In this essay, I argue that the relationship between India’s nuclear and space programmes has waxed and waned. Three phases can be identified that the relationship went through. There was a period in the early days of both the programmes when the relationship was close, signified by the fact that they were even headed by the same leadership, Dr. Vikram Sarabhai. For a variety of reasons that included growing maturity of both programmes but also political decisions about the need to separate the two programmes to reduce international concerns, the programmes became autonomous of each other for a period of time. More recently, over the last two decades, there has been greater collaboration between the two programmes though the nature of the cooperation is very different from what it was in the first phase. In this essay, I outline these three stages chronologically and conclude with some thoughts about how the relationship is likely to evolve.
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It is a long essay and I concluded with the following:
Evolution of the relationship between India’s nuclear and space sectors has gone through multiple stages, partly as a consequence of domestic factors such as bureaucratic politics, technology development as well as due to international conditions such as the state of India’s relations with the global nuclear regime. In the current space, both the maturing of India’s technological capabilities in both the nuclear and space sectors and the evolution of India’s nuclear weapons programmes as well as the changed relationship between India and the global regime has led to a synergistic relationship in which India’s space programme provides significant support to India’s nuclear weapons programme. This is likely to continue for a period of time because India’s nuclear programme is still growing and it has not reached completion. For example, India still does not have a fully developed deterrence capability against China because it does not have any delivery system that can cover all of China. Moreover, the growing Chinese nuclear and space capabilities will require India to undertake further efforts before India can have a satisfactory deterrence relationship with China.
At the same time, the evolution of India’s nuclear weapons programme has changed the relationship between the nuclear and space programmes in at least two ways. First, the development of India’s missile systems outside the ISRO means that the Indian nuclear programme no longer has to depend on the space programme for this particular requirement. The DRDO has come a long way from its early efforts and is now fully capable of developing the delivery vehicles that India’s nuclear weapons programme needs. Second, the growth and complexity of India’s nuclear weapons establishment means that it needs other service support to fully exploit the delivery capability that India has developed. For example, it makes little sense to have delivery capabilities without advanced command and control systems to manage the delivery capability and ensure that it is used appropriately, which requires support from space-based communication and command systems. Similar reasons apply for intelligence and target acquisition, which are also space-based. Therefore, as the Indian nuclear weapons programme becomes more sophisticated, it also requires additional support from India’s space capabilities. What this suggests is that as India’s nuclear weapons programme continues to develop, we should expect a closer and more synergistic relationship between India’s nuclear and space programmes.
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