Showing posts with label Andaman Sea. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Andaman Sea. Show all posts

Monday, December 7, 2020

SITMEX: India-Singapore-Thailand Complete Second Trilateral Maritime Exercises - The Diplomat, 27 November 2020

In my column for The Diplomat last month, I looked at the India-Singapore-Thailand Trilateral Maritime Exercises that were just concluded.  I argue that China’s growing economic might and its aggressive military posturing have provided India, Singapore and Thailand strategic rationale to combine their efforts.  

India, Singapore and Thailand recently concluded their trilateral naval exercise SITMEX-20. This is the second edition of SITMEX. Hosted by the Republic of Singapore Navy from November 21-22, the exercise was held in the Andaman Sea. This represents a growing number of naval engagements that India has been holding with various navies, including those in Southeast Asia. But it also indicates the growing willingness of regional navies to look to India as a maritime partner, as well as the increasing comfort level in coming together at the regional level rather than look to just the U.S. in dealing with a rising China. That these exercises were held in spite the challenges imposed by COVID-19 pandemic suggests the importance attached by the three navies to these exercises and also the seriousness of the threats they mutually face.

For the full post, click here.  

This particular trilateral exercise is relatively new. The first edition was held in the Andaman Sea only last year, in September 2019. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi had announced the trilateral exercise at his keynote address at the 2018 Shangri La Dialogue in Singapore.  At the inaugural edition of the exercise, the Indian Navy was represented by the guided missile destroyer INS Ranvir, missile corvette INS Kora, Offshore Patrol Vessel Sumedha and P8I long-range maritime reconnaissance aircraft.  

Indian Ministry of Defense said that the second edition of the exercise was being conducted “as a ‘non-contact, at sea only’ exercise in view of COVID-19 pandemic,” emphasizing this as being indicative of the “growing synergy, coordination and cooperation in the maritime domain between the three friendly navies and maritime neighbors.”  The statement added that the three navies would engage in a series of “exercises including naval maneuvers, surface warfare exercises and weapon firings.”  The stated goals of these exercises were to strengthen “mutual interoperability” and to understand and assimilate “best practices” between the three navies.  

The Indian Navy ships participating in the exercise include the indigenously-built ASW (anti-submarine warfare) corvette Kamorta and missile corvette Karmuk. Singapore sent its Formidable-class frigates, Intrepid and the Endeavour, an Endurance-class LST (landing ship tank).  Thailand was represented by a Chao Phraya-class frigate, the Kraburi.  

Explaining the importance of the exercise, the commander of SITMEX 20 Task Force and commanding Officer of RSS Intrepid, Lieutenant Colonel Oh Zongbo said that the SITMEX “serves as a useful exercise for the three like-minded navies to enhance our inter-operability in maritime operations. The ability to execute and conduct these operations together is a testament to the long-standing ties and trust that we have established with one another.”  After the SITMEX concluded, the Singapore Navy joined the Indian Navy for a bilateral naval exercise, SIMBEX 20, in the Bay of Bengal from November 25 to 27.   

The military exercises with Singapore and Thailand also demonstrate the increasingly strategic nature of engagements that India has developed with the countries in Southeast Asia. From a “Look East” policy in the early 1990s (which itself was not very successful) that focused on economic issues to an “Act East” policy initiated by Modi in 2014, bilateral relations in the region as well as the regional context have been transformative. Even though these exercises have been shortened on account of the pandemic, the fact that the navies of the three countries decided to go ahead with the exercise is a clear reflection of the similarity of views between India, Singapore and Thailand.  This could mean that the three navies may continue to strengthen these exercises in terms of scope of the maneuvers, expansion of the geographical areas of their exercise, and greater sophistication in terms of their overall objectives of SITMEX. 

Singapore, of course, has been one of India’s stronger security partners in the region. Defense relations between the two began with the signing of their first Defense Cooperation Agreement in 2003. Since then, the two have signed several more agreements for greater military-to-military interactions. Given that Singapore is a small island nation, India has been a good partner, offering training to the Singapore Armed Forces at its military training facilities like the air force and artillery firing ranges. Their main naval interaction, SIMBEX, has continued now for more than 20 years. The importance of freedom of navigation and open seas, in line with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as well as respect for international law, have been often-repeated themes in their bilateral discussions.  

India-Thailand bilateral relations are not as deep, but they have also picked up pace over the last decade with a number of high-level political visits and institutional mechanisms. These include periodic Foreign Office Consultations, India-Thailand Joint Commission Meetings (which are held at the foreign ministers level) and defense cooperation mechanisms that have seen military exercises between the armies and the air force of the two countries.  In addition to the annual army and air force exercises, the two countries also hold bi-annual coordinated maritime patrolling by the two navies. Given the slowly brewing tension between Thailand and China, it is likely that Thailand will reach out to countries such as India to hedge against possible longer-term trouble in relations with Beijing. Such moves are also backed by growing popular opposition to Chinese high-handedness across the region. The Milk Tea Alliance, which grew from online squabbles between Chinese and Thai netizens represents “deep-seated reservations about the relationship among Thai people.” The so-called Milk Tea Alliance also quickly expanded, with support pouring in from other countries such as Taiwan, the Philippines, and Hong Kong.  

China’s growing economic might and its aggressive military power have provided India, Singapore and Thailand strategic rationale to combine their efforts. Increasing concerns about American commitment to the region have spurred such efforts and they will likely continue.  

Friday, March 6, 2020

Sino-Indian Competition in Myanmar in the Spotlight With Indian Navy Chief Visit - The Diplomat, February 24, 2020

I have been lagging with my blog posts but I am trying to get it back on track. Here's a short essay on the Sino-Indian competition in Myanmar, I did for The Diplomat in February. The Indian Navy Chief who was on a visit to Myanmar a couple of weeks ago again focused attention on the role of India and China in the Southeast Asian state, even though New Delhi’s weakness lies more in non-security realms.


Last week, India’s Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Karambir Singh visited Myanmar in a trip lasting from February 17 to 20. The trip, which came just weeks after Chinese President Xi Jinping’s trip to the country, spotlighted the tussle between China and India for influence in the Southeast Asian state.

Myanmar has long factored into India’s strategic calculations: Delhi considers relations with Myanmar to be very important, particularly in the context of evolving Indo-Pacific strategic dynamics, and Myanmar is also a key link in furthering India’s ‘Act East’ Policy. For China, which has a bigger political and economic footprint in Myanmar, its inroads into Myanmar have geostrategic implications because it gives Beijing proximity to the Bay of Bengal and the Andaman Sea, maritime space that is crucial to Indian security.

For the full essay, click here.



But India nonetheless continues to compete and consolidate its ties with Myanmar for its own interests. As the statement from the Indian Ministry of Defense said, Admiral Singh’s “visit is intended to consolidate and enhance the bilateral maritime relations between India and Myanmar.”

That was seen in aspects of the visit itself as well. During his visit, Admiral Singh called on a range of top officials, including Admiral Tin Aung San, commander in chief of the Myanmar Navy, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, the Commander in Chief of Defense Services, and other senior government officials, including Aung San Suu Kyi, the State Counselor and Minister of Foreign Affairs.

During his meeting with Admiral Tin Aung San, Adm. Singh offered increased training assistance for the Myanmar Navy. The Indian Navy chief is reported to have briefed the officials on the state of cooperation between the two navies. The navy chief also held interactions with trainees of the National Defense College in Naypyidaw and visited the Naval Dockyard and Training Command of the Myanmar Navy in Yangon.

These gains were notable but not necessarily surprising. The defense aspect of the relationship has been built on by both sides over the past few years, including not just regular exercises, visits, and training, but also defense equipment, with a case in point being when India handed over a diesel-electric Kilo-class submarine, INS Sindhuvir, which India refurbished after procuring from Russia in the 1980s.

Furthermore, the challenge for India in competing with China in Myanmar lies less in the naval domain and more in other aspects. In the economic domain, for instance, India’s lack of capacity to reach out and address many of Myanmar’s requirements is stark, especially when pitted against China and its Belt and Road initiative. Key projects, such as the trilateral India-Myanmar-Thailand highway project and the multi-modal Kaladhan Transit Transport project, are behind schedule.

Myanmar’s importance to India cannot emphasized enough. Given India’s push for the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), Myanmar remains a critical pillar for closer engagement with the southeast Asian region. But New Delhi is still to resolve its problem with delivering on its promises.

2020 - A challenging year yet a satisfying year, professionally

2020 has remained a challenging year for the world around and I was no exception.  Personally, it was a trying year with a lot of dislocatio...