International Relations in Space: the European Approach

The French Institute for International Relations (Ifri) and Secure World Foundation (SWF-Brussels) partnered again this year to hold their annual space conference. The conference was held in Brussels, on September 13, 2012. The conference explore the way Europe conducts international relations in the area of space. Programs, geographic priorities and European actors were addressed in three different panels and debates.

I had a presentation at the conference looking at Europe as a partner in space. While identifying areas for potential cooperation, I also took the opportunity to air some of the Indian concerns with regard to the EU-initiated code of conduct on space.

My presentation is available here.



Type rest of the post here

Liang's India visit: What does it mean for bilateral ties?

Here's an article on the recent visit of Chinese defence minister Liang to India.

The three-nation visit of a high-powered Chinese defence delegation led by Defence Minister Liang Guanglie is significant for a variety of reasons. Liang was on a visit to Sri Lanka, India and Laos. Obviously, the India leg was the most critical one because Sino-Indian political and military ties have not kept pace with the increasing trade relationship between the two countries. But Liang's first stop-over in Sri Lanka was also important.



The delegation was in Sri Lanka for five days and its conduct of business in the backdrop of the strengthening bilateral ties merit closer attention. Sri Lanka's Army chief Jagath Jayasuriya was in Beijing only two months ago. Recently, Sri Lanka has partnered with China's state-owned China Great Wall Industry Corporation (CGWIC) to design, manufacture and launch a satellite-a feat to be accomplished in 2015. The fact that this was the first time that a Chinese defence minister was in Sri Lanka and the timing of the visit against the backdrop of the changing regional security dynamics are also important and New Delhi should be paying greater attention.

Both the Sri Lankans and the Chinese are being cautious about the relationship, mindful of India's concerns, but the growing warmth is undeniable and understandable, given New Delhi's propensity to pay greater attention to domestic politics rater than neighbourhood sensitivities in framing these relationships. At a lecture at the Sapugaskanda Defence Staff Collee, Liang pointedly referred to "how [the two countries had] withstood the test of international vicissitude"-obviously referring to the negative international human rights attention on both countries, a point that would have many takers in both Sri Lanka and China. He was careful to say that closer China-Sri Lanka military relations were not focused at any third country, but the elephant was obviously in the room. China is also believed to be extending a $ 100 million package to the army-run reconstruction efforts in the north and the east in addition to a grant of $ 1.5 million for the upgradation of the Defense Services College in Colombo for children of security forces and police personnel.

Liang arrived in India on Sunday for a three-day visit, after a gap of nearly a decade. While these visits are not meant to solve some of the major irritants in the bilateral relationship, such high level interactions could help ease the tension and reduce some of the trust deficit issues that characterise India-China relations-something that should be encouraged in that context. The visit also assumed relevance given that Liang was accompanied by top military officials of the important military commands, including Guangzhou, Tibet, Lanzhou and the political commissar of the South China Sea fleet of the PLA Navy.

The composition of the Chinese team indicated a broad agenda, possibly including both bilateral and multilateral issues. The border issue was obviously discussed with both sides stating that efforts to promote peace and tranquility on the border areas will be pursued. It is also fair to assume that other issues such as India's oil exploration in Vietnam and the South China Sea troubles were also discussed. A third issue was the re-starting of the stalled joint military exercises between India and China.

India and China have so far held two rounds of military exercises, in 2007 in Kunming and in 2008 Belgaum, Karnataka. India called off the third "Hand-in-Hand" series exercises in August 2010 when Beijing refused permission to a senior army officer from Jammu and Kashmir to be part of the delegation. There have been attempts since 2011 by both sides to re-start the exercises although both have been looking at face-saving options to do the same. Thereafter, India sent a multi-command military delegation in June 2011 that included the military officer who was earlier denied permission. A return visit from the Chinese side took place in November 2011. Both sides appeared keen on restarting these exercises. Meanwhile, the India-China annual defence dialogue has also progressed, with the fourth one held in Beijing in December 2011.

These visits and interactions are mainly meant for improving the atmospherics of the relationship. In that context, it is also important that both India and China find newer areas for cooperation and move beyond collaboration on soft issues such as economic or climate change issues. Both countries have to look for newer avenues in the security domain if they are serious in addressing the trust gap that exits currently. There are several issues including the Asian framework issue that could mar progress in this bilateral relationship unless the two sides identify new areas for cooperation in the security and strategic realm because improvement in economic relations has its own limits and need not necessarily result in better bilateral relations.

In addition to bilateral military-to-military ties, India and China should explore cooperating on maritime security, UN Peace Keeping Operations, and reconstruction and rehabilitation in the aftermath of natural disasters, all of which are common challenges to both the countries and which are probably easier to cooperate on. Working on areas which are not suffused with political sensitivities would not only be easier but could instill a habit of cooperation and trust that could pay dividends in the larger bilateral ties.

Pune Blasts and India's Policing Woes

Here's an OpEd on the recent Pune blast and the policing woes published in Pioneer on August 11, 2012.

When will India have a police force worth the name? A recent study, shelved as usual, exposes the glaring lapses which were exploited by the planners of the Pune blasts last week.

Following the Pune blasts, India’s Home Minister, Sushil Kumar Shinde, gave the usual assurance about the “serious” nature of the incident and how the Government of India has launched “investigations.” One is used to hearing such statements after terror attacks but what do they mean? More pertinent is the question, what is the government doing about some of the institutional reforms so badly needed to stop such attacks.

For the full article, click here.



Various reports have brought out the inadequacy of the police forces, including that of the paramilitary, in terms of both quantity and quality of men and officers. The training capacity is woefully inadequate too. A study done in 2010 by Observer Research Foundation for the Integrated Defence Staff, Government of India, Navigating Near: Non Traditional Security Threats to India, 2022, highlighted the huge deficiency that India faces as also made recommendations to address some of the gaps.

India’s low police-population ration — a major indicator of law and order infrastructure — is low at 130 policemen for 100,000 as against a global average of 270:100,000. Mexico has 491.8, Saudi Arabia at 386.5 and Belgium at 357.5 per 100,000 persons, these countries fare better than India even if we do not compare with the world’s best.

While the quality of policing is critical, not having enough personnel is far worse. India’s sanctioned police strength has remained at pretty much the same for decades. In Gujarat, for example, the sanctioned strength has not been upgraded since 1960; the shortage has been dealt with through ad hoc appointments.

Constables recruited in Gujarat in recent years have been taken on as “lokrakshak” and are paid a meagre salary of `3,500. The Government cannot expect very much with such an approach.

The situation remains the same in many other States. As of 2008, the sanctioned strength of police personnel in India was 17,46,215 whereas only 14,78, 888 have been recruited, leaving a critical gap of 267,000. The then Home Minister, P Chidambaram, stated that India faced a shortage of 400,000 policemen and promised to remedy the situation by 2012.

Training and capacity building represent similar depressing scenarios. For a 2.8 million-strong police-paramilitary force, India has only 62 training institutions for central police forces and 170 for state police forces. And India has a total of 9,589 instructors in states, central police and paramilitary organisations; 4,989 for indoor training and instructions and 4,600 for outdoor activities. This would correspond to not more than 50,000 policemen who can be trained per year, meaning that the recruitment needs of 2012 cannot be met for almost a decade.

The reality is also that Indian policemen do not go through any training during their whole career. The basic instructions they get at the time of joining service is about all the training they get in their entire careers. The basic training programme does not last more than three months, including weapons training, dealing with law and order problems, rioting, terrorism, radiological accidents, cyber-crimes, financial scams, illegal money transfers, disaster management besides learning how to write FIRs, investigate cases, prepare court documents and brief public prosecutors, and dealing with the media. Worse, the trainers at the state training institutions are the most demotivated lot who normally treat training assignments as punishment postings.

A status check on police commando forces is equally pertinent. The National Policy on Police Training demands that every state is tasked to train a minimum of 8.5 per cent of the total force as Quick Response Teams (QRT) and Commando units. QRT are meant to be vital given that they are the first respondent to any terror attacks. The Mumbai Police now plans to have “Response Ten” units — three to four commandos armed with bullet-proof vests and assault rifles — at each police station in the city. The Response Ten units are essentially culled out of the existing QRTs and commando units and with India having barely 4,300 such personnel, this is going to be a tough call. India’s capacity to impart training in this regard is also limited with only four training centres available run by the paramilitary forces.

Shortage of force is not a new phenomenon although the government has handled the issue in an ad hoc fashion. In terms of strengthening the quantity aspect, the central government has been sanctioning and creating new battalions of central paramilitary forces. Additional companies and battalions offer no real solution. This is because local police forces are familiar with local surroundings and the people are more efficient than the CPMFs. Hence, strengthening of police force, both in quantity and quality, is the need of the hour.

Another issue particularly relevant in India’s fight against terrorism is intelligence. While the state intelligence agencies are not adequately equipped in terms of training and therefore not suitable, there is also the issue of lack of technical support and resource availability that affect the intelligence-gathering capability of the state intelligence agencies. The value of human intelligence cannot be overemphasized, but technical intelligence is beginning to assume a particularly important role in the backdrop of advancing technologies which the terrorists are using today. The central government has no shortage of resources although this cannot be said for the state agencies.

In addition, there are problems with communication, connectivity and information sharing, which was once again a glaring weakness exposed through the Pune blast. One, there is the absence of an information grid linking up state and federal police forces with police stations as the lowest common denominator. While NATGRID serves to address some of these issues, the formation of a Crime and Criminal Tracking Network System is long overdue. While giving the IB Endowment lecture in 2009, then Home Minister Chidambaram brought out some of these issues saying “there is no system of data storage, data sharing and accessing data. There is no system under which one police station can talk to another directly. There is no record of crimes or criminals that can be accessed by a Station House Officer, except the manual records relating to that police station.”

Three years later, the situation is not significantly different.

Lastly, political interference, lack of autonomy of the police and utter absence of police accountability are serious hindrances to developing a professional force. The current police functioning under the grip of state government has led to gross abuses, resulting in erosion of the rule of law and loss of credibility as a professional organisation.

For instance arbitrary transfers and suspensions have affected the function of intelligence gathering. Meanwhile, the police should be made more accountable to the rule of law and the people through State Assemblies and the Parliament and not to the ruling political party. In an effort to insulate police from the political masters, the National Police Commission recommended that similar state-level bodies be set up. This is yet to be implemented given the strong resistance from political parties.

Unless the new Home Minister becomes live to some of these issues, India’s preparedness to deal with internal security would continue to be weak.

Pune Blasts and India's CBR Security Challenges

Here's an article of mine on CBR security challenges in India published by The Diplomat on August 28, 2012.

The use of ammonium nitrate in the recent Pune blast signifies yet again India’s vulnerabilities in the Chemical-Biological-Radiological (CBR) security domain. Trafficking and trading of chemicals such as ammonium nitrate, which are used in explosives, have become common among terrorist groups and criminal gangs.

For full article, click here.



Amending India’s Explosives Act is long overdue. The law must take into account the changing circumstances and the more challenging ways in which state and non-state actors are aiding and abetting terrorism. One of the major shortcomings of the act is its sole focus on the safety of these materials in terms of managing the handling and storage. The security of such materials is often overlooked.

India’s small- and medium-scale industries have continued to argue that any theft of chemicals is done only for pecuniary reasons, which would mean that the security of these materials – the material falling into the wrong hands – is often overlooked. Pilferage is often rubbished as stolen material for commercial purposes; simply put, to earn some extra money. But they do pose serious security threats to India’s internal security, as was evident in the Pune blast. India has now witnessed several recent incidents of such security breaches, including the July 2011 Mumbai attacks.

In an effort to arrest criminal use and to control the easy and unrestricted availability of the chemical, the government in 2011 categorized ammonium nitrate as an “explosive.” However, the catch was that ammonium nitrate is in large-scale use in the agricultural sector and therefore, the government loosened the regulation to say that “its possession and use would invoke penal action only if the composition had 45% or more ammonium nitrate content.” Terrorists and criminal groups have been able to exploit this loophole effectively, which has allowed them to repeatedly use it in major and minor terrorist incidents in India.

Recently, a committee set up by the central government to look into the distribution and handling of explosives suggested that the Home Ministry may be better suited to regulate the flow and trading of these chemicals instead of the Department of Industries, Policy and Planning, as is the case currently. However, the Home Ministry’s already much too overstretched to be assigned additional tasks. Regardless, one agency must be invested with the sole responsibility to lead on this issue.

A separate internal security ministry with a department focused on CBR security with adequate manpower is truly needed. With India’s expansive and expanding network of educational institutions and associated labs as well as private industrial units, the use of ammonium nitrate and other chemicals is likely to grow manifold.

Consequentially, India should be monitoring and addressing the weaknesses in the current approach of controlling the material technical know-how of the product. The need for an integrated approach cannot be overstated.

India’s ancient rules are another set of issues that need urgent attention. The Explosives Act of 1884, which was last amended in 2002 need to be overhauled again in the face of new challenges.

A recent study by ORF and RUSI on the subject, India & Non-State Actors: Chemical, Biological & Radiological Threats, which was largely based on primary research, highlighted some of these loopholes while also suggesting ways to remedy some of the gaps.

While the central government-appointed committee is looking into some of these recommendations, it appears to be focusing a great deal on coordination between different departments handling these chemicals. This is by no means unimportant; indeed, as noted above, a whole-of-government approach is needed to properly address the threat. Nonetheless, a host of other issues also require greater attention.

For example, transportation remains a significant weakness. Additionally, industry rarely considers the dangers of these materials from falling into the hands of terrorists, criminals, and third parties who may sell the materials to terrorist groups.

The huge variation between the large, medium and small-scale industries in their approach to security of these dangerous materials is significant. The government has to devise innovative measures to control and streamline the production and distribution of such materials. The wide-scale disparity in the training and security provisions and the lack of standardization of private security agencies puts India at serious risk. An accreditation and audit mechanism, with periodic security audits and a reporting structure for audit findings to be signed off by a designated regulator, should become standard practice in industries. Industries also have to be alert to insider threats that go undetected by and large because of inadequate background threats.

A related issue is the lack of threat communication and training at the grassroots level among ordinary security agencies. While senior-level officers may be aware of CBR threats, the forces that form most of the front-line security layers are not adequately aware of the dangerous materials they deal with. In cases where they are alert, moreover, they are not adequately equipped with in-house security forces and certainly cannot afford to pay for a Central Industrial Security Force (CISF) contingent. Also small, profit-driven units are not as concerned about the security of these materials. Addressing this effectively could be done by encouraging greater resource-pooling among smaller units to employ good security outfits as a way to reduce costs while strengthening the impact of security spending.

Lastly, India’s mindset about having precedents before strengthening measures needs to undergo change. We have to become sensitive to threats as they evolve rather than wait for incidents to happen and react thereafter.

India in the world power ladder

Here's a short OpEd of mine on where India stands in the world power game, published by Bombay-based News Bharati on August 16, 2012.

India is an emerging great power but whether it will emerge successfully or not will depend on a range of challenges at the domestic and international levels. Of these, the domestic challenges are of far greater consequences. Internal challenges range from poor infrastructure to coalition politics and external challenges include managing great power relations and ensuring a stable South Asia.


Some of the serious economic challenges that India faces include its economic growth. India traditionally had the Hindu growth rate of 2-3 percent for decades where the economy was dominated by a strong state that remained closed to international interaction. It also had put serious restrictions on its private sector and the market-driven growth. Starting in the late 1980s, India did slowly liberalise its economy but it took the 1990s economic crisis for liberalization to pick up the pace. The liberalization process that followed led to much higher growth rate, reaching levels of 8-10 percent. In fact, over the last three years, this growth rate has begun to suffer. India did successfully deal with the global financial crisis but nevertheless its economic growth rate has begun to slow down, nevertheless high by global standards. However, India starting from a lower base, (even though its growth rate is higher than most other countries)and if India has to catch up to the more developed economies, it has to sustain its 8-10 percent growth rate annually but domestic politics is coming in the way of faster growth.

One of the factors for slow growth rate is India’s poor infrastructure. The recent double blackout is only one indicator of that. India’s power sector suffers from both lack of capacity and poor distribution. The US-India nuclear deal was supposed to help India in this regard by increasing the nuclear component in the energy basket but the nuclear liability bill is preventing progress in the nuclear energy sector. Additionally, the Fukushima nuclear disaster has led to greater concern in India about the nuclear safety, leading to further slow down.

Situation is not much better in another area of infrastructure – highways and transportation links. Land acquisition troubles, inadequate attention preventing highway and other transportation hub developments at a fast-enough pace are big enough issues but the more serious problem is politics!! Coalition governments and differences between the centre and state governments are preventing the much-needed market reforms as a number of international agencies have already pointed out. There is also increasing objection to faster economic growth because of the assumption that faster economic growth leads to greater economic inequality. While income inequalities are a problem, the assumption that GDP growth rates will lead to inequality is wrong. The GDP-led growth needs to lead to better distribution but the government has to push for greater economic growth as well. These are not mutually incompatible.

Maoist violence is another serious domestic issue. While India has always faced domestic rebellion, the Maoist violence is a qualitatively different problem. Lack of coordination between state and central forces, inadequate trained personnel available for combatting the violence has meant serious blows to India.

Yet another issue is corruption. Corruption is not only a political issue but also an economic issue. Unfortunately, none of the major political parties are paying any serious attention to it other than pointing fingers at each other. Corruption makes not only an incompetent economy but also makes it an unattractive option for foreign investors, affecting further India’s growth story.

A final domestic issue is the state of the intellectual infrastructure. India’s educational system, especially at the school level, is going from bad to worse. But since education at the school level is a responsibility of the state government rather than the central government, there are huge problems at that level. Some states do perform better than the other but the situation overall is quite abysmal. There is lot of tinkering going on at the higher education level, but unless the school education is taken seriously, reforming higher education is not going to matter much. The effect of the educational weakness can be seen already in the shortages in some sectors of the industry, in terms of quality manpower.

One of the major international challenges is managing the rise of China. While rise of China is a challenge to the whole world, India faces a particular challenge given the history of relations including the 1962 border war. In addition, China’s border infrastructure, its support to Pakistan in the military and non-military arena is of concern. For that matter, China’s South Asia relations areno different!

India has also problems with relationship with the United States. Although US-India relations have improved dramatically, India is afraid of being caught between the United States and China. Therefore, India has to play the complicated game of trying to balance its relations with these two powers.

Meanwhile, what affect us most are the developments in our neighbourhood and India’s position is nothing to envy about. We are faced with new challenges all around India, with many having serious issues of instability that has the potential to spill over. On our Western front, the situation in Pakistan and Afghanistan are sliding from bad to worse. With the US plan to exit Afghanistan in 2014, it opens up new challenges and opportunities for India and the region.

Meanwhile, Pakistan is going through serious internal turmoil although the geopolitical importance of Pakistan will come handy for Islamabad with neither the US nor China letting it slide to become a “failed state.” This may be the only hope we have of preventing the worst from happening in Pakistan. While a stable Pakistan may be in the interest of India and the region, an unstable Pakistan with nuclear weapons is going to be a greater concern for the West, particularly the US. For India, the issue has not been really the growing size of the Pakistani nuclear arsenal or its safety (this is important by all means) but Islamabad’s sponsorship of cross-border terrorism.

Coming to Afghanistan, India has played a critical role in the development and reconstruction efforts despite the Pakistani effort to keep India out on a sustained basis. However, with the US exit plan being readied, India has to take the lead in formalizing a large coalition of nations including its immediate neighbours such as Pakistan, Iran, China, if Afghanistan is to witness any long-term peace and stability.

These are no easy challenges and how India manages all these will determine its position in Asia and the world.

Japan's nuclear debate stirs anxieties in the region... my piece on the recent nuclear law amendment and the Ishiba statement ....

While the amendment to the atomic law and the statement may be innocuous, it has given scope for fresh anxieties within the region and beyond about the Japanese nuclear programme, particularly its recycling programme of extracted plutonium from spent nuclear fuel.

For the full article, click here.





Former Japanese defence minister Shigeru Ishiba's recent statement that "having nuclear plants shows to other nations that Japan can make nuclear weapons," has raised fresh questions on Tokoyo's nuclear intentions. However, the statement is to be seen in the backdrop of opposition to nuclear energy power plants after the 2011 Fukushima crisis. While Ishiba is not arguing for Japan to develop nuclear weapons, the technical know-how and the material availability will suggest a certain capability about Japan - that it can develop a weapon capability should the need arise in the future. Estimates suggest that given that Japan already has the technology and the know-how, it could take up to one year to develop a weapon.


However, this debate deserves greater attention in the backdrop of another development - the June 20, 2012 change in the Japanese Atomic Energy Basic Law, considered to be the fundamental document pertaining to use of nuclear energy. Amendment to Article 2 of the Atomic Energy Basic Law involved insertion of a national security phrase, saying nuclear safety should be guaranteed not only to defend lives, people's health and the environment but also to "contribute to Japan's national security." This has come under criticism within the country with several commentators questioning Japan's long-term intentions. In one of the opinion pieces, Tetsuya Endo, former diplomat and acting chairman of the Cabinet Office's Japan Atomic Energy Commission, argued that given the ambiguity and anxiety following the insertion of the phrase "national security," the Atomic Energy Basic Law should be amended again to revise security clause.


In an effort to moderate the anxieties, nuclear policy minister Goshi Hosono and Chief Cabinet Secretary Osamu Fujimura, among others, have clarified that the term security only connotes to security against proliferation or security against terrorism. While this may have been true, both the amendment to the nuclear law and the Ishiba statement has aroused curiosity among the regional powers as well. Referring to the Japanese government statement that it is not considering at all the possibility of weaponisation, the South Korean official position maintained that it is keeping a watch on the developments. However, some South Koreans have been much more critical. An editorial in the South Korean newspaper ChosunIlbo said, "Tokyo is displaying its schizophrenia by eyeing nuclear weapons … Its main excuse is North Korea's own nuclear program." Similar concerns have been expressed in other South Korean newspapers such as Donga Ilbo and JoongangIlbo too. Similarly, China is also watching closely. Commenting on the amendment, deputy director of the Institute of International Studies at Tsinghua University, Beijing, in an interview to the Global Times (China) opined that the new language could become the legal basis for Japan to develop a nuclear weapon programme.


There has also been a change in the Japanese Aerospace Basic Law which has mentioned that its space assets will have "contribution to Japan's national security," which again sparked regional attention. The change implied the use of space assets for defense and military purposes. In an interview to the Global Times (China), Kazuto Suzuki from Hokkaido University, Japan, maintained that the change was more of a necessity as there is a growing demand for military satellite communications because of the deployment of Japanese Self Defense Forces (SDF) for peacekeeping operations.


On the other hand, Lee Sangsoo, a research fellow with the Stockholm-based Institute for Security and Development Policy, was much more aggressive and ambitious about the Japanese space programme. He suggested that Japan could possibly shift to re-militarisation with the military utilization of space assets, including beefing up its missile detection system and that it will possibly be increasing R&D funding for military uses of space technology. He also added that these amendments will pave way for expansion of Japan's military capabilities while easing the security restraints imposed by Article 9 of the Japanese constitution.


This is not the first time that there have been such debates about Japan's military capabilities. There have been numerous efforts in the past to make changes to its pacifist posturing - after the Chinese nuclear test in 1964, during the Vietnam War, in the context of the end of the Cold War, during the 1994 North Korean nuclear crisis, and also after the indefinite extension of NPT. Japan contemplated a nuclear weapon programme in each of these situations. The very fact that there is an open public debate on the nuclear issue today reflects that there is a more mature and realistic appraisal of Japan's geopolitics and security than ever before.


In conclusion, while the amendment to the atomic law and the statement may be innocuous, it has given scope for fresh anxieties within the region and beyond about the Japanese nuclear programme, particularly its recycling programme of extracted plutonium from spent nuclear fuel. Article 9 and Japan's pacifist posture have meant that it never enjoyed the clout of a major geopolitical power. This, however, is changing gradually. It is clear that Japan is beginning to assume larger security responsibilities in an effort to emerge as a more "normal" nation. And the changes being undertaken in the nuclear law may be the beginning of more concrete changes to come in the future.

China’s South China Sea Claims: Strategic Implications

Here's an article of mine on the South China Sea issue written for the ORF South China Sea Monitor. While South China Sea has remained contested for several decades, the recent tensions surrounding these waters have heightened the potential for it to emerge as a major flashpoint. China’s recent steps have made the involvement of external powers very likely. Involvement of major actors such as the US, India (to a limited extent) and ASEAN has brought in new dynamics into play. To China, South China has come to mean more than just territorial claims or economic benefits, while not ruling out the huge economic benefits. China’s interests are understandable given the huge economic and strategic benefits South China Sea offers. However, what has come to trouble the smaller neighbours and others in the region and beyond is the growing Chinese assertiveness, almost entirely based on the growing military might of the nation. These developments have long-term implications for the region. For the full article, click here. The South China Sea has remained contested but stable for several decades. This is changing. The recent tensions surrounding the area have shown its potential to emerge as a major flashpoint between China and other powers in Asia. Control over parts of the 1.3 mn square mile waterway are disputed between China, Taiwan, Malaysia, Philippines, Brunei, and Vietnam. China’s recent provocations have made involvement of external powers increasingly likely. Involvement of major external actors such as the US, India and ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations) have brought new dynamics into play in an already complicated dispute. The fight over the area has been intensifying over the last decade. One of the major incidents took place in 2005 when two Vietnamese fishing boats from Thanh Hoa province were fired upon by Chinese ships. Nine Vietnamese were killed and China captured the boat. In 2009, there was another incident with Chinese ships accused of harassing one of the US surveillance ships in the area. The US Defense department said in a report that five Chinese vessels “shadowed and aggressively maneuvered in dangerously close proximity to USNS Impeccable, in an apparent coordinated effort to harass the US ocean surveillance ship while it was conducting routine operations in international waters.” The report added that the crewmembers from the Chinese vessels waved Chinese flags and asked the US ship to leave the area. Another more recent and much publicized event took place in May 2011, involving a clash between Chinese maritime patrol vessels and Vietnamese Binh Minh 02, an oil and gas survey ship. Vietnam stated on May 26, 2011, that Chinese boats intentionally cut the survey ship’s cables in Vietnamese waters. Chinese authorities denied these allegations, but it nevertheless stirred large protests against China in Vietnam, particularly in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh. Barely weeks later, on June 09, 2011, there was another incident between China and Vietnam. The incident took place well within the Vietnamese Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) between three Chinese fishery patrol vessels and a Norwegian-flagged seismic conducting ship that was hired by Vietnam Oil & Gas Corporation (PetroVietnam). Vietnam once again complained about the Chinese vessels deliberately cutting the exploration cables. Reacting to the second incident, the Vietnamese spokeswoman Pham Phuong Nga said, “China’s systematic action is aimed at turning the undisputed area belonging to Vietnam into an area under dispute in order to materialize China’s nine-dotted line claim in the East Sea. This is unacceptable.” The most recent incident involved China and Philippines. In April 2012, two Chinese surveillance vessels and the Philippine warship Gregorio del Pilar were involved in a clash in the Scarborough Shoal, an area claimed by both China and Philippines. This was a relatively protracted conflict and was resolved only two weeks ago with both nations agreeing to withdraw their naval vessels from the area due to bad weather. The Philippine navy wanted to arrest a group of Chinese fisherman who had gone into their territory but they were unable to do so. Meanwhile, the US and Philippines held their annual military exercise in the middle of April which China construed as muscle-flexing. In retaliation, the Chinese foreign ministry asked a Philippine archaeological ship to leave the Scarborough Shoal on April 16. A few weeks later, on May 7, China toughened its stance further by making a serious representation with Alex Chua, Charge D’Affaires of the Philippine Embassy in China. China also issued travel advisories to those travelling to the Philippines and strengthened trade barriers, affecting the export of pineapples and bananas to China. By May 16, both the nations effected a fishing ban in the Scarborough Shoal. Finally, the two countries withdrew their vessels from the area in mid-June, but this was due to bad weather. The conflict is far from over. Soon after the withdrawal of the Chinese and Philippine vessels from the region, the Chinese State Council established a prefecture-level city of Sansha to administer the Xisha (Paracel), Zhongsha and Nansha (Spratlys) islands and the waters around these islands. Earlier, there was a county-level administration office for the islands located in Yongxing Island, part of the Xisha Islands. In reaction, Vietnam on the same day (June 21) approved a law claiming sovereignty and jurisdiction over Xisha and Nansha islands. Earlier in 2011, Philippines had also passed legislation on the South China Sea and now calls it as the West Philippine Sea. Meanwhile, the Chinese oil company CNOOC, on its website, announced last week that it was inviting foreign partners to jointly explore and develop nine oil blocks in the western part of the South China Sea. Vietnam has challenged this and called the Chinese moves “illegal,” while stating that China is encroaching onto Vietnamese territory. China reacted saying these tenders were in accordance to the Chinese and international law and urged Vietnam not to aggravate tension in this regard. In further moves, China has started combat-ready patrols in South China Sea. Meanwhile, there are Vietnamese air patrols over the Spratly Islands, and the Chinese remain critical of such measures by Vietnam. Reacting to the Vietnamese patrols, the foreign ministry spokesperson Geng Yansheng said that China would “resolutely oppose any militarily provocative behavior.” All these incidents reveal a toughening stance on the part of China on South China Sea. The Chinese posturing has several strategic implications. Increased regional rivalry, mutual suspicion and competition have come to define the relations between China and its smaller neighbours. It appears that China miscalculated the response of its smaller neighbours – Beijing clearly did not expect the kind of high-pitched response from these countries given that China has increased its overall power quotient. To some extent, the stronger responses by China’s neighbours might be the result of strengthened role and involvement of external powers in the region. Despite deep economic ties between these powers and China, the smaller neighbours have become much bolder in seeking external interventions as a means to beef up their own defences against China. Vietnam, for instance, has begun fresh military procurement in order to strengthen its internal defence capabilities while also building external alliances and partnerships. This has resulted in furthering the regional security dilemma. Why does South China Sea matter to China? Is the new approach driven by territorial claims, economic considerations or strategic impetus or a combination of all three? Also what are the strategic implications for Asia of this new posturing? To China, the South China Sea has come to mean more than just territorial claims or economic benefits, though these are also important. In economic terms, it is quite understandable that China wants control of the area since large volume of trade pass through this region. The abundance of oil and gas resources along with other natural resources makes the territorial claims even more intense. Having said that, it is China’s strategic interests that are probably the crucial drivers here. China reportedly has established a signals intelligence station on Rocky Island, north of Woody Island. Rocky Island offers significant strategic and military advantages to Beijing, as it is one of the highest points in the area, thus offering good coverage of the activities in this region. The same study by John C. Baker and David G. Wieneck also suggested that China has built “a 350-meter pier and a 2,600-meter airstrip, which is capable of handling all types of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) aircraft.” The report adds that there are in addition oil tanks, gun emplacements and ammunition storage bunkers, besides Silkworm anti-ship cruise missile installations on Woody Island, all of which point to the possibility that China has long-term plans for these islets. Lastly, nationalism has become an important factor driving the new Chinese approach. The sense of nationalism particularly among the younger generation of Chinese has led to a greater emphasis on territorial sovereignty. This is manifested in the making of expanding sovereignty claims. How far will China go back into history to make these claims is an important question. China’s claims can be traced back to the 1930s when official maps showed the entire territory as Chinese. Besides, Chinese historians have shown remains of ancient pottery on the atolls as proof substantiating their claims to these islands. The Chinese claims also appear to contradict the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). China ratified the UNCLOS in 1996 although it does not stand by many of the clauses and cites a 1998 internal legislation to prove its historical claim over South China Sea. With China’s accession to the UNCLOS, it, in a sense, acceded to other states’ rights including EEZ or continental shelf and the natural resources thereof. China is now trying to strengthen its claims through the provision of the 1998 Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf that gives cover for China to its historic rights. For instance, article 14 of the 1998 Law says, provisions of this Law “shall not affect the historic rights enjoyed by the People’s Republic of China.” The fact of the matter is that with China’s accession to the UNCLOS, Beijing and other parties are guided UNCLOS and not China’s internal legislation. International law takes precedence over domestic law when it comes to multi-party international disputes. In fact, Articles 55 to 75 of the UNCLOS have dealt with EEZs in detail explaining the limits and activities allowed under international law. Also article 121 is particularly important in this regard. It says, “Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no economic zone or continental shelf.” Therefore, countries in the region, wanting to establish EEZs, have attempted to build structures as a means of justification. While the Chinese behavior may be legitimate from its point of view, its disregard for international law and the UNCLOS and for its neighbour’s interests will have long-term implications for regional security. Incidentally, the recent events have also brought out the differences within ASEAN. As long as economic issues were the focus of the group, it functioned well and was displayed as a model for other regional groupings. However, it appears unable to present a united front when political issues such as territory and sovereignty are brought into the forum. On the other hand, Chinese behavior was also partly responsible for bringing the US back to Asia. If the US was distracted from its commitment to Asia, given the decade-long mission in Afghanistan and Iraq as well as the domestic fiscal compulsions, it is amply clear that the US is now here to stay. The repeated statements by US officials highlight the nervousness as well as the enthusiasm to cash in on an opportunity that welcomes back the US with greater vigour. Another consequence of the heightened tensions is the developing arms race in the region. Smaller neighbours such as Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia are on a major arms buying spree. Vietnam has begun beefing up its military capabilities particularly in the maritime domain with addition of new submarines. Malaysia too has been adding to its inventory. Singapore plans to strengthen its submarine strength with two additional submarines. Bigger players such as South Korea, Japan and Australia are not lagging behind. The fact is that the military expenditure of these countries has been rising in the last few years. Implications for India Traditionally, India maintained a neutral stance on South China Sea. However, India has become proactive on South China Sea in the last few years given the rising profile of India as well as the changing dynamics of Asia. For instance, India was less ambivalent at one of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) meetings in 2010, stating that open seas and freedom of navigation are important and every country must respect other countries’ legitimate interests. In July last year, India reacted sharply when the Chinese navy contacted one of the Indian naval vessels INS Airavat that was on a friendly visit to Vietnam, saying that “India supports freedom of navigation in international waters, including in the South China Sea, and the right of passage in accordance with accepted principles of international law.” India similarly stood its ground when it came to developing oil blocks in Vietnam although it does appear that Hanoi was keener on putting a brave front, in determining its hold on the territory as well as in seeking external alliances and partnerships. Vietnam was certainly disappointed when India had to pull out of Vietnam owing to commercial considerations although China has construed this as India succumbing to its pressure. What are India’s options? While trade flows are an important consideration and therefore one may see an active India in this region, there are strategic motives that should also inform India’s policy approach. India’s strengthened partnership with Southeast Asian nations, increasingly strategic in nature, will call for greater Indian support to these countries on the issue. Insistence on freedom of navigation and respect for each other’s territorial integrity are factors that should guide India’s policy. Instability in India’s neighbourhood including Southeast Asia does not augur well for India. Therefore, it is imperative for India to take an active role in shaping the regional dynamics that corresponds to India’s growing influence.