U.S. Backs Efforts to Draft Space Code, article in Arms Control Today

Here's an article on the US effort in drafting a space code in the latest issue of Arms Control Today, quoting me ....

The United States will join with the European Union and other space-faring countries to develop an international code of conduct for outer space activities, but will not sign on to the EU’s current draft of a proposed code, U.S. officials have said.

“The long-term sustainability of our space environment is at serious risk from space debris and irresponsible actors…. A Code of Conduct will help maintain the long-term sustainability, safety, stability, and security of space by establishing guidelines for the responsible use of space,” Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton said in a Jan. 17 press release. U.S. officials have discussed whether to support the EU’s draft of the code since the original version was circulated in December 2008.

Taking the effort forward, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Space and Defense Policy Frank Rose said the EU will take the lead on negotiating an international code and plans to host a series of experts meetings over the next several months. The United States “plans to actively participate in those discussions,” which aim “to develop a consensus text that could become an eventual international code,” he said.

Rose said the United States hopes to involve all space-faring nations in the meetings, but he highlighted five countries that should be a focus of EU efforts: Brazil, India, Indonesia, Nigeria, and South Africa. However, experts say China and Russia are the two countries that matter most because they are the biggest space-faring countries after the United States.

In a Jan. 26 e-mail to Arms Control Today, Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, a senior fellow in security studies at the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi, pointed to the fast-growing space programs in Asia and said that, “in the absence of an inclusive mechanism, the EU Code is likely to see a repeat” of the experience with the Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, “where the majority of the Asian countries that contribute to the challenge of missile proliferation remain outside the mechanism.”

As Arms Control Today went to press, India had not come out with a formal position on the EU’s draft. However, India’s informal position is that the code lacks a provision for a legally binding mechanism, which has been “a long-standing demand from some of the Asian countries,” Rajagopalan said. Nevertheless, she said, India is “prudent” enough to “recognize that a legal framework may emerge much later” and legal frameworks often “are the by-products of normative exercises.”

To read the full article, click here.



The United States will join with the European Union and other space-faring countries to develop an international code of conduct for outer space activities, but will not sign on to the EU’s current draft of a proposed code, U.S. officials have said.

“The long-term sustainability of our space environment is at serious risk from space debris and irresponsible actors…. A Code of Conduct will help maintain the long-term sustainability, safety, stability, and security of space by establishing guidelines for the responsible use of space,” Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton said in a Jan. 17 press release. U.S. officials have discussed whether to support the EU’s draft of the code since the original version was circulated in December 2008. (See ACT, January/February 2009.)

The EU released the latest draft of the code in 2010 after receiving feedback from other countries, including the United States. That document retained much of the language from previous versions, including a clause establishing a voluntary commitment to refrain from intentionally harming space objects, measures to control space debris, and mechanisms for cooperation and consultation. It added language to protect countries’ rights to self-defense under the UN Charter. (See ACT, November 2010.)

Despite the negotiations between the United States and the EU, Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Ellen Tauscher told reporters on Jan. 12, “It’s been clear from the very beginning that we were not going with the [EU] code.” When asked why the United States would not sign on to the EU draft, Tauscher said that “it’s too restrictive.”

Speaking a week later at the Stimson Center, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Space and Defense Policy Frank Rose said Tauscher’s comment was referring to the process surrounding the creation of the EU code more than the substance of the code. “Before you convene a multilateral ad hoc conference to sign the code, you need to develop a process in between to build consensus on a code,” Rose said.

In a Jan. 25 interview, Michael Krepon, co-founder of the Stimson Center and director of its South Asia and space security programs, said that “leaders from other space-faring countries not in Europe, like India, rightly complained that they didn’t have co-authorship of the EU’s draft.” The code “already has important partnerships, like Japan, Canada, Australia, and Europe, but the task now is to get the concept of a code of conduct greater international standing,” Krepon said.

EU reaction to the U.S. decision not to sign on to the current draft of the code was “rather mixed and quite negative from the senior officials,” according to an EU government official familiar with negotiations over the proposed code.

According to the unclassified summary of the U.S. “National Security Space Strategy,” released in January 2011, space “is becoming increasingly congested, contested, and competitive.” The clutter of manmade objects is exacerbated by actions such as the “irresponsible” 2007 Chinese anti-satellite test that created more than 3,000 pieces of debris, the report said.

Next Steps

At the Stimson Center event, Rose said the EU will take the lead on negotiating an international code and plans to host a series of experts meetings over the next several months. The United States “plans to actively participate in those discussions,” which aim “to develop a consensus text that could become an eventual international code,” he said.

Rose said the United States hopes to involve all space-faring nations in the meetings, but he highlighted five countries that should be a focus of EU efforts: Brazil, India, Indonesia, Nigeria, and South Africa. However, experts say China and Russia are the two countries that matter most because they are the biggest space-faring countries after the United States.

In a Jan. 26 e-mail to Arms Control Today, Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, a senior fellow in security studies at the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi, pointed to the fast-growing space programs in Asia and said that, “in the absence of an inclusive mechanism, the EU Code is likely to see a repeat” of the experience with the Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, “where the majority of the Asian countries that contribute to the challenge of missile proliferation remain outside the mechanism.”

As Arms Control Today went to press, India had not come out with a formal position on the EU’s draft. However, India’s informal position is that the code lacks a provision for a legally binding mechanism, which has been “a long-standing demand from some of the Asian countries,” Rajagopalan said. Nevertheless, she said, India is “prudent” enough to “recognize that a legal framework may emerge much later” and legal frameworks often “are the by-products of normative exercises.”

Krepon said that any involvement by India to help draft an international code would be “a change in its strategic culture, which is currently to be an outsider and to complain,” citing India’s reluctance to participate in the UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Space and its absence from the Hague Code of Conduct.

The GGE, which was established by UN General Assembly Resolution 65/68 in October 2011 to examine transparency and confidence-building measures, is scheduled to start in July 2012 and is expected to finish by July 2013. The GGE process is separate from the one that Rose proposed and is not a formal negotiating process. It is not clear whether the GGE process will include discussion of a code of conduct.

China and Russia have proposed their own space agreements, most recently a draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects (PPWT). Rose stressed that the U.S. position is not to negotiate on the PPWT. The United States sees the code “as a pragmatic and responsible alternative to the PPWT,” he said. U.S. officials, including Rose, have said that the PPWT’s language is weak and lacks an effective mechanism for verification.

Domestic Politics

Four congressional Republicans expressed their support of the State Department’s decision on the EU code in a Jan. 28 letter to President Barack Obama, but said they were concerned about the administration’s plans to negotiate an international agreement similar to the EU’s draft.

“Such an international agreement could establish the foundation for a future arms control regime that binds the United States without approval of Congress,” said the letter signed by Reps. Michael Turner (Ohio) and Joe Heck (Nev.), and Sens. Jeff Sessions (Ala.) and Jon Kyl (Ariz.). Turner, Heck, and Sessions hold senior positions on their respective chamber’s armed services or intelligence committees; Kyl is the Senate minority whip and a leading Republican voice on national security issues.

At the Jan. 19 Stimson Center event, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy Gregory L. Schulte said nothing in the code would keep the United States from developing, deploying, or testing land or space ballistic missile defense systems. He said that any code would not be a legally binding arms control agreement, but a set of nonbinding “guidelines” that countries would follow.

The four lawmakers said in their letter that although “it is worth considering whether a non-binding arrangement for outer space activities could be in the interest of the United States, we are not comfortable that all policy and operational impacts of doing so have been assessed.” They went on to say that Republicans “are deeply concerned about the unknown consequences such limitations would have on future military or intelligence programs given that the draft Code appears to be of unlimited duration.”

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The Space Code of Conduct Debate: A View from Delhi, my article in Strategic Studies Quarterly

Here's an article of mine on the space code of conduct debate, a perspective from Delhi published in the latest issue of Strategic Studies Quarterly, published by Air University, US Air Force.

While India has interests in drafting rules of the road on space issues, the EU has lost out an ideal opportunity to rope in India as a major spacefaring power to shape the debate. The “Not Invented Here” syndrome characterises, at best, India’s position on the EU Code. If the EU had to do this exercise all over again, it might be relevant to adopt an inclusive approach, bringing together all the spacefaring countries to debate and shape an instrument that is widely acceptable. India’s interests in writing the rules are driven by the fact that it has been one of the earliest space powers and therefore it should have been part of the debate. In addition, it also has interests in formulating rules that would affect and curtail certain space activities. Indian interests are also to do with the Indian economic growth story that is increasingly dependent on space utilisation.

Also certain measures, by way of narrowing down the differences, have been suggested including the idea whether states around the world can agree to an “IPCC model of experts” on space; mulling over new initiatives along the lines of International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO).


For the full article, click here.

Finally, what's the way around?

Can states around the world agree to an “Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change” model of experts to address space issues? Given that space debris or an arms race in space are universal problems confronting every nation-state, the idea of constituting a panel of experts under the aegis of the United Nations may be a good starting point. his may be the kind of inclusive mechanism India should aim for while making an effort to enlist the support of other key space-faring countries.

Obviously space traffic management is at the core of the entire issue. Countries could mull over new initiatives along the lines of the Inter­national Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). Letting technical experts handle issues is one way to reduce political salience and competition.

Also, is the Conference on Disarmament (CD) still a relevant forum to discuss and debate space security? More than a decade has passed since the CD debated and moved forward on important security issues. Given such a track record, it is time to consider alternate venues to tackle these challenges. he ICAO model may be appropriate, since overcrowding,
industrialization, and weaponization of space and management of space traffic have become critical issues. One has to think of new platforms outside the CD, given the problems with the consensual decision-making process in the CD. Can there be
a major grouping of space-faring powers similar to the P-5 who are the nuclear weapon countries recognized by the NPT? Such a grouping might be keener on making decisions and moving forward than any other conceivable forum.

Finally, the EU has to recognize that geopolitics has significant value in determining and shaping norms and establishing practices. In this regard the geopolitical weight of Asia may be in a position to dictate new terms and conditions in formulating these norms and practices. Getting as many Asian countries as possible on board would be a major plus if the EU is keen on pushing an agenda. his is also important considering the increasing trend toward securitization of geopolitics in Asia. Therefore, the EU must listen and understand the Asian realities and concerns.

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My interview with the Voice of Russia ....

Here's an interview of mine with the Voice of Russia on the developments in Asia Pacific including US-China relations, the new Chinese leadership.

Burning Point → Asian Pacific region: Cooperation or confrontation

What are the strategies of major regional players? How successful have they been in expanding their ties with other countries in the region? And what is it that we are going to witness there – the development of the working relationship, or rather a stand-off, between China and US over the control of the Asia Pacific?

We’ve been looking into the issue with the help from Dr. Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, a Senior Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi, India, and Alexander Gabuyev, expert on China and participant of the UN Millenium Program.

To hear the full interview, click here.

The text of the interview is available here.



Today we’ll be focusing on the Asian Pacific region – a location that has been playing an increasingly important role in the global politics and hence, has become an arena of growing competition between two of the world powers – China and the US.

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New Delhi has shown a lack of strategic vision by choosing the Rafale fighter aircraft

Here is an article of mine on the recent MMRCA decision published by The Economic Times. I have argued that GoI underplayed the importance of strategic interests and went ahead with the risk free option of relying on technical inputs alone to make one of the most high profile defence deals.

India's long and convoluted search for a new fighter plane - a medium multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA) - has entered its final stage. New Delhi has just announced that the Rafale, built by Dassault Aviation of France, has been chosen to meet the Indian Air Force's (IAF) requirement. Only price negotiation now remains.

For the full article, click here.



The Rafale had been shortlisted along with the Eurofighter Typhoon from a field that originally included four more jets: the US-built F-16 and F-18, the Russian MiG-35 and the Swedish JAS 39 Gripen. But though the fight over the selection is over, questions about the wisdom of New Delhi's choice are unlikely to end any time soon.

Commenting on the MMRCA decision, a former IAF officer proudly stated that this was probably the first decision that was made purely on technical grounds. If accurate, this reveals serious strategic shortsightedness. While the government should have received inputs from the IAF, such a decision should not have been taken on purely technical grounds. For India's decision-makers, limiting themselves to technical specifications was a risk-free option, but that reveals more about the state of strategic decision-making in Delhi than the wisdom of the choice they made.

Ideally, the Indian decision should have been guided by a strategy that balances reducing danger and broadening opportunity. Accordingly, the question for New Delhi should have been how to use this lucrative deal to beef up India's strategic options. Thus, it is probably a strategic blunder to narrowly focus on technical specifications and capabilities alone, as many proponents of the IAF's choice have done.

A decision of this magnitude should have been filtered through three key parameters: strategic, operational and tactical. A pragmatic strategy would have been to analyse the risk and opportunity through these three parameters and then make the final decision about which of the fighter plane choices would have best advanced Indian security. In strategic and geopolitical terms, France can provide little help to India in either Asia or in the global theatre. While France has always been a well-wisher, it has never had much capacity to help India. For example, though France wanted to sell India nuclear reactors, it could do little to change the nuclear non-proliferation rules that prevented it from doing so. It took Washington to change these rules to India's benefit.

Additionally, numbers (of aircraft India could acquire) and cost should have been factored in. Buying fewer but more expensive aircraft might make some fighter jocks happy, but having greater numbers might be more relevant to a country like India which faces a two-front threat from China and Pakistan. It was often argued in the MMRCA debate that maintaining air superiority required technological superiority, range and payload but an equally important consideration is that of numbers.

Numerical superiority in India's regional context is of particular significance given that the current strength of India's fighter jets is only around 600, and unless replenished, it will reach critically low numbers soon. Meanwhile, both Beijing and Islamabad have been augmenting their fighter fleets. India could have procured far greater numbers of fighters with the US or Russian option.

Though the probability of a two-front war is low, no pragmatic Indian strategic decision-maker should rule it out. Indeed, it is precisely for this reason that the Indian army is raising new forces to deploy on the China border. It is unclear if the technological superiority of the Rafale is so great as to compensate for the smaller numbers that India will have to settle for.

Cost should have also had an important role in the MMRCA decision. India's decision to go for Rafale is going to cost New Delhi around $20 billion, if not more. Opting for a Russian or US jet would have been far cheaper. The Russian option would have been the least expensive whereas the American fighters would have been somewhere in the middle with the European jets being the most expensive. In overall terms, the American F-18s would have been the best given that they (as well as the F-16s) came with the second-generation AESA radars.

Lastly, the most important consideration should have been the strategic benefits that accrue to India through this deal. Indian decision-makers should have been mindful of the fact that this deal was as much about making strategic investments in a relationship as simply buying fighters. India does not enjoy a benign neighbourhood, and these security needs are important. But India also needs to balance these with its requirements as a rising power, which means having capable friends. The MMRCA deal was a great opportunity to consolidate its strategic ties with either Russia or the US, or even with both. Instead, New Delhi has ended up antagonising both of them.

The standard response that India has signed many other defence contracts with both Russia and the US does not wash because this was a very different and high-profile deal which was closely watched around the world. Signing smaller deals, even if they add up to significant amounts, does not have the same weight as the MMRCA deal. New Delhi needs to be more careful in both understanding strategic moments and being able to exploit them if it wants to sit at the global high table.

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India has made powerful enemies by selecting Dassault ... my take on the MMRCA decision in yesterday's Pioneer ....

Here's my OpEd on the recent MMRCA decision in yesterday's Pioneer. India is not likely to bow to Anglo-American pressure to revisit the MMRCA decision in favour of Dassault-Rafale. By deciding on the basis of technical parameters alone, India satisfied its own needs, but quite ignored the diplomatic fall out.



Price negotiation is what remains of the crucial MMRCA deal. It’s a complicated process. Nevertheless, it appears unlikely that the decision to buy the Rafale itself will be revisited. Given how drawn-out and difficult the choice was, the government is unlikely to add further controversy by admitting it made a mistake, which will be the consequence if the MMRCA competition is reopened. The selection apparently involved testing the platforms on around 600 odd technical parameters. This is the key argument made by proponents of the deal: that the deal was so carefully and technically handled that it should not be questioned.

But the premise that technical factors are all that matters is not defensible especially for such a large and politically important deal. While the technical qualifications are an important set of elements that should go into while making a decision, this has also brought to the fore how strategic factors were underplayed in this critical deal.

A decision made purely on technical parameters seems like the decision makers in India were opting for an easy, risk free option. This is understandable in the domestic political context. The single most important political concern today is about corruption in administrative decisions. Given the importance of this issue in public perception, and particularly given the many corruption scandals that have come out over the last year, it is not surprising that the government wants to play it safe. And the easiest way to play it safe is to leave political discretion out by letting the IAF make a purely technical decision.

Indian military services are known for their thoroughness in assessing weapons systems. Clearly the IAF did a good job of picking what was the best fighter from its perspective. But while the Rafale might have been the best from a

technical standpoint, it is not clear that it was diplomatically and strategically a good choice.

A strategic perspective should have looked at which of the countries fighting for the contract was most useful to India. This is not just about who wants good relations with India or who is a well-wisher because all of the competitors were good friends of India and were India’s well-wishers.

Where they were different was in terms of which could do more for India. This should have been a purely cold, hard assessment. Such an assessment would have put the US and Russia as the top choices. While the European consortium and Sweden would probably have brought up in the back of this list, France would have been somewhere in the middle. It definitely has greater global weight than Sweden and probably a better bet than a consortium of several countries, but it would have been no match for the US or Russia.

Of course, this should not have been the only consideration. Strategic and diplomatic reasons alone should not decide which fighter jet was picked. India’s decision-makers should have also looked at the different technical capabilities of the various competing planes. In fact, the final choice should have been a combination of the technical merits and the political and strategic requirements. And this is the key criticism if the manner in which India has chosen to make the deal — using only technical parameters to make a choice and ignoring diplomatic and strategic factors.

Considering how big this contract was, India could have received significant political benefits, which it stands to lose by making a technical decision. Even France could very well make the argument that there is no political quid pro quo for India choosing the Rafale because India itself claims that this was not a political choice. There is little reason why France has to give any political support for a decision that was purely technical in nature.

This leaves India in the politically the worst position possible — both the US and Russia, politically far more significant than France on global issues, are unhappy with India, but India is unlikely to get much benefit from France despite picking the French plane. And unlike Britain, which is also unhappy about the Indian decision, the US and Russia matter quite a lot in the global arena. So, India has effectively annoyed more important friends for nothing.

There are other factors in addition to the strategic factor that also needs closer examination. The cost factor itself is a serious issue. The unit cost of the plane is only one factor. The cost — acquisition, lifecycle and maintenance cost — should have been an important determinant in this decision. As against hundred odd Rafale, India could have procured many more Russian or US fighter jets for the same value. The Rafale option has cost India dearly both on the acquisition as well as the cost of spare parts.

Thus, though there may have been good reasons for picking the Rafale from a technical point of view, or even from a domestic political perspective, this is not enough. The choice should have at least considered the strategic implications in such a big contract.

That might still have led to the Rafale being picked, but it would have been a more defensible decision.

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Flying into rough weather .... My OpEd on India's MMRCA decision in ToI

Here's a piece of mine on India's MMRCA decision that appeared in Times of India on Friday, Feb. 10, 2012.

New Delhi needs to be more careful in both understanding strategic moments and being able to exploit them if it wants to sit at the global high table.



India's long and convoluted search for a new fighter plane - a medium multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA) - has entered its final stage. New Delhi has just announced that the Rafale, built by Dassault Aviation of France, has been chosen to meet the Indian Air Force's (IAF) requirement. Only price negotiation now remains.

The Rafale had been shortlisted along with the Eurofighter Typhoon from a field that originally included four more jets: the US-built F-16 and F-18, the Russian MiG-35 and the Swedish JAS 39 Gripen. But though the fight over the selection is over, questions about the wisdom of New Delhi's choice are unlikely to end any time soon.

Commenting on the MMRCA decision, a former IAF officer proudly stated that this was probably the first decision that was made purely on technical grounds. If accurate, this reveals serious strategic shortsightedness. While the government should have received inputs from the IAF, such a decision should not have been taken on purely technical grounds. For India's decision-makers, limiting themselves to technical specifications was a risk-free option, but that reveals more about the state of strategic decision-making in Delhi than the wisdom of the choice they made.

Ideally, the Indian decision should have been guided by a strategy that balances reducing danger and broadening opportunity. Accordingly, the question for New Delhi should have been how to use this lucrative deal to beef up India's strategic options. Thus, it is probably a strategic blunder to narrowly focus on technical specifications and capabilities alone, as many proponents of the IAF's choice have done.

A decision of this magnitude should have been filtered through three key parameters: strategic, operational and tactical. A pragmatic strategy would have been to analyse the risk and opportunity through these three parameters and then make the final decision about which of the fighter plane choices would have best advanced Indian security. In strategic and geopolitical terms, France can provide little help to India in either Asia or in the global theatre. While France has always been a well-wisher, it has never had much capacity to help India. For example, though France wanted to sell India nuclear reactors, it could do little to change the nuclear non-proliferation rules that prevented it from doing so. It took Washington to change these rules to India's benefit.

Additionally, numbers (of aircraft India could acquire) and cost should have been factored in. Buying fewer but more expensive aircraft might make some fighter jocks happy, but having greater numbers might be more relevant to a country like India which faces a two-front threat from China and Pakistan. It was often argued in the MMRCA debate that maintaining air superiority required technological superiority, range and payload but an equally important consideration is that of numbers.

Numerical superiority in India's regional context is of particular significance given that the current strength of India's fighter jets is only around 600, and unless replenished, it will reach critically low numbers soon. Meanwhile, both Beijing and Islamabad have been augmenting their fighter fleets. India could have procured far greater numbers of fighters with the US or Russian option.

Though the probability of a two-front war is low, no pragmatic Indian strategic decision-maker should rule it out. Indeed, it is precisely for this reason that the Indian army is raising new forces to deploy on the China border. It is unclear if the technological superiority of the Rafale is so great as to compensate for the smaller numbers that India will have to settle for.

Cost should have also had an important role in the MMRCA decision. India's decision to go for Rafale is going to cost New Delhi around $20 billion, if not more. Opting for a Russian or US jet would have been far cheaper. The Russian option would have been the least expensive whereas the American fighters would have been somewhere in the middle with the European jets being the most expensive. In overall terms, the American F-18s would have been the best given that they (as well as the F-16s) came with the second-generation AESA radars.

Lastly, the most important consideration should have been the strategic benefits that accrue to India through this deal. Indian decision-makers should have been mindful of the fact that this deal was as much about making strategic investments in a relationship as simply buying fighters. India does not enjoy a benign neighbourhood, and these security needs are important. But India also needs to balance these with its requirements as a rising power, which means having capable friends. The MMRCA deal was a great opportunity to consolidate its strategic ties with either Russia or the US, or even with both. Instead, New Delhi has ended up antagonising both of them.

The standard response that India has signed many other defence contracts with both Russia and the US does not wash because this was a very different and high-profile deal which was closely watched around the world. Signing smaller deals, even if they add up to significant amounts, does not have the same weight as the MMRCA deal. New Delhi needs to be more careful in both understanding strategic moments and being able to exploit them if it wants to sit at the global high table.

Click Here to Read More..

My interview with The Diplomat .... on China's aircraft carrier, India's subs, missile defense options.....

Here's an interview of mine in the Diplomat published today ... touching upon issues including China's aircraft carrier, US-India relations and India's subs.

For the full interview, click here.



Meet The Diplomat Writers
February 7, 2012 By The Diplomat
The Diplomat speaks with Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, a senior fellow at the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi, who answers readers’ questions on China’s aircraft carrier, missile defense and India’s attack submarine.

Mark Sharpis (LinkedIn):
There has been much written and debated regarding China’s new carrier, the ex-Soviet carrier Varyag. What do you make of the carrier and its current capabilities? Do you see China’s new carrier as a threat to India? Do you feel it could be used as a platform to build future vessels?
We don’t know very much about the carrier, but it seems in line with what the PLA Navy’s Academic Research Institute had been stating, that it will be a “conventionally powered medium-sized carrier that would be equipped with Chinese engines, aircraft, radar and other hardware.” While there was no doubt that China will have its own aircraft carrier someday, external assessments as far as the timeline was concerned have been wrong. Many of the western assessments had calculated that Beijing would have its first carrier by 2012 or so. However, today, the aircraft carrier is only undergoing initial sea trials, and still testing its engines, navigation equipment, electronics, fire control and maintenance systems, according to published reports. But they are a long way away from carrying combat planes. It will be years before they have a carrier battle group comprising a consolidated group of frigates, destroyers, submarines and other support vessels.

Having said that, what does an aircraft carrier mean for China? Having an aircraft carrier in its arsenal doesn’t mean much as yet, and China is years away from being capable of even effective sea denial strategy in the East Asian maritime region. However, as a rising power, China will possess such capabilities and more in the future. If there are no serious hitches, the PLAN is scheduled to induct the carrier into service by October 2012, though this sounds ambitious.
China’s aircraft carrier plans are an element of its assertive naval posturing that it has been displaying vis-a-vis its neighbors in recent years – be it the East China Sea or the South China Sea. In fact, an aircraft carrier would provide Beijing with greater coercive means for enforcing its claims in these two seas. Reportedly, a Chinese defense ministry-run website suggested that the carrier should handle territorial disputes as well. A PLA Daily article, too, noted that in a theater like the South China Sea, a carrier would provide them the ability to apply significant air-to-ground firepower during military missions, while not being affected by geographical restrictions. They see the aircraft carrier as a “mobile maritime airport.”

What does the Chinese aircraft carrier mean for India and other neighbors? In the first place, it would induce caution in other maritime powers in the region, particularly India, the U.S. and Japan. China’s submarine force already has produced this effect to some extent on these powers; the aircraft carrier would compound it. As for the Southeast Asian countries, the Chinese aircraft carrier would be a display of power and prestige. In fact, a PLA Daily article said that the aircraft carrier has far greater political significance than military significance. This is particularly important given that until a few years back, the PLAN was the weakest wing of the Chinese military. But this has changed now with greater attention in favor of the naval and air wing of the military. Chinese strategists seem to believe that aircraft carriers are important if they want to have effective maritime power projection capabilities, as opposed to purely defensive tasks. Display of power and prestige is important both for internal and external audiences.

Manish Kumar (LinkedIn):
There has been speculation in the media that the United States and/or Europe may wish to work with India on missile defense technology. Do you feel such collaboration is possible? What benefits would it bring to India as well as its potential partners?
While India had traditionally opposed missile defense, it now acknowledges its utility and is developing it publicly given the short- and medium-range missile threats from both Pakistan and China. In essence, though Indian missile defense architecture isn’t yet settled, India appears to be planning to establish a multi-layered missile defense system. It has been reported that the system will include a huge network of advanced notification sensors, command centers and anti-missile land- and sea based missile batteries. However, we must remember that defense scientists have made many tall claims on a number of areas but have delivered very little. So though the interest in missile defense and in building domestic systems is clear, that doesn’t denote that this will be successful.

While India has been making efforts to develop a missile defense system indigenously, it has also sought foreign partners. In this regard, partnering with the U.S. may be particularly important. This was best evident in India’s reaction to President Bush’s NMD speech in May 2001. In contrast to the strident criticism to the United States’ Strategic Defense Initiative in the 1980s, India had adopted a much more nuanced and considered position that was in recognition of the utility of these systems in the Indian context. The changed stance was also based on the assumption that it might facilitate high-tech missile defense cooperation in addition to currying favor with Washington.

The most serious problem that India seems to face is unclear political direction. There appears to be no clear direction about whether India really wants to build such a system (either indigenously or imported) and no apparent considerations of the financial and strategic consequences of such a move. In the absence of such political direction, India’s defense research agencies are on auto-pilot, making grandiose plans, but their feasibility is unclear yet.

Harry Kazianis:
With your research agenda looking at U.S. missile defense, do you advocate for a specific missile defense that is better than others? Do you feel the SM-2 or SM-3 would offer the United States and its potential partners the best defense against today’s expanding anti-ship and cruise missile technologies? Do you see an exotic technology like rail guns or something on the horizon offering better protection?

I’m not even sure that missile defenses will be useful or necessary in the Indian context. And questions about specific systems have to wait until the purposes of BMDs are defined in the Indian context: are they for point defense or national defense? If for point defense (which is obviously more feasible) how many ‘points’ will be covered – just the National Command Authority (NCA) or other vital targets such as major population centers or strategic areas? Without even the most basic architectural questions resolved, it’s difficult to consider specific systems.

Stewart Walters (LinkedIn):
The United States has recently announced various budget cuts to its armed forces. Will America be able to “pivot” to the Pacific with such cuts being considered? If America is to truly pivot to the Asia-Pacific/Indo-Pacific, wouldn’t it need to increase the size of its Navy?
While the U.S. is undertaking major cuts in its defense expenditure, one thing has been made clear repeatedly in the last few months: the U.S. is back in Asia for good. Most recently, outlining the challenges, priorities and opportunities in the new U.S. defense strategy, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, President Obama said that while U.S. interests are global, its security and economic interests are intertwined with developments in the region, from Western Pacific and East Asia into the Indian Ocean region and South Asia. Therefore, the U.S. presence and influence in the Asia Pacific region is seen as necessary “rebalancing.” After being stretched too thin for a while, in both Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. is now attempting to rationalize its defense strategy. In fact, the changing geopolitical circumstances and fiscal compulsions dictate new dynamics to this strategy.

While budget pressures will make it difficult for the U.S., the “pivot” is more a political statement than one about the state of the U.S. military. I don’t think the U.S. lacks military capabilities in the region. While more might certainly be good for the U.S., it’s also a fine balance between the domestic economic requirements and military spending. In addition, as China strengthens, we are likely to see its neighbors step up their military efforts. I think they would realize now that they can’t entirely depend on American efforts alone. This additional regional capability should reduce slightly the burden on the U.S. also.

Jason Miks:
Where do you see U.S.-India relations going in the next ten years? Do you feel the U.S. and India will enter in some sort of Alliance structure? Will India stay away considering its past leadership in such ideas like the Non-Aligned Movement?
Since the conclusion of the U.S.-India nuclear deal, both Washington and New Delhi have been drifting. With the nuclear deal over, U.S. and India need another big idea to power the relationship over the next several years. Without such a political initiative at the highest levels, U.S.-India relations threaten once again to wallow in bureaucratic inertia. Space cooperation, cooperation in advanced technologies and managing the Indo-Pacific are potential areas that would bring the two sides closer.
In Washington, there’s significant disappointment on a number of issues including India’s nuclear liabilities bill, which for all practical purposes prevents the U.S. nuclear industry from participating in India’s civilian nuclear sector; and the Indian decision to reject two American competitors from the Indian Air Force’s lucrative Medium Multi Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) deal. In Delhi, on the other hand, there’s unhappiness at what is seen as American pressure for greater defense cooperation. These issues suggest that all is not well with U.S.-India relations.

However, there are several issues such as the global war on terrorism, the future of Pakistan-Afghanistan, managing the Asia-Pacific including maritime security and the protection of sea lines of communication that bind the two countries for the foreseeable future. Meanwhile, the more important aspect isn’t to lose sight of the importance of this bilateral relationship and hence invest time, effort and resources to nurture it.

While U.S.-India relations are likely to mature further and grow into a strong partnership, it’s unlikely that New Delhi will posture itself as an “ally” in the classical sense of the term. For that matter, the U.S. itself is moving away from the typical traditional alliance structure to more fluid strategic partners and coalitions of the willing.

While there are a few proponents of non-alignment in New Delhi, in reality, non-alignment was always more of a declaratory than a real policy. India has been trying hard to shed this policy and move into building partnerships with the west and the U.S. in particular, evident in the U.S.-India nuclear deal. But India also values its “strategic autonomy.” We should expect that India will cooperate with the United States and others on some areas, such as seeking a balance in Asia, but would not formally align with the U.S. But because the balance in the Asian region is also in a flux, India, like others, won’t make long-term bets. Paradoxically, it’s China’s rise that might dictate India’s strategy: if China should falter, there will be less pressure to cooperate with the U.S. and vice-versa.

Sandeep Sharma (Facebook):
Russia has just completed the transfer of an Akula II Nuclear Attack Submarine to India on a ten year lease. What knowledge and experience can India gain from such a move? How much of a benefit will it bring to India’s own nuclear submarine program?
INS Chakra is important for a variety of reasons. First of all, the Indian Navy will be operating a nuclear submarine after a gap of about twenty years; the last one, again Russian-leased, a Charlie II class vessel, was operated during 1988-1991. Operating this new Akula II class vessel will benefit the Indian Navy tremendously in training a new batch of submariners in nuclear operations.
While India can learn some of these lessons once its own nuclear-powered submarines come in, this lease offers India the option of getting a head start. In addition, nuclear submarine operations are a recently developed maritime skill, somewhat like carrier operations, and only a few countries have such capacity. The Indian Navy has an opportunity to learn these skills from those with experience rather than re-inventing the wheel very slowly. But most importantly, the Navy will be able to learn and apply lessons learnt to its own domestic submarine development program. And though there have been several controversies surrounding the Russian submarines, including the one that’s being leased to India, it’s important to bear in mind that there aren’t very many other countries that are willing to lease India a nuclear-powered submarine. So there are multiple benefits.

http://the-diplomat.com/author-spotlight/2012/02/07/meet-the-diplomat-writers-11/
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India's MMRCA Decision: Strategic Implications

Here's my take on India's MMRCA decision .... While the fight over the selection is over, questions about the wisdom of New Delhi's choice is unlikely to end any time soon. For India's current administration, beset with corruption scandals, letting technical merits alone determine the MMRCA decision was probably the politically easiest choice. But its strategic merits are somewhat less clear.

For the full article published by ORF, click here.



India's long and convoluted search for new fighter plane - or the MMRCA (Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft) - has entered its final stage. New Delhi has just announced that the Rafale, built by Dassault Aviation of France, has been chosen to meet the Indian Air Force's (IAF) requirement. Only price negotiation remains now.

The fight over the choice of aircraft appears to be now over. The Rafale had already been short-listed along with the Eurofighter Typhoon from a field which originally included four more jets: the US-built F-16 and F-18, the Russian MiG-35 and the Swedish JAS 39 Gripen. But, though the fight over the selection is over, questions about the wisdom of New Delhi's choice is unlikely to end any time soon.

Commenting on the MMRCA decision, Air Marshal Ahluwalia, a former IAF officer, proudly stated that this was probably the first decision that was made purely on technical grounds. While probably accurate, this reveals serious strategic short-sightedness. While the government should have received inputs from the Air Force, such decisions should not have been taken on purely technical grounds. For India's decision-makers, limiting themselves to technical specifications was a risk-free option, but that reveals more about the state of strategic decision-making in Delhi than the wisdom of the choice they made.

Ideally, the Indian decision should have been guided by a strategy that balances reducing danger and broadening opportunity. Accordingly, the question for New Delhi should have been how to use this lucrative deal to beef up India's strategic options. Thus it is probably a strategic blunder to narrowly focus on the technical specifications and capabilities alone, as many proponents of the IAF's choice have done. A decision of this magnitude should have been filtered through three key parameters: strategic, operational and tactical. Additionally, numbers (of aircraft India could acquire) and cost should have been factored in. Buying fewer but more expensive aircraft might make some fighter jocks happy, but having greater numbers might be more relevant to a country like India which faces a two-front threat from China and Pakistan. It was often argued in the debate about the MMRCA that maintaining air superiority required technological superiority, range and payload, but an equally important consideration is that of numbers. Numerical superiority in India's regional context is of particular significance given that the current strength of India's fighter jets is only around 600 and unless replenished, it will reach critically low numbers soon. Meanwhile, both Beijing and Islamabad have been augmenting their fighter fleets. India could have procured far greater numbers of fighters with the US or Russian option. Though the probability of a two-front war is low, no pragmatic Indian strategic decision-maker should rule it out. Indeed, it is precisely for this reason that the Indian army is raising new forces to deploy on the China border. It is unclear if the technological superiority of the Rafale is so great as to compensate for the smaller numbers that India will have to settle for.

Cost should have also had an important role in the MMRCA decision. India's decision to go for Rafale is going to cost New Delhi around $20 billion, if not more. Opting for a Russian or US jet would have been far cheaper for India. The Russian option would have been the least expensive whereas the American fighters would have been somewhere in the middle with the European jets being the most expensive. In overall terms, the American option in an F-18 would have been the best given that it (as well as F-16s) came with the second-generation AESA radars.

Lastly, the most important consideration should have been the strategic benefits that accrue to India through this deal. Indian decision-makers should have been mindful of the fact that this deal was as much about making strategic investments in a relationship as simply buying fighters. In strategic and geopolitical terms, France can provide little help to India in either Asia or in the global theatre. While France has always been a well-wisher, it has never had much capacity to help India. For example, though France wanted to sell India nuclear reactors, it could do little to change the nuclear non-proliferation rules that prevented it from doing so. It took Washington to change these rules to India's benefit.

For India's current administration, beset with corruption scandals, letting technical merits alone determine the MMRCA decision was probably the politically easiest choice. But its strategic merits are somewhat less clear.

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Writing the Rules on Space: Why Inclusion Matters

Recently two American scholars Bharat Gopalaswamy and Gaurav Kampani wrote an article on space code and the Indian debate, in Space News. The article, while citing my Occasional Paper, came to very different conclusions and even suggested that the current Indian debate was the role of a "spoiler." It went on further to suggest that "Indian security pundits seek power for India without the responsibility that comes with wielding it."

Here's my response article that has appeared in the Jan. 23 edition of Space News.


India’s interests in nonproliferation measures have been well known — starting from its efforts on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Despite its earnest intentions, New Delhi has been unable to effect serious transformation in the nonproliferation discourse. Now India is making efforts to play a constructive role on the space code of conduct issue that has been gaining momentum in recent months.

Although two codes are under discussion — the Stimson Center code and the European Union (EU) code — it is the EU code that has become contentious. The EU is making an eleventh-hour effort to gather support to universalize the code although it has been met with certain inflexible positions from non-EU capitals. While most of the countries have yet to come out with a formal position on the code, discussions and debates at unofficial parleys suggest that EU has a long, tough journey ahead in mustering the kind of support that it needs to have its space code institutionalized.

Debates in some Asian capitals have led to position papers that are indicative of certain broad trend lines as far Asian positions on the code are concerned. I recently produced a paper, published by the Observer Research Foundation, a Delhi-based think tank, that tried to summarize the perspectives from the Indian strategic, scientific and military communities. A recent commentary in Space News by two respected American analysts, Bharath Gopalaswamy and Gaurav Kampani, criticized some of the arguments made in my paper. I take this opportunity to respond to their comments.

India has an obvious interest in wanting to define the rules of the road on space (as do other powers). India is an emerging space power and it wants to curtail potential norms that will be counterproductive to its ambition in exploiting space. This is particularly important to a developing country that has invested enormous wealth toward its space program and now sees that being threatened because of issues such as space debris, aggravated by potential military tests in space, such as the anti-satellite (ASAT) tests that China and the U.S. have conducted in recent years. Thus, India has a material stake in the kinds of space rules now being proposed.

Gopalaswamy and Kampani underestimate the importance of the political component in international rule-making. The geopolitical value of India’s efforts in this normative exercise is tremendous. While the two authors appear astonished at some of the responses from the strategic community in New Delhi, this can at best be described as lacking an understanding of the geopolitical aspects of this exercise. A code, before it becomes institutionalized, goes through several critical stages — politico-diplomatic, technical and legal clearances.

Of these, the politico-diplomatic is the most critical for a variety of reasons. The kind of political support the code gathers determines the scope of the instrument. A successful politico-diplomatic initiative would ensure that it has wide-based support, even if it means that the content of the treaty is left as broad as possible to include all issues of concern to the various participants, including space debris and the arms race in space. In fact, today it is a problem of decision-making — more specifically, crisis in reaching a consensus (indeed, even in identifying challenges) among the major powers — that is at the root of the problem. This is not a problem unique to space security, of course, but that does not make it any easier. Major powers have to reach a political consensus in tackling some of these challenges, and in fact the technological part of the problem becomes much smoother if there is a political consensus among the major actors. Consensus also would ensure the longevity of any arms control measures in space. Gopalaswamy and Kampani fail to fully understand the import of this political imperative.

The EU clearly lost out on the politico-diplomatic front. If the EU were to do this again, it would be wise to go for an inclusive approach bringing together all the spacefaring nations and making them part of the creative process instead of the EU deciding on its own what is good for the world. While the EU’s initiative is commendable, its method is not.

Gopalaswamy and Kampani assert that India is “doggedly” insistent on a legal framework with enforcement and verification mechanisms built in. India does eventually want a legal framework, but Delhi is realistic to understand that it may have to move gradually toward such mechanisms and that it has to start from a normative exercise. India faces potential problems posed by both space debris and ASAT weapons, which are therefore understandably high on the agenda of Indian decision-makers. China’s ASAT test in 2007 was an eye-opener to the kinds of hard military realities that exist in India’s neighborhood.

The two authors have again reached misplaced conclusions about the importance of space debris in India’s priorities — including their reference to India’s failure to disaggregate space debris and ASAT tests. While the geopolitical and hard military realities may compel India to do an ASAT test, it is not to suggest that India underplays the criticality of space debris. It is also wrong to suggest that India does not pay attention to the creation of debris from a variety of different sources other than ASAT tests. The very fact that certain sections within the scientific establishment in India see the potential in using laser technology in order to reduce the amount of space debris is an illustration of the importance attached. Orbital debris remediation is certainly one area in which India and the U.S. could collaborate, and in fact this could easily feed into a broad array of cooperation in the space domain between the two countries.

The point to be emphasized is that precisely because India has an interest in the normative process and institutionalizing a space code, it is important for New Delhi to sit on the high table as an active party shaping the debate. It is rather unfortunate to characterize India’s efforts at triggering a debate on space security as that of a spoiler. India is certainly not looking to free-ride with major spacefaring nation status without shouldering any responsibility that comes along with that status.

The importance of being norm-shaper is important in the Indian discourse. This will also send out clear signals to its friends and foes in Asia and beyond about the potential role of India in any normative exercise. Therefore, the larger point is for India to have its own debate about the utility of the code of conduct and then become a full partner rather than to be pushed into it resentfully. Of course India has to come to the bargaining table with a strong proactive position that is considered and constructive and not reactive and defensive. It is not in India’s interests to be a naysayer in an international forum if it has ambitions to emerge as a major power in the coming decades.

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US Proposal on Space CoC: International Responses

Space code of conduct is in news with new developments almost on a daily basis. Here's a quickie from me on the international responses and what India should do to capture the space in framing the debate, published by ORF.

The debates around setting up an international code of conduct for outer space activities is getting more interesting. Recent proposals such as the Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) and the European Union-proposed Code of Conduct have highlighted the importance of a cleaner and safer outer space, although these have not found many takers around the world.



Most recently, the US rejected the EU Code saying that it is "too intrusive." Making the US position clear, Ellen Tauscher, Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, during a breakfast meeting on January 12, said, "it's been clear from the very beginning that we're not going along with the code of conduct." However, she clarified that "what we haven't announced is what we're going to do."Thereafter, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton issued a Press Statement and the Department of Defense (DoD) issued a Fact Sheet on space code of conduct arguing the need to come up with an international code of conduct. Specific concerns relate to space debris, radio frequency interference and competition as more countries and private corporations enter the fray.1

Official responses by Tauscher and thereafter by the State Department and DoD to the EU Code have sent mixed signals. On the one hand, the US has rebuffed the code saying it constrains the US military's options in space while the DoD suggested that the Code is "a promising basis for an international code." This indicates that there is probably only a minor disagreement - over who spearheads the Code initiative so that it musters wide support. However, this is a smart political move by the US. The EU could not have managed to gather much support for its initiative.

Meanwhile, there have already been some reactions to the US proposal. Moscow ridiculed Washington for sidelining or ignoring the earlier initiatives at framing measures for responsible behaviour in outer space. A few months back, Beijing used similar arguments as the US reached across to start bilateral talks on space security.

Moscow also found slip-ups in the new American approach saying that the critical issue of militarisation of space is missing in Washington's proposal. There is merit in this; the draft treaty proposed by Russia and China, "Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects"(PPWT) at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) makes "prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space and of an arms race in outer space" as important elements of their initiative. However, there are also several flaws with this formulation. First, the draft treaty considers only placement of weapons in outer space and does not take into account ground-based weapons for outer space operations. In fact, 'weaponisation of outer space' often refers only to weapons placed in outer space that will damage and destroy space-based assets. But this is inadequate because ground-based weapons can also target space activities. Ground-based lasers, for example, can target satellites.Operations based on ground-based weapons are likely to go up in the future.

Second, China had earlier made it clear that it did not consider space debris as a major issue to be included in a code,which reflects the Chinese intention to carry on with activities that may create debris, and damage and destroy space assets. Third, China's military space activities have continued unabated even as it suggests the PPWT. There are also other contradictions - China, on the one hand, works with COPUOS on the issue of space debris but on the other hand, it makes it clear that it will not support an instrument that considers space debris as an issue.

Now that Moscow has made its position clear, it will be the turn of Beijing to voice its opposition to the US effort as a superficial initiative that does not look at weaponisation of space. It appears that China and Russia will join hands again and earn some brownie points from arms controllers by harping about weaponisation of space while continuing with their weaponisation efforts. But more importantly, Moscow and Beijing need to introspect whether their activities are contributing and strengthening the writing of these rules. Michael Listner, for instance, opines that the two of them have in fact have done the "most destructive ASAT tests" creating debris to such levels where the "ISS is playing the orbital version of dodge ball."

Meanwhile, it appears that Australia is getting on board for an international code under the US leadership. Japan had already endorsed the EU Code and one can see an even greater effort on the part of Tokyo to push and muster support for the US proposal. Canada has also extended full support for the proposal.

How should India react to the developments? It is in India's interests to institute a code for guiding certain responsible behavior in order to ensure a cleaner, safer, and less congested outer space. It is also in Indian interests to ensure that a code takes shape that brings certain restraint on China. And, it will be to our benefit if India took the lead in spearheading the creation of a code along with the US and other major spacefaring powers. It is understood that in a recent briefing on the issue in Washington DC, US officials repeatedly emphasized the potentially critical role that India could play in developing a code, starting from negotiations to giving shape to the final instrument. Consultative meetings should start towards this end in the next few months and it will do well if India debates this internally and reaches considered and constructive position on the subject. India should recognize that it should not let opportunity pass again on a major global issue. New Delhi has to be inside the tent rather than outside if it is to be able to frame the rules and regulations that will affect its own future in space.
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1 It is estimated that there are around 60 nations and government consortia that operate satellites. There are additionally several commercial and academia satellite operators, which make outer space a congested place. There are roughly 22,000 objects in orbit out of which 1,100 are active satellites, tracked by the US Department of Defense. In addition, there are hundreds of thousands of small objects that may be difficult to track but those that can still cause damage to assets in the orbit. For info, see Department of State, International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities: Strengthening Long-Term Sustainability, Stability, Safety, and Security in Space, January 17, 2012, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/181208.pdf.

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Space Code: A potential area for US-India cooperation

In the recent weeks, there have been several developments on the space code ... most recently, the US rejecting it saying it is too restrictive. Here's my take (published on ORF website) on the debate and the future course, particularly looking at whether India and the US can shape this debate and ultimately a code of conduct on space.

Space debris, traffic management and orbital frequency being issues that concern both India and the US, this ideally should be on the agenda in future US-India endeavours. It might be good for both the countries if they can engage in shaping this debate that would give them ownership of the issue.



As outer space becomes increasingly crowded, it has become clear that there needs to be some clear rules for regulating activities of different nation-states in space. Instituting such a code of conduct on outer space activities has been at the centre stage for the past few months. The United Nations took the lead in this regard in 2008, with the General Assembly adopting resolution 62/217, endorsing the "Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines" of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS). The European Union (EU) also proposed a code of conduct on space, but it has run into rough waters for a variety of reasons and the EU has not managed to muster much support for their initiative outside the EU capitals. While the EU needs to be complimented for its initiative, unfortunately the EU did not institute a consultative mechanism, which could have brought together all the major space-faring countries. This has hurt the prospects of the EU Code.

While India has not taken a formal position on the EU Code, discussions at informal parleys suggest that India too has concerns. To start with, India has been concerned with the fact that the EU did not engage major space-faring powers, including India, in this exercise. The exclusive approach adopted by the EU in this regard has made this exercise futile. Second, while the EU Code is a voluntary and non-binding arrangement, it expects states to establish national policies that are in sync with the EU guidelines, which may or may not be in the interests of India. Such measures have been seen as affecting the legitimate national security interests of other countries.

Similar concerns have been expressed in Washington as well. Most recently, the US rejected the EU Code on the grounds that it is "too restrictive." On January 12, Ellen Tauscher, Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, made the US position quite clear on the EU Code saying that "it's been clear from the very beginning that we're not going along with the code of conduct." However, she also went on to say that "what we haven't announced is what we're going to do."

American concerns have ranged from the fact that this non-binding, voluntary arrangement could restrict the US military's options in space to the issue of a non-ownership of the code, the document having been produced by the EU. For instance, in a Senate hearing in May, Senator Jeff Sessions said, "we've advanced further technologically in development and actual deployment of these systems than anyone else, and agreements [and] codes of conduct tend to … constrain our military." An assessment by the Pentagon's Joint Staff supported this assessment, stating that the US becoming a party to the EU Code "would hurt the US military's space operations in several areas." Similarly, a State Department cable on the subject noted that the US "continues to have significant concerns about the widespread use of language connoting binding obligations, such as 'shall' and 'will,' in the proposed non-binding Code of Conduct."

Having junked the EU Code as too restrictive, the US is now in the process of working on a new draft, of course, with the EU draft "as a promising basis for an international Code." US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in a Press Statement made amply clear the importance of instituting a code that "will help maintain the long-term sustainability, safety, stability, and security of space by establishing guidelines for the responsible use of space." The US intends to join the EU and other countries in developing a code as a way of strengthening international cooperation while constraining irresponsible behaviour. However, the US move in this direction has already come in for criticism from Republicans on the ground that this is a typical Liberal arms control measure. John R. Bolton, former Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, criticised the new move saying, "the last thing the United States needs is a space code of conduct. The idea of arms control has already failed in the Russian 'reset' policy, and it is sure to fail here as well." Among other criticism, two national security officials condemned the administration's national security policies as arms control-driven, which emphasise on concluding international pacts rather than building its military capabilities.

In sum, while the Obama Administration's interests in instituting a code for a safe and workable outer space environment is legitimate, this is an election year and neither the Obama Administration nor any of the other Presidential candidates will want to commit themselves to a code, especially when it has not been produced by the US.

Can the new US proposal to write the rules of the road on space be an area of interest for India? India clearly has interests in laying out the rules of the road for space conduct but it also has an interest in being recognised as a major space-faring power whose voice should form an intrinsic part in creating these rules. India cannot come on board as a latecomer. In a sense, the "Not Made Here" syndrome probably best characterises the Indian position on the EU Code. Indian interests are driven by several factors including the geopolitics of Asia and the Indian neighbourhood, which is rather hostile. Therefore, it has an interest in a normative exercise that will reduce China's aggressive and unregulated behaviour in outer space, best illustrated by their irresponsible Anti-Satellite (ASAT) test in 2007 that left behind a huge amount of space debris. Given that space debris, traffic management and orbital frequency are issues that concern both India and the US, this ideally should be on the agenda in future US-India endeavours. New Delhi's broader approach has been to institute an inclusive and comprehensive approach in addressing space security.

How should India shape the discourse in this regard? As a first step, it will be in India's interest to produce a backgrounder or white paper outlining the importance of space in India's developmental and security calculus. This in turn should lead to identifying what kind of a space future it would like to see and thereafter identify areas that would contribute to such an environment while putting in place measures that would constrain India's ability to help generate such a future. It might be good for both India and the US if they can engage in shaping this debate that would give them ownership of the issue.

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India A Long-term Strategic Partner: US Defense Strategy

The US recently announced its new defense strategy, taking into account the new geopolitical realities and the fiscal compulsions back home. The new strategy lays particular emphasis in developing a long-term strategic partnership with India. Here are my quick thoughts on the new strategy.

Outlining the challenges, opportunities and priorities, President Obama released the US defence strategy, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, on January 05, 2012. After an overstretch by the US military in the last decade in both Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. is now attempting to rationalise its defence strategy. The changing geopolitical circumstances and fiscal compulsions add new dynamics to this strategy.



The new strategy, however, should not to be mistaken for a retreat. Obama was categorical in stating that while the U.S. military will be downsized, moving towards a smaller and leaner force, they will remain "agile, flexible, and ready for the full range of contingencies" with continuing investment in capabilities, including "intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; counter-terrorism; countering weapons of mass destruction; operating in anti-access environments; and prevailing in all domains, including cyber."

The defence strategy outlined the core US national interests as "defeating al-Qa'ida and its affiliates and succeeding in current conflicts; deterring and defeating aggression by adversaries, including those seeking to deny our power projection; countering weapons of mass destruction; effectively operating in cyberspace, space, and across all domains; maintaining a safe and effective nuclear deterrent; and protecting the homeland."

The document also highlights the US plan to effectively deal with anti-access and area denial (A2AD) strategies. This emphasises a range of capabilities, including developing new stealth bombers, improving missile defences, improving the effectiveness of critical space-based capabilities and submarine technologies. Recognising the importance of information and communication networks in future operations as also the vulnerability that these mediums face, the document attaches special attention to further protection to cyberspace and space assets. International partnerships with allies and partners to develop new capabilities to effectively defend their networks and maintain operational effectiveness in outer space and cyberspace are an important part of efforts to reduce vulnerabilities and strengthen defences. U.S. and India have a great deal to cooperate, particularly in this regard, given the kind of threats and attacks that the two countries have witnessed in the recent years.

While the U.S. interests are global, its security and economic interests are intertwined with developments in the regions, from Western Pacific and East Asia into the Indian Ocean region and South Asia. Therefore, the U.S. presence and influence in the Asia Pacific region is seen as "of necessity rebalancing." Similarly, even though the importance of its traditional allies remains unquestionable, the need to have more friends and partners in the region is undeniable. Accordingly, the U.S. is seeking to build and strengthen partnerships in the region so as to improve "collective capability and capacity".

It is in this context that the US sees India. The U.S. investment "in a long-term partnership with India to support its ability to serve as a regional economic anchor and provider of security in the broader Indian Ocean region" is clearly part of this effort. However, in less than 24 hours after the release of the defense strategy, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, in an interview to the PBS, has talked about rising powers including India as a challenge. While it is fair that the U.S. is still coming to grapple with the new and fast-changing geopolitical shift from the West to Asia, it is unclear why they see India in somewhat the same light as China, as a challenge.

On the other hand, China's rise as a regional power in the Asia Pacific presents both opportunities and challenges for the U.S. While both countries have interests in seeing a stable East Asian order, the opaqueness of Chinese military objectives and intentions continue to be a factor in U.S. thinking. However, U.S. recognises that issues such as freedom of navigation that ensures smooth flow of cargo and resources and the U.S. influence in the region will depend partly on the kind of U.S. military posturing.

China has already reacted saying that while the U.S. is encircling China, Beijing cannot afford to bend backwards to appease Washington. In this context, 'Freedom of the seas' is an obvious reference to the South China Sea - an area in which there has been greater exchange of minds between India and the U.S. But, Panetta in the interview to the PBS, was of the view that the U.S. will need to work with China on a host of issues, including North Korea, nuclear proliferation and free passage of goods and resources in the international waters.

While Obama has been categorical that the new strategy should not be seen as a drawdown of the U.S. in any manner, the important question is how the proposed budget cuts are going to affect certain weapon platforms such as the F-35. Similarly, it is not clear how the whole budget mess will affect the U.S. capacity to fund this strategy. Equally important, there is the possibility that this new approach might not last very long considering that Obama faces a tough presidential campaign over the next year.

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Asia and a Space Code

Here's an article of mine on the emerging Asian views on a space code. The article appeared in the Diplomat yesterday.

Asian concerns on a space code are important because future challenges to space cooperation may well come from Asia, not least because so many of the new space powers are emerging from this region.



Establishing international norms for space has gradually started to become a priority in recent months, with two codes – the EU Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities and the Stimson Center’s Model Code of Conduct – being the subject of much international debate. And while the Stimson Code has been perceived as less controversial, the EU Code has come in for significant flak, particularly in Asia.

Asian concerns are important because future challenges to space cooperation may well come from Asia, not least because so many of the new space powers are emerging from this region.

One key mistake the European Union made was not engaging India, one of the oldest space faring powers, earlier in the process. India is interested in instituting norms to guide the behavior of others in the space arena, but it’s also interested in being acknowledged as one of the major space powers. While the Indian position is evolving, the “not invented here” syndrome characterizes much of its current mood.

But even as the European Union is making fresh efforts in reaching out to countries to gain support for the code, nations such as China have already made their positions clear. One EU official speaking at a conference in Paris, for example, described the Chinese as being opposed to space debris being a major item in the code. This suggests that China has plans to carry out more anti-satellite tests, something that has raised a red flag in New Delhi.

Meanwhile, China has been critical of the EU’s emphasis on sharing information about national space policies and strategies, including objectives for security related policies. Beijing has made it clear that it will be “impossible” to share information on national security.

In addition, China has articulated the need for a code under a multilateral framework that includes discussion among all space faring powers. But it has also made clear it won’t agree to any arrangements potentially affecting its development in the military space domain. While China has been active at the U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space over a number of issues, its military space program has made considerable advances.

In contrast, another Asian space giant, Japan, seems to be completely behind the code. Hirofumi Katase, deputy secretary general in Japan’s Secretariat for Space Policy, urged the code’s global adoption. This move was in many ways expected given Japan’s preferences for major arms control measures. Still, the reality is that Tokyo’s space program has clearly begun to shift from completely civilian toward a potentially more militarized program.

Australia, meanwhile, hasn’t formally made its position clear. It appears in principle to agree with the sentiments expressed in the EU code, and there’s a general appreciation for the emphasis on transparency and confidence-building measures, which are traditionally popular in the West.

The United States hasn’t taken a final official position on the code, but it’s unlikely that it will fully endorse the document. Concerned that U.S. military utilization of outer space may potentially be restrained, the Department of Defense has expressed reservations over the United States becoming a party to the code.

While instituting a code of conduct on space is of the utmost importance, the West, particularly the European Union, needs to acknowledge the global nature of the issue, and the importance of the involvement of all concerned countries. The need to have Asian space powers on board is significant given the geo-political weight of Asia, and unless Asian countries are brought properly into the process, any code that the West may pursue will simply end up being a toothless treaty.

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End of Road for America?

2012 has begun on a hectic note for me. Hence, even posting an article that was published on January 01, 2012 has got delayed. Anyway, late better than never. So, here it is ... an OpEd of mine on the much-hyped US retreat. Is it a retreat? I would say, in sum, the picture is mixed. While the US has suffered some strategic reverses, it has also made a few gains. It is not yet time to write off the United States of America. The OpEd was published by The Pioneer on January 01, 2012.



The United States saw a retreat, both economic as well as strategic, in 2011. Will the decline be arrested in 2012?

Talks about America’s retreat, both economic and strategic, are gaining momentum. The 2008 financial crisis and its continuing reverberations, the American pull out of Iraq a few weeks back and Afghanistan next year, and the strategic stalemate in Iran and North Korea where Washington hasn’t been able to force these weaker powers to bend to its will — all these are touted as indicators of US decline. While these signs need to be taken seriously, there are pointers which clearly suggest that its dominance in world affairs is far from being over.

America has spent enormously, both in wealth and blood, in Afghanistan and Iraq. While the Kabul mission has had greater domestic support, Baghdad has always been a controversial venture even within the US. Their global implications have been equally, if not more, disastrous. A decade of efforts by the world’s most powerful military, using the world’s most advanced technologies of warfare, has been insufficient in gaining Washington a clear victory. Though the US managed to extricate itself from Baghdad in a relatively better condition than it did out of Saigon in 1975, there is little doubt that the mission in Iraq and Afghanistan failed to provide tangible results.

The second indicator of American retreat is Washington’s declining global economic dominance. The financial crisis that hit the US in 2008 began to have serious impact on the nation’s debt-income ratio. In 2011, the country’s national debt overtook its national income. As of December 15, 2011, the gross debt was $15.098 trillion, of which $10.438 trillion was held by the public and $4.659 trillion was intragovernmental holdings. In contrast, in June 2011, the annual gross domestic product was $15.003 trillion.

Meanwhile, other powers such as China and India have been growing fast. Though these trends have been long-standing ones, going back to the end of World War II, their consequences are now appearing to be quite grim for the US. The rise of the BRIC nations, America’s rising foreign debt and a steady shift of the manufacturing sector out of the US are all suggesting that Washington’s global dominance is nearing its end.

Third, Iran and North Korea have become belligerent and the US appears to be in no position to convince them to change their behaviour. The fact that Pyongyang can only be influenced by Beijing has only worsened the situation for Washington. After all, China has been less than forthcoming in helping tone down the aggression of the North Korean leadership. In two decades of negotiations, Pyongyang has become a nuclear power, withdrawn from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and is now thought to be a potential nuclear proliferation threat. Likewise, the US is unable to get Iran change its policies and countries like Russia and China with veto power have restrained America’s manoeuvrability to a large extent. The fiasco with the bad intelligence that led to the Iraq war has meant that Washington is not in a position to convince global opinion that Tehran is building nuclear weapons.

Fourth, the impact of the Arab Spring on the US and its global image hasn’t been positive either. This is odd. After all, America has for long been championing the cause of democracy and human rights in the region. Several US allies have been the ones whom the Arab street targeted and threw out of power, leaving a big question mark on the support for America in these countries. Egypt is a case in point. The new leadership/regime that emerges in these countries need not necessarily be US-friendly and this undermines Washington’s position in the region.

While all these may seem unfavourable, a more holistic overview would demonstrate that it is not that bad for the US. While the decline (in relative terms) is indisputable, there are counterpoints that need to be kept in mind.

So, if one were to concede a strategic and economic retreat for America, how bad is it? For instance, everyone talks about the economic mess that the US is in today, but we should remember that almost every country is in trouble today. Also, the dollar appreciation in recent times demonstrates the economic strength of America. For all the Chinese economic growth story or its influence/stake in the financial restructuring, Beijing does not have the ability to float an alternate currency. Nor can it afford to invest its money in any currency other than the dollar. The Euro crisis has further reinforced the American role in the global economic system.

Second, America’s retreat from Iraq and Afghanistan may appear as weakness, but the move will help Washington consolidate its domestic economy, besides reducing the direct threat that the country faces from Islamist terrorists. Refocussing domestically should help the US deal with the problem better.

On the strategic front, while the US may be disappointed in not being able to get its way vis-à-vis Iran and North Korea, President Barack Obama’s unwearied policy in dealing with the two is gradually paying off. Today the allies as well as other countries in the region are calling upon the US to take necessary action, thus giving Washington a lot more legitimacy to pursue a pro-active policy. For instance, the Arab League is more open to a concrete action being taken against Iran. Similar is the scenario in East Asia, where most countries are today far more keen about the US playing an active role in the region than they were a decade ago. Of course, China’s aggressive foreign policy towards its neighbours has helped the American cause.

America’s military modernisation is another issue. While China is doing a lot in terms of catching up with the US, Washington still maintains an unmatchable technological edge. The drone war, for instance, which the US has pursued against terrorists in Afghanistan and Pakistan, is a feat that no other country can duplicate anytime in the near future. Similarly, the killing of Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden in Pakistan was an incredible exercise of the American hard power. The kind of intelligence, military and technological capabilities that the country put to use was stupendous and cannot be replicated by other nations in the near future.

Last, the Arab Spring may have been bad news for some American allies, but many of its regional adversaries (Muammar Gaddafi in Libya and Bashar al-Assad in Syria), too, have also suffered losses.

In sum, the picture is mixed. While the US has suffered some strategic reverses, it has also made a few gains. It is not yet time to write off the United States of America.

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