Is India Ready to Play the ‘Tibet Card’ in Its Battle With China? - The Diplomat, 16 July 2020

I am a bit behind in updating my blog but here is the column I did for The Diplomat a couple of weeks ago, looking at the 'Tibet Card' in India's battle with China. While the talk of a “Tibet card” in India’s hands is not new, the key question is if New Delhi is likely to play it?

In the month since 20 Indian Army personnel were killed as a result of the clash at Galwan on the Sino-Indian border, public anger at China is palpable. There have been growing calls for a strong response from the Indian government, including a strengthened partnership with Taiwan. There have also been similar calls for enhanced support for Tibet and the Dalai Lama.

For the full essay, click here.



About 10 days after the Galwan clash, Pema Khandu, chief minister of Arunachal Pradesh, referred to the Line of Actual Control dividing India and China as the India-Tibet border. Several points are noteworthy here: He was speaking at an Indian Army meeting at the Bumla border post; he is from the BJP, the party that also holds power in New Delhi; and his state is entirely claimed by China, which calls it “southern Tibet.”

Coming against the backdrop of the Galwan clash, this could appear to be an attempt at rekindling the Tibet issue, which India has done every now and then when there is a conflict with China. This was of course music to the ears of Tibet activists, who have been seeking active Indian support for a long time. Tenzin Tsundue, a Tibetan writer and activist, during a recent media interview, echoed Khandu and said that the border must be called “the Tibet border and not the China border.” Not surprisingly, Chinese media has commented on such Indian views and opposed them.

There is ongoing debate about how India should respond to the Tibet question in the light of China’s increased pressure. Some Indian public commentators support playing the Tibet card while others are somewhat cautious. Well before the current conflict, in 2018, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), the Hindu nationalist organization out of which the BJP emerged, had argued for a reappraisal of India’s Tibet policy. Prominent BJP ideologues have supported reopening the Tibet issue, even supporting the right of Tibetans to live “as a free nation.”

Such voices have become louder. A retired senior Army officer wrote about the strategic importance of Tibet, and argued that time has come “to challenge the very legitimacy of the Chinese claim over Tibet.” In another opinion piece in Business World, Krishan Varma, a former head of India’s foreign secret service, made a case for a fresh assessment of India’s Tibet policy. He argued that a new Indian policy approach on Tibet “has the real potential of causing major turbulence in China’s underbelly.” He added that India might do well to “align its policy on the issue with the U.S. and support the ‘Tibet Policy and Support Act (2019)’ that has been passed by the U.S. Congress and is pending U.S. Senate approval before being promulgated into law through due process.”

Similarly, an editorial in Hindustan Times, a national newspaper, called for a rethink of India’s Tibet policy. Stating that India has had an inconsistent approach to Tibet, it said, “Delhi now needs to shed its hesitation, not just because Tibet is a ‘card’, but is intertwined with the values of freedom and peace central to the vision to resist China.” The editorial added that although India has continued to respect to China’s core interests, Beijing has not reciprocated. The editorial argued for honoring the Dalai Lama with the Bharat Ratna, India’s highest civilian honor, and for India to take up the rights of Tibetans in international platforms and build deeper links with the younger generation of Tibetan activists who are the face of the new resistance. Finally, it also recommended that India make a statement on the Dalai Lama’s successor indicating that India will respect the Dalai Lama’s wishes on the succession issue. Others have argued that China’s paranoia about the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan presence in India ensures that India continues to have a Tibet card to play at all.

The idea of the “Tibet card” is not new, of course. And various Indian commentators have previously warned against such a strategy. For example, Suhasini Haidar, a prominent foreign policy correspondent, had argued in 2018 that the idea of the Tibet card is “out of step” with shifting ground realities in Tibet and cautioned the Indian establishment against using “the Tibetan population in India as a strategic tool,” a point others have also made.

Similarly, Sudha Ramachandran, writing also in 2018, asserted that India never did have a Tibet card, considering that India and the even the Tibetans have accepted the One China formulation and India’s efforts to keep the Tibet card has only angered China, “without yielding tangible dividends.” Echoing Ramachandran’s sentiments, P. Stobdan, a China analyst who had previously argued that the idea of a Tibet card is a folly, declares in a recent book that China’s slow invasion tactic has been successful in dealing with India whereas New Delhi, even after 60 years, has made no significant gains in its China policy. Instead, he argues that India is now “worryingly and helplessly entangled in a Tibetan quagmire with serious implications for the stability of its frontier region.” What is noteworthy is that arguments against using the so-called Tibet card have been rare during the current crisis.

Part of the problem is the inconsistency in the Indian approach to Tibet under the Modi government. In December 2016, the Dalai Lama was invited to the Rashtrapati Bahavan, India’s presidential palace in New Delhi, for an event in honor of Nobel Peace prize winners, which raised objections from China. In March 2017, the Dalai Lama was also allowed to travel to Tawang, which was again questioned by China. In July that year, in the middle of the Doklam conflict, Lobsang Sangay of the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA), the Tibetan government-in-exile, was allowed to unfurl the Tibetan flag at Pangong Tso in Ladakh, one of the points of the current stand-off. But since the 2017 Doklam confrontation, New Delhi has attempted to play down the Tibetan presence in India, even preventing government officials from attending the 60th anniversary of the Dalai Lama’s exile.

Ultimately, it is unlikely that the Modi government will really play any “Tibet card,” despite the frequency and prominence of those arguing for it in the Indian debate. Even these opinions are more likely a reflection of the general anger toward China, rather than carefully thought out policy proposals.

What Does the Modi-Xi Summit Mean for Sino-Indian Relations?, my this week's column for The Diplomat

"What Does the Modi-Xi Summit Mean for Sino-Indian Relations?," my this week's column for The Diplomat published on Thursday, a day before the informal summit between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping. Though the interaction between the two leaders is notable, there is reason for skepticism and managing expectations.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi is set to travel to Wuhan in central China for an “informal summit” with the Chinese President Xi Jinping. The visit comes against the backdrop of nearly two years of friction between India and China over a whole host of issues including the Doklam standoff, India’s Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) bid, and China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

What will the summit between the two leaders produce? Of course, there is no set agenda and it may be a fairly free-wheeling conversation. Given the deep hostility that exists and the anti-India rhetoric that was on display last year during the Doklam crisis, it is not certain that such negative sentiments can be brushed under the rug that quickly.

For the full essay, click here.



The bilateral relationship plummeted to an all-time low in the wake of friction on multiple fronts. But in December last year, two high-level visits from China suggested the need for a fresh review of the relationship. Within a few weeks of each other, both the Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and State Councilor Yang Jiechi visited India.

Since early February this year, there have been efforts from the Indian side too – the cancellation of the Dalai Lama’s events in Delhi marking the occasion of 60 years in exile of the Dalai Lama, was the first indication of the Indian outreach to China. In a note to Cabinet Secretary PK Sinha, India’s Foreign Secretary Vijay Gokhale said it is a “very sensitive time” in India’s bilateral relations with China and therefore, it is “not desirable” for government officials and other leaders to take part in the celebrations of the Tibetan government in exile.

Several weeks later, it was reported that the Indian government had actually informed China about this before advisory was sent out. Informing China appears to have been undertaken to earn some brownie points with Beijing. India’s overtures to China seems like a one-way process as yet, because China is yet to take any reciprocal steps.

The idea of an informal summit was first floated during the visit of the Indian Foreign Secretary Vijay Gokhale to China on February 23. Modi agreed to the summit in principle when he called Xi to congratulate him on the extension of his tenure in March. Since then, there have been visits by other officials, including India’s National Security Adviser Ajit Doval and Minister of External Affairs Sushma Swaraj, who have fine-tuned various details in preparing for Modi’s summit in Wuhan. In fact, it was Sushma Swaraj, in a joint press conference with the Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, who announced that Modi will visit China. Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Kong Xuanyou too travelled to India in April to finalize the summit details.

Even though Modi will be traveling to China for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Summit on June 9-10, the Indian leadership took the bold decision to make another earlier visit for the summit. The idea of an informal meeting is not to have a set agenda and engage in a free-flowing conversation between the two leaders. The conversation could include the domestic political and economic climate in both the countries, regional developments like the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), and international ones such as the U.S.-China trade war. While it is impossible to predict the outcome of this meeting, the importance and consequence of the state of Sino-Indian relationship for Asian security and stability cannot be ignored.

There is disquiet in New Delhi because China has not demonstrated any reciprocal efforts to pacify India. On the contrary, China has engaged in additional efforts to boost its military forces in the Doklam area, as well as in other areas along the disputed Sino-Indian border. Construction of a new road and military posts (at least two) in Shaksgam Valley, north of Siachen Glacier, in the past few months also raises concerns. Shaksgam Valley is located in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and was ceded by Pakistan to China in 1963, although India does not acknowledge this and treats the Valley as part of the state of Jammu and Kashmir.

This may not yet pose itself as a direct threat to Indian armed forces deployed in Siachen Glacier, Nonetheless, the Chinese action was described by the former Indian army Northern Army Commander Lt. Gen. DS Hooda as a “provocative” step.

There is thus considerable skepticism in India about the summit. Progress on the bilateral front will be judged on whether Beijing shows some sensitivity to Indian concerns on the BRI and CPEC, on India’s NSG bid, and on terrorism. China’s rising influence and growing footprint in South Asia and Indian Ocean are of concern to India and China has not acted to reassure India about China’s long-term intentions.

Nevertheless, China appears to believe that India has agreed to the Wuhan summit because New Delhi has recognized the follies of the so-called Indo-Pacific partnership with the United States and Japan and the ill-effects of that strategy on Sino-Indian relations. Some Chinese analysts suggest that many of the frictions in India-China relations are a result of “lack of trust” or “Western instigation.”

But so far, there is also little indication that India will bend. For instance, on the BRI, India has officially stated that “the so-called ‘China-Pakistan Economic Corridor’ violates India’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. “No country can accept a project that ignores its core concerns on sovereignty and territorial integrity,” the statement continues. “We are of firm belief that connectivity initiatives must be based on universally recognized international norms, good governance, rule of law, openness, transparency and equality, and must be pursued in a manner that respects sovereignty and territorial integrity.”

Indeed Sushma Swaraj reiterated this at the SCO Foreign Minister’s meeting and stated: “Connectivity with SCO countries is India’s priority. We want connectivity to pave the way for cooperation and trust between our societies. For this, respect for sovereignty is essential. Inclusivity, transparency and sustainability are imperative. India has cooperated extensively with the international community for enhanced connectivity.” India has once again refused to endorse the BRI.

All of this, as well as the efforts on both sides to lower expectations, suggest that not much should be expected out of the informal summit. Indeed, beyond some general and temporary stabilization of ties, it is not exactly clear what either side will get out of this meeting.