Monday, June 1, 2009

North Korean N-tests: Japan's Options and Implications




North Korea conducted its second round of nuclear tests on May 25, 2009. North Korea also fired three surface-to-air missiles into the sea, according to South Korea's defense minister, Lee Sang-hee, in an apparent effort to chase off U.S. spy planes monitoring the nuclear test site.

How does the region and more specifically Japan deal with a nuclear North Korean in its neighbourhood? While Japanese officials have acknowledged that a direct attack on Japan may not be on the anvil, the more serious worry will be Pyongyang’s ability and possible intention to proliferate these dangerous weapons to states or more so, non-state actors through black market, like they had sold and proliferated missile technology in the Middle East. Despite such acknowledgement, the threat of an attack cannot be ignored altogether.



While North Korea has been pursuing its nuclear weapons programme, in the last decade it has advanced to a great degree. In fact, Pyongyang believes that nuclear weapons and missiles along with their conventional capabilities are required as deterrents against possible South Korean, Japanese and American military aggression against North Korea. Soon after the May tests, the Korean Central News Agency announced that Pyongyang had “successfully conducted one more underground nuclear test as part of the measures to bolster up its nuclear deterrent for self-defence in every way as requested by its scientists and technicians. The test will contribute to defending the sovereignty of the country and the nation and socialism and ensuring peace and security on the Korean Peninsula and the region around it with the might of (the military first policy) Songun.” Japan has, time and again, contemplated pre-emptive strikes and nuclear deterrence as effective options. Will Japan purse such options in the wake of the second round of nuclear tests or will Japan be constrained by the US-Japan security alliance?

The recent nuclear tests, Pyongyang argues that, is in response to the international response, more particularly the UN statement criticizing the April 5 missile/rocket launch. Following these responses, North Korea (Foreign Ministry spokesman) had suggested that Pyongyang’s “additional self-defensive measures could also include a uranium enrichment programme to enhance its nuclear capabilities.” The implication of this is that they have sufficient fuel and other paraphernalia to carry out nuclear tests, once they decide on further tests (within a month too). Such capabilities are destabilizing on several accounts. The situation is slightly complex because the government mines its own uranium, builds laboratories using its own technical expertise and generates its own plutonium, making it hard to stop the process from the outside.

Prime Minister Taro Aso said that Japan "absolutely cannot tolerate" the nuclear test because North Korea is also beefing up its ballistic missile capability, which "could be a means of transportation for weapons of mass destruction." Chief Cabinet Secretary, Takeo Kawamura said, “The North Korean nuclear test, along with the nation, building up the capability of carrying devices of mass destruction by its long-range missiles, poses a serious threat to Japan’s peace and security as well as to the region.”
Following the recent nuclear tests, former Defence Chief General Nakatani said in a meeting of the LDP officials that Japan should consider developing the capability to conduct pre-emptive military strikes on North Korea. He elaborated saying “We must look at active missile defense such as attacking an enemy’s territory and bases.” One of the options he considers is to equip naval ships with cruise missiles. Earlier, following April 2009 missile tests, an LDP panel had articulated the need to change its policy (thereby the constitution) that would permit attacks on “hostile areas.” Japan also deployed naval and land-based ballistic missile defences fearing a repeat of the 2006 missile tests when parts of the missile fell on Japanese territory. Kyodo News reported Finance Minister Shoichi Nakagawa as saying that “We (Japan) should hold a proper debate about attacking launch bases and about shelters in case something does happen.”[1] Under the pacifist clause of its post-war constitution, Japan is nominally barred from taking aggressive action or acquiring aggressive weapons. Even before Monday’s test, the LDP officials were exploiting the previous missile test to argue that Japan should be able to take “preemptive action” and not “sit and wait for death”.
Following the tests, Japan dispatched three military aircraft from separate bases to monitor the possible presence of radioactive substances in the air, the Defense Ministry said. Japan's anxiety about the test is heightened by its vulnerability to attack from nearby North Korea, which has more than 200 mid-range Nodong missiles capable of striking most of the country. Several experts, including American and Japanese have concluded that North Korea has built or is attempting to build nuclear warheads small enough to fit atop those missiles.
The earlier public debates on the possible Japanese response have been again to adopt a hardline, more on the lines of preemptive strikes and nuclear deterrence. Since mid-1995, a section of the Japanese government has believed that Japan should have the capability to strike North Korean assets if Japan perceives an imminent attack. Following the 1998 Taepodong-1 missile tests in August 1998, the Japanese government, media and security analysts debated serious counter-measures, including development of missile defence programmes and “acquisition of military strike capabilities” on North Korean missile bases. The subject was debated again in 2003 when the Japanese defence minister suggested that it should contemplate a “preemptive strike” on North Korea if Japan saw an evidence of North Korea planning an attack on it. Following such discussions, the LDP in 2004 proposed that the country debate about whether it should develop offensive military capabilities and if so, how it should be used.[2] Some security analysts believe that developing offensive strike capability will be an effective measure in defending Japan against ballistic missile attacks on several accounts. Firstly, the SDF “can attack missile launch sites when a country intends to attack Japan and the missile is being prepared for launch.” Second, analysts argue that even when Japan is attacked first, “an offensive strike capability could prevent subsequent ballistic missile attacks against Japan.” Third argument revolves around using offensive capability as a deterrent against any missile attacks.[3] This debate gained a further momentum after the 2006 missile tests by North Korea when some members within the government and the Liberal Democratic Party argued that Japan should “consider developing the capability to strike a foreign missile base if there is an imminent threat of an attack on Japan.”[4] Debates in this regard focused on preemptive military strikes against North Korean missile facilities. The 2006 debates were triggered by the statement of Defence Agency Director General Fukushiro Nukaga. He said, “As a sovereign nation, it is natural to consider possessing the minimum capability (for a preemptive strike against a foreign missile base) within the confines of the Constitution in order to protect the citizens.”[5] Following Nukaga’s remarks, Foreign Minister Taro Aso and Chief Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe too expressed similar sentiments, with Aso saying that “Japan must consider the acquisition of a preemptive strike capability within constitutional constraints.”[6] In August 2006, the Subcommittee on Defence Policies in the Liberal Democratic Party’s National Defense Division was debating whether Japan should “acquire the capability to attack ‘a foreign enemy base’.”[7]
Japan, however, lack the wherewithal as of now in terms of long-range bombers or missiles. Japan would need to acquire a few systems in place, including a) ability to destroy air defense radars; b) low-flying aircraft so as to avoid radar detection; c) air-to-surface guided missiles or cruise missiles; and ability to collect intelligence on enemy sites.[8] Additionally, many experts believe that such pre-emptive strikes can be destabilising for the entire region. First of all, these strikes will be seen as a return to a “militaristic” Japan. Second, Japan’s development of such capabilities could spur North Korea in to testing more advanced weapon systems, which will force Japan to carry out further measures. This will lead to a regional arms race. If Japan changes its current defensive stance, China will be compelled to increase the quantity and quality of its offensive weapons; thereafter India will follow the suit and then Pakistan and it could even impact the situation in Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Egypt. However, what is probably feasible might be for Japan to improve its missile defence capabilities to an advanced level, whereby it can detect the launch at the boost phase itself, which might not be viewed as offensive capability by the international community. Despite these debates, such strike options are complicated in the Japanese case given the restrictive nature of Japanese constitution.

Similar has been the Japanese debates whether it should go nuclear or not. Most of the debates, however, are not connected with war-fighting scenarios as is in the case of China or due to an existential threat like in the case of Israel. The debate is placed within the “political and strategic entropy that would be associated with a collapse of the US extended deterrence commitment.”[1] In fact, some Japanese scholars believe that Japan should acquire nuclear weapons whenever situation warrants, because as they argue, “credibility of the US commitment to Japan would inevitably erode, China would develop a blue water naval presence in Japanese strategic sea lanes, and the international community would acquiesce to North Korea’s nuclear weapons and allow the NPT regime to collapse.”[2]
All the while, the opinion among prominent Japanese opinion-makers was a clear no, owing to two main reasons. First, it was believed that Japanese nuclear programme in response to China could evoke regional instability. Second issue was that a Japanese nuclear programme could possibly affect the US security ties and weaken the alliance.[3] Public allergy to nuclearisation remains strong, despite the fact that there is a new sense of nationalism developing particularly among the younger generation. A few security analysts have been of the view that this new nationalism could affect Japan significantly in the sense that they may not feel the need to be relying on the US for their security and be beholden to US objectives and principles.[4] They may even start questioning the need to continue with a pacifist constitution imposed upon them by the US. If that be the case, it could lead to an independent foreign and security policy, including the nuclear option. Serious geopolitical developments in the region such as a possible Korean reunification could have serious consequences for Japan. If re-unification of the Koreas takes place, one question that will gain immediate prominence will be whether that it would be a nuclear Korea.

Tokyo however remains frustrated about its options vis a vis Pyongyang. The 6-party talks haven’t worked; nor the unilateral sanctions against NK by Japan. Tokyo already maintains tough sanctions against North Korea—with a ban on all imports from North Korea, no transport links and a prohibition on exports of luxury items. The Nikkei English News reported that the government was considering a complete ban on exports to North Korea.

In conclusion, Japan maintains that the US nuclear umbrella and the security assurance with the US remain the best choice, without giving up the potential for a deterrent capability at a future date. This is also due to the fact that Japanese strategists continue to be concerned about possible US arms control agreements with China and North Korea that could leave Japan at a strategic loss, facing serious insecurities. Even when Japan maintains that the US security umbrella remains the best security cover, they would like to get a better ownership of security, be it nuclear or otherwise. This could be also due to the rising nationalism among the younger generation who may not like to be dictated by US directives.

Implications: However, if Japan and South Korea perceive that US’ extended deterrence strategy as not credible, these countries will be forced to take security on their shoulders. Japan, for instance has been compelled to consider hardline options on two accounts.[1] First, the worry that North Korea’s nuclear- and missile-related issues cannot be sorted out through international arms control agreements. There is a sense that international arms control arrangements are not effective in taking care of problems like Iran, North Korea. Such a line of thinking led the Bush Administration to go for a preemptive attack on Iraq. The validity of these actions is a separate debate. In a similar vein, Japan is sensing the increasing North Korean threat and is not certain about the effectiveness of international agreements to curb the North Korean threat.

Second, the Japanese apprehension about the US ability and intention to extend support through extended deterrence. There is an increasing perception that there is a gradual erosion of the US’ extended deterrence strategy.[2] If US power is seen to be declining and it is not able to provide extended deterrence, this could lead to some regional powers, including Japan, taking security on their shoulders rather than relying on the US. If regional powers start taking security onto their own shoulders, this may in turn mean that the US must selectively choose to decide regions that are vital to its strategic interests and thereby apply extended deterrence selectively. In this scenario, the question that needs to be asked is whether Japan is worth the cost to prioritise and maintain its bases and provide credible deterrence.[3]

Lastly, Where does Japan figure in that new configuration of priorities? If preponderance is also exercised through extended deterrence strategy and thereby forward deployment and basing policy, it becomes a costly proposal. Whether the US is willing to risk and take that additional cost any more is an issue.[4] Hence, some scholars have argued that a preponderance strategy if continued will be a drain on the US economy, thereby reducing its economic might and “weaken its geopolitical standing” in the new century.[5] Obama appears to be taking these measures a bit too seriously ignoring the fact that it is America’s “hard power” that is most influential in the Asia-Pacific and any discount on that front can cost the US’ standing in Asia as well as risk its allies in the region.[6] The recent decision by the Obama Administration to cut back on some of the defense programmes involving high technology weapon systems could be detrimental to Japanese security, as Obama is cutting down on missile defence and satellite programmes.[7] The Airborne Laser program that is being axed remains an important component in intercepting ballistic missiles in the “boost” phase, shortly after launch. All these scenarios put Japan and its security at serious risk.[8] The US’ decision regarding F-22 Raptor could also send wrong signals to Japan.[9] Therefore, Japan might be forced to go pro-active and offensive in its postures, even if gradually. The Bush Administration, despite its even ties with China, had maintained that its relations with Japan remain the backbone of its security in Northeast Asia.[10]

Lastly, a point about China in the US calculations in East Asia. Given the kind of highly interdependent relationship between China and the US, especially in the current scenario of global economic crisis, it is a serious dilemma in the minds of Japanese security analysts as to whether the US would provide that kind of security to Japan if there is a catastrophic attack on Japan from North Korea or China. A related but similar concern in Japan stems from the fact that a closer Sino-US partnership could possibly widen the “gap between Tokyo’s and Washington’s security perspectives” and could weaken the US security commitment.[11]

Similarly, there is a greater sense of apprehension on the minds of Japanese security officials on the US intention to punish North Korea for its nuclear- and missile related activities. This was clearly evident as early as in the 1994 crisis. Imposition of sanctions would have been considered provocative and as “declaration of war,” so the US was quick to enter into an agreement and brought Pyongyang back into the non-proliferation order on the condition that no force will be employed on North Korea.[12] The move was exemplary from the conflict resolution framework, although the US’ response was not necessarily in tune with its extended deterrence commitments to Japan.[13] This sense has been best captured by Green and Sakamoto in their analysis when they state that “while strategic conversion underlies a broader level of support for the alliance in both countries than ever before [at the end of the Cold War], there is increasing tactical disagreement about how to manage relations. This soron sansei/kakuron hantai (agreement in principle/disagreement on the specifics is emerging as the greatest challenge for alliance in the future.”[14]

Another issue complicating the US-Japan security alliance is Obama’s recent push towards global disarmament. Tokyo will be forced to choose between a secure nuclear umbrella or nuclear abolition in the face of serious threats from Pyongyang. Support for Washington giving up its nuclear arsenal is intricately tied to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. For now, Japan feels it still needs to be protected under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. And until it no longer considers North Korea's nuclear weapons a threat, it will be hard for Tokyo to support the global zero movement. Japanese security analysts believe that so long as the Japanese government needs the nuclear umbrella, ‘Zero’ or nuclear disarmament could remain just a dream.
[1] Some of these aspects have been dealt with in great details in Daniel A. Pinkston and Kazutaka Sakurai, “Japan Debates Preparing for Future Preemptive Strikes against North Korea,” The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, vol. XVIII, no. 4, Winter 2006, pp. 95-121, available at http://cns.miis.edu/north_korea/Pinkston_Sakurai_KIDA_Winter_2006.pdf.
[2] See, Christopher Layne, “From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America’s Future Grand Strategy,” International Security, vol. 22, no. 1, Summer 1997, p. 104. The concept has become even more problematic with the relative decline of the US power and its capability to protect the interests of the allies and the nature of new threats.
[3] Some of these thoughts have been articulated also by Michael J. Green and Katsuhisa Furukawa, “Japan: New Nuclear Realism,” in Muthiah Alagappa, The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia (Stanford University Press: Stanford, California, 2008) p. 354.
[4] As early as in 1997, Pentagon was contemplating reduction of US forces in Asia, due to cost considerations. See, Paul Richter, “US Pacific Troop Strength May Be Cut, Admiral Says,” Los Angeles Times, February 04, 1997, p. A14, cited in Christopher Layne, “From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America’s Future Grand Strategy,” International Security, vol. 22, no. 1, Summer 1997, p. 109.
[5] Christopher Layne, “From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America’s Future Grand Strategy,” International Security, vol. 22, no. 1, Summer 1997, pp. 95-96.
[6] Dan Blumethal, “The Erosion of US Power in Asia,” Far Eastern Economic Review, May 01, 2009, available at http://www.aei.org/article/100445.
[7] The Obama Administration is believed to be reducing the missile defense budget by $1.4 billion. See, Jim Kouri, “Obama Imitates Clinton with Major Defense Budget Cuts,” Pacific Freeze, April 13, 2009, available at http://pacificfreeze.ips-dc.org/2009/04/obama-imitates-clinton-with-major-defense-budget-cuts/.
[8] Dan Blumethal, “The Erosion of US Power in Asia,” Far Eastern Economic Review, May 01, 2009, available at http://www.aei.org/article/100445.
[9] Analysts in Washington note that exporting F-22 stealth fighters could potentially impede the “strategically important Sino-US relations.” Meanwhile, Japan is believed to be developing a Japanese stealth fighter, called Shinshin, meaning the heart of God. Japan has allocated about 8.5 billion yen in the next financial year for the purpose. Japan plans to spend a total of a total of 39.4 billion yen for the fighter programme until the fiscal year 2015. The US might be thinking of replacing F-22 Raptor with F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, but the issue remains that F-35 cannot be a replacement. Although both are of the current generation, the F-22 is clearly a superior fighter that ensures air superiority whereas F-35 is intended primarily as a ground attack aircraft. The other more important capability remains that F-22 is a “first strike” weapon if armed with nukes, and with a 1.5 Mach speed, it would have been an apt system for Japan. Given the short duration of a missile (once launched) from North Korea, F-22 would have been the perfect weapon system. See, Kosuke Takahashi, “Japan Frets over the US’s F-22s,” Asia Times, February 05, 2009, available at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/KB05Dh01.html; Dennis Sevakis, “Killing the F-22,” American Thinker, April 11, 2009, available at http://www.americanthinker.com/2009/04/killing_the_f22.html.
[10] Even with all the reductions, it might be wrong to conclude that the US’ commitment towards Japan might be reducing. In fact, the US military commitment has been evident through a range of steps that it has taken including, its joint development of missile defence system with Japan and possibly Taiwan; its deployment of F-22A Raptors in Japan and so on. Interestingly, the US decision with regard to a defence contract showed US determination regarding Asia-Pacific. Pentagon opting for a tanker aircraft (Northrop Grumman/ EADS) which “can fly the longer distances, and carrying more people and cargo, required for rapid, trans-Pacific Ocean deployments” made it amply clear the US priorities. This is believed to be in tune with the priorities set out in the QDR that stated a “strategic shift from Atlantic to Pacific oceans” while particularly looking at potential hot spots like North Korea, China/ Taiwan and even the Southeast Asian region ripe with Islamic terrorism and so on. See, “Tanker Award Shows Pacific Strategy,” AviationWeek.com, March 06, 2008, available at http://www.defensetech.org/archives/004046.html.
[11] Brad Glosserman, “Japan Peers into the Abyss,” PacNet Newsletter #20, March 20, 2008, cited in Emma Chanlett-Avery and Mary Beth Nikitin, “Japan’s Nuclear Future: Policy Debate, Prospects, and US Interests,” CRS Report for Congress, February 19, 2009, available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34487.pdf.
[12] Joel S. Wit, Daniel B. Poneman, Robert L. Gallucci, Going Critical: The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), pp. 55-56. Cited in “Chapter Four: The 1993-94 Nuclear Crisis,” PhD Thesis, Aberystwyth University, UK, pp. 103-04, available at http://cadair.aber.ac.uk/dspace/bitstream/2160/1552/5/10_Chapter%20Four.doc.
[13] This is another area where Japan feels that the US does not share its concerns vis a vis North Korea. US’ soft pedaling on the North Korean issue could also widen the gap between Tokyo and Washington in their strategic perspectives. This view is also expressed by some other security analysts. See, Brad Glosserman, “Nuclear Basics for the Alliance,” PacNet Newsletter, #21, April 19, 2007, cited in Emma Chanlett-Avery and Mary Beth Nikitin, “Japan’s Nuclear Future: Policy Debate, Prospects, and US Interests,” CRS Report for Congress, February 19, 2009, available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34487.pdf.
[14] Michael Jonathan Green and Kazuya Sakamoto, “The US-Japan Alliance after the Cold War,” in Yoichi Funabashi, Alliance Tomorrow: Security Arrangements after the Cold War (The Tokyo Foundation: Tokyo, 2001), p. 48. See also, Michael J. Green, “Asia in the Debate on American Grand Strategy,” Naval War College Review, Winter 2009, available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0JIW/is_1_62/ai_n31415250/?tag=content;col1.
[1] Michael J. Green and Katsuhisa Furukawa, “Japan: New Nuclear Realism,” in Muthiah Alagappa, The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia (Stanford University Press: Stanford, California, 2008) p. 348.
[2] In fact, Terumasa Nakanishi argues that with Japan going nuclear, it will improve Japan’s diplomatic position vis a vis China than weaken and isolate it. See, Terumasa Nakanishi, Nihonkoku Kakubushou heno Ketsudan (Japan’s Decision to be Armed with Nuclear Weapons), Shokun!, August 2003, pp. 14-58, cited in Michael J. Green and Katsuhisa Furukawa, “Japan: New Nuclear Realism,” in Muthiah Alagappa, The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia (Stanford University Press: Stanford, California, 2008) p. 357.
[3] Emma Chanlett-Avery and Mary Beth Nikitin, “Japan’s Nuclear Future: Policy Debate, Prospects, and US Interests,” CRS Report for Congress, February 19, 2009, available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34487.pdf.
[4] Emma Chanlett-Avery and Mary Beth Nikitin, “Japan’s Nuclear Future: Policy Debate, Prospects, and US Interests,” CRS Report for Congress, February 19, 2009, available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34487.pdf.
[1] Isabel Reynolds, “North Korea Rocket Revives Japan Pre-emptive Strike Talk,” Reuters UK, April 06, 2009, available at http://uk.reuters.com/articlePrint?articleId=UKTRE5351L120090406.
[2] Liberal Democratic Party Policy Research Council, “Proposal, Japan’s New Defense Policy – for a Secure, Peaceful Japan,” March 30, 2004, available at http://www.nakatanigen.com/teigen.htm, cited in Daniel A. Pinkston and Kazutaka Sakurai, “Japan Debates Preparing for Future Preemptive Strikes against North Korea,” The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, vol. XVIII, no. 4, Winter 2006, pp. 95-121, available at http://cns.miis.edu/north_korea/Pinkston_Sakurai_KIDA_Winter_2006.pdf.
[3] Daniel A. Pinkston and Kazutaka Sakurai, “Japan Debates Preparing for Future Preemptive Strikes against North Korea,” The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, vol. XVIII, no. 4, Winter 2006, pp. 95-121, available at http://cns.miis.edu/north_korea/Pinkston_Sakurai_KIDA_Winter_2006.pdf.
[4] “Our Very Own Preemptive Option,” Editorial, The Japan Times, July 18, 2006, available at http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/ed20060718a1.html. See also, “Anthony Faiola, “In Japan. Tough Talk About Preemptive Capability,” The Washington Post, July 11, 2006, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/10/AR2006071000106_pf.html.
[5] “Our Very Own Preemptive Option,” Editorial, The Japan Times, July 18, 2006, available at http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/ed20060718a1.html.
[6] “Reinvasion Plans Reach Severe Level,” Korean Central News Agency, July 26, 2006, available at http://www.kcna.co.jp. The English version of the editorial is a short summary without the citations of Japanese officials. The English version is available as “Japanese Authorities’ Theory of ‘Preemptive Attack’ on DPRK
Assailed,” Korean Central News Agency, July 26, 2006, available at http://www.kcna.co.jp. For English versions of remarks by Abe, Aso and Nukaga, see Kyodo News Agency, “Japan Needs Debate on Possessing Capability to Attack Foreign Bases–Official,” BBC Monitoring International reports, July 9, 2006, in Lexis-Nexis, available at http://www.lexis-nexis.com; Hiroko Nakata, “First Strike Permitted if Attack Imminent: Abe Hitting Missiles Seen as Self-defense,” Japan Times, July 11, 2006, in Lexis-Nexis, available at http://www.lexis-nexis.com; “Japan Has Right to Protect Itself from N. Korea Aggression–Foreign Minister,” AFX–Asia, July 9, 2006, in Lexis-Nexis, available at http://www.lexis-nexis.com, cited in Daniel A. Pinkston and Kazutaka Sakurai, “Japan Debates Preparing for Future Preemptive Strikes against North Korea,” The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, vol. XVIII, no. 4, Winter 2006, pp. 95-121, available at http://cns.miis.edu/north_korea/Pinkston_Sakurai_KIDA_Winter_2006.pdf.
[7] Japan Economic News Wire, “LDP Begins Debate on Possession of Capability to Attack Enemy Base,” Kyodo News Service, August 04, 2006, in Lexis-Nexis, available at http://www.lexis-nexis.com, cited in Daniel A. Pinkston and Kazutaka Sakurai, “Japan Debates Preparing for Future Preemptive Strikes against North Korea,” The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, vol. XVIII, no. 4, Winter 2006, pp. 95-121, available at http://cns.miis.edu/north_korea/Pinkston_Sakurai_KIDA_Winter_2006.pdf.
[8] Daniel A. Pinkston and Kazutaka Sakurai, “Japan Debates Preparing for Future Preemptive Strikes against North Korea,” The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, vol. XVIII, no. 4, Winter 2006, pp. 95-121, available at http://cns.miis.edu/north_korea/Pinkston_Sakurai_KIDA_Winter_2006.pdf.

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