The Sino-Indian Clash: Russia in the Middle - The Diplomat, 25 June 2020

Once again, I am lagging with my blog updates. A couple of weeks ago, I wrote a piece for The Diplomat on the Sino-Indian border clash and how Russia has positioned itself on the same. Clearly, the Sino-Indian clash puts Russia in an awkward position.

In the midst of a border crisis with China, Indian Defense Minister Rajnath Singh is away in Moscow. At the same time, India’s foreign minister joined his Russian and Chinese counterparts online for an Russia-India-China (RIC) meeting. The Sino-Indian crisis potentially puts Russia in a difficult position, having to choose between its traditional partners in India, which also represents a lucrative arms market, and its new but much more powerful friend in the east, China.

For the full essay, click here.



The ostensible reason for Singh’s visit to Russia was to attend the rescheduled Victory Day Parade. The annual parade commemorating the end of World War II was supposed to be held on May 9, but was postponed due to the pandemic. A 75-member tri-service Indian military contingent participated in the parade.

The Chinese defense minister was also in Moscow to attend the same parade. However, the Indian side made it clear that there would be no meeting between the two ministers. All negotiations between India and China on the border crisis are taking place bilaterally either through diplomatic channels or through local military commanders. The fact that the RIC meeting was an online affair also helps to ensure that Russia is not forced to mediate between the two sides.

Indian anger at China is palpable. In fact, Indian Foreign Minister Dr. S. Jaishankar in his speech at the RIC pointedly stated that “the challenge today is not just one of concepts and norms, but equally of their practice. The leading voices of the world must be exemplars in every way.”

India’s interests in Russia are obvious. A significant part of Indian military equipment comes from Russia. In the midst of the crisis with China, the Indian Air Force has asked for 33 new fighter aircraft including 21 MiG-29s and 12 Su-30 MKIs from Russia. This is an old acquisition plan, but it has been pushed for accelerated delivery. The deal is worth over 60 billion Indian rupees ($793 million) and is expected to be approved by the Ministry of Defense in the coming days. In addition, India had already ordered 272 Su-30 MKIs spread over a 10 to 15-year time frame.

Meanwhile, India has also asked Russia for the expedited delivery of the S-400 anti-missile system. The two sides signed a contract for the S-400s in 2019. The original delivery was scheduled for 2021. There were reports that because of COVID-19, the delivery would be delayed. Singh was expected to seek an expedited delivery of the system.

Singh was also seeking assurances that the spare parts supply for Russian equipment that India already has in its arsenal will not be delayed during any crisis with China. Specifically, he was referring to the issue of spare parts for Russian-origin fighter aircraft (including the Su-30MKIs and MiG-29s of the Air Force and the MiG29Ks of the Indian Navy), the T-90 battle tanks for the Army, and the Navy’s Kilo-class submarines.

The Sino-Indian clash puts Russia in an awkward position as a recent analysis in The Wall Street Journal by Yaroslav Trofimov and Thomas Grove pointed out. There is growing recognition in Moscow about pressure from Beijing. But as the report pointed out, Russia is also stuck with China because of pressure from the West. Russia’s difficulties in improving relations with Europe have left Moscow with few options.

In the current crisis, Russia appears to have little interest in mediating between China and India. As Konstantin Kosachev, a senior lawmaker and chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Russian Federation Council, told the Indian media that Russia should not interfere in the India-China dispute and that these should be dealt with through bilateral channels.

At the recent RIC meeting, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov also maintained that India and China do not need any help in resolving their bilateral issues. Although Russia might want to keep its head down in the current crisis, Russian reactions are also being closely watched by the Indian public. Russia has a reservoir of support in India because of its traditional support, including during the 1971 India-Pakistan War. This support glosses over the fact that Russia was neutral during the 1962 Sino-Indian War because it occurred simultaneously with the Cuban missile crisis. Russia’s relations with China had become increasingly rocky – in fact, closer Soviet relations with India were one factor in the Sino-Soviet rift – but the need for Beijing’s support during the Cuban missile crisis forced Moscow to be neutral. That removed an important leg of India’s diplomatic strategy at the time. Almost 60 years later, New Delhi is probably worried that history will repeat and Russia might lean toward China simply by staying neutral.

Amidst a Pandemic, Donald Trump Signs Order to Mine on the Moon - The Wire, 12 April 2020

I write for The Wire on US President Trump's Executive Order to mine on the Moon. On the anniversary of Yuri Gagarin's (and humankind's) first journey into space, the US Executive Order, stipulating that Americans should have the right use the resources of space, rings outrageous.

In the midst of the global pandemic crisis, US President Donald Trump has found time to sign an Executive Order charting out a new US policy on recovery and use of resources on the Moon, including water and minerals.

Despite the pandemic, the move has received global attention, much of it critical. But there are also some seeking to partner with the US on lunar exploration.

For the full post, click here.

The Executive Order reads that Americans “should have the right to engage in commercial exploration, recovery, and use of resources in outer space, consistent with applicable law. Outer space is a legally and physically unique domain of human activity, and the United States does not view it as a global commons.”

The US seeking “the right to engage in commercial exploration, recovery, and use of resources in outer space” is possibly in line with international law. Nevertheless, it is controversial because it is unclear who other than national courts could enforce any mining rights, and national courts, in turn, cannot do so without exercising sovereign rights, as lawyers have pointed out.

But the explicit assertion that outer space will not be considered as part of global commons is new.

Space powers have generally been uncomfortable with idea of space as a global common because this was thought to preclude mining and extracting resources from space.

This was a major reason why the US and many other spacefaring nations such as the Soviet Union/Russia, China and Japan and even many of the countries making up the European space consortium refused to sign the Moon treaty. India is the only space power that has signed the treaty, though New Delhi has not yet ratified it.

Following the Executive Order, Dr. Scott Pace, Deputy Assistant to the President and Executive Secretary of the National Space Council, stated in a press statement that as the US “prepares to return humans to the Moon and journey on to Mars, this Executive Order establishes US policy toward the recovery and use of space resources, such as water and certain minerals, in order to encourage the commercial development of space.”

He went on to add that “the order reaffirms US support for the 1967 Outer Space Treaty while continuing to reject the 1979 Moon Agreement, which only 17 of the 95 Member States of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space have ratified in the past four decades.”

He also pointed out that the Executive Order “reinforces the 2015 decision by Congress that Americans should have the right to engage in the commercial exploration, recovery, and use of resources in outer space.”

This Executive Order needs to be seen in the light of this 2015 US legislation that Dr. Pace referenced, the “Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act of 2015”, signed into law by President Barack Obama, which permits American companies to extract space resources.

A second document that relates to the Executive Order is the NASA’s Artemis lunar exploration programme. Last week, NASA came out with a report, the Plan for Sustained Lunar Exploration and Development, which outlines plans for long-term space exploration. The reports details plans for the next several years which includes humans returning to the Moon and a mission thereafter to “also emplacing and building the infrastructure, systems, and robotic missions that can enable a sustained lunar surface presence.” In order to do this, NASA wants to “develop Artemis Base Camp at the South Pole of the Moon.”

On the lunar exploration for water and other minerals, a White House space adviser is reported to have told the media that “it was important to clarify what US policy was toward the Moon Agreement and then lay out a more positive vision going forward.” Section 2 of the Executive Order talks about the Moon Agreement, saying that the US is not a party to the Agreement; and that the US does not believe “the Moon Agreement to be an effective or necessary instrument to guide nation states regarding the promotion of commercial participation in the long-term exploration, scientific discovery, and use of the Moon, Mars, or other celestial bodies.”

Trump has further directed the Secretary of State to oppose to any state or multilateral organisation that would consider the Moon Agreement as customary international law.

The other aspect that is emphasised in the Executive Order is the US seeking collaboration with like-minded partners. To this end, Trump has directed the Secretary of State to work out bilateral and multilateral statements of intent and arrangements “regarding safe and sustainable operations for the public and private recovery and use of space resources.”

The president has sought action on this within 180 days. It remains unclear what happens to the body of work done by The Hague Space Resources Governance Working Group which has been working to develop a legal framework for the use of space resources found on asteroids and other celestial bodies.

While most spacefaring countries are yet to make a formal response to the Executive Order, deputy head of Russian Roscosmos in charge of international cooperation is reported to have said that Trump’s Executive Order is “comparable” to colonialism. The Roscosmos has stated that “Attempts to expropriate outer space and aggressive plans to actually seize territories of other planets hardly set the countries (on course for) fruitful cooperation.” The Kremlin is also reported to have remarked that “any colonization of space would be ‘unacceptable’.”

The US is not the only country that has plans for the Moon and other celestial bodies. China has ambitious plans in this regard too. A few years ago, Ye Peijian, chief commander and designer of China’s lunar exploration programme stated that China would send the first batch of asteroid exploration spacecraft around 2020.

Ye added that “many of the asteroids near the Earth contain high concentrations of precious metals,” which could rationalise the huge cost and risks involved in these activities. He estimated their economic value to be in the trillions of US dollars.

Despite its criticism of the US move, Russia is not lagging behind when it comes to asteroid mining and other space exploration plans either. Russia plans to have a permanent base on the Moon somewhere after 2025 for possible extraction of Helium. In the mid-2000s, Russia had said that it will have a lunar base between 2015 and 2025. These plans appear to have been delayed because of domestic difficulties. Additionally, both Russia and China are also planning to team up, contributing science payloads to their respective Luna-26 and Chang’e-7 spacecraft sometime in the 2020s. They also plan to establish a joint lunar and deep space data centre with hubs in both the countries.

Given the changing balance of power dynamics, the outer space domain is once again becoming a victim to great power competition and rivalry.

To minimise the harmful impact of this competition and to establish certain amount of predictability in outer space affairs, there have been several efforts to develop certain global rules of the road. But these efforts have not made any progress.