How China Strengthens the Quad - The Diplomat, 4 September 2020

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I wrote on the future of the Quad, looking at the challenges to the group because of Abe's sudden resigning and a possible political change in the US following the November elections. Despite some minor headwinds, I argue that Chinese belligerence further strengthens the motivation for Australia, India, Japan, and the United States to keep the Quad together.

The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue or the Quad has regained strength in the face of an aggressive China. The foreign ministers of the four countries – Australia, India, Japan, and the United States – are scheduled to meet in Delhi for a face-to-face meeting in late September. That New Delhi is playing host to the Quad ministerial meeting amid the COVOD-19 pandemic is particularly noteworthy. The countries are reacting to increased bullying by China. The grouping has gained greater traction since early 2020 because of Beijing’s role in the COVID-19 pandemic and the manner in which it has attempted to hijack multilateral institutions, such as the World Health Organization (WHO) and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). The four countries are also concerned about global supply chain problems, recognizing the vulnerability of their dependence on China. The upcoming in-person foreign ministers meeting appears, at the least, aimed at sending a strong message to China about the resoluteness of the Quad.

For the full essay, click here.

That said, the Quad does face some minor headwinds, which are likely to be easily overcome, due to political changes in both Japan and the United States.

Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo’s sudden resignation was a blow to the Quad because Abe was one of the major proponents of this minilateral initiative, even if his departure does not shift Japan’s policy. Under Abe’s leadership, Japan had become a driving force for the Quad. His strategic vision and determined leadership in the face of China’s belligerent behavior will be missed by Japan’s Quad partners. Although Abe was not successful in changing Japan’s pacifist constitution, he has been instrumental in bringing important changes to Tokyo’s approach to regional and global security.

For New Delhi, Abe was a reliable pillar of support. Takenori Horimoto says that the big push for Japan to build closer relations with India happened in 2004-05 because of anti-Japan protests taking place in China, leading Tokyo to reduce the risks to its investments by moving to other countries. Thus, although India-Japan ties had been gaining momentum even before Abe came into office, the Abe-Modi dynamic helped a great deal. It led to strengthened military and security ties, including military exercises across all the branches of the military, and a civil nuclear agreement. With Abe leaving office, it remains to be seen how bilateral India-Japan relations as well as Japan’s broader strategic engagement in the Indo-Pacific will play out with a new leader in office.

Second, the coming presidential elections in the United States in November also raises some concerns about a possible change in leadership. While Joe Biden and the Democrats are not against the Quad or the free and open Indo-Pacific strategy, a change in the political powers that be could introduce short-term policy turbulence. It will take a few months for a new administration to settle into office before addressing some of the political and strategic issues in the Indo-Pacific region. That said, China’s aggressive behavior will invariably draw any administration’s attention. A Biden administration may differ from the Trump administration more in terms of style and rhetoric than actual policy when it comes to China. Indeed, the two parties are competing over who is harsher on China.

Set against these small challenges is China’s behavior, which serves to promote the Quad. India and Australia, the other two Quad parties, have recently faces even greater aggression from Beijing.

Since early May, China has crossed into Indian territory and engaged in violent clashes, including the one at Galwan in June that resulting in the deaths of 20 Indians and an unknown number of Chinese troops. Since then, there have been several military and diplomatic discussions between India and China, but with no progress. Over the past few days, there has been further activity, with India reportedly occupying areas south of the south bank of Pangong Tso (Lake); the military talks that followed, as usual, have been inconclusive. China claimed that India violated the consensus and crossed the Line of Actual Control (LAC). In India, both the foreign ministry and army put out statements blaming China. The expectation appears to be that the border confrontation will escalate further. India, for good measure, has also banned another 118 Chinese apps.

Similarly, Australia has been under strident Chinese attack almost from the beginning of 2020. China has been using coercive trade practices to target Australia for asking for an independent investigation into the origin of the novel coronavirus. In the latest move, China targeted Australian barley in response to Prime Minister Scott Morrison’s announcement of a new Australian legislation that would “tear up” the Belt and Road Initiative agreements with the state of Victoria that run into billions of dollars. A few days earlier, China targeted Australian beef exports. Prior to this, it was the Australian wine that was banned by China. But Jeffrey Wilson of the Perth USAsia Centre says it is not that the Chinese government cares about wine, beef, or barley, but “the real game is to create societal splits that pressure the Government to change foreign policy toward China.”

China’s crude attempts to put pressure on other countries have met with increasingly stiff resistance, of which the Quad is a clear manifestation. In India, there have even been suggestions for the Quad to assume a military role. Thus, whatever minor headwinds the Quad faces are likely to be easily overcome by the rapidly changing attitudes in the region because of China’s unrelenting pressure on others.

my take on the Chinese foreign minister's visit to India...

A lot has been said and written on the Chinese foreign minister's visit to India. Most of the writings focused on the huge economic opportunities waiting to be unleashed and a few talked about the Chinese rigidity as far as the border and territorial issues are concerned.

I wanted to add to this debate making a qualification to the India-China economic engagement. While I am all for trade and economic engagement, lets not be under the illusion that the basic nature of India-China relations is being altered through such interactions. Economics is important but it has a limited utility. Two, lets not get carried away by the Chinese rhetoric. It should be kept in mind that there is a huge gap between the Chinese rhetoric and actions. Here's my analysis, substantiating these arguments.

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi was in Delhi to meet the new Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his foreign policy team in order to gauge the new leadership's mood towards China and the major powers. Sticking to the usual rhetoric, Wang Yi said India and China are "natural" partners while remaining rigid on stapled visas and border issues.

Going by the MEA statement, the Chinese foreign minister and the Indian officials discussed all issues of significance.

For the rest of the article, click here.



It is likely that it must have been all economic, trade and investment from the Chinese side. From the Indian side too, trade is an important area, particularly the trade imbalance which should have been a point of emphasis. Current estimates suggest that the trade imbalance is heavily in favour of China to the tune of $35-45 bn. Wang Yi responded to this issue by saying that China will be happy to import more from India though this is not the first time that Beijing has assured India in this regard.

Wang Yi focused attention on the infrastructure sector which the Chinese are keen on. India has to diversify its export items to China in order to create some leverage. Trade imbalance is bad on its own but more importantly it creates certain dependencies on China which need to be countered. India has to be able to create counter-dependencies and in the absence of which Beijing could hold India to ransom during conflicts. Beijing banning the export of rare material to Japan following a naval incident in September 2010 should serve as an eye opener to India. The fact that India is a huge market for China should give India some leverage too.

Detailing the Chinese interest in investment in India, the minister proposed a larger share of the Indian pie in key sectors such as power, telecom and infrastructure. Infrastructure demand within China having peaked, Beijing is clearly on a look out for new destinations, particularly in Asia. China wants a share in all - expressways and highways, railways and high speed trains. Infrastructure is one area in which the Indian government is likely to make massive investment in the coming years given the huge shortage not just on the border, but inland and maritime as well. Talking on this aspect, the Chinese foreign minister is reported to have told the Indian side China's willingness to share its expertise in high speed trains and bullet trains, an expertise he claimed as their own , as well as help India in upgrading its railways and highways.

If India has to build high speed and bullet trains, why not approach the masters of the technology from whom China copied and developed such as Japan. Japan is already prominent in India's infrastructure projects, including the golden quadrilateral highway linking Delhi, Mumbai, Calcutta and Chennai; Delhi metro and the Western Dedicated Freight Corridor (DFC).

Another area that figured prominently in the discussions is the issue of access to Chinese markets, at least in two critical sectors of IT and pharmaceutical products. Of China's $25 bn IT market, 80% is controlled by the Chinese state owned enterprises, which do not encourage any outsiders' entry. On the other hand, the Chinese are interested in forming joint research working groups wherein they stand to gain in understanding the Indian advantages. Similarly on the pharmaceutical sector, China has been slow in responding to Indian requests. The lengthy process of four to five years that Indian pharmas have faced in entering the Chinese market has had a dampening effect on India gaining access to the Chinese market. Here again, China is interested in setting bilateral working groups through which China may come to learn from the Indian experience and expertise.

Border issues are reported to have figured prominently during the talks. On the question of border incursions, the visiting official noted that such incidents are inevitable when the border is not demarcated. However, it is strange for a Chinese leader to state that issuing stapled visas to people from Arunachal Pradesh was a sign of "goodwill" and "flexibility." His precise response was: "In the eastern sector of China-India border, relatively big area is in dispute. This is an objective fact. However, people living in those areas need to interact with each other. So, as a special arrangement, we have resorted to stapled visa to address the need of the local people to travel. This is a gesture out of goodwill and out of our own flexibility. If we do not do that, we will not be able to address the question concerning the outbound and overseas travel of these people. This practice has been going on for relatively a long period of time, and if it is acceptable to the Indian side, it could be continued in the future because it does not undermine or compromise our respective positions on the boundary question…will also be able to help us address the issues concerning travel of people living in those areas." The Modi Government needs to respond appropriately to such comments before China oversteps dangerously.

It does not appear that China is in any hurry to find a mutually acceptable solution to the border issue. As the Chinese premier said a few years ago, they want the border issue to be left to the future generations to sort it out. Their lack of interest comes from the thinking that the possibly strenuous talks on the border and territorial issues will stall the ongoing and future cooperation in the economic arena. The Chinese have been clear on this aspect, evident from the Chinese delegations that come along with major visits - it is always a big business delegation that accompanies their premier or the president. It simply goes to show that they are clear about and able to dictate what they seek in this bilateral relationship.

Lastly, India needs to get a lot more clarity on what it expects from China. For all the economic engagement that India may have with China, it should not be under the illusion of its impact on the overall India-China relations. Economic and trade relations serve a limited utility of creating prosperity on both sides but that constituency may not be able to deflect a conflict altogether. There are multiple imperatives including nationalism that works in the conduct of inter-state relations. For all the talk of natural partners, China's policy on Arunachal Pradesh and stapled visas has remained problematic. India should understand that there is a huge gap between the Chinese rhetoric and their actions. India has to be realistic about, as Prime Minister said during his campaign days, "Beijing's possible expansionist designs." This is not to suggest that India should not cooperate with China where it might maximise India's own power and gains but be realistic to say a No when it is not to India's advantage.

my interview with the Hong Kong-based Phoenix TV on the recent Chinese incursions....

Here's the link to my interview with the Hong Kong-based Phoenix TV on the recent Chinese incursions....


Type rest of the post here

A new book on India-China relations, looking at potential areas of cooperation ... from trade to border and political issues

My chapter on India-China relations, looking at areas of convergence and divergence has been published in Prof. Sit's edited book China-India Cooperation Prospects.

One more book in the long list on India-China relations ... exploring new avenues of cooperation. This collection brings out some of the traditional areas of collaboration such as trade and economy, BRICS and other multilateral platforms but not entirely convinced on the state of political and strategic ties. Looking at the recent trends, it is not particularly reassuring.

Details of the book are available here.



KEY FEATURES

A collection of papers presented by 12 respected scholars from China and India at the First Academic Summit on China-India Cooperation held by the China India Fortune Foundation
Covers issues such as the economic development of China and India, the possibility of future cooperation between these two countries, and the economic situation in the South Asian region
Provides new insights into the relations between China and India

CONTENT HIGHLIGHTS

Part I China-India Economic Development Experiences and Relevance to Future Cooperation
Comparison of Chinese and Indian Economic Reform and Development Models
The Development of the Sino-Indian Economic Partnership and the Creation of a Bilateral Free Trade Zone

Part II General Issues on China-India Cooperation
The Rise of India and its Pursuit of Goals and World Power
Areas of Convergence and Divergence in India-China Relations

Part III China-India Sectoral Cooperation Scenarios
The Energy-Poverty-Climate Nexus: A Tale of Two Countries
Higher Education in India and China: The Changing Role of the State

Part IV China-India and the World Order
China's International Strategies and the Situation of South Asia
China, India, and the Emerging World Order

INDIA/CHINA: Hopes for Early Border Settlement Recede

Here's a story by Ranjit Devraj on the recent India-China border controversies that has quoted me and it has appeared today on the Inter Press Service (Rome, Italy) website.



INDIA/CHINA:
Hopes for Early Border Settlement Recede

Analysis by Ranjit Devraj
NEW DELHI, Oct 16 (IPS) - Hopes for an early settlement of the ‘world’s oldest standing border dispute’ receded last week after Asian neighbours China and India engaged in a tit-for-tat spat that ran counter to the spirit of a formal dialogue they are engaged in.
On Wednesday India's external affairs ministry called on Beijing to cease work on development projects, including highways and hydro-electric dams, in Pakistan-controlled Kashmir.

That request was made apparently in retaliation for China’s objections to an electioneering visit made by Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to the north-eastern state of Arunachal Pradesh, which Beijing considers to be disputed territory and part of the Tibetan Autonomous Region.

A day earlier, a Chinese spokesman had sent shockwaves through the Indian establishment by saying at a press briefing in Beijing: ‘’China expresses its strong dissatisfaction on the visit by the Indian leader to the disputed area in disregard of China’s grave concerns.’’

"By trying to tell the Indian prime minister where he can go within his own country, all limits of diplomacy have been crossed," said Sujit Dutta, one of India’s foremost China experts. "In fact, this is the worst of a series of provocations emanating over the last six months from Beijing, to which the Indian government responded in a muted fashion."

Dutta, who is currently a professor at the Nelson Mandela Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies at the Jamia Milia Islamia University, listed among those provocations the issuance of ‘stapled visas’ to Indian students from Indian Kashmir and Arunachal Pradesh "as if to question their citizenship status".

China became a party to the territorial dispute over the former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir state by occupying the Aksai Chin area following the 1962 Sino-Indian border war and was ceded the Trans-Karakorum tract (or Shaksam valley) by Pakistan in the following year. Currently, India administers 43 percent of Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan controls 37 percent and China holds 20 percent.

During the 1962 war China invaded and briefly occupied large parts of Arunachal Pradesh, which it officially refers to as ‘southern Tibet’, but withdrew its troops across the mountains for logistical reasons.

Currently, the effective border between China and India is the Line-of-Actual Control, which extends over 4,057 kilometres, with Kashmir on the west end and Arunachal Pradesh on the east. In between fall the Indian states of Uttarakhand, Himachal Pradesh, the republic of Nepal, Sikkim state and the kingdom of Bhutan.

Dutta also counted among the provocations the objections raised by China at the Asian Development Bank to a loan being provided for a hydro-electric project in Arunachal Pradesh, which caused the bank’s operations in the territory to cease. "Such actions are not conducive to an easy settlement of the border issue," he said.

Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, a senior fellow at the independent Organiser Research Foundation (ORF), told IPS that she believed China’s provocations were primarily calculated to put pressure on India to "soften its positions at the negotiating table" for a series of border talks that have been conducted between the two countries over three decades.

At the 13th round of talks, which took place Aug. 7-8 in Beijing it was decided to set up a ‘hotline’ between Beijing and New Delhi as part of confidence-building measures. "But there has been little real progress at these talks," observed Rajagopalan, who is currently working on a project to study the military strategies of the major Asian powers.

Ahead of the talks, on Aug. 4, the ‘People's Daily’ carried an interview with Zhang Yan, China’s ambassador in New Delhi, in which he said: "China and India should settle the existing border disputes properly, calling into play the greatest possible political wisdom.

It added: "Despite the twists and turns in China-India ties and border disputes, the two countries share the same historical responsibilities of developing economies, improving people's lives and safeguarding world peace and development, which requires them to properly handle existing problems with the utmost political wisdom."

Zhang observed that "China is now India's top trading partner, while India has become China's largest overseas project contracting market and an important investment destination. Bilateral trade volume between the two hit 51.7 billion U.S. dollars in 2008, up 35 percent over the same period a year ago. The two countries have also set a target of bilateral trade volume of 60 billion dollars by 2010."

But as the talks began, the Daily carried an article by Chinese military expert, Long Tao, who warned that though the two countries wished to develop bilateral ties, "China won't sacrifice its sovereignty in exchange for friendship. Therefore, India should not have any illusions with regard to this issue."

"This blow hot, blow cold approach is typical of Chinese diplomacy," said Rajagopalan. "But there could be real issues worrying Beijing, starting with vastly improved relations between India and the United States that led to the signing of a civilian nuclear pact between the two countries last year."

An editorial in ‘People’s Daily Online’ on Thursday accused India of attempts at "hegemony" and of following a policy of "befriend the far and attack the near".

The Daily issued the following admonishment: "India, which vows to be superpower, needs to have its eyes on relations with neighbours and abandon the recklessness and arrogance as the world is undergoing earthshaking changes."

According to the state-controlled paper, "the pursuit of being a superpower is justifiable, the dream of being a superpower held by Indians appears impetuous". It goes on to say: "For India, the ease of tension with China and Pakistan is the only way to become a superpower. At present, China is proactively engaging in negotiations with India for the early settlement of border dispute and India should give positive response."

But, said Rajagopalan, relations between the two countries were complex and there were many factors that needed to be addressed before anything like a permanent settlement of the border could be effected. ‘’One factor is the Dalai Lama who fled to India 1959 to set up a ‘government -in-exile’ in Himachal Pradesh.’’

The Dalai Lama plans to visit Arunachal Pradesh in November and this has not gone down well with Beijing, which regards the Tibetan leader as a ‘splitist’ and accuses him of being behind the protests that erupted in the Tibetan capital of Lhasa and elsewhere in March 2008.

Dutta commented that instead of accusing India of attempted hegemony, Beijing should look at its own record in Tibet, which, he said, is autonomous only in name. "The simple fact is that Tibetan refugees have continued to stream across the border into India after 1959 and they are now at least 250,000 of them resident in India. China has done nothing to encourage them to go back home."

China’s military advantage over India vanishing, says analyst

Last month, India's Chairman of Chiefs of Staff Committee and Navy chief Admiral Sureesh Mehta, speaking on National Security Challenges at the National Maritime Foundation, New Delhi admitted that India neither has the “capability nor the intention” to match China’s military strength. He added, “Common sense dictates that cooperation with China would be preferable to competition or conflict, as it would be foolhardy to compare India and China as equals... Whether in terms of GDP, defence spending or any other economic, social or development parameter, the gap between the two is just too wide to bridge and getting wider by the day.

An analyst, however, claims that China's military advantage over is vanishing.

Such OpEd pieces may be soothening to the ears of many, but this is not the reality. The reality of the situation may be hardhitting. What is needed at this hour is a realistic assessment of the kind of capabilities that exist on both sides of the border and beyond. Such a reality check may help India prepare better for the future.



The infrastructure on the Indian side is quite deplorable. Indian military and political establishment appears to have believed for a long time that if it undertakes major infrastructure development, it would actually enhance the Chinese ability to move into Indian territory. However, the Indian government has recognised, of late, the need to upgrade the general infrastructure in the region. In June 2006, the Indian Cabinet sanctioned a series of infrastructure projects along the border. These projects include the building of 72 roads, three airstrips and several bridges in the border areas along the undefined LAC that would enable the Indian military to move troops quickly into the region.

In terms of forces, India has about twelve mountain divisions capable of swift offensive operations in the mountainous areas. Two of these were reportedly created in February 2008, specifically for combat in Arunachal Pradesh. Two additional such divisions are estimated to become operational by 2015-16, at a cost of around INR 14 billion (USD 358 million). These will be reinforced by air power, including possibly, AWACS, and fighter jets. There have also been reports of India’s plans to procure 140 ultra-light 155mm artillery pieces, as also a large number of heavy lift and combat ready helicopters, all of which would have special utility in mountain warfare. Although India has tested a number of intermediate-range missiles, including the Agni-3 capable of hitting both Beijing and Shanghai, these missiles are still not operational. Additionally, India has recently deployed two army divisions and two air force squadrons in Assam. With this new deployment in Assam, India’s troop strength in the region will cross more than one hundred thousand. Meanwhile, the Indian Air Force (IAF) announced (June 2009) that it will deploy two squadrons of advanced Sukhoi-30 MKI aircraft in Tezpur, Assam. Though only four fighters are deployed now, there are plans to increase it to its full complement in a gradual manner. Additionally, India has acquired three Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS), which also potentially has uses on the Eastern border. In addition, India is also undertaking upgradation of airstrips and advanced landing stations along the Northeast, including at Tezpur (Assam), Chabua (Assam), Jorhat (Assam), Panagarh (West Bengal), and Purnea (Bihar). If the AWACS are deployed to the northeast, it could be significant as it is a potent force multiplier capable of monitoring the movement and activities of troops and aircraft on the Chinese side. The state of Arunachal Pradesh is also planning to raise a 5,000-strong force, comprising of local populace, to supplement Indian Army efforts during a crisis. This is being modeled on Ladakh Scouts that proved useful during the 1999 Kargil War with Pakistan.

On the other hand, the infrastructural developments that China has undertaken in Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) as well as on the India-China border is remarkable. It provides the potential to the PLA Army to mobilise forces and equipment in a much shorter span of time. It would enable China to quickly mobilise large forces by train and by road onto Indian borders. Earlier this exercise not only took a long time but also was impossible during periods of snow. The new rail line into Tibet, and expressways, have changed the scenario totally. Besides, it is believed that China has about 160,000 troops in Tibet, and with improved infrastructure, it will be able to amass another 100,000 troops from the central reserve in a span of six weeks. Indian military planners have also noted that China has vastly improved its air force capability in the region, with multiple air bases and forward airstrips near the border. The PLA Air Force is also believed to have improved its command and control structures. China can also deploy heavy-lift planes in Tibet, though they may not be able to land and take-off fully loaded because of altitude restrictions. Besides the positioning of intermediate range ballistic missiles such as DF-4 and DF-21 in Tibet, it is reported that they could also deploy DF-31 ICBMs in bases such as at Delingha, near Tibet.

This is in essence India's defence as far as China is concerned. How is the military balance favoring India?

India-China Border Talks

On August 7 and 8, 2009, India and China held the 13th round of talks. PLA Daily, in a story on the subject, noted that during the talks, the two sides exchanged in-depth views on the further development of China-India Strategic Cooperative Partnership, as well as regional, international and global issues of mutual interest. The Chinese side emphasized that China and India have no other option than living in peace and developing side by side. China stands firmly committed to working with India to press ahead with the bilateral ties. The Chinese side expressed belief that both countries need to promote the relationship with a higher and strategic perspective and continue to uphold the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. China and India should endeavor to build the strategic mutual trust. Both need to expand the common interests and cooperation bilaterally and on regional and global affairs.

While the Chinese official line is all about friendship and peaceful co-existence, the tone and tenor of academic and think-tank writings are not that reassuring. The anti-India rhetoric in the Chinese writings have gone up significantly in the last few years.

Here's an article published a year ago on some of these aspects, more specifically a provocative article, ‘A Warning to the Indian Government: Don’t Be Evil!' in one of the Chinese think-tanks. The article was published by the Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi.



In a provocative article entitled, ‘A Warning to the Indian Government: Don’t Be Evil!’ China has sent a strong message to India. Posted on the website (http://str.chinaiiss.org/content/2008-3-26/26211952.shtml) of a prominent Chinese think-tank, the China Institute of International Strategic Studies, the article by Zhan Lue (March 26, 2008), compares the present India-China situation to that of 1962 when, the author claims, India provoked a war with China. He notes that China today is better prepared in terms of its military presence in Tibet and nearby regions, besides possessing nuclear weapons. He also contends that China believes that India has been in an aggressive mood as evident in its stationing of more troops on the border, conduct of military exercises with countries, and massive arms acquisitions with China as the target. He concludes by accusing the Indian government of “walking today along the old road of resisting China,” advising India “not to requite kindness with ingratitude.”
Chinese rhetoric has undoubtedly intensified in the last few years, be it from the Chinese politico-military leadership or senior academics. Earlier, Professor Ma Jiali of the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), a government think-tank, had argued that India should “return” Tawang, a sacred place for Tibetan Buddhists in Arunachal Pradesh, to China for resolving the vexed border issue, as Beijing could then be “magnanimous” in settling the border in the Western and Middle Sectors of the disputed boundary. Of course, by the same logic, China should be ready to give Lake Mansarovar to India as it is considered one of the most sacred pilgrimage centres for the Hindus!
Will China really launch an attack on India in Tawang or elsewhere in the eastern sector? If so, is India prepared for such an eventuality? While India has improved its overall fighting capability and is willing to use air power in combat (something it did not do in 1962), infrastructure development on the Indian side of the border has remained inadequate. This has been partly the result of the belief harboured by the Indian military and political establishment that infrastructure development in the region would actually enhance the Chinese ability to move into Indian territory in case of a crisis.
In the last few years, the infrastructural developments that China has undertaken in Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) as well as on the India-China border provide the potential to the PLA Army to mobilise forces and equipment in a much shorter span of time. It would enable China to mobilise large forces by train and by road onto Indian borders. Earlier this exercise not only took a long time but also was impossible during periods of snow. The new rail line into Tibet, and expressways, have changed the scenario totally. It is believed that China has about 160,000 troops in Tibet, and with improved infrastructure, it will be able to amass another 100,000 troops from the central reserve in a span of six weeks. Indian military planners have also noted that China has vastly improved its air force capability in the region, with multiple air bases and forward airstrips near the border. The PLA Air Force is also believed to have improved its command and control structures, as was evident from an air battle drill staged on March 30, 2008. China can also deploy heavy-lift planes in Tibet, though they may not be able to land and take-off fully loaded because of altitude restrictions. Besides the positioning of intermediate range ballistic missiles such as DF-4 and DF-21 in Tibet, it is reported that they could also deploy DF-31 ICBMs in bases such as at Delingha. This may mean that even a limited conflict between India and China has the potential to spiral out of control to become a dangerous nuclear flashpoint.
India, on the other hand, has about twelve mountain divisions capable of swift offensive operations in the mountainous areas. Two of these were reportedly created in February 2008, specifically for combat in Arunachal Pradesh. Two additional such divisions are estimated to become operational by 2015-16, at a cost of around INR 14 billion (USD 358 million). These will be reinforced by air power, including AWACS and fighter jets. There have also been reports of India’s plans to procure 140 ultra-light 155mm artillery pieces, as also a large number of heavy lift and combat ready helicopters, all of which would have special utility in mountain warfare. Although India has tested a number of intermediate-range missiles, including the Agni-3 capable of hitting both Beijing and Shanghai, these missiles are still not operational.
Despite the rhetoric, it may not be feasible for China to undertake military action against India for at least two reasons. Firstly, present day India is very different from the one defeated by China in 1962 – a fact that was evident to the Chinese even during Operation Falcon/Exercise Chequerboard in 1986/87. Secondly, in any future conflict with China, the use of air power will be critical and is likely to change the outcome in India’s favour. There have been several debates on the offensive use of air power in high altitude areas, the potential of which was well demonstrated in the high-altitude air war during the Kargil conflict. Limited conflicts can be contained to India’s advantage if India takes recourse to the use of air power.
The belligerent tone of Chinese writings and the improved connectivity to its borders notwithstanding, China may not go in for a military attack, given its understanding of improvements in India’s military capabilities. India should not, however, rule out the possibility of occasional Chinese adventurism till such time that there is a clear demarcation of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) on the ground and in military maps.

Sino-Indian Border Tensions: Implications

After years of reports of China upgrading its combat capabilities in Tibet, New Delhi has finally begun to react. The recent decision (June 8, 2009) by the Government of India to deploy two additional army divisions and two air force squadrons near its border with China sparked new tensions between the two countries, with Beijing reiterating yet again that a large stretch of the state of Arunachal Pradesh belongs to them.



With this new deployment in Assam, India’s troop strength in the region will cross more than one hundred thousand. Meanwhile, the Indian Air Force (IAF) announced that it will deploy two squadrons of advanced Sukhoi-30 MKI aircraft in Tezpur, Assam. Though only four fighters are deployed now, there are plans to increase it to its full complement in a gradual manner. Additionally, India has acquired three Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS), which also potentially has uses on the Eastern border. In addition, India is also undertaking upgradation of airstrips and advanced landing stations along the Northeast, including at Tezpur (Assam), Chabua (Assam), Jorhat (Assam), Panagarh (West Bengal), and Purnea (Bihar). If the AWACS are deployed to the northeast, it could be significant as it is a potent force multiplier capable of monitoring the movement and activities of troops and aircraft on the Chinese side. The state of Arunachal Pradesh is also planning to raise a 5,000-strong force, comprising of local populace, to supplement Indian Army efforts during a crisis. This is being modeled on Ladakh Scouts that proved useful during the 1999 Kargil War with Pakistan. The Indian moves have clearly irked the Beijing leadership as reflected in several editorials in the PLA mouthpiece People’s Daily. One editorial said that “China won’t make any compromises in its border disputes with India.” The question is whether this anger stop with these editorials or whether they translate into a more serious problem on the border.
For more than five years now, China’s anti-India rhetoric has been going up significantly, not just among officials, but also in the academic and think-tank circles. Earlier, Professor Ma Jiali of the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), a government think-tank, had argued that India should “return” Tawang, a sacred place for Tibetan Buddhists in Arunachal Pradesh, to China for resolving the vexed border issue, as Beijing could then be “magnanimous” in settling the border in the Western and Middle Sectors of the disputed boundary. In April 2009, a provocative article titled, ‘A Warning to the Indian Government: Don’t Be Evil!’ China has sent a strong message to India. The author compared the present India-China situation to that of 1962 when, the author claims, India provoked a war with China. He noted that China today is better prepared in terms of its military presence in Tibet and nearby regions, besides possessing nuclear weapons. He also contended that China believes that India has been in an aggressive mood as evident in its stationing of more troops on the border, conduct of military exercises with countries, and massive arms acquisitions with China as the target. He concluded by accusing the Indian government of “walking today along the old road of resisting China,” advising India “not to requite kindness with ingratitude.”
Similar has been the voice from the Chinese officialdom. In November 2006, just before the visit of Chinese President Hu Jintao to India, the Chinese Ambassador to India, Sun Yuxi, made a claim on the entire state of Arunachal Pradesh. Besides, Chinese have protested at the Indian troop movements in Sikkim, as well as against Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to Arunachal Pradesh in January 2008. In May 2007, the Chinese government refused visa to an Indian Administrative Service (IAS) officer from Arunachal Pradesh to visit China, stating that Arunachal Pradesh was part of Chinese territory. In August 2007, the Chinese demanded that India remove two bunkers on the Sino-Indian border close to the tri-junction of Sikkim, Bhutan and Tibet, raising doubts about earlier China’s acceptance that Sikkim is part of India. More recently China has objected to a loan proposal by the Asian Development Bank because part of the loan would be used in Arunachal Pradesh, which China claims. China had also opposed the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) waiver to India last year for international nuclear commerce with India and has objected repeatedly to Indian proposals to add names of Pakistan-based terrorists to the UN terror list.
Lately, China has been trying to activate the Sikkim card as a bargain for its larger claim on the state of Arunachal Pradesh, and more particularly Tawang. For instance, in May 2008, China began to make fresh claims on Sikkim, otherwise a peaceful sector on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) that divides India and China. Sikkim is a state in the north-eastern part of India, bordering China, which acceded to India in 1975. China lays claims to the northernmost tip of Sikkim that appears on the map like a protruding finger and thus termed Finger Area. It contains some stone cairns or heaps of stones that demarcate the India-China border. However, China has continued to state that it will demolish those cairns as the current mapping is not entirely correct and is based on the 1924 Survey of India. The current border controversy started last year when PLA troops began frequenting the area and constructed a road that crossed the Finger Area. Although India protested such moves in February 2008, the Chinese have continued assert their claims and have succeeded in introducing the issue as an agenda in the boundary talks between the two countries.
China has been trying to adopt various measures to put pressure on India so as to get leverage from India on the boundary issue. For instance, the Chinese border incursions have been on an increase. There were nearly 200 border intrusions in all three sectors in 2007, 270 in 2008 and 60 so far in 2009, although most of the intrusions took place in Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh. Border incursions into Sikkim have also gone up significantly. While the numbers may not critical, it still demonstrates the changed Chinese attitude towards India. The Chinese incursions are also getting deeper into Indian territory than before. Nevertheless, the Indian establishment continues to maintain that these are minor issues and that India and China being responsible powers will not stumble into a military clash. Despite India’s stationing of more than 40,000 troops in the state of Sikkim, its policy and posturing have continued to be, by and large, defensive.
On the other hand, despite the assertion that India is not a challenge, it continues to irk China to see India’s rising politico-strategic and military profile, especially in the Asia-Pacific. India’s Look East policy has been highly criticized. In fact, China’s concerns are reflected in an internal study undertaken at the behest of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Mohan Malik, a noted China-watcher, in a recent essay analysed this internal study undertaken in 2005, which recommended that China undertake measures to maintain the current lead and strategic leverage in terms of territory, P-5 membership, or the Nuclear Club; hold on to diplomatic advantages through its special relationship particularly with India’s neighbouring countries; as also maintain the economic lead over India. India’s role and stand on Tibet may also be irksome to the Chinese leadership.
The Chinese are firmly convinced that increasing rhetoric along with increased incursions on the eastern sector will pressurise India to agree to major compromises on the border and territorial issue. China also believes that it should be in no hurry to resolve the border issue with India, but should be patient.
Lastly, will the Chinese anger result in a limited conflict on the border? If so, how are the two sides placed for such a conflict? In the past few years, the infrastructural developments that China has undertaken in Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) as well as on the India-China border provide the potential to the PLA Army to mobilise forces and equipment in a much shorter span of time. It would enable China to quickly mobilise large forces by train and by road onto Indian borders. Earlier this exercise not only took a long time but also was impossible during periods of snow. The new rail line into Tibet, and expressways, have changed the scenario totally. It is believed that China has about 160,000 troops in Tibet, and with improved infrastructure, it will be able to amass another 100,000 troops from the central reserve in a span of six weeks. Indian military planners have also noted that China has vastly improved its air force capability in the region, with multiple air bases and forward airstrips near the border. The PLA Air Force is also believed to have improved its command and control structures. China can also deploy heavy-lift planes in Tibet, though they may not be able to land and take-off fully loaded because of altitude restrictions. Besides the positioning of intermediate range ballistic missiles such as DF-4 and DF-21 in Tibet, it is reported that they could also deploy DF-31 ICBMs in bases such as at Delingha, near Tibet. This may mean that even a limited conflict between India and China has the potential to spiral out of control to become a dangerous nuclear flashpoint.
The infrastructure on the Indian side is quite deplorable. Indian military and political establishment appears to have believed for a long time that if it undertakes major infrastructure development, it would actually enhance the Chinese ability to move into Indian territory. However, the Indian government has recognised, of late, the need to upgrade the general infrastructure in the region. In June 2006, the Indian Cabinet sanctioned a series of infrastructure projects along the border. These projects include the building of 72 roads, three airstrips and several bridges in the border areas along the undefined LAC that would enable the Indian military to move troops quickly into the region. China may not perceive these developments favourably, even though these developments are on the Indian side of the border.
However, in terms of forces, India has about twelve mountain divisions capable of swift offensive operations in the mountainous areas. Two of these were reportedly created in February 2008, specifically for combat in Arunachal Pradesh. Two additional such divisions are estimated to become operational by 2015-16, at a cost of around INR 14 billion (USD 358 million). These will be reinforced by air power, including possibly, AWACS, and fighter jets. There have also been reports of India’s plans to procure 140 ultra-light 155mm artillery pieces, as also a large number of heavy lift and combat ready helicopters, all of which would have special utility in mountain warfare. Although India has tested a number of intermediate-range missiles, including the Agni-3 capable of hitting both Beijing and Shanghai, these missiles are still not operational.
Despite such rhetoric, China may not be in a mood to engage in a border conflict with India, as it would affect the growth trajectory of China quite adversely. Second, while Beijing may like to intensify its pressure on India, it recognizes that India is not the same that it defeated in 1962. India’s upgraded military capabilities, specifically air power if used in combat, will significantly alter the outcome of a conflict.