Deepening US-India Maritime Ties in Focus with Navy Chief Visit - The Diplomat, May 15, 2019

In last week's column for the Diplomat, "Deepening US-India Maritime Ties in Focus with Navy Chief Visit," I examined the deeper engagement between Indian and the US navies in the face of growing maritime threats in the Indo-Pacific. A recent interaction highlighted this aspect of relations between the two countries.

Admiral John Michael Richardson, the chief of naval operations of the U.S. Navy, has just wrapped up a visit to India to explore additional areas of naval cooperation between the Indian and U.S. navies. Richardson’s trip provided the opportunity for both sides to deepen their naval collaboration as part of their broader defense ties.

For the full essay, click here.



During his visit, Richardson met with a number of Indian officials, including Indian naval chief Admiral Sunil Lanba, who is also chairman of India’s Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC), as well as Indian Defense Secretary Sanjay Mitra and other senior officials. They are reported to have discussed all issues covering operations and exercises, training interactions, as well as capacity building and enhancement.

The visit comes against the backdrop of U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s statements that the United States is reorienting its ties with like-minded partners in nurturing “a free and open order” in the Indo-Pacific. He said that the United States is “banding together with the likeminded nations like Australia, India, Japan, and South Korea to make sure that each Indo-Pacific nation can protect its sovereignty from coercion.”

Like this one, many of the recent initiatives have been in the backdrop of a more muscular China that has been using infrastructure investment and other economic tools to further its narrow interests, even when China understands the economic non-feasibility of these projects.

A particular concern, as Admiral Richardson’s visit shows, is China’s growing naval power, a concern to both India and the United States. The PLA has traditionally been a land-focused force, but this is no more the case. Both the specific need of protecting China’s sea routes of commerce – vital for a nation as dependent on foreign trade as China – and China’s larger ambition to return to its traditional great power role, require China to expand its naval power.

The Chinese naval base in Djibouti established in 2017 is a case in point. It has also established a firmer foothold in the Indian Ocean by acquiring Sri Lanka’s Hambantota part for 99 years. (Interestingly, possibly to demonstrate its control over the port, Sri Lanka held a week-long exercise with the United States known as Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) in Hambantota). China also has access to Pakistan’s Gwadar port, which adds to its growing maritime footprint.

China’s naval push is leading India and the United States to do a lot more together, especially in the seas. Even though India has been trying to improve relations with China, New Delhi has also stepped up its security engagements with Washington. India’s recent decision to join the United States, Japan, Australia, and the Philippines in sailing through and conducting a naval exercise in the South China Sea demonstrated India’s growing concerns with a belligerent China and the need to cooperate and coordinate with other like-minded partners in the region.

The United States, too, has changed, with the Trump Administration, in particular, taking a much more strategic and longer-term approach to India that is more clearly directed at China. The United States granted the ‘Major Defense Partner’ status to India in 2016 and the ‘Strategic Trade Authorisation-1’ (STA) rank to India in 2018, evidence of the changing view in Washington regarding India’s role in the region. The 2+2 Strategic Dialogue between the two sides also had its inaugural edition in September 2018 and the signing of the Communications, Compatibility, Security Agreement (COMCASA) have added more substance and depth into the defense and strategic cooperation.

The recent U.S. decision to approve the sale of two dozen multi-role MH-60R Seahawk maritime helicopters to India for around $2.6 billion is important in the context of having strengthened anti-submarine warfare capabilities against China. These helicopters can operate from a number of different platforms including frigates, destroyers, cruisers and aircraft carriers and can be used for multiple missions including anti-surface and anti-submarine warfare operations along with secondary missions including vertical replenishment, search and rescue, and communications relay. Other important developments in this respect include the Seahawk helicopters to be armed with Hellfire missiles. These are capable of undertaking multiple missions with anti-submarine warfare missions being a critical one.

The two sides have also strengthened education, training and joint exercises in recent years – the two navies recently concluded a joint submarine-hunting exercise in the Indian Ocean, with the goal of having more reinforced and coordinated maritime patrol and reconnaissance missions in the region. The United States has sold India a number of major non-naval items also, underlining the broader nature of military ties. Earlier, India took possession of four of the 15 Boeing-made Chinook heavy-lift helicopters ordered in 2018. In addition, India has placed orders for 22 Apache attack helicopters from the United States, the first of which was handed over to the Indian Air Force last week.

Richardson’s visit will help in furthering the growing cooperation between the two sides. Because this cooperation is being driven by external pressures that both the United States and India feel, it is likely that it will deepen, irrespective of the outcome of the current national elections in India.

India’s Space Program: The Commercial Domain - The Diplomat, May 10, 2019

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I write on the Indian space programme, focusing on the commercial aspects of it. The establishment of a new private institution has spotlighted New Delhi's ongoing efforts to build out the commercial aspect of its space programme.

In the beginning of March this year, the Indian Cabinet cleared the establishment of a private institution, the Newspace India Limited (NSIL), under the Department of Space. While the development may not have received as much international attention as some of the other space- and defense-focused developments in India, it bears careful watching as it is in line with New Delhi’s ongoing efforts to build out the commercial aspect of its space program.

India’s focus on the commercial aspect of its space program in general and moves such as the establishment of NSIL are not entirely new or surprising. This follows from the Narendra Modi government’s plan to make space a major industry focus under the government’s Vision 2030 announced in this year’s interim budget. The 10-point agenda in Vision 2030 included making India “the launchpad of the world and placing an Indian astronaut in space by 2022.”

For the full essay, click here.



With respect to NSIL itself, the new entity has been set up with a paid-up capital of around $1 million. NSIL will function under the directorship of Radhakrishnan Durairaj and Suma Devaki Ram, who have been Indian Space Research Association (ISRO) directors of launch services and operations respectively. They also serve on the management team of Antrix.

The new institution is the second commercial arm of the ISRO after the Antrix Corporation, which was set up in 1992 primarily to facilitate ISRO’s commercial launch of foreign satellites. The major goal for the NSIL will be to facilitate the transfer of ISRO technologies to private industries as well as aid in marketing space-based products and spin-off technologies.

Reports citing official documents suggest that in order to facilitate transfer of technology, NSIL will take license from ISRO before sub-licensing them to the commercial players. The technology transfer envisaged through the NSIL will include India’s small satellite program, the small satellite launch vehicle (SSLV) program and the Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV). This would mean that services including launching of satellites can be undertaken by private entities once the license is procured by the NSIL.

Speaking to Times of India, Dr. Sivan, head of the ISRO, said that the NSIL will essentially become the connecting link for ISRO with commercial players to aid in technology transfer for a fee. As he put it: “We wanted a mechanism to transfer the technologies of our new projects like SSLV and even lithium-ion cells. With this company, ISRO will be able to smoothly transfer these technologies after charging fees. Once companies start mass production of small satellites and launchers, ISRO will be charging them for using its launch services.” In another interview, he had stated that he expected a demand for 2-3 SSLV rockets per month.

A January 2019 notice on the ISRO website had already shortlisted ten domestic industries for the technology transfer with regard to lithium-ion cell technology. The ISRO had already decided to transfer the PSLV rocket to the private sector more than a decade ago, though this has not yet been accomplished. The NSIL can possibly help do this quicker. On the regulatory aspects, the ISRO Chairman added that a separate “space law” is being readied, which will soon be with the Indian cabinet for its approval. It will manage all aspects of the regulation of space ventures and will “also have provisions related to the accountability of manufacturers for its space components.”

The ISRO has a proven track record in launching small satellites with the success of the PSLV. The development of the SSLV will give India a further boost in this segment. SSLV will offer an even more cost-effective option than the existing PSLV. The Chairman and Managing Director of Antrix, Rakesh Sasibhushan has said that with the SSLV, they expect to hit “a much lower cost than the PSLV” and that they were “also looking at a large increase in our revenues.” Besides the cost factor, the SSLV can also be assembled in 3-4 days as against the 40 days for a normal size rocket (Other reports suggest 15 days to assemble the SSLV).

The first test flight of SSLV is scheduled for July-August this year. ISRO has plans to launch two defense satellites of 120 kg each during the first test slight itself. The SSLVs will carry payloads between 300-500 kgs to Low Earth Orbit, thus eyeing a specific market that has not been tapped into much as yet.

ISRO’s approach to privatization and commercial engagements has come a long way, driven by the need to stay competitive at a time when there are fast emerging competitors including China and foreign commercial players who have been eyeing the global commercial space. The competition is likely to be stiff, especially in the small satellite segment given the global trend to break the big satellite constellation into smaller ones. Small satellites offer many advantages, the cost to manufacture and launch being a major consideration. ISRO’s opening to bring commercial entities into India’s space trajectory is likely to have several spin-off benefits, including for national security purposes.

Will the Masood Azhar Listing Improve Sino-Indian Relations? - The Diplomat, May 7, 2019

In this week's column for The Diplomat, Rajesh and I wrote a joint article, "Will the Masood Azhar Listing Improve Sino-Indian Relations?," examining if China's decision on Masood Azhar is likely to have any positive impact on India-China relations. But we believe there are reasons to be skeptical.

Masood Azhar, a Pakistani national who heads the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) terrorist group, has now been placed in the United Nations Security Council 1267 Sanctions List. This was long sought by India, who blamed Azhar and the JeM for various terror attacks in India. The issue was also a major irritant in Sino-Indian relations because China had for several years placed a “technical hold” that prevented the listing.

The Indian government was jubilant, and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who is fighting national parliamentary elections, immediately claimed credit. Though the Indian government welcomed China’s decision, they have been cautious about whether this by itself would move the relationship forward, stating that there are “many things” which have contributed to the “Wuhan Spirit” and “it is difficult to point out one single incident or instance which will contribute to a better India-China relationship.”

The caution is well-founded. Sino-Indian relations have improved since the Doklam confrontation in 2017. The Wuhan “spirit,” the supposed positive outcome of the informal summit at Wuhan between Modi and Chinese leader Xi Jinping, is credited with improving relations between the two countries. A follow-up informal summit is slated for later this year. China’s move on Azhar should add to the positive spirit. Still, fundamental problems remain in the relationship and they are unlikely to be easy to resolve.

For the full essay, click here.



The most important is the consequence of the changing balance of power between the two countries. From rough parity in the 1980s, China’s economy has pulled away from India at a dizzying speed, and it is now about five times as large. This has created a gross imbalance between the two sides that is likely to persist for some time to come, even if India’s marginally faster economic growth rate of the last couple of years continues into the future. This imbalance also leads to a military imbalance, as China’s military budget grows along with its wealth. Though China’s military spending as proportion of its GDP is still quite low, that should be of little comfort because in absolute terms, it is almost four times that of India’s.

More importantly, the effect of this imbalance is likely to be felt more in the political clout that it brings to China than in a test of arms. Over the last decade, China has become bolder in wielding its economic clout, as Evan Feigenbaum has pointed out. But even without such direct exhibitions of its power, China’s clout gives it political capacities in international settings that will be difficult to ignore. New Delhi will find that when it comes to many issues where its interest conflicts with that of China’s, China will be able to garner greater international political support than India. This is already very visible among India’s neighbors in South Asia, and its effect is possibly much more diffuse but far more potent than New Delhi yet realizes. This represents a pressure on India that will not yield in the near future, and it will limit the possibilities of Sino-Indian ties.

Of course, the older problem of the disputed border also remains, despite decades of negotiations. Neither side can compromise very much on this. The best that can be hoped for is that neither side will attempt to settle it by force, but misperceptions and local misunderstandings are likely to periodically recur. The Doklam confrontation was possibly the result of something along these lines; the next time, it could become more serious.

But one consequence that can be dismissed is any effect of the current general elections on the future course of Sino-Indian relations, even though China’s move comes in the midst of a hot campaign. As Vipin Narang and Paul Staniland have noted, foreign policy has fairly low electoral salience in India. Though the ruling BJP’s campaign is pushing strategic issues in an unusually heavy manner, it is unclear what effect this will have. But even if this has some limited effect (and it will be difficult to decide this even after the election results are announced, though exit polls may give at least some clues) on the elections, its effect on subsequent Indian foreign policy may be limited. Whoever wins these elections will still have to deal with the context of China’s power and its effects on India’s options, and these are fairly limited.

New Delhi is thus correct to be cautious about the effects of the Masood Azhar listings. And while it is at it, India should equally cautious about the so-called “Wuhan spirit” because it is not likely to last very much longer either.

The Importance of Nepal’s First Satellite Launch - The Diplomat, 26 April 2019

In a second piece this week for the Diplomat, I write on the importance of Nepal's first satellite launch. Earlier this month, the United States launched Nepal’s first satellite, NepaliSat-1, into orbit. The satellite, equipped with a 5-megapixel camera and a magnetometer, is meant to gather information about Nepal’s topography and earth’s magnetic field, and is part of the greater attention the country is paying to the space realm amid domestic and wider regional developments.

The NepaliSat-1 was launched by the United States under the “Birds-3 satellite launch to International Space Station project.” The BIRDS project is a UN initiative to help countries launch their first satellite and the Japanese Kyushu Institute of Technology has been involved in this particular project. Under the project, there was also a satellite from Sri Lanka, named Raavana-1, that was launched along with the NepaliSat-1.

For the full piece, click here.



Nepal’s satellite was developed by two Nepali scientists, Abhas Maskey and Hariram Shrestha, at Japan’s Kyushu Institute of Technology and carries the Nepali national flag and the logo of the Nepal Academy of Science and Technology (NAST). Suresh Kumar Dhungel, senior technical officer and spokesperson of NAST, said that the data and images will be available in a month, by which time the ground station at NAST is expected to be ready. It is reported that the ground station at NAST will be able to receive data from the other Birds-3 project satellites too.

Nepal government is estimated to have spent a total of 20 million Nepali rupees (roughly $180,000) for the development and launch of the satellite as well as the construction of the ground station. This was clearly a proud moment for Nepal, and Nepal’s Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli congratulated the scientists in a tweet saying, “Though a humble beginning, with the launching of NepaliSat-1 Nepal has entered the Space-Era. I wish to congratulate all those scientists and institutions that were involved right from the development to its launching thereby enhancing the prestige of our country.”

Nepal’s involvement with satellites is expected to continue. The country is working on a second satellite, Nepal PQ-1, to be launched in 2020. And given the growing demand in the telecommunications sector, Nepal is reported to be working with France to launch a communication satellite in 2022.

That this is being made a priority should come as no surprise given Nepal’s own needs. For instance, currently, Nepal’s service providers rely on foreign communication satellites for meeting their requirement in the broadcasting and telecommunication sectors, but Kathmandu clearly understands the cost-effectiveness of having its own satellite. The growth projection in areas including direct-to-home (DTH) and rural internet connectivity is pushing Kathmandu to expand its own assets in outer space.

Interestingly, Nepal and Sri Lanka chose to avoid India and China — the two established space powers in the neighborhood — to launch their satellites. This comes after Bangladesh launched its Bangabandhu-1 satellite on an improved version of SpaceX Falcon 9 rocket last summer. India had reportedly offered assistance to launch the satellite but because the satellite weighed 3,500 kg, it was beyond the Indian launch capacity at the time.

On the other hand, both Nepal and Bangladesh are part of the Indian-launched South Asia Satellite (SAS) – or GSAT-9 – that has significance in the context of communication, e-governance, and disaster management. The SAS is expected to enhance communication and provide better disaster links in the Indian neighborhood. The satellite, launched in May 2017, was characterized by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi as a “priceless gift” to India’s neighbors.

More specifically with respect to Nepal, under the SAS, India agreed to provide at least one transponder with a bandwidth of 24,000 to 36,000 MHz to Nepal, though Nepal had to establish its own ground stations. In fact, a senior diplomat the Indian Embassy in Kathmandu is reported to have said that Nepal would receive two transponders on the SAS. Further, Nepali engineers are to be trained at Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) training centers in India. Each of the participating countries – Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, the Maldives, Nepal, and Sri Lanka –have received 36 Mbps of bandwidth from this satellite.

It was smart of Modi to use outer space to entice India’s neighbors, giving New Delhi a high-profile success while also satisfying some real needs of its neighbors. Going beyond GSAT-9, Modi is reported to have invited the South Asian neighborhood also to use the Indian Regional Navigation Satellite System, a mini-version of the U.S. Global Positioning System. India could also be fielding its remote sensing satellites to help its neighbors as the growth for downstream applications picks up pace. While there has been some apprehension in the neighborhood about getting caught up in the geopolitical tensions between India and China, space cooperation is probably too tempting an offer for smaller countries like Nepal to refuse.

All indications are that Nepal’s focus on satellites is expected to continue in the coming years. And the recent launch reinforces the need to pay greater attention to smaller countries in South Asia and beyond in the wider conversation about space cooperation and assistance. Though space is often discussed in the context of emerging geopolitical competition between major powers, other dynamics such as these also have their own importance as well.

India’s Growing Iran Dilemma - The Diplomat, 25 April 2019

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I write on India's growing Iran dilemma, and the current sanction waiver issue is just the latest manifestation of New Delhi's rising challenge in managing ties with Tehran.

The Trump administration appears to have decided not to extend waivers from sanctions on those countries that continue to buy oil from Iran. The decision not to extend another round of Significant Reduction Exceptions (SREs) will have a significant impact on big Asian oil importers including India, China, Japan, and South Korea, which had each initially secured a 180-day exemption from U.S. sanctions last year.

Among these countries, India is likely to be significantly impacted. India is the second largest importer of Iranian crude oil after China, and New Delhi is reported to be buying a considerable share of its oil from Tehran, making Iran the third largest oil supplier to India after Iraq and Saudi Arabia. This means that the Indian government will find it difficult to accept the U.S. decision.

The issue also raises broader questions about New Delhi’s relations with Washington. Among those is whether India has miscalculated its capacity to manage the United States. Given the centrality of India in the U.S. Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy, the Modi government may have assumed that India will get another exemption from the sanctions that are to kickstart on May 1.

For the full post, click here.



Indian Petroleum Minister Dharmendra Pradhan tweeted to say that India has “a robust plan for an adequate supply of crude oil to Indian refineries. There will be additional supplies from other major oil-producing countries; Indian refineries are fully prepared to meet the national demand for petrol, diesel & other petroleum products.” But while India may have possibly been ready for additional reduction of oil imports from Iran, New Delhi is certainly not ready for a complete halt.

The U.S. decision is likely to create some negative reaction in New Delhi and raise once again the rhetoric of the United States as an unreliable partner that encroaches on Indian interests and sovereignty. Such a dynamic has been seen in the past as well whenever there have been tensions between the United States and India.

But in truth, India does have alternate options – Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and even the United States are potential suppliers that could replace Iran as an oil source. In fact, a White House statement made just this point: “The United States, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, three of the world’s great energy producers, along with our friends and allies, are committed to ensuring that global oil markets remain adequately supplied. We have agreed to take timely action to assure that global demand is met as all Iranian oil is removed from the market.”

Nonetheless, there are a number of strategic reasons why India wants to continue buying Iranian oil in spite of other options available. For instance, Shia Iran is seen in New Delhi as an ally against the predominantly Sunni Pakistan. Pakistan’s traditionally close relations with Saudi Arabia made Iran a possible ally. Iran’s position on Pakistan’s flank is also attractive, as is the perception of common Indian-Iranian interest in countering Pakistan’s influence in Afghanistan.

From a wider perspective, New Delhi also sees Iran as a conduit to Central Asia, a region that India considers strategically vital. India has invested in Chabahar port in Iran and highways that provide an alternative route to both Afghanistan and Central Asia, bypassing Pakistan. And despite the growing closeness with the United States, there is residual sympathy in New Delhi for some of Washington’s opponents, including Iran, that is rooted in India’s historic cultivation of multiple alignments with a diverse array of states. Finally, there is a question of timing too: In the midst of a tough national election campaign, the Modi government will not want to be seen as bowing to U.S. diktats.

But the impact of the U.S. decision on India can also belie India’s own challenges in its relationship with Iran, which are important to keep in mind as well. For one, India has invested more in its relationship with Saudi Arabia and other anti-Iranian Gulf monarchies. Such improving relationships will put pressure on India to moderate its support for Iran.

India has also grown increasingly close to Israel, a country that is the source of vital military equipment for India, but which is also engaged in severe competition with Iran. New Delhi has so far managed to insulate these relationships, but they also mean that India cannot be seen to be going out of its way to support Tehran.

Iran’s positioning on a number of issues that matter to India is no longer very reassuring to New Delhi. For instance, Iran appears to be more closely aligned to Pakistan on Afghanistan than before, as evidenced by Pakistan Prime Minister Imran Khan’s recent trip to Iran.

Last and certainly not least, all said and done, the United States itself is an increasingly vital partner for India. Joining Beijing in defying American wishes on the Iran issue may not be particularly wise given the broader interests that Washington and New Delhi and share. All of this ensures that New Delhi will find itself in a strategically difficult position in the coming weeks.

Army Exercise Showcases Growing India-Singapore Defense Collaboration - The Diplomat, April 17, 2019

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I looked at the significance of the recently concluded India-Singapore joint army exercise, called “Bold Kurukshetra 2019. As was noted in these pages earlier this week, India and Singapore have just completed their annual joint army exercise, called “Bold Kurukshetra 2019.” The recent bilateral military exercise is a reflection of the growing strategic proximity between India and Singapore in the face of a series of challenges, including a growing and muscular China.

For the full essay, click here.



Singapore has remained one of India’s major security partners in Southeast Asia. The two countries signed their first Defense Cooperation Agreement in October 2003 and a separate memorandum of understanding on joint army exercises in 2005. The two then signed several more agreements for accelerating the pace of military-to-military relations in 2007 and 2008. These agreements have been reviewed and renewed periodically, maintaining their commitment to developing a habit of cooperation between the two countries’ armed forces.

Given Singapore’s territorial limitations, India has also opened its own military training facilities, such as the air force and artillery firing ranges, to the Singapore Armed Forces. Besides, the Indian and Singapore navies have been engaged in the annual naval exercise series called SIMBEX for more than two decades. In fact, the two countries celebrated the silver jubilee of their naval exercises last year with major displays of “multidimensional drills,” which saw the participation of many different types of ships and aircraft from India and Singapore.

Starting in 2015, the two countries have also held three editions of the Defense Ministers’ Dialogue, the last of which was held in November 2018. The third edition of this Dialogue had both the defense ministers appreciating the conclusion of the Navy Implementing Arrangement Concerning Mutual Coordination, Logistics and Services Support in June 2018. This, along with the Navy Bilateral Agreement signed in November 2017, broadened and deepened India-Singapore bilateral naval cooperation, taking the relationship higher.

They are also manifestations of the broader focus by both sides on maritime security, as evidenced by other developments as well such as a technical agreement on the sharing of white shipping information and advancing coast guard collaboration. Highlighting the significance of maritime security, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi had stated during the ASEAN India Commemorative Summit, “We remain committed to work with ASEAN to enhance our practical cooperation in our shared maritime domain.” He said India is particularly interested in pursuing cooperation on disaster risk reduction and management, joint patrols and exercises, and maritime capacity building.

India-Singapore engagements have gotten a lot stronger in recent years. Certainly, Modi has infused more traction into this relationship as part of his strengthened outreach to Southeast Asia with the Act East Policy. And there are upcoming developments that will showcase this as well, including reports that India is planning a new trilateral maritime exercise in the Andaman Sea with Singapore and Thailand later in the year.

The broader convergence of strategic interests between India and Singapore is clearly the driving factor for these engagements. At the Defense Ministers’ Dialogue, both sides have repeatedly emphasized “the importance of maintaining freedom of navigation and overflight consistent with international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.” Further, while reiterating the importance of international law, they have articulated the need to resolve disputes through peaceful means.

On the issue of deepening defense technology collaboration, India and Singapore have a set up a bilateral Defense Technology Steering Committee as well as the India-Singapore Defense Industry Working Group and they are reported to be making good progress. Areas of cooperation include Combat Care and Vehicle Armor.

The growing economic muscle and military posturing by China provides an important rationale for India and Singapore to strengthen their bilateral relations. Irrespective of the results of the current Indian national elections, which are expected in late May, it is likely that India-Singapore ties would deepen and that Singapore will remain an important priority for India’s outreach to Southeast Asia.

What Did India’s Foreign Secretary Achieve on His Trip to Russia? - The Diplomat, April 12, 2019

In my column for The Diplomat last week, I wrote on the Indian Foreign Secretary's visit to Russia. Recently, India’s Foreign Secretary Vijay Gokhale, the most senior bureaucrat in India’s foreign ministry, completed a visit to Russia. The visit shed light on the ongoing collaboration between the two countries and the opportunities and challenges for the relationship.

For the full essay, click here.



Unsurprisingly, official accounts of the visit focused on areas of collaboration, most of it already ongoing. The Russian embassy release said that the two countries examined “cooperation within the BRICS format, the current issues of the key multilateral export control regimes, including New Delhi’s application for NSG [Nuclear Suppliers Group] membership, other non-proliferation and arms control issues, as well as topical international issues of mutual interest.”

The evolving situation in Afghanistan too was covered by the two leaders. The foreign secretary is reported to have also met Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Morgulov for Foreign Office Consultations, where they “reviewed the implementation of the decisions of the 19th Annual Bilateral Summit” between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Vladimir Putin in 2018.

The two officials also discussed the upcoming high-level meetings, including India’s participation at the Eastern Economic Forum. Putin has reportedly invited India to participate in the Forum, which is to take place in Vladivostok in September this year.

Meanwhile, the Ministry of External Affairs press release on the visit characterized the meetings as “in-depth and productive, characteristic of the Special & Privileged Strategic Partnership between India and Russia.” The statement added, “The meetings resulted in enhanced mutual convergence and coordination of views on all major regional and international issues in the spirit of long standing and time-tested friendship between India and Russia.”

Despite the ongoing collaboration in these areas, the visit, and the official accounts of it, belie the mixed nature of actual ties. In fact, while India and Russia have had a long and warm relationship historically and Russia remains an important strategic partner (it is one of only two countries India has an annual bilateral summit with, the other being Japan), structural trends are pulling them in different directions.

Part of it has to do with perceptions on both sides. On India’s side, it can at times appear not to acknowledge the reality that Russia needs China far more than it needs India, and that its own diversification of partners in both the economic and security domains can also raise concerns in Moscow and complicate bilateral dealings. On Russia’s side, there is at times not enough of an appreciation for India’s strategic considerations, including its sensitivities toward China, as well as an acknowledgement that some of Moscow’s foreign policy activities can cause headaches in New Delhi.

But developments have also accelerated these perceptions as well. Russia’s adventurism abroad, including in Ukraine, China’s rise and its increasing convergence with Russia as it does so, rising U.S. competition with both Beijing and Moscow as it has gradually warmed to New Delhi, and upped conversation on the Indo-Pacific and the divergent approaches by India and Russia have all contributed to this.

Seen from this perspective, it is arguably even more important to have visits such as the one we saw from Gokhale, in order for both sides to understand each other. But at the same time, it is also critical to distinguish between the rhetoric that comes out of the visits and the reality of the relationship, especially when the gap between the two can seem to be growing wider in some senses.