tibet should be of concern to New Delhi.

Last month, China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) engaged in a major military exercise in the Tibet region. The engagement showcased some of the latest weapons in the Chinese military inventory and also spotlighted its deployments in the region more generally.

According to reports, the exercise last month in Tibet witnessed the deployment of several key aspects of Chinese military capabilities, including the Type 15 light battle tank and the new 155 mm vehicle-mounted howitzer. A Chinese military analyst speaking to the Global Times said that both “had powerful engines, allowing them to maneuver efficiently in Tibet’s terrain.” The same Global Times report also stated that the PLA Tibet Military Command had deployed helicopters, armored vehicles, heavy artillery, and anti-aircraft missiles across the region, from Lhasa, which has an elevation of around 3,700 meters, to border defense frontlines at an altitude higher than 4,000 meters.

For the full essay, click here.



These developments were by no means surprising. Indeed, the PLA has been beefing up its overall combat proficiency in the last few years by engaging in training and joint exercises, especially in high-altitude regions, with implications for how China’s military operates and how other actors in the Indo-Pacific region respond in kind.

With respect to Tibet in particular, the PLA has been doing a number of exercises in Tibet, and the frequency seems to be increasing. Close to a decade ago, in 2011, the PLA conducted two joint exercises at the group army level in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), with the goal of practicing employing a division-size force in a truly integrated manner, involving armor, artillery, and the PLA Air Force (PLAAF). There were also reportedly network-centric operations in a high-intensity electromagnetic environment practiced during this exercise. A J-11 regiment was sighted engaging in night-combat training in Tibet in August 2015.

Beyond individual exercises and more broadly, these developments demonstrate the growing air infrastructure in the TAR, including civilian airports, many of which are used by the PLAAF. These exercises have continued to grow bigger and more sophisticated. Even amidst the Doklam crisis in 2017, the PLA was engaged in a joint military exercise on the Tibetan plateau to test agility and combat proficiency in tasks such as assaults on enemy positions.

China’s engagements are part of an effort to step up their combat proficiencies in Tibet. More specifically, they address a significant lacuna of the PLA – lack of recent operational experience. These exercises have also focused on bringing about true jointness and integration in military operations. In addition to these exercises, there are other indicators of increased PLA activity in the TAR. For example, from 2013 onwards, PLAAF aircraft and helicopters have been sighted doing increased patrolling. Since 2013, troops coming to sectors opposite the Ladakh sector have been instructed to only travel by air and not by road, though the implications of this is unclear. Since April 2015, there have been increasing PLAAF activities, with J-11 and Su-27 aircraft of the PLAAF engaged in periodic exercises in the TAR.

From an Indian perspective in particular, China’s military efforts in the TAR are of grave concern. Even though this was the first major exercise of the PLA in 2020, there has been a significant increase in PLA engagements in terms of military training and exercises in the TAR over the last decade. The fact that Beijing has established all-weather physical border infrastructure in these areas has enhanced its ability to project military power in the region.

Additionally, the PLA is also known to have set up many military camps close to the border areas with periodic deployment of forces in these camps. This would imply that the PLA remains relatively acclimatized to the high-altitude conditions prevalent in the region, whereas on the Indian side, most forces responsible for the Sino-Indian border areas are in the plains of Assam.

This is a challenge in itself, but the bigger worry for New Delhi should be the growing number of Chinese military exercises in the TAR. The PLA has been engaged in many single-service and joint military exercises to validate several operational concepts.

The increase in the frequency and complexity of the PLA exercises in the TAR could also be an indicator of things to come. The fact that the Chinese state-run media are publicizing these exercises in Tibet is possibly an effort to send a signal to India and a demonstration of the overall better combat proficiency of the PLA. New Delhi cannot afford to ignore them.

Clearly, the tempo of China’s military activities in the TAR is growing, and it is likely to lead to even greater efforts on the Indian side. Though the Doklam confrontation ended peacefully, the preparations being undertaken by both sides suggest that the next one may have a different outcome.

China Isn’t Hearing Asia’s Fears About Its Military Buildup - The Diplomat, March 11, 2019

In last week's column for The Diplomat, "China Isn’t Hearing Asia’s Fears About Its Military Buildup," I looked at the 2019 Chinese defence defence expenditure. The response to the country’s new defense budget suggests that Beijing continues to be tone deaf to regional anxieties.

China recently announced a defense budget of 1.19 trillion yuan ($177.61 billion). This represents a slower growth rate in the budget, falling to 7.5 percent as against an 8.1 percent increase in 2018. Nevertheless, there are likely to be predictable expressions of concerns at the size of even the publicly announced budget, considering that it is more than three times as large as India’s, which has the second largest defense budget in Asia.

For the full essay, click here.



China’s military power has expanded dramatically in the last several years. A recent report by the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) noted that “since 2014, China has launched more submarines, warships, principal amphibious vessels and auxiliaries than the total number of ships currently serving in the navies of Germany, India, Spain, Taiwan, and the United Kingdom.”

Beijing has been closing the gap even with the United States, though the latter still maintains a considerable lead. Where China has been not able to catch up, it has developed certain asymmetric capabilities to compete with the United States. As Andrew Erickson points out, “In many areas, they have weapons systems that only a few other countries possess.” The development of the People’s Liberation Army’s capabilities across all domains has been “impressive” under Xi’s leadership.

Such growth has also led to concerns in the neighborhood. Even countries like South Korea that have generally had good relations with China are beginning to face hostile actions from the Chinese PLA. For more than a year now, there have been repeated violations of the South Korean air defense identification zone (Korea-ADIZ) by the PLA Air Force, the most recent one in late-February.

However, these foreign concerns are falling on deaf ears in China. Headlines like “history proves China’s defense budget growth benefits the world” appear to be more the norm. Officially, Zhang Yesui, spokesperson for the annual session of the 13th National People’s Congress, termed the defense budget hike as “reasonable and appropriate.”

China has continued to reiterate that much of the hike in the defense expenditure goes to meet the salaries and other benefits of the troops, in addition to developing weapon systems, military reforms, and training. It has tried to make the case that China still lags behind a number of countries like the United States and that there are outdated systems and platforms that need to be replaced.

A quick look suggests that China’s defense analysts are largely reiterating the official line. Commenting on the defense budget announcement, Xu Guangyu, a senior consultant with the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association, noted that the Chinese military has reached “a normal and stable speed instead of a premature rush.” Chinese analysts also slammed reports that say the Chinese spending in actuality is much bigger than what is announced by the Chinese authorities, saying that “China’s military modernization is meant for self-defense and not threatening other countries. We should not care much about what others say.”

Many Chinese military analysts have also tried to highlight the fact that its defense spending has moved away from a double-digit growth rate since 2016. Chinese military analyst Li Daguang from the National Defense University of the PLA argued that the defense spending of 2018, which was 1.107 trillion yuan, was only 1.3 percent of China’s GDP, a much smaller proportion compared to other countries like the United States and Russia that spend around 4 percent of the GDP on defense. Instead, there are suggestions that as China engages in more international projects such as the Belt and Road Initiative, its security concerns will only go up and accordingly, “it must speed up its national defense power to protect the legitimate interests of Chinese people.”

Broader ambitions are also driving China’s defense budgets. Xi Jinping has outlined important goals for China in the next few decades as part of his Chinese Dream. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is all set to celebrate its 100th anniversary in 2021, by which time China hopes to have a “moderately well-off society.” The second major centenary goal is the 100th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China itself and China hopes to be “a completely developed country” by 2049.

Along with these broad goals, China has specified areas for focus like military drones, space, artificial intelligence, and overall development in the strategic domain. The Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation could see a lot more emphasis in the coming years with higher spending on each of these high-tech and defense arena. But China – and Chinese analysts – should take greater cognizance of the concerns around the region.

My contribution to the ChinaFile Conversation this week - One Year After They Almost Went to War, Can China and India Get Along?

This week's ChinaFile Conversation @AsiaSociety focused on India-China relations, specifically looking at the likelihood of another border stand-off that might erupt in the near future - One Year After They Almost Went to War, Can China and India Get Along?. This is a pertinent question to ask, a year after the Doklam conflict. The ChinaFile Conversation carried short write-ups from other experts as well, including: Jeff Smith, Oriana Skylar Mastro, Sameer Lalwani.

I argue that even as Sino-Indian relations have stabilized since the serious military confrontation last year at Doklam, the fundamental problems between the two sides continue to persist. The “informal” Wuhan summit between President Xi and Prime Minister Modi was touted as the “reset” in the bilateral relations. The two leaders have met again at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit, and there are more meetings planned. The talks are believed to have improved understanding between the two sides even as substantive issues between India and China remain.
Though there is optimism, there appears to have been no significant progress made on issues that are crucial to both sides.

For the full article, click here.



Though there is optimism, there appears to have been no significant progress made on issues that are crucial to both sides. Beijing has yet to accept India’s concerns on the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), especially the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) branch of the BRI, or support India’s bid to join the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) or India’s efforts to use multilateral tools to contain Pakistan’s support for terrorism. India remains concerned also about China’s greater role and presence in the maritime space in India’s neighborhood, and China has not taken steps to reassure India that its intentions are benign.

For China, India’s lack of endorsement of the BRI may still irritate. India has supported regional connectivity proposals, but New Delhi has articulated that “connectivity initiatives must be based on universally recognized international norms, good governance, rule of law, openness, transparency and equality, and must be pursued in a manner that respects sovereignty and territorial integrity.” Accordingly, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs has stated that the “so-called ‘China-Pakistan Economic Corridor’ violates India’s sovereign.”

While these are important parameters for both India and China to judge the state of the relations, a more critical and a deep-rooted problem is the competition for the Asian strategic space. Beijing believes its rise is a natural phenomenon and it approaches the world in a hierarchical manner, which is increasingly problematic for a number of countries in the Indo-Pacific, including India. The speech delivered by China’s Vice Foreign Minister Liu Zhenmin at the sixth Xiangshan Forum, held in October 2015, reveals China’s view: he spoke about the responsibility of “big countries” in not creating spheres of influence while small and medium countries should not take sides between big countries. The Chinese division of the international system into big, medium, and small countries itself reflects China’s hierarchical view of the international system and the differentiated role that it has assigned to itself as a big country and to its neighbors as small countries that ought to know their place. This line of thinking repeated itself when President Xi discussed with President Obama the format for developing a new pattern of major country relations. Such an approach is hardly the way to reassure its neighbors or win friends. The Asian strategic order that China seems to want is one where it sees itself as the hegemon. Therefore, even as relations have become warmer, it is unlikely that Sino-Indian relations have stabilized for good. Border stand-offs like Doklam are just the beginning of a troubling phase in Asian security.

What Does the Modi-Xi Summit Mean for Sino-Indian Relations?, my this week's column for The Diplomat

"What Does the Modi-Xi Summit Mean for Sino-Indian Relations?," my this week's column for The Diplomat published on Thursday, a day before the informal summit between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping. Though the interaction between the two leaders is notable, there is reason for skepticism and managing expectations.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi is set to travel to Wuhan in central China for an “informal summit” with the Chinese President Xi Jinping. The visit comes against the backdrop of nearly two years of friction between India and China over a whole host of issues including the Doklam standoff, India’s Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) bid, and China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

What will the summit between the two leaders produce? Of course, there is no set agenda and it may be a fairly free-wheeling conversation. Given the deep hostility that exists and the anti-India rhetoric that was on display last year during the Doklam crisis, it is not certain that such negative sentiments can be brushed under the rug that quickly.

For the full essay, click here.



The bilateral relationship plummeted to an all-time low in the wake of friction on multiple fronts. But in December last year, two high-level visits from China suggested the need for a fresh review of the relationship. Within a few weeks of each other, both the Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and State Councilor Yang Jiechi visited India.

Since early February this year, there have been efforts from the Indian side too – the cancellation of the Dalai Lama’s events in Delhi marking the occasion of 60 years in exile of the Dalai Lama, was the first indication of the Indian outreach to China. In a note to Cabinet Secretary PK Sinha, India’s Foreign Secretary Vijay Gokhale said it is a “very sensitive time” in India’s bilateral relations with China and therefore, it is “not desirable” for government officials and other leaders to take part in the celebrations of the Tibetan government in exile.

Several weeks later, it was reported that the Indian government had actually informed China about this before advisory was sent out. Informing China appears to have been undertaken to earn some brownie points with Beijing. India’s overtures to China seems like a one-way process as yet, because China is yet to take any reciprocal steps.

The idea of an informal summit was first floated during the visit of the Indian Foreign Secretary Vijay Gokhale to China on February 23. Modi agreed to the summit in principle when he called Xi to congratulate him on the extension of his tenure in March. Since then, there have been visits by other officials, including India’s National Security Adviser Ajit Doval and Minister of External Affairs Sushma Swaraj, who have fine-tuned various details in preparing for Modi’s summit in Wuhan. In fact, it was Sushma Swaraj, in a joint press conference with the Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, who announced that Modi will visit China. Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Kong Xuanyou too travelled to India in April to finalize the summit details.

Even though Modi will be traveling to China for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Summit on June 9-10, the Indian leadership took the bold decision to make another earlier visit for the summit. The idea of an informal meeting is not to have a set agenda and engage in a free-flowing conversation between the two leaders. The conversation could include the domestic political and economic climate in both the countries, regional developments like the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), and international ones such as the U.S.-China trade war. While it is impossible to predict the outcome of this meeting, the importance and consequence of the state of Sino-Indian relationship for Asian security and stability cannot be ignored.

There is disquiet in New Delhi because China has not demonstrated any reciprocal efforts to pacify India. On the contrary, China has engaged in additional efforts to boost its military forces in the Doklam area, as well as in other areas along the disputed Sino-Indian border. Construction of a new road and military posts (at least two) in Shaksgam Valley, north of Siachen Glacier, in the past few months also raises concerns. Shaksgam Valley is located in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and was ceded by Pakistan to China in 1963, although India does not acknowledge this and treats the Valley as part of the state of Jammu and Kashmir.

This may not yet pose itself as a direct threat to Indian armed forces deployed in Siachen Glacier, Nonetheless, the Chinese action was described by the former Indian army Northern Army Commander Lt. Gen. DS Hooda as a “provocative” step.

There is thus considerable skepticism in India about the summit. Progress on the bilateral front will be judged on whether Beijing shows some sensitivity to Indian concerns on the BRI and CPEC, on India’s NSG bid, and on terrorism. China’s rising influence and growing footprint in South Asia and Indian Ocean are of concern to India and China has not acted to reassure India about China’s long-term intentions.

Nevertheless, China appears to believe that India has agreed to the Wuhan summit because New Delhi has recognized the follies of the so-called Indo-Pacific partnership with the United States and Japan and the ill-effects of that strategy on Sino-Indian relations. Some Chinese analysts suggest that many of the frictions in India-China relations are a result of “lack of trust” or “Western instigation.”

But so far, there is also little indication that India will bend. For instance, on the BRI, India has officially stated that “the so-called ‘China-Pakistan Economic Corridor’ violates India’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. “No country can accept a project that ignores its core concerns on sovereignty and territorial integrity,” the statement continues. “We are of firm belief that connectivity initiatives must be based on universally recognized international norms, good governance, rule of law, openness, transparency and equality, and must be pursued in a manner that respects sovereignty and territorial integrity.”

Indeed Sushma Swaraj reiterated this at the SCO Foreign Minister’s meeting and stated: “Connectivity with SCO countries is India’s priority. We want connectivity to pave the way for cooperation and trust between our societies. For this, respect for sovereignty is essential. Inclusivity, transparency and sustainability are imperative. India has cooperated extensively with the international community for enhanced connectivity.” India has once again refused to endorse the BRI.

All of this, as well as the efforts on both sides to lower expectations, suggest that not much should be expected out of the informal summit. Indeed, beyond some general and temporary stabilization of ties, it is not exactly clear what either side will get out of this meeting.

Is Xi Jinping the Successor to Hu?

It is widely believed that Xi Jinping, the 8th Vice President of the People's Republic of China could possibly be the next President, when Hu Jintao finishes his term in 2012. The 204-member Central Committee that opened up its annual meeting on September 15 in Beijing, will decide whether to induct Jinping into the Central Military Commission. If he is selected to this mighty powerful body, it will be a clear indication of his succession to Hu. However, if he is not selected, then that move will reflect upon the possible discord among the top leadership as to who should take the mantle from Hu.


There is a general consensus among China watchers that Jinping will be taking over from Hu, given that he was already shown the door two years ago, when he was appointed to the Politburo Standing Committee in 2007. However, internal political discord cannot be ruled out. For instance, within the Standing Committee, Xi outranks Li Keqiang, a long-time protégé of Hu. Li Keqiang is believed to be taking over from Wen Jiabao as premier in 2013. There is a general estimation that Hu might be delaying the induction of of Jinping, in order to allow Li, a former party boss of the Youth League, time to build up a power base at the top.

By way of background, Xi Jinping is an ethnic Han, native of Fuping, Shaanxi Province, northwestern part of China, born in June 1953. He is currently member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, member of the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee, and secretary of the CPC Shanghai Municipal Committee. He is someone who has risen from the rank over the years, having joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1974. However, he comes with his own baggage, to say. His father, Xi Zhongxun was a Long March hero who was banished during the Cultural Revolution. He was one of the leaders who was purged three times by Mao Zedong and later became a pro-market reformer. Later, he became one of the few leaders to defend Hu Yaobang, a progressive party chief sacked in 1986, as also to condemn the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, after which he was rarely seen in public. However, it is reported that Jinping has strong credentials, from being an effective provincial leader to excellent administrator. Accordingly, he is believed to have been given high-profile assignments; overseeing the final preparations of the 2008 Beijing Olympics, being one among them. Besides, he is very popular within the party and he is essentially seen as a man of the masses. For a detailed profile, click here.

While Xinhua, the official news agency annunced the opening of the annual conclave, it made no mention of the leadership issues. It simply noted taht a draft document on "party building" -- issues ranging from recruitment for the 75 million-member CPC to fighting the corruption that has fuelled many protests -- will be discussed. Another report in the Wen Wei Po, a party-backed newspaper in Hong Kong, said that the meeting will also discuss on new measures that would require officials to declare their assets.