Why the India-Sri Lanka-Maldives NSA-level Talks Matter - The Diplomat, 4 December 2020

In my first column for The Diplomat in December, I looked at the increasing strategic relevance of the India-Sri Lanka-Maldives NSA-level talks.  I argue that the nature of bilateral political relations in the Indian Ocean region has an impact on the quality of subregional engagements such as the NSA-level talks held in Colombo.  

Last week, Colombo hosted an India-Sri Lanka-Maldives trilateral maritime security dialogue. The meeting saw the revival of the national security advisor (NSA)-level dialogue among the three countries, which began almost a decade ago in 2011. That the meeting took place six years after the last edition in 2014 is significant. Both Sri Lanka and the Maldives are rcritical maritime neighbors to India in the Indian Ocean region and there have been continuous efforts by both India and China to win friends and favors in Colombo and Male.

For the full post, click here.  

The NSA-level talks are also a demonstration of the Indian intent to push subregional diplomacy, which has been gaining traction in India’s foreign policy in the last few years. The Modi government has made efforts to engage in subregional diplomacy as a useful track following the near-complete halt in regional diplomacy in South Asia under the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). 

For the Colombo trilateral, the Indian side was represented by National Security Advisor Ajit Doval whereas the Maldives sent its defense minister, Mariya Didi, and Sri Lanka was represented by Defense Secretary Maj. Gen. (retd) Kamal Gunaratne. Mauritius and the Seychelles were also present virtually at the level of senior officials. With the goal of encouraging meaningful maritime cooperation in the Indian Ocean region, India, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives discussed a number of areas for possible collaboration such as maritime domain awareness (MDA), humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR), joint military exercises, capacity building, maritime security threats, marine pollution, and maritime underwater heritage. The Heads of Delegations decided that they would meet periodically to maintain the momentum of the dialogue and to ensure timely execution of the decisions taken at the NSA-level meetings. According to the joint statement, a decision was also made to institute deputy NSA-level working group meetings biannually for cooperation at the operational level.  

So far, there have been several iterations of the trilateral meetings at the NSA-level. The first, hosted by the Maldives, was held in Male in 2011, following which Sri Lanka hosted the second edition. The third was held in New Delhi in 2014, which was attended also by Mauritius and the Seychelles as “guest countries.”   

Following the first trilateral meeting, the India-Maldives “DOSTI” joint coast guard exercise in 2012 added Sri Lanka and was held as a trilateral exercise. The India-Maldives DOSTI exercises have been going on since 1991 and are aimed at strengthening capabilities of the three partners in the area of search and rescue operations, combating piracy and armed robbery, damage control, and casualty evacuation at sea. India and Sri Lanka also have held bilateral naval exercises called SLINEX since 2005. The latest iteration, the eighth, was held off Trincomalee in Sri Lanka in October 2020. India’s official statement on the exercise noted that the synergistic approach developed by the two navies for “seamless coordination” was in evidence when the two navies came together in September 2020 to assist MT New Diamond, a Very Large Crude Carrier (VLCC), that caught fire off the East Coast of Sri Lanka. 

While broader maritime security, anti-piracy, and HADR are important components of the growing India-Sri Lanka-Maldives strategic narrative, the real worry for India is growing Chinese activism in the Indian Ocean region. China’s efforts at cultivating the Indian Ocean littoral states have been a concern for New Delhi. In response, New Delhi has pursued many paths to build rapport with these neighbors, including bilateral, trilateral, and minilateral conversations in the region.  

While India is a resident Indian Ocean power and has its own advantages, there are capacity gaps in India’s ability to play a sustained or dominant role. Meanwhile, China has the economic and military wherewithal to expand its military presence in the Indian Ocean and has been developing serious inroads into the region through bases and other strategic networks. It is these that India is most concerned about and to which it is responding.  

While India is stepping up its efforts in naval modernization, these are capital intensive and time-consuming projects. The small budget allocations for the Indian Navy are not helpful either. Therefore, India has also entered into a series of partnerships with like-minded countries in the Indo-Pacific, such as Australia, Japan, and the United States, to offset the growing Chinese influence as well as to enhance India’s own capabilities. The logistic agreements that India has signed with a number of countries — including the United States, Australia, France, South Korea, Singapore, and Japan — in recent years are a demonstration of the Indian intent to enhance the geographical reach of the Indian Navy, and also to strengthen the combined capability mix that is available to deal with China’s aggressive maneuvers in the Indian Ocean region. It is also an important tool for messaging both to its friends and foes.  

Meanwhile, even as India pursues a neighborhood first approach, it has also acknowledged the limitations of regional groupings such as the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), which came to a grinding halt a few years ago. Modi had reached out to the SAARC nations when he came to office in 2014 but the bonhomie did not last long. Therefore, India has energized other regional groupings such as BIMSTEC and subregional arrangements such as the BBIN and India-Sri Lanka-Maldives trilateral. While the subregional initiatives have primarily focused on connectivity and similar issues, India is also exploring the possibility of engaging in subregional security cooperation.  

But subregional initiatives are not free from the state of bilateral relations with these countries. As K. Yhome explained in a recent essay, the nature and framework of bilateral political relations will have an impact on these subregional initiatives. The case of the NSA-level trilateral maritime dialogue between India, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives is a case in point. The talks were stalled from 2014 primarily because of India’s poor relations with Maldives under then-President Abdulla Yameen. India, as a big state, has to be mindful of the needs and aspirations of its much smaller neighbors and has to be able to adapt to meet their requirements. 

What’s Behind the Rising India-France Maritime Activity in the Indo-Pacific? - The Diplomat, 26 March 2020

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I wrote on the rising India-France maritime activity in the Indo-Pacific. A recent engagement spotlighted the broader strategic collaboration between the two countries in this realm.

Despite growing fears of the global coronavirus pandemic, India and France held a joint exercise in the Indian Ocean. While dealing with this and other challenges, both countries understand that they share broader strategic interests including the implications China’s rise in the Indo-Pacific and beyond.

For the full essay, click here.



In a first, the two navies conducted joint patrols from Reunion Island, the French naval base in the Indian Ocean. The Commander of the Indian Navy P-8I, which was part of the joint patrols, is reported to have said that that such joint security operations “make it possible to maintain the security of international maritime routes for trade and communications.”

These engagements are not without significance. India has so far generally conducted Coordinated Patrols (CORPAT) only with its maritime neighbors. Currently, the Indian Navy has Joint Exclusive Economic Zone surveillance exercises with the Maldives, Seychelles and Mauritius and CORPAT series are undertaken with the navies of Bangladesh, Myanmar, Thailand and Indonesia. The United States had earlier made an offer to India to carry out CORPAT but India rejected it.

But India’s own comfort level in engaging in CORPAT-like exercises is growing because New Delhi seems to be realizing that it is in India’s own interests to expand the number of countries with which its does such engagements. Thus, India in the last five years has shown greater inclination to engage with like-minded countries to expand its presence in the Indian Ocean. The current engagement is also a clear acknowledgement of the growing strategic importance of the areas between the East African coastline and the Malacca Straits.

Speaking to an Indian newspaper on the latest India-France interactions more specifically, Indian defense ministry sources said that while both India and France are on the same page when it comes to the challenges and concerns in the region, both also have capacity limitations. These constraints have in fact become an imperative for the two to join hands and undertake more coordinated and joint naval maneuvers. The sources were careful to add that these “patrols will be periodical” and that “there is no set pattern” to these engagements. Nevertheless, it remains an important indicator of India’s greater willingness for expanding its own footprint in the region as also for strengthening capacity-building by partnering with navies of like-minded nations.

India and France discussed CORPAT-like engagements in November 2019 during the visit of the French Navy Chief Admiral Christophe Prazuck. He had then emphasized the importance of “organizing joint patrols with the Indian Navy” and stated that the two sides are working on “the very precise objectives” of such maneuvers. He added that “if a zone [Exclusive Economic Zones] is not controlled, then it is bound to be pillaged, and if it is pillaged, then it is bound to be occupied. And if it is occupied, it will be contested.” As for the areas of engagements, he said it could be “North Western Indian Ocean or Southern Indian Ocean around the islands that are part of France.” Earlier in October 2019, the French President Emmanuel Macron had mentioned that a patrol aircraft from the Indian Navy will be deployed at Le Reunion to participate in surveillance missions in the first quarter of 2020.

Speaking about the growing Chinese presence in western Indian Ocean and the threat it poses, Admiral Prazuk noted that before piracy issues flared up in Somalia in 2008, there were no Chinese vessels. But clearly piracy has become an excuse for China to send its ships and they are still sending them even though the threat from piracy has diminished significantly. In addition to ships, China has also been sending Nuclear Attack submarines (SSNs) into the western Indian Ocean. As the Admiral noted, SSNs are “not the most effective tool to fight against pirates.”

The closer strategic engagement between the different arms of the governments including the militaries is a sign of the comfort and confidence that exist between India and France. This comfort level is demonstrated by the comments of an Indian official, who said that “France is a safe country for us, there will be no concerns in conducting joint patrols with them.” Thus, it is no surprise that France became the first country to have a Liaison Officer at the Indian Navy’s Information Fusion Centre (IFC-IOR).

France is one of the oldest, most trusted of India’s partners, possibly second only to Russia. But today with Russia having established an uncomfortably close relationship with China, India’s reliance on France has become that much greater. Even though India has traditionally remained uneasy with terms like alliance, Modi used the term to describe the relations with France at his speech at UNESCO in Paris, where he said, “Today in the 21st century, we talk of INFRA. I would like to say that for me it is IN+FRA, which means the alliance between India and France.”

This is a significant recognition of how much closer New Delhi and Paris have become even in the last few years. Some in the Indian strategic community discounted this as word play, but the reality is that the two countries’ strategic engagements have expanded and deepened in significant ways. The manner in which France backed India at the UN Security Council discussion on Jammu and Kashmir in 2019 is the latest indication of France’s strategic commitment to India. Russia used to be that reliable partner in the UN Security Council in the past but increasingly that spot is occupied by France (and of course, the United States).

While India and France have collaboration across a number of important sectors such as space, nuclear and defense, the particular focus on Indian Ocean and maritime security is significant. This is in line with India’s own changed vision for the Indian Ocean. In 2014, Prime Minister Modi made a pitch to India’s friends and strategic partners, saying “collective action and cooperation will best advance peace and security in our maritime region,” wherein India looks to key partners such as France and the United States in guaranteeing a stable maritime order in the Indian Ocean. This is a big shift from India’s earlier approach of criticizing the presence of any extra-regional powers in the Indian Ocean.

The recent CORPAT between Indian and French navies in Reunion Island became possible only because India and France signed an agreement in 2018 that would give reciprocal access to each other’s military facilities. This is similar to the logistics agreement, LEMOA, that India signed with the US. The agreement with France has expanded the presence and the type of naval operations that the Indian Navy is able to undertake in the western Indian Ocean. France has military facilities in the island of La Réunion, Mayotte, and the French Southern and Atlantic Lands. India’s pragmatic approach to Indian Ocean will go a long way in strengthening its operational maneuverability and creating more strategic options as it prepares to address a more muscular Chinese presence in the maritime spaces in India’s vicinity.

From Sea to Space: India and France Deepen Security Cooperation

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I focused on the visit of the French President, examining two facets that gained particular traction in India-France security relations. The essay titled, "From Sea to Space: India and France Deepen Security Cooperation," examined why and how outer space and maritime security had come to feature prominently during the French president’s India visit this week.

French President Emmanuel Macron was on a four-day visit to India earlier this week, with both sides trying to elevate the India-France strategic relationship. The bilateral partnership covers an entire gamut of issues from defense, civil nuclear, and space to climate change, clean energy, and urbanization, and India and France signed 14 agreements. But what was of particular importance on the defense side were those on outer space and maritime security in the Indian Ocean.

For the full essay, click here.



On outer space, the two countries identified nine specific areas in the India-France Joint Vision for Space Cooperation of which a few including high resolution earth observation, space domain and situational awareness, satellite navigation, space transportation, and human exploration, stand out. Space Situational Awareness (SSA) and high resolution earth observation are especially relevant in the context of the growing concerns around maritime security and the Indian Ocean.

The two countries have shared concerns on a number of issues, including, as they framed it, “maritime traffic security, especially in the Horn of Africa; respect of international law by all States, in particular freedom of navigation and overflight; fight against organized crime, trafficking, including in weapons of mass destruction, smuggling and illegal fishing.”

Recognizing the need to develop a joint action plan, the two sides signed a Joint Strategic Vision for Cooperation in the Indian Ocean Region. A practical joint action in the area of maritime surveillance around Indian Ocean waters would at the very least call for a clearer understanding of the maritime environment that they are operating in and this has pushed both India and France to increase sharing of information on the emerging maritime scenario in the Indian Ocean.

The MoU signed between the two space agencies foresees them joining hands to design and develop “products and techniques, including those involving Automatic Identification System, to monitor and protect assets in land and sea.” This, the two sides believe, will significantly boost maritime domain awareness in the region. Given the growing reliance and vulnerabilities that exist in the outer space domain, the two space agencies also agreed to develop a cooperative agenda that will protect their space assets, by also developing infrastructure that is necessary to create a broader engagement on SSA.

Underlying all these practical steps is the shared strategic vision, particularly driven by the strategic uncertainties around China’s rise and its growing assertiveness. The two share a common strategic objective of “establish[ing] an open, inclusive and transparent cooperation architecture, with the aim of delivering to all associated with the region, peace, security and prosperity.”

Modi, during his meeting with Macron said that both sides believed in the importance of the Indian Ocean for the global community, while Macron in his own remarks acknowledged the importance of the Indian Ocean for the stability of the entire region. Most significantly, India and France agreed to reciprocal access to each other’s naval facilities to military facilities. France has facilities in the island of La Réunion, Mayotte, and the French Southern and Atlantic Lands. Indian access to French military facilities will help India spread its reach and influence, especially in western Indian Ocean.

This is similar to the understanding that India had earlier reached with the United States with the signing of LEMOA. That agreement occasioned a lot of criticism in India, with commentators suggesting that India was bargaining away its precious “strategic autonomy.” Indeed, that agreement was delayed for years precisely because of the fear of such criticism.

But the agreement with France has largely received a positive reception in the Indian media. The difference between the treatment of these two agreements indicates a clear evidence of the continuing opposition among sections of the Indian elite to any closer ties with Washington. Indeed, precisely for this reason, France may be a good supplement to India’s strategic partnerships. It should also be remembered that France has generally been supportive of critical issues of concern to India, including India’s nuclear weapons program (before it acquired its current level of legitimacy).

On the other hand, the limitations of the partnership should also be kept in mind. If France has not received as much importance in New Delhi as some others such as the United States, despite France’s well-acknowledged sympathy for India’s strategic concerns, the reason has been mostly due to France’s relatively limited capacity. The current bonhomie overlooks this old and unchanged limitation: though France can help India, its own remaining weakness will likely not allow Paris to become a major source of strategic support to New Delhi. But in these troubled times, one more supporter is surely welcome.