Raji's Indian Security Page

India has made powerful enemies by selecting Dassault ... my take on the MMRCA decision in yesterday's Pioneer ....

2012-02-12T21:53:00.003+05:30

Here's my OpEd on the recent MMRCA decision in yesterday's Pioneer. India is not likely to bow to Anglo-American pressure to revisit the MMRCA decision in favour of Dassault-Rafale. By deciding on the basis of technical parameters alone, India satisfied its own needs, but quite ignored the diplomatic fall out.

Price negotiation is what remains of the crucial MMRCA deal. It’s a complicated process. Nevertheless, it appears unlikely that the decision to buy the Rafale itself will be revisited. Given how drawn-out and difficult the choice was, the government is unlikely to add further controversy by admitting it made a mistake, which will be the consequence if the MMRCA competition is reopened. The selection apparently involved testing the platforms on around 600 odd technical parameters. This is the key argument made by proponents of the deal: that the deal was so carefully and technically handled that it should not be questioned.

But the premise that technical factors are all that matters is not defensible especially for such a large and politically important deal. While the technical qualifications are an important set of elements that should go into while making a decision, this has also brought to the fore how strategic factors were underplayed in this critical deal.

A decision made purely on technical parameters seems like the decision makers in India were opting for an easy, risk free option. This is understandable in the domestic political context. The single most important political concern today is about corruption in administrative decisions. Given the importance of this issue in public perception, and particularly given the many corruption scandals that have come out over the last year, it is not surprising that the government wants to play it safe. And the easiest way to play it safe is to leave political discretion out by letting the IAF make a purely technical decision.

Indian military services are known for their thoroughness in assessing weapons systems. Clearly the IAF did a good job of picking what was the best fighter from its perspective. But while the Rafale might have been the best from a

technical standpoint, it is not clear that it was diplomatically and strategically a good choice.

A strategic perspective should have looked at which of the countries fighting for the contract was most useful to India. This is not just about who wants good relations with India or who is a well-wisher because all of the competitors were good friends of India and were India’s well-wishers.

Where they were different was in terms of which could do more for India. This should have been a purely cold, hard assessment. Such an assessment would have put the US and Russia as the top choices. While the European consortium and Sweden would probably have brought up in the back of this list, France would have been somewhere in the middle. It definitely has greater global weight than Sweden and probably a better bet than a consortium of several countries, but it would have been no match for the US or Russia.

Of course, this should not have been the only consideration. Strategic and diplomatic reasons alone should not decide which fighter jet was picked. India’s decision-makers should have also looked at the different technical capabilities of the various competing planes. In fact, the final choice should have been a combination of the technical merits and the political and strategic requirements. And this is the key criticism if the manner in which India has chosen to make the deal — using only technical parameters to make a choice and ignoring diplomatic and strategic factors.

Considering how big this contract was, India could have received significant political benefits, which it stands to lose by making a technical decision. Even France could very well make the argument that there is no political quid pro quo for India choosing the Rafale because India itself claims that this was not a political choice. There is little reason why France has to give any political support for a decision that was purely technical in nature.

This leaves India in the politically the worst position possible — both the US and Russia, politically far more significant than France on global issues, are unhappy with India, but India is unlikely to get much benefit from France despite picking the French plane. And unlike Britain, which is also unhappy about the Indian decision, the US and Russia matter quite a lot in the global arena. So, India has effectively annoyed more important friends for nothing.

There are other factors in addition to the strategic factor that also needs closer examination. The cost factor itself is a serious issue. The unit cost of the plane is only one factor. The cost — acquisition, lifecycle and maintenance cost — should have been an important determinant in this decision. As against hundred odd Rafale, India could have procured many more Russian or US fighter jets for the same value. The Rafale option has cost India dearly both on the acquisition as well as the cost of spare parts.

Thus, though there may have been good reasons for picking the Rafale from a technical point of view, or even from a domestic political perspective, this is not enough. The choice should have at least considered the strategic implications in such a big contract.

That might still have led to the Rafale being picked, but it would have been a more defensible decision.

Flying into rough weather .... My OpEd on India's MMRCA decision in ToI

2012-02-12T21:45:00.004+05:30

Here's a piece of mine on India's MMRCA decision that appeared in Times of India on Friday, Feb. 10, 2012.

New Delhi needs to be more careful in both understanding strategic moments and being able to exploit them if it wants to sit at the global high table.

India's long and convoluted search for a new fighter plane - a medium multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA) - has entered its final stage. New Delhi has just announced that the Rafale, built by Dassault Aviation of France, has been chosen to meet the Indian Air Force's (IAF) requirement. Only price negotiation now remains.

The Rafale had been shortlisted along with the Eurofighter Typhoon from a field that originally included four more jets: the US-built F-16 and F-18, the Russian MiG-35 and the Swedish JAS 39 Gripen. But though the fight over the selection is over, questions about the wisdom of New Delhi's choice are unlikely to end any time soon.

Commenting on the MMRCA decision, a former IAF officer proudly stated that this was probably the first decision that was made purely on technical grounds. If accurate, this reveals serious strategic shortsightedness. While the government should have received inputs from the IAF, such a decision should not have been taken on purely technical grounds. For India's decision-makers, limiting themselves to technical specifications was a risk-free option, but that reveals more about the state of strategic decision-making in Delhi than the wisdom of the choice they made.

Ideally, the Indian decision should have been guided by a strategy that balances reducing danger and broadening opportunity. Accordingly, the question for New Delhi should have been how to use this lucrative deal to beef up India's strategic options. Thus, it is probably a strategic blunder to narrowly focus on technical specifications and capabilities alone, as many proponents of the IAF's choice have done.

A decision of this magnitude should have been filtered through three key parameters: strategic, operational and tactical. A pragmatic strategy would have been to analyse the risk and opportunity through these three parameters and then make the final decision about which of the fighter plane choices would have best advanced Indian security. In strategic and geopolitical terms, France can provide little help to India in either Asia or in the global theatre. While France has always been a well-wisher, it has never had much capacity to help India. For example, though France wanted to sell India nuclear reactors, it could do little to change the nuclear non-proliferation rules that prevented it from doing so. It took Washington to change these rules to India's benefit.

Additionally, numbers (of aircraft India could acquire) and cost should have been factored in. Buying fewer but more expensive aircraft might make some fighter jocks happy, but having greater numbers might be more relevant to a country like India which faces a two-front threat from China and Pakistan. It was often argued in the MMRCA debate that maintaining air superiority required technological superiority, range and payload but an equally important consideration is that of numbers.

Numerical superiority in India's regional context is of particular significance given that the current strength of India's fighter jets is only around 600, and unless replenished, it will reach critically low numbers soon. Meanwhile, both Beijing and Islamabad have been augmenting their fighter fleets. India could have procured far greater numbers of fighters with the US or Russian option.

Though the probability of a two-front war is low, no pragmatic Indian strategic decision-maker should rule it out. Indeed, it is precisely for this reason that the Indian army is raising new forces to deploy on the China border. It is unclear if the technological superiority of the Rafale is so great as to compensate for the smaller numbers that India will have to settle for.

Cost should have also had an important role in the MMRCA decision. India's decision to go for Rafale is going to cost New Delhi around $20 billion, if not more. Opting for a Russian or US jet would have been far cheaper. The Russian option would have been the least expensive whereas the American fighters would have been somewhere in the middle with the European jets being the most expensive. In overall terms, the American F-18s would have been the best given that they (as well as the F-16s) came with the second-generation AESA radars.

Lastly, the most important consideration should have been the strategic benefits that accrue to India through this deal. Indian decision-makers should have been mindful of the fact that this deal was as much about making strategic investments in a relationship as simply buying fighters. India does not enjoy a benign neighbourhood, and these security needs are important. But India also needs to balance these with its requirements as a rising power, which means having capable friends. The MMRCA deal was a great opportunity to consolidate its strategic ties with either Russia or the US, or even with both. Instead, New Delhi has ended up antagonising both of them.

The standard response that India has signed many other defence contracts with both Russia and the US does not wash because this was a very different and high-profile deal which was closely watched around the world. Signing smaller deals, even if they add up to significant amounts, does not have the same weight as the MMRCA deal. New Delhi needs to be more careful in both understanding strategic moments and being able to exploit them if it wants to sit at the global high table.

My interview with The Diplomat .... on China's aircraft carrier, India's subs, missile defense options.....

2012-02-07T23:11:00.005+05:30

Here's an interview of mine in the Diplomat published today ... touching upon issues including China's aircraft carrier, US-India relations and India's subs.

For the full interview, click here.

Meet The Diplomat Writers
February 7, 2012 By The Diplomat
The Diplomat speaks with Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, a senior fellow at the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi, who answers readers’ questions on China’s aircraft carrier, missile defense and India’s attack submarine.

Mark Sharpis (LinkedIn):
There has been much written and debated regarding China’s new carrier, the ex-Soviet carrier Varyag. What do you make of the carrier and its current capabilities? Do you see China’s new carrier as a threat to India? Do you feel it could be used as a platform to build future vessels?
We don’t know very much about the carrier, but it seems in line with what the PLA Navy’s Academic Research Institute had been stating, that it will be a “conventionally powered medium-sized carrier that would be equipped with Chinese engines, aircraft, radar and other hardware.” While there was no doubt that China will have its own aircraft carrier someday, external assessments as far as the timeline was concerned have been wrong. Many of the western assessments had calculated that Beijing would have its first carrier by 2012 or so. However, today, the aircraft carrier is only undergoing initial sea trials, and still testing its engines, navigation equipment, electronics, fire control and maintenance systems, according to published reports. But they are a long way away from carrying combat planes. It will be years before they have a carrier battle group comprising a consolidated group of frigates, destroyers, submarines and other support vessels.

Having said that, what does an aircraft carrier mean for China? Having an aircraft carrier in its arsenal doesn’t mean much as yet, and China is years away from being capable of even effective sea denial strategy in the East Asian maritime region. However, as a rising power, China will possess such capabilities and more in the future. If there are no serious hitches, the PLAN is scheduled to induct the carrier into service by October 2012, though this sounds ambitious.
China’s aircraft carrier plans are an element of its assertive naval posturing that it has been displaying vis-a-vis its neighbors in recent years – be it the East China Sea or the South China Sea. In fact, an aircraft carrier would provide Beijing with greater coercive means for enforcing its claims in these two seas. Reportedly, a Chinese defense ministry-run website suggested that the carrier should handle territorial disputes as well. A PLA Daily article, too, noted that in a theater like the South China Sea, a carrier would provide them the ability to apply significant air-to-ground firepower during military missions, while not being affected by geographical restrictions. They see the aircraft carrier as a “mobile maritime airport.”

What does the Chinese aircraft carrier mean for India and other neighbors? In the first place, it would induce caution in other maritime powers in the region, particularly India, the U.S. and Japan. China’s submarine force already has produced this effect to some extent on these powers; the aircraft carrier would compound it. As for the Southeast Asian countries, the Chinese aircraft carrier would be a display of power and prestige. In fact, a PLA Daily article said that the aircraft carrier has far greater political significance than military significance. This is particularly important given that until a few years back, the PLAN was the weakest wing of the Chinese military. But this has changed now with greater attention in favor of the naval and air wing of the military. Chinese strategists seem to believe that aircraft carriers are important if they want to have effective maritime power projection capabilities, as opposed to purely defensive tasks. Display of power and prestige is important both for internal and external audiences.

Manish Kumar (LinkedIn):
There has been speculation in the media that the United States and/or Europe may wish to work with India on missile defense technology. Do you feel such collaboration is possible? What benefits would it bring to India as well as its potential partners?
While India had traditionally opposed missile defense, it now acknowledges its utility and is developing it publicly given the short- and medium-range missile threats from both Pakistan and China. In essence, though Indian missile defense architecture isn’t yet settled, India appears to be planning to establish a multi-layered missile defense system. It has been reported that the system will include a huge network of advanced notification sensors, command centers and anti-missile land- and sea based missile batteries. However, we must remember that defense scientists have made many tall claims on a number of areas but have delivered very little. So though the interest in missile defense and in building domestic systems is clear, that doesn’t denote that this will be successful.

While India has been making efforts to develop a missile defense system indigenously, it has also sought foreign partners. In this regard, partnering with the U.S. may be particularly important. This was best evident in India’s reaction to President Bush’s NMD speech in May 2001. In contrast to the strident criticism to the United States’ Strategic Defense Initiative in the 1980s, India had adopted a much more nuanced and considered position that was in recognition of the utility of these systems in the Indian context. The changed stance was also based on the assumption that it might facilitate high-tech missile defense cooperation in addition to currying favor with Washington.

The most serious problem that India seems to face is unclear political direction. There appears to be no clear direction about whether India really wants to build such a system (either indigenously or imported) and no apparent considerations of the financial and strategic consequences of such a move. In the absence of such political direction, India’s defense research agencies are on auto-pilot, making grandiose plans, but their feasibility is unclear yet.

Harry Kazianis:
With your research agenda looking at U.S. missile defense, do you advocate for a specific missile defense that is better than others? Do you feel the SM-2 or SM-3 would offer the United States and its potential partners the best defense against today’s expanding anti-ship and cruise missile technologies? Do you see an exotic technology like rail guns or something on the horizon offering better protection?

I’m not even sure that missile defenses will be useful or necessary in the Indian context. And questions about specific systems have to wait until the purposes of BMDs are defined in the Indian context: are they for point defense or national defense? If for point defense (which is obviously more feasible) how many ‘points’ will be covered – just the National Command Authority (NCA) or other vital targets such as major population centers or strategic areas? Without even the most basic architectural questions resolved, it’s difficult to consider specific systems.

Stewart Walters (LinkedIn):
The United States has recently announced various budget cuts to its armed forces. Will America be able to “pivot” to the Pacific with such cuts being considered? If America is to truly pivot to the Asia-Pacific/Indo-Pacific, wouldn’t it need to increase the size of its Navy?
While the U.S. is undertaking major cuts in its defense expenditure, one thing has been made clear repeatedly in the last few months: the U.S. is back in Asia for good. Most recently, outlining the challenges, priorities and opportunities in the new U.S. defense strategy, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, President Obama said that while U.S. interests are global, its security and economic interests are intertwined with developments in the region, from Western Pacific and East Asia into the Indian Ocean region and South Asia. Therefore, the U.S. presence and influence in the Asia Pacific region is seen as necessary “rebalancing.” After being stretched too thin for a while, in both Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. is now attempting to rationalize its defense strategy. In fact, the changing geopolitical circumstances and fiscal compulsions dictate new dynamics to this strategy.

While budget pressures will make it difficult for the U.S., the “pivot” is more a political statement than one about the state of the U.S. military. I don’t think the U.S. lacks military capabilities in the region. While more might certainly be good for the U.S., it’s also a fine balance between the domestic economic requirements and military spending. In addition, as China strengthens, we are likely to see its neighbors step up their military efforts. I think they would realize now that they can’t entirely depend on American efforts alone. This additional regional capability should reduce slightly the burden on the U.S. also.

Jason Miks:
Where do you see U.S.-India relations going in the next ten years? Do you feel the U.S. and India will enter in some sort of Alliance structure? Will India stay away considering its past leadership in such ideas like the Non-Aligned Movement?
Since the conclusion of the U.S.-India nuclear deal, both Washington and New Delhi have been drifting. With the nuclear deal over, U.S. and India need another big idea to power the relationship over the next several years. Without such a political initiative at the highest levels, U.S.-India relations threaten once again to wallow in bureaucratic inertia. Space cooperation, cooperation in advanced technologies and managing the Indo-Pacific are potential areas that would bring the two sides closer.
In Washington, there’s significant disappointment on a number of issues including India’s nuclear liabilities bill, which for all practical purposes prevents the U.S. nuclear industry from participating in India’s civilian nuclear sector; and the Indian decision to reject two American competitors from the Indian Air Force’s lucrative Medium Multi Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) deal. In Delhi, on the other hand, there’s unhappiness at what is seen as American pressure for greater defense cooperation. These issues suggest that all is not well with U.S.-India relations.

However, there are several issues such as the global war on terrorism, the future of Pakistan-Afghanistan, managing the Asia-Pacific including maritime security and the protection of sea lines of communication that bind the two countries for the foreseeable future. Meanwhile, the more important aspect isn’t to lose sight of the importance of this bilateral relationship and hence invest time, effort and resources to nurture it.

While U.S.-India relations are likely to mature further and grow into a strong partnership, it’s unlikely that New Delhi will posture itself as an “ally” in the classical sense of the term. For that matter, the U.S. itself is moving away from the typical traditional alliance structure to more fluid strategic partners and coalitions of the willing.

While there are a few proponents of non-alignment in New Delhi, in reality, non-alignment was always more of a declaratory than a real policy. India has been trying hard to shed this policy and move into building partnerships with the west and the U.S. in particular, evident in the U.S.-India nuclear deal. But India also values its “strategic autonomy.” We should expect that India will cooperate with the United States and others on some areas, such as seeking a balance in Asia, but would not formally align with the U.S. But because the balance in the Asian region is also in a flux, India, like others, won’t make long-term bets. Paradoxically, it’s China’s rise that might dictate India’s strategy: if China should falter, there will be less pressure to cooperate with the U.S. and vice-versa.

Sandeep Sharma (Facebook):
Russia has just completed the transfer of an Akula II Nuclear Attack Submarine to India on a ten year lease. What knowledge and experience can India gain from such a move? How much of a benefit will it bring to India’s own nuclear submarine program?
INS Chakra is important for a variety of reasons. First of all, the Indian Navy will be operating a nuclear submarine after a gap of about twenty years; the last one, again Russian-leased, a Charlie II class vessel, was operated during 1988-1991. Operating this new Akula II class vessel will benefit the Indian Navy tremendously in training a new batch of submariners in nuclear operations.
While India can learn some of these lessons once its own nuclear-powered submarines come in, this lease offers India the option of getting a head start. In addition, nuclear submarine operations are a recently developed maritime skill, somewhat like carrier operations, and only a few countries have such capacity. The Indian Navy has an opportunity to learn these skills from those with experience rather than re-inventing the wheel very slowly. But most importantly, the Navy will be able to learn and apply lessons learnt to its own domestic submarine development program. And though there have been several controversies surrounding the Russian submarines, including the one that’s being leased to India, it’s important to bear in mind that there aren’t very many other countries that are willing to lease India a nuclear-powered submarine. So there are multiple benefits.

http://the-diplomat.com/author-spotlight/2012/02/07/meet-the-diplomat-writers-11/
For inquiries, please contact The Diplomat at info@the-diplomat.com

India's MMRCA Decision: Strategic Implications

2012-02-04T20:22:00.004+05:30

Here's my take on India's MMRCA decision .... While the fight over the selection is over, questions about the wisdom of New Delhi's choice is unlikely to end any time soon. For India's current administration, beset with corruption scandals, letting technical merits alone determine the MMRCA decision was probably the politically easiest choice. But its strategic merits are somewhat less clear.

For the full article published by ORF, click here.

India's long and convoluted search for new fighter plane - or the MMRCA (Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft) - has entered its final stage. New Delhi has just announced that the Rafale, built by Dassault Aviation of France, has been chosen to meet the Indian Air Force's (IAF) requirement. Only price negotiation remains now.

The fight over the choice of aircraft appears to be now over. The Rafale had already been short-listed along with the Eurofighter Typhoon from a field which originally included four more jets: the US-built F-16 and F-18, the Russian MiG-35 and the Swedish JAS 39 Gripen. But, though the fight over the selection is over, questions about the wisdom of New Delhi's choice is unlikely to end any time soon.

Commenting on the MMRCA decision, Air Marshal Ahluwalia, a former IAF officer, proudly stated that this was probably the first decision that was made purely on technical grounds. While probably accurate, this reveals serious strategic short-sightedness. While the government should have received inputs from the Air Force, such decisions should not have been taken on purely technical grounds. For India's decision-makers, limiting themselves to technical specifications was a risk-free option, but that reveals more about the state of strategic decision-making in Delhi than the wisdom of the choice they made.

Ideally, the Indian decision should have been guided by a strategy that balances reducing danger and broadening opportunity. Accordingly, the question for New Delhi should have been how to use this lucrative deal to beef up India's strategic options. Thus it is probably a strategic blunder to narrowly focus on the technical specifications and capabilities alone, as many proponents of the IAF's choice have done. A decision of this magnitude should have been filtered through three key parameters: strategic, operational and tactical. Additionally, numbers (of aircraft India could acquire) and cost should have been factored in. Buying fewer but more expensive aircraft might make some fighter jocks happy, but having greater numbers might be more relevant to a country like India which faces a two-front threat from China and Pakistan. It was often argued in the debate about the MMRCA that maintaining air superiority required technological superiority, range and payload, but an equally important consideration is that of numbers. Numerical superiority in India's regional context is of particular significance given that the current strength of India's fighter jets is only around 600 and unless replenished, it will reach critically low numbers soon. Meanwhile, both Beijing and Islamabad have been augmenting their fighter fleets. India could have procured far greater numbers of fighters with the US or Russian option. Though the probability of a two-front war is low, no pragmatic Indian strategic decision-maker should rule it out. Indeed, it is precisely for this reason that the Indian army is raising new forces to deploy on the China border. It is unclear if the technological superiority of the Rafale is so great as to compensate for the smaller numbers that India will have to settle for.

Cost should have also had an important role in the MMRCA decision. India's decision to go for Rafale is going to cost New Delhi around $20 billion, if not more. Opting for a Russian or US jet would have been far cheaper for India. The Russian option would have been the least expensive whereas the American fighters would have been somewhere in the middle with the European jets being the most expensive. In overall terms, the American option in an F-18 would have been the best given that it (as well as F-16s) came with the second-generation AESA radars.

Lastly, the most important consideration should have been the strategic benefits that accrue to India through this deal. Indian decision-makers should have been mindful of the fact that this deal was as much about making strategic investments in a relationship as simply buying fighters. In strategic and geopolitical terms, France can provide little help to India in either Asia or in the global theatre. While France has always been a well-wisher, it has never had much capacity to help India. For example, though France wanted to sell India nuclear reactors, it could do little to change the nuclear non-proliferation rules that prevented it from doing so. It took Washington to change these rules to India's benefit.

For India's current administration, beset with corruption scandals, letting technical merits alone determine the MMRCA decision was probably the politically easiest choice. But its strategic merits are somewhat less clear.

Writing the Rules on Space: Why Inclusion Matters

2012-01-24T07:09:00.003+05:30

Recently two American scholars Bharat Gopalaswamy and Gaurav Kampani wrote an article on space code and the Indian debate, in Space News. The article, while citing my Occasional Paper, came to very different conclusions and even suggested that the current Indian debate was the role of a "spoiler." It went on further to suggest that "Indian security pundits seek power for India without the responsibility that comes with wielding it."

Here's my response article that has appeared in the Jan. 23 edition of Space News.

India’s interests in nonproliferation measures have been well known — starting from its efforts on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Despite its earnest intentions, New Delhi has been unable to effect serious transformation in the nonproliferation discourse. Now India is making efforts to play a constructive role on the space code of conduct issue that has been gaining momentum in recent months.

Although two codes are under discussion — the Stimson Center code and the European Union (EU) code — it is the EU code that has become contentious. The EU is making an eleventh-hour effort to gather support to universalize the code although it has been met with certain inflexible positions from non-EU capitals. While most of the countries have yet to come out with a formal position on the code, discussions and debates at unofficial parleys suggest that EU has a long, tough journey ahead in mustering the kind of support that it needs to have its space code institutionalized.

Debates in some Asian capitals have led to position papers that are indicative of certain broad trend lines as far Asian positions on the code are concerned. I recently produced a paper, published by the Observer Research Foundation, a Delhi-based think tank, that tried to summarize the perspectives from the Indian strategic, scientific and military communities. A recent commentary in Space News by two respected American analysts, Bharath Gopalaswamy and Gaurav Kampani, criticized some of the arguments made in my paper. I take this opportunity to respond to their comments.

India has an obvious interest in wanting to define the rules of the road on space (as do other powers). India is an emerging space power and it wants to curtail potential norms that will be counterproductive to its ambition in exploiting space. This is particularly important to a developing country that has invested enormous wealth toward its space program and now sees that being threatened because of issues such as space debris, aggravated by potential military tests in space, such as the anti-satellite (ASAT) tests that China and the U.S. have conducted in recent years. Thus, India has a material stake in the kinds of space rules now being proposed.

Gopalaswamy and Kampani underestimate the importance of the political component in international rule-making. The geopolitical value of India’s efforts in this normative exercise is tremendous. While the two authors appear astonished at some of the responses from the strategic community in New Delhi, this can at best be described as lacking an understanding of the geopolitical aspects of this exercise. A code, before it becomes institutionalized, goes through several critical stages — politico-diplomatic, technical and legal clearances.

Of these, the politico-diplomatic is the most critical for a variety of reasons. The kind of political support the code gathers determines the scope of the instrument. A successful politico-diplomatic initiative would ensure that it has wide-based support, even if it means that the content of the treaty is left as broad as possible to include all issues of concern to the various participants, including space debris and the arms race in space. In fact, today it is a problem of decision-making — more specifically, crisis in reaching a consensus (indeed, even in identifying challenges) among the major powers — that is at the root of the problem. This is not a problem unique to space security, of course, but that does not make it any easier. Major powers have to reach a political consensus in tackling some of these challenges, and in fact the technological part of the problem becomes much smoother if there is a political consensus among the major actors. Consensus also would ensure the longevity of any arms control measures in space. Gopalaswamy and Kampani fail to fully understand the import of this political imperative.

The EU clearly lost out on the politico-diplomatic front. If the EU were to do this again, it would be wise to go for an inclusive approach bringing together all the spacefaring nations and making them part of the creative process instead of the EU deciding on its own what is good for the world. While the EU’s initiative is commendable, its method is not.

Gopalaswamy and Kampani assert that India is “doggedly” insistent on a legal framework with enforcement and verification mechanisms built in. India does eventually want a legal framework, but Delhi is realistic to understand that it may have to move gradually toward such mechanisms and that it has to start from a normative exercise. India faces potential problems posed by both space debris and ASAT weapons, which are therefore understandably high on the agenda of Indian decision-makers. China’s ASAT test in 2007 was an eye-opener to the kinds of hard military realities that exist in India’s neighborhood.

The two authors have again reached misplaced conclusions about the importance of space debris in India’s priorities — including their reference to India’s failure to disaggregate space debris and ASAT tests. While the geopolitical and hard military realities may compel India to do an ASAT test, it is not to suggest that India underplays the criticality of space debris. It is also wrong to suggest that India does not pay attention to the creation of debris from a variety of different sources other than ASAT tests. The very fact that certain sections within the scientific establishment in India see the potential in using laser technology in order to reduce the amount of space debris is an illustration of the importance attached. Orbital debris remediation is certainly one area in which India and the U.S. could collaborate, and in fact this could easily feed into a broad array of cooperation in the space domain between the two countries.

The point to be emphasized is that precisely because India has an interest in the normative process and institutionalizing a space code, it is important for New Delhi to sit on the high table as an active party shaping the debate. It is rather unfortunate to characterize India’s efforts at triggering a debate on space security as that of a spoiler. India is certainly not looking to free-ride with major spacefaring nation status without shouldering any responsibility that comes along with that status.

The importance of being norm-shaper is important in the Indian discourse. This will also send out clear signals to its friends and foes in Asia and beyond about the potential role of India in any normative exercise. Therefore, the larger point is for India to have its own debate about the utility of the code of conduct and then become a full partner rather than to be pushed into it resentfully. Of course India has to come to the bargaining table with a strong proactive position that is considered and constructive and not reactive and defensive. It is not in India’s interests to be a naysayer in an international forum if it has ambitions to emerge as a major power in the coming decades.

US Proposal on Space CoC: International Responses

2012-01-23T19:06:00.004+05:30

Space code of conduct is in news with new developments almost on a daily basis. Here's a quickie from me on the international responses and what India should do to capture the space in framing the debate, published by ORF.

The debates around setting up an international code of conduct for outer space activities is getting more interesting. Recent proposals such as the Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) and the European Union-proposed Code of Conduct have highlighted the importance of a cleaner and safer outer space, although these have not found many takers around the world.

Most recently, the US rejected the EU Code saying that it is "too intrusive." Making the US position clear, Ellen Tauscher, Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, during a breakfast meeting on January 12, said, "it's been clear from the very beginning that we're not going along with the code of conduct." However, she clarified that "what we haven't announced is what we're going to do."Thereafter, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton issued a Press Statement and the Department of Defense (DoD) issued a Fact Sheet on space code of conduct arguing the need to come up with an international code of conduct. Specific concerns relate to space debris, radio frequency interference and competition as more countries and private corporations enter the fray.1

Official responses by Tauscher and thereafter by the State Department and DoD to the EU Code have sent mixed signals. On the one hand, the US has rebuffed the code saying it constrains the US military's options in space while the DoD suggested that the Code is "a promising basis for an international code." This indicates that there is probably only a minor disagreement - over who spearheads the Code initiative so that it musters wide support. However, this is a smart political move by the US. The EU could not have managed to gather much support for its initiative.

Meanwhile, there have already been some reactions to the US proposal. Moscow ridiculed Washington for sidelining or ignoring the earlier initiatives at framing measures for responsible behaviour in outer space. A few months back, Beijing used similar arguments as the US reached across to start bilateral talks on space security.

Moscow also found slip-ups in the new American approach saying that the critical issue of militarisation of space is missing in Washington's proposal. There is merit in this; the draft treaty proposed by Russia and China, "Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects"(PPWT) at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) makes "prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space and of an arms race in outer space" as important elements of their initiative. However, there are also several flaws with this formulation. First, the draft treaty considers only placement of weapons in outer space and does not take into account ground-based weapons for outer space operations. In fact, 'weaponisation of outer space' often refers only to weapons placed in outer space that will damage and destroy space-based assets. But this is inadequate because ground-based weapons can also target space activities. Ground-based lasers, for example, can target satellites.Operations based on ground-based weapons are likely to go up in the future.

Second, China had earlier made it clear that it did not consider space debris as a major issue to be included in a code,which reflects the Chinese intention to carry on with activities that may create debris, and damage and destroy space assets. Third, China's military space activities have continued unabated even as it suggests the PPWT. There are also other contradictions - China, on the one hand, works with COPUOS on the issue of space debris but on the other hand, it makes it clear that it will not support an instrument that considers space debris as an issue.

Now that Moscow has made its position clear, it will be the turn of Beijing to voice its opposition to the US effort as a superficial initiative that does not look at weaponisation of space. It appears that China and Russia will join hands again and earn some brownie points from arms controllers by harping about weaponisation of space while continuing with their weaponisation efforts. But more importantly, Moscow and Beijing need to introspect whether their activities are contributing and strengthening the writing of these rules. Michael Listner, for instance, opines that the two of them have in fact have done the "most destructive ASAT tests" creating debris to such levels where the "ISS is playing the orbital version of dodge ball."

Meanwhile, it appears that Australia is getting on board for an international code under the US leadership. Japan had already endorsed the EU Code and one can see an even greater effort on the part of Tokyo to push and muster support for the US proposal. Canada has also extended full support for the proposal.

How should India react to the developments? It is in India's interests to institute a code for guiding certain responsible behavior in order to ensure a cleaner, safer, and less congested outer space. It is also in Indian interests to ensure that a code takes shape that brings certain restraint on China. And, it will be to our benefit if India took the lead in spearheading the creation of a code along with the US and other major spacefaring powers. It is understood that in a recent briefing on the issue in Washington DC, US officials repeatedly emphasized the potentially critical role that India could play in developing a code, starting from negotiations to giving shape to the final instrument. Consultative meetings should start towards this end in the next few months and it will do well if India debates this internally and reaches considered and constructive position on the subject. India should recognize that it should not let opportunity pass again on a major global issue. New Delhi has to be inside the tent rather than outside if it is to be able to frame the rules and regulations that will affect its own future in space.
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1 It is estimated that there are around 60 nations and government consortia that operate satellites. There are additionally several commercial and academia satellite operators, which make outer space a congested place. There are roughly 22,000 objects in orbit out of which 1,100 are active satellites, tracked by the US Department of Defense. In addition, there are hundreds of thousands of small objects that may be difficult to track but those that can still cause damage to assets in the orbit. For info, see Department of State, International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities: Strengthening Long-Term Sustainability, Stability, Safety, and Security in Space, January 17, 2012, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/181208.pdf.

Space Code: A potential area for US-India cooperation

2012-01-19T18:15:00.004+05:30

In the recent weeks, there have been several developments on the space code ... most recently, the US rejecting it saying it is too restrictive. Here's my take (published on ORF website) on the debate and the future course, particularly looking at whether India and the US can shape this debate and ultimately a code of conduct on space.

Space debris, traffic management and orbital frequency being issues that concern both India and the US, this ideally should be on the agenda in future US-India endeavours. It might be good for both the countries if they can engage in shaping this debate that would give them ownership of the issue.

As outer space becomes increasingly crowded, it has become clear that there needs to be some clear rules for regulating activities of different nation-states in space. Instituting such a code of conduct on outer space activities has been at the centre stage for the past few months. The United Nations took the lead in this regard in 2008, with the General Assembly adopting resolution 62/217, endorsing the "Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines" of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS). The European Union (EU) also proposed a code of conduct on space, but it has run into rough waters for a variety of reasons and the EU has not managed to muster much support for their initiative outside the EU capitals. While the EU needs to be complimented for its initiative, unfortunately the EU did not institute a consultative mechanism, which could have brought together all the major space-faring countries. This has hurt the prospects of the EU Code.

While India has not taken a formal position on the EU Code, discussions at informal parleys suggest that India too has concerns. To start with, India has been concerned with the fact that the EU did not engage major space-faring powers, including India, in this exercise. The exclusive approach adopted by the EU in this regard has made this exercise futile. Second, while the EU Code is a voluntary and non-binding arrangement, it expects states to establish national policies that are in sync with the EU guidelines, which may or may not be in the interests of India. Such measures have been seen as affecting the legitimate national security interests of other countries.

Similar concerns have been expressed in Washington as well. Most recently, the US rejected the EU Code on the grounds that it is "too restrictive." On January 12, Ellen Tauscher, Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, made the US position quite clear on the EU Code saying that "it's been clear from the very beginning that we're not going along with the code of conduct." However, she also went on to say that "what we haven't announced is what we're going to do."

American concerns have ranged from the fact that this non-binding, voluntary arrangement could restrict the US military's options in space to the issue of a non-ownership of the code, the document having been produced by the EU. For instance, in a Senate hearing in May, Senator Jeff Sessions said, "we've advanced further technologically in development and actual deployment of these systems than anyone else, and agreements [and] codes of conduct tend to … constrain our military." An assessment by the Pentagon's Joint Staff supported this assessment, stating that the US becoming a party to the EU Code "would hurt the US military's space operations in several areas." Similarly, a State Department cable on the subject noted that the US "continues to have significant concerns about the widespread use of language connoting binding obligations, such as 'shall' and 'will,' in the proposed non-binding Code of Conduct."

Having junked the EU Code as too restrictive, the US is now in the process of working on a new draft, of course, with the EU draft "as a promising basis for an international Code." US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in a Press Statement made amply clear the importance of instituting a code that "will help maintain the long-term sustainability, safety, stability, and security of space by establishing guidelines for the responsible use of space." The US intends to join the EU and other countries in developing a code as a way of strengthening international cooperation while constraining irresponsible behaviour. However, the US move in this direction has already come in for criticism from Republicans on the ground that this is a typical Liberal arms control measure. John R. Bolton, former Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, criticised the new move saying, "the last thing the United States needs is a space code of conduct. The idea of arms control has already failed in the Russian 'reset' policy, and it is sure to fail here as well." Among other criticism, two national security officials condemned the administration's national security policies as arms control-driven, which emphasise on concluding international pacts rather than building its military capabilities.

In sum, while the Obama Administration's interests in instituting a code for a safe and workable outer space environment is legitimate, this is an election year and neither the Obama Administration nor any of the other Presidential candidates will want to commit themselves to a code, especially when it has not been produced by the US.

Can the new US proposal to write the rules of the road on space be an area of interest for India? India clearly has interests in laying out the rules of the road for space conduct but it also has an interest in being recognised as a major space-faring power whose voice should form an intrinsic part in creating these rules. India cannot come on board as a latecomer. In a sense, the "Not Made Here" syndrome probably best characterises the Indian position on the EU Code. Indian interests are driven by several factors including the geopolitics of Asia and the Indian neighbourhood, which is rather hostile. Therefore, it has an interest in a normative exercise that will reduce China's aggressive and unregulated behaviour in outer space, best illustrated by their irresponsible Anti-Satellite (ASAT) test in 2007 that left behind a huge amount of space debris. Given that space debris, traffic management and orbital frequency are issues that concern both India and the US, this ideally should be on the agenda in future US-India endeavours. New Delhi's broader approach has been to institute an inclusive and comprehensive approach in addressing space security.

How should India shape the discourse in this regard? As a first step, it will be in India's interest to produce a backgrounder or white paper outlining the importance of space in India's developmental and security calculus. This in turn should lead to identifying what kind of a space future it would like to see and thereafter identify areas that would contribute to such an environment while putting in place measures that would constrain India's ability to help generate such a future. It might be good for both India and the US if they can engage in shaping this debate that would give them ownership of the issue.

India A Long-term Strategic Partner: US Defense Strategy

2012-01-07T20:06:00.005+05:30

The US recently announced its new defense strategy, taking into account the new geopolitical realities and the fiscal compulsions back home. The new strategy lays particular emphasis in developing a long-term strategic partnership with India. Here are my quick thoughts on the new strategy.

Outlining the challenges, opportunities and priorities, President Obama released the US defence strategy, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, on January 05, 2012. After an overstretch by the US military in the last decade in both Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. is now attempting to rationalise its defence strategy. The changing geopolitical circumstances and fiscal compulsions add new dynamics to this strategy.

The new strategy, however, should not to be mistaken for a retreat. Obama was categorical in stating that while the U.S. military will be downsized, moving towards a smaller and leaner force, they will remain "agile, flexible, and ready for the full range of contingencies" with continuing investment in capabilities, including "intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; counter-terrorism; countering weapons of mass destruction; operating in anti-access environments; and prevailing in all domains, including cyber."

The defence strategy outlined the core US national interests as "defeating al-Qa'ida and its affiliates and succeeding in current conflicts; deterring and defeating aggression by adversaries, including those seeking to deny our power projection; countering weapons of mass destruction; effectively operating in cyberspace, space, and across all domains; maintaining a safe and effective nuclear deterrent; and protecting the homeland."

The document also highlights the US plan to effectively deal with anti-access and area denial (A2AD) strategies. This emphasises a range of capabilities, including developing new stealth bombers, improving missile defences, improving the effectiveness of critical space-based capabilities and submarine technologies. Recognising the importance of information and communication networks in future operations as also the vulnerability that these mediums face, the document attaches special attention to further protection to cyberspace and space assets. International partnerships with allies and partners to develop new capabilities to effectively defend their networks and maintain operational effectiveness in outer space and cyberspace are an important part of efforts to reduce vulnerabilities and strengthen defences. U.S. and India have a great deal to cooperate, particularly in this regard, given the kind of threats and attacks that the two countries have witnessed in the recent years.

While the U.S. interests are global, its security and economic interests are intertwined with developments in the regions, from Western Pacific and East Asia into the Indian Ocean region and South Asia. Therefore, the U.S. presence and influence in the Asia Pacific region is seen as "of necessity rebalancing." Similarly, even though the importance of its traditional allies remains unquestionable, the need to have more friends and partners in the region is undeniable. Accordingly, the U.S. is seeking to build and strengthen partnerships in the region so as to improve "collective capability and capacity".

It is in this context that the US sees India. The U.S. investment "in a long-term partnership with India to support its ability to serve as a regional economic anchor and provider of security in the broader Indian Ocean region" is clearly part of this effort. However, in less than 24 hours after the release of the defense strategy, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, in an interview to the PBS, has talked about rising powers including India as a challenge. While it is fair that the U.S. is still coming to grapple with the new and fast-changing geopolitical shift from the West to Asia, it is unclear why they see India in somewhat the same light as China, as a challenge.

On the other hand, China's rise as a regional power in the Asia Pacific presents both opportunities and challenges for the U.S. While both countries have interests in seeing a stable East Asian order, the opaqueness of Chinese military objectives and intentions continue to be a factor in U.S. thinking. However, U.S. recognises that issues such as freedom of navigation that ensures smooth flow of cargo and resources and the U.S. influence in the region will depend partly on the kind of U.S. military posturing.

China has already reacted saying that while the U.S. is encircling China, Beijing cannot afford to bend backwards to appease Washington. In this context, 'Freedom of the seas' is an obvious reference to the South China Sea - an area in which there has been greater exchange of minds between India and the U.S. But, Panetta in the interview to the PBS, was of the view that the U.S. will need to work with China on a host of issues, including North Korea, nuclear proliferation and free passage of goods and resources in the international waters.

While Obama has been categorical that the new strategy should not be seen as a drawdown of the U.S. in any manner, the important question is how the proposed budget cuts are going to affect certain weapon platforms such as the F-35. Similarly, it is not clear how the whole budget mess will affect the U.S. capacity to fund this strategy. Equally important, there is the possibility that this new approach might not last very long considering that Obama faces a tough presidential campaign over the next year.

Asia and a Space Code

2012-01-05T12:55:00.004+05:30

Here's an article of mine on the emerging Asian views on a space code. The article appeared in the Diplomat yesterday.

Asian concerns on a space code are important because future challenges to space cooperation may well come from Asia, not least because so many of the new space powers are emerging from this region.

Establishing international norms for space has gradually started to become a priority in recent months, with two codes – the EU Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities and the Stimson Center’s Model Code of Conduct – being the subject of much international debate. And while the Stimson Code has been perceived as less controversial, the EU Code has come in for significant flak, particularly in Asia.

Asian concerns are important because future challenges to space cooperation may well come from Asia, not least because so many of the new space powers are emerging from this region.

One key mistake the European Union made was not engaging India, one of the oldest space faring powers, earlier in the process. India is interested in instituting norms to guide the behavior of others in the space arena, but it’s also interested in being acknowledged as one of the major space powers. While the Indian position is evolving, the “not invented here” syndrome characterizes much of its current mood.

But even as the European Union is making fresh efforts in reaching out to countries to gain support for the code, nations such as China have already made their positions clear. One EU official speaking at a conference in Paris, for example, described the Chinese as being opposed to space debris being a major item in the code. This suggests that China has plans to carry out more anti-satellite tests, something that has raised a red flag in New Delhi.

Meanwhile, China has been critical of the EU’s emphasis on sharing information about national space policies and strategies, including objectives for security related policies. Beijing has made it clear that it will be “impossible” to share information on national security.

In addition, China has articulated the need for a code under a multilateral framework that includes discussion among all space faring powers. But it has also made clear it won’t agree to any arrangements potentially affecting its development in the military space domain. While China has been active at the U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space over a number of issues, its military space program has made considerable advances.

In contrast, another Asian space giant, Japan, seems to be completely behind the code. Hirofumi Katase, deputy secretary general in Japan’s Secretariat for Space Policy, urged the code’s global adoption. This move was in many ways expected given Japan’s preferences for major arms control measures. Still, the reality is that Tokyo’s space program has clearly begun to shift from completely civilian toward a potentially more militarized program.

Australia, meanwhile, hasn’t formally made its position clear. It appears in principle to agree with the sentiments expressed in the EU code, and there’s a general appreciation for the emphasis on transparency and confidence-building measures, which are traditionally popular in the West.

The United States hasn’t taken a final official position on the code, but it’s unlikely that it will fully endorse the document. Concerned that U.S. military utilization of outer space may potentially be restrained, the Department of Defense has expressed reservations over the United States becoming a party to the code.

While instituting a code of conduct on space is of the utmost importance, the West, particularly the European Union, needs to acknowledge the global nature of the issue, and the importance of the involvement of all concerned countries. The need to have Asian space powers on board is significant given the geo-political weight of Asia, and unless Asian countries are brought properly into the process, any code that the West may pursue will simply end up being a toothless treaty.

End of Road for America?

2012-01-05T12:43:00.003+05:30

2012 has begun on a hectic note for me. Hence, even posting an article that was published on January 01, 2012 has got delayed. Anyway, late better than never. So, here it is ... an OpEd of mine on the much-hyped US retreat. Is it a retreat? I would say, in sum, the picture is mixed. While the US has suffered some strategic reverses, it has also made a few gains. It is not yet time to write off the United States of America. The OpEd was published by The Pioneer on January 01, 2012.

The United States saw a retreat, both economic as well as strategic, in 2011. Will the decline be arrested in 2012?

Talks about America’s retreat, both economic and strategic, are gaining momentum. The 2008 financial crisis and its continuing reverberations, the American pull out of Iraq a few weeks back and Afghanistan next year, and the strategic stalemate in Iran and North Korea where Washington hasn’t been able to force these weaker powers to bend to its will — all these are touted as indicators of US decline. While these signs need to be taken seriously, there are pointers which clearly suggest that its dominance in world affairs is far from being over.

America has spent enormously, both in wealth and blood, in Afghanistan and Iraq. While the Kabul mission has had greater domestic support, Baghdad has always been a controversial venture even within the US. Their global implications have been equally, if not more, disastrous. A decade of efforts by the world’s most powerful military, using the world’s most advanced technologies of warfare, has been insufficient in gaining Washington a clear victory. Though the US managed to extricate itself from Baghdad in a relatively better condition than it did out of Saigon in 1975, there is little doubt that the mission in Iraq and Afghanistan failed to provide tangible results.

The second indicator of American retreat is Washington’s declining global economic dominance. The financial crisis that hit the US in 2008 began to have serious impact on the nation’s debt-income ratio. In 2011, the country’s national debt overtook its national income. As of December 15, 2011, the gross debt was $15.098 trillion, of which $10.438 trillion was held by the public and $4.659 trillion was intragovernmental holdings. In contrast, in June 2011, the annual gross domestic product was $15.003 trillion.

Meanwhile, other powers such as China and India have been growing fast. Though these trends have been long-standing ones, going back to the end of World War II, their consequences are now appearing to be quite grim for the US. The rise of the BRIC nations, America’s rising foreign debt and a steady shift of the manufacturing sector out of the US are all suggesting that Washington’s global dominance is nearing its end.

Third, Iran and North Korea have become belligerent and the US appears to be in no position to convince them to change their behaviour. The fact that Pyongyang can only be influenced by Beijing has only worsened the situation for Washington. After all, China has been less than forthcoming in helping tone down the aggression of the North Korean leadership. In two decades of negotiations, Pyongyang has become a nuclear power, withdrawn from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and is now thought to be a potential nuclear proliferation threat. Likewise, the US is unable to get Iran change its policies and countries like Russia and China with veto power have restrained America’s manoeuvrability to a large extent. The fiasco with the bad intelligence that led to the Iraq war has meant that Washington is not in a position to convince global opinion that Tehran is building nuclear weapons.

Fourth, the impact of the Arab Spring on the US and its global image hasn’t been positive either. This is odd. After all, America has for long been championing the cause of democracy and human rights in the region. Several US allies have been the ones whom the Arab street targeted and threw out of power, leaving a big question mark on the support for America in these countries. Egypt is a case in point. The new leadership/regime that emerges in these countries need not necessarily be US-friendly and this undermines Washington’s position in the region.

While all these may seem unfavourable, a more holistic overview would demonstrate that it is not that bad for the US. While the decline (in relative terms) is indisputable, there are counterpoints that need to be kept in mind.

So, if one were to concede a strategic and economic retreat for America, how bad is it? For instance, everyone talks about the economic mess that the US is in today, but we should remember that almost every country is in trouble today. Also, the dollar appreciation in recent times demonstrates the economic strength of America. For all the Chinese economic growth story or its influence/stake in the financial restructuring, Beijing does not have the ability to float an alternate currency. Nor can it afford to invest its money in any currency other than the dollar. The Euro crisis has further reinforced the American role in the global economic system.

Second, America’s retreat from Iraq and Afghanistan may appear as weakness, but the move will help Washington consolidate its domestic economy, besides reducing the direct threat that the country faces from Islamist terrorists. Refocussing domestically should help the US deal with the problem better.

On the strategic front, while the US may be disappointed in not being able to get its way vis-à-vis Iran and North Korea, President Barack Obama’s unwearied policy in dealing with the two is gradually paying off. Today the allies as well as other countries in the region are calling upon the US to take necessary action, thus giving Washington a lot more legitimacy to pursue a pro-active policy. For instance, the Arab League is more open to a concrete action being taken against Iran. Similar is the scenario in East Asia, where most countries are today far more keen about the US playing an active role in the region than they were a decade ago. Of course, China’s aggressive foreign policy towards its neighbours has helped the American cause.

America’s military modernisation is another issue. While China is doing a lot in terms of catching up with the US, Washington still maintains an unmatchable technological edge. The drone war, for instance, which the US has pursued against terrorists in Afghanistan and Pakistan, is a feat that no other country can duplicate anytime in the near future. Similarly, the killing of Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden in Pakistan was an incredible exercise of the American hard power. The kind of intelligence, military and technological capabilities that the country put to use was stupendous and cannot be replicated by other nations in the near future.

Last, the Arab Spring may have been bad news for some American allies, but many of its regional adversaries (Muammar Gaddafi in Libya and Bashar al-Assad in Syria), too, have also suffered losses.

In sum, the picture is mixed. While the US has suffered some strategic reverses, it has also made a few gains. It is not yet time to write off the United States of America.

Why the US Needs India's Air Force ... my take on US-India military ties ... in today's The Diplomat

2011-11-30T00:07:00.003+05:30

Here's an article of mine on US-India military ties, arguing for greater engagement between the Indian Air Force and the US Air Force. This has been published today as the lead article in The Diplomat.

Until now, the flag-bearers of U.S.-Indian military cooperation have been the two countries’ navies, a point that was highlighted during the response to the 2005 tsunami and subsequent reconstruction operations. In contrast, while there have been some joint exercises between their two air forces, the rationale for air force-to-air force cooperation appears to be neither understood nor appreciated in either capital.

During his visit to India last November, U.S. President Barack Obama characterized relations with India as “one of the defining and indispensable partnerships of the 21st century.” Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, in turn, stated that India had “decided to accelerate the deepening of our ties and to work as equal partners in a strategic relationship that will positively and decisively influence world peace, stability and progress.” Arguing that cooperation extended to India’s immediate neighborhood, Singh said the two countries “have a shared vision of security, stability and prosperity in Asia based on an open and inclusive regional architecture.”

But if the bilateral relationship really as is important as the two leaders suggest, then there’s undoubtedly a need for greater strategic synergy. In particular, the two countries’ militaries need to understand each other better if they are to work together for regional and global peace.

Until now, the flag-bearers of U.S.-Indian military cooperation have been the two countries’ navies, a point that was highlighted during the response to the 2005 tsunami and subsequent reconstruction operations. In contrast, while there have been some joint exercises between their two air forces, the rationale for air force-to-air force cooperation appears to be neither understood nor appreciated in either capital.

Indian strategic planners seem to be in broad agreement with their U.S. counterparts in identifying the big strategic challenges in the Asia-Pacific region, yet New Delhi has been reluctant to develop joint approaches in addressing many of these challenges.

The hope is, of course, that even if India is hesitant now, that it may change its mind over the next decade. After all, India’s interests, and its incapacity to address the challenges it faces on its own, seem bound to drive it towards the United States and Asian partners such as Japan and Australia.

Certainly, former U.S. President George W. Bush saw India as a significant pole in Asia, and close ties with India as being in U.S. interests – something that the Obama administration also seems to have recognized. Such views have prompted the United States to develop more formal defense cooperation and to talk about India in terms reserved for U.S. allies (something that causes some discomfort in New Delhi).

The most frequently cited reason for Washington’s interest in India is as a balancer to China, but this view is more complicated than many assume. For a start, the United States has a stake in the ongoing Sino-Indian border dispute. Although the U.S. is yet to take a position on the broader boundary and territorial dispute between the two countries, it certainly wouldn’t be in the interests of the United States to see a conflict break out – and especially to see India lose face in a military confrontation. China decided to teach India a lesson in their brief war in 1962. If this were repeated today, though, the U.S. would also be adversely affected as India’s perceived value as a regional ally would be diminished. A Chinese victory would also raise the question in the minds of smaller states over what hope they have in standing up to China if the United States stood by and watched as a major ally such as India was picked on. Such worries would undoubtedly undermine the United States’ position in Asia, and make China’s neighbors more susceptible to coercion.

But it’s not just about the negatives – India’s airpower can help underpin U.S. Pacific forces indirectly. For a start, a strong Indian Air Force would likely prompt China to focus at least part of its air power away from the Pacific and on the Tibet region. In addition, the Indian Air Force could also tip the scales in the Indo-Pacific by reducing the burden on the U.S. Air Force and providing security in the global commons. For instance, with a single air refueling, India’s SU-30MKI’s combat radius can include either the Straits of Malacca or the Persian Gulf.

Of course, it’s an open question whether India is willing to take such proactive steps. But co-operating more with the United States will help India feel more comfortable with future joint operations.

The reality is that both countries’ air forces face common threats, meaning it would benefit both to share data on a more regular basis and plan joint responses to any problems. The Indian Air Force, for instance, faces threats in its Northeastern sector similar to those facing the United States in the Western Pacific, namely ballistic missiles, advanced integrated air defense systems (IADS), 4th and 5th generation fighters, and increasingly sophisticated Chinese air-to-air missile and electronic warfare capabilities. All these developments increasingly impinge on both India and the United States, and it makes sense for the two to boost co-operation and learn lessons from each other’s experiences in the region.

Similarly, given the growing trend of India procuring U.S. weapons and equipment, greater engagement between their air forces would be particularly beneficial. Joint operations on democracy promotion, humanitarian missions, post disaster management and reconstruction are all ideal areas for joint operations.

But for any of this to occur, India must first recognize the potential for it to become a net provider of constructive airpower in the Indian Ocean Region. If India’s procurement plans go as planned, it could have a modern air force that will be highly capable of anything from disaster relief and humanitarian assistance to providing lethal combat air support.

At the end of the day, if India wants to sit at the high table of international diplomacy, it should be prepared to shoulder greater responsibilities and shed its risk averse foreign policy. Ramping up its air force co-operation seems a good place to start.

EU Code of Conduct: Response from India and other Asian countries ....

2011-11-29T23:50:00.004+05:30

Here's an article by Michael Listner on the EU Code of Conduct and some of the Indian concerns, published yesterday by the Space Review. He has also cited my recent Occasional Paper on the subject.

The article says, "There has been no official comment to the response on the CoC from the international community outside of the European Union and the United States. However, open source material suggests that countries in the Asia Pacific Region, in particular India, have several concerns about the CoC, which could prevent them from adopting the measure."

There has been much debate in 2011 over the draft version of the European Union’s proposed Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities (the CoC), released in October 2010. Since its release, the CoC has been analyzed by policy experts in several different forums including a panel discussion at the George Marshall Institute as well as the pages of this publication.1 Little has been said publically since the flurry of analysis in the first half of the year due in no small part to the State Department and other branches of the United States government’s review of the CoC in lieu of formal adoption by the United States.

Countries in the Asia Pacific Region, in particular India, have several concerns about the CoC, which could prevent them from adopting the measure.
The FAA’s Commercial Space Transportation Advisory Committee’s Space Transportation Operations Working Group (STOWG) met on August 4, 2011, and featured an update on the CoC by Richard Buenneke, Senior Advisor, Space Policy for the US Department of State.2 At that time Mr. Bunneke informed STOWG that the CoC was under review by the Department of Defense and that the United States remained interested in the CoC, but it was not prepared to sign the document in 2011. According to Mr. Bunneke, the European Council continued to present the CoC to the international community for consideration. The CoC was slated for adoption in 2012, but that deadline has been pushed back indefinitely.

There has been no official comment to the response on the CoC from the international community outside of the European Union and the United States. However, open source material suggests that countries in the Asia Pacific Region, in particular India, have several concerns about the CoC, which could prevent them from adopting the measure.

Indian concerns with the CoC
Dr. Rajeswari Rajagopalan, Senior Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi, India, presented an occasional paper in October 2011 discussing the CoC and India’s perspectives on it.3 Dr. Rajagopalan’s paper presents concerns that India and the Asian nations have with the current form of the CoC and whether those can concerns can be addressed to their satisfaction. Six fundamental concerns can be discerned from Dr. Rajagopalan’s dissertation: the non-binding nature of the CoC, repetition of and intrusion into a country’s domestic space policies, the failure of the EU to consult Asian countries when drafting the CoC, failure of the CoC to address the geopolitical realities of the Asian sphere of influence, ambiguity of terms and phrases within the CoC, and administration of the CoC. Each of these are briefly addressed below.

India’s prominent concern with the EU’s approach is the CoC’s lack of a legally binding mechanism, which is a long-standing requirement of some of the Asian counties. India takes the position that in order to be workable, the CoC requires a legal framework, an enforcement and verification mechanism, and a penalty mechanism for countries violating the CoC. The lack of legally binding measures is seen by the Asian countries as a weakness that will undermine and eventually defeat the CoC’s purpose.

Associated with the concern that the CoC is not legally binding is its voluntary nature and that its precepts replicate existing policies. Most of the principles and guidelines proposed in the CoC already exist either in the national space policies of some of the countries involved with the CoC or in bilateral and multilateral transparency and confidence building measures (TCBMs). Suggesting that countries adopt policies consistent with the CoC may also be considered an intrusion to the domestic policy-making of countries, who are already developing policies on their own initiative.

Another concern of India is EU’s omission to consult with India and the other Asian nations when the CoC was devised. This lapse is considered enough to preclude India and the other Asian countries from signing on to an otherwise acceptable instrument. India considers the inclusion of the spacefaring nations of Asia to be a crucial element during the creation of the CoC, especially considering that the fastest growing space programs are among the Asian countries, and it is among those countries where most new challenges relating to outer space will materialize.

Related to the India’s concern of exclusion in the creation of the CoC is the viewpoint that it is essential that the EU and the Western nations address the realities of geopolitics in the Asia-Pacific region. These considerations will prescribe suggestions from India and the Asian nations to amend the CoC, and not the other way around. The geopolitical realities of the Asia-Pacific region would translate into new terms and conditions in the CoC that are not currently within it, but what those interests are varies among the Asian nations, which could further complicate amendment to the CoC.

Amendments to the CoC could fundamentally alter its nature and estrange Western countries, such as the United States, from adopting it.
The ambiguous manner by which the CoC is written is another concern for India. Many phrases within the CoC are open to interpretation, and while phrases and terms contained within the current draft of the CoC may be interpreted one way by the members of the EU or the United States, those same phrases and terms could be construed in a different manner by Asian countries, including India. This concern is magnified by the possibility that countries with substantial diplomatic and political clout such as the United States or China could dictate how vague sections are interpreted to the detriment of countries such as India.

Finally, the question of who will administer the CoC once it is implemented is a prominent one in the eyes of India. India views administration of the CoC as feasible only by an authority that has the benefit of ample hard power and diplomatic clout. However, India sees the EU, which would be the likely choice as the administering authority of the CoC, as lacking in both these qualities. This calls into question the effectiveness of the CoC from India’s point of view.

Impact of Asian concerns
The concerns enunciated by Dr. Rajagopalan and the alterations to the CoC that India and the other Asian countries may seek before signing are the type that panelists hosted by the George Marshall Institute expressed concern about when asked whether the United States should adopt the CoC. During that discussion, the panelists were all of the opinion that the United States should not sign onto the CoC until other countries recommend their changes to CoC, perhaps explaining why the United States has delayed indefinitely its adoption of the instrument.4

Beyond the concerns that India and the Asian countries have articulated about the CoC, there is the issue of whether those concerns can be addressed by amendment of the CoC without altering its nature and structure. Amendments to the CoC could fundamentally alter its nature and estrange Western countries, such as the United States, from adopting it. For example, if the CoC was transformed from a non-binding confidence-building measure to a legally binding international accord, the United States may object and refuse to adopt it since signing it would implicate its national space policy with regard to signing onto outer space security treaties.

Continuing to persuade the PRC to accept measures such as the CoC is futile and will only make the process of persuading others to adopt such measures more difficult.
There is also the issue of the stance the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has taken with certain precepts of the CoC. In particular, the PRC has taken the position that the issue of orbital space debris should not be included in the CoC. The PRC also objects to the CoC’s insistence that states who adopt the CoC share information on their domestic national space policies, including objectives for security and defense related activities. There is little chance the PRC’s “no” will turn to a “yes” on these two issues, so the EU is faced with the option of diminishing the CoC to accommodate the PRC or having the PRC refuse to adopt the accord. If the success of the CoC is dependent on the PRC adopting it, then the EU could be disappointed.

How any amendment of the CoC to address Indian and other Asian concerns will impact US national space policy is also a concern. US diplomatic efforts are presently focused on addressing outer space security issues through redefined and repurposed TCBMs instead of legally-binding treaties.5 The current US interest in the CoC—effectively a TCBM—is one path of that policy, with a more robust effort intended for engaging other countries via the United Nations. Many of the concerns articulated by India about the CoC can apply equally to the planned application of TCBMs in the UN and effectively derail the United State’s effort should those concerns be amended into the CoC.

Alternative approaches
The EU is faced with the possibility that the CoC in its current form will not accommodate the concerns of the Asian countries without substantially altering the nature of the instrument. This possibility is not lost on India, and one of India’s considerations, aside from adopting the CoC, is to develop a code of their own. Such a code could take a similar form to the CoC and would address a significant portion of the concerns enunciated by India and the Asian countries, with the bonus of having an indigenous accord reflecting Asian interests instead of an instrument drafted from the viewpoint of Western geopolitics. It is plausible that such a code could coexist with the CoC. The dual-code approach could parallel each other in some areas and distinguish themselves to address issues that are relevant to their respective geopolitical and security situations.

Another alternative that could allow for a greater integration of Asian concerns into the CoC is for the EU and the United States to face the reality that the PRC is not going to acquiesce to the precepts of the CoC nor will it ever adopt it. This assertion is highlighted by Dean Cheng, Research Fellow for Asian Studies at the Heritage Foundation, where he dispels the myth that the PRC is interested in cooperation in space by noting that the PRC is engaged with a power competition with the United States, and space is a major venue of that competition. The upshot of this is that the PRC is unlikely to be swayed by proposals of codes of conduct or symbolic meetings with space officials from the United States.6

Policymakers from the EU and the United States would do well to face this reality, particularly in the context of the CoC. Continuing to persuade the PRC to accept measures such as the CoC is futile and will only make the process of persuading others to adopt such measures more difficult. If the EU and the US are serious about adopting the CoC, they must acknowledge that the PRC has no intention of engaging in good faith negotiations over the CoC and instead focus their efforts on addressing the concerns of countries such as India, which has a better chance of reaching consensus with the EU on its own absent the presence of the PRC at the negotiating table.

It is plausible that the current form of the CoC may not be able to accept amendment without substantially altering it.
Beyond TCBMs, including measures such as the CoC, an effective way to establish a “code of conduct” is through legally binding agreements. This author postulated shortly after the collision of Iridium 33 and Cosmos 2251 in February 2009 that bilateral accords defining conduct for outer space activities would be an effective means of preventing incidents in outer space more so than a treaty banning “space weapons.”7 Accords defining conduct have been implemented in maritime law and have opened a line of dialogue between the parties that have prevented incidents and subsequent escalations that could have led to full-blown confrontations.

Applying this concept to outer space activities would differentiate itself from the CoC and the current approach to TCBMs by the United States. Since these agreements would be legally binding, countries such as India would be more inclined to enter them, and it would eliminate the objection of the Russian Federation likely to leveled at the current track of United States space policy. Bilateral treaties negotiated between two countries would also avoid the multiplicity of converging cultural and geopolitical differences encountered during the negotiation of multilateral accords, and they could be tailored to satisfy the national space policy’s requirement that any treaties be equitable and verifiable.

Conclusion
Whether the CoC is ultimately adopted depends in no small measure how it originators address the concerns of India and the Asian nations. It is plausible that the current form of the CoC may not be able to accept amendment without substantially altering it. If that is the case, the EU and United States must resist the impulse to strong-arm these nations into otherwise adopting the CoC. Alternatively, if the concerns of India and other Asian nations cannot be addressed within the framework of the CoC, then the EU and the United States need to be prepared to consider measures other than the CoC to address security and cooperation in outer space.

Footnotes
1 Jeff Foust, “Debating a code of conduct for space”, The Space Review, March 7, 2011.

2 Michael Listner, “Update on the proposed European Code of Conduct”, The Space Review, August 8, 2011.

3 Dr. Rajeswari Rajagopalan, Debate on Space Code of Conduct: An Indian Perspective, Observer Research Foundation, ORF Occasional Paper #26, October 2011.

4 “Codes of Conduct in Space: Considering the Impact of the EU Code on U.S. Security in Space.”, George Marshall Institute, February 4, 2011.

5 Michael Listner, “TCBMs: A New Definition and New Role for Outer Space Security”, Defense Policy.Org, July 7, 2011.

6 Dean Cheng, “Five Myths About China’s Space Program”, The Heritage Foundation, September 29, 2011.

7 Michael Listner, “A bilateral approach from maritime law to prevent incidents in space”, The Space Review, February 16, 2009.

Shared Goals, Converging Interests: A Plan for U.S.-Australia-India Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific: A Joint Report from Heritage, Lowy & ORF

2011-11-04T14:13:00.007+05:30

Here's a quick synopsis of "Shared Goals, Converging Interests: A Plan for U.S.-Australia-India Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific" is a joint project report from the Heritage Foundation, the Lowy Institute for International Policy and the ORF, launched at the Lowy today and going to be launched at the ORF on November 07. The report has six authors -- Lisa Curtis, Walter Lohman, Rory Medcalf, Lydia Powell, Andrew Shearer -- including me.

The U.S., Australia, and India face common challenges and opportunities in the Indo-Pacific region that are defined by their shared values and interests. These include sea-lane security, counterterrorism, nonproliferation, among others. A formal trilateral dialogue gives these three countries an opportunity to understand and act together to address current and future challenges more effectively. Such an attempt to arrive at a mutual understanding of each others' concerns will help promote the Indo-Pacific as an area conducive to economic and political stability, security, free and open trade and democratic governance.

For the full report, click here.

Debate on Space Code of Conduct: An Indian Perspective

2011-10-28T19:41:00.003+05:30

ORF has published my Occasional Paper on the Space Code of Conduct Debate: An Indian Perspective.

Clearly there is a need to frame a code that is acceptable to all space-faring nations and India is all for setting norms of behaviour. However, whether India should get on board the EU Code -- a code that has been developed with no consultation of India or any other spacefaring nation-- is an issue. This Paper assesses the concerns of Asian countries, especially India, on the code proposed by the European Union while analysing India's options in this regard.

For the full report, click here.

China Walks the US-India Space-Based Solar Power Dream

2011-09-21T23:11:00.004+05:30

Here's a link to the analysis on how China walks the US-India space-based solar power dream, written by Rahul and me for the ORF.

While India and the US make pledges about potential collaboration on space, others walk those promises and potentials. In the India-US context, space has remained a potential area of cooperation for the last decade or so whereas China, which has studied the Indo-US joint communications carefully, has made fast progress on space-based solar power (SBSP), in terms of devoting financial and human resources into the project.

The need of the hour is for democracies like India, US and may be even Japan to come together, structure large collaborations around space and capture the political space in this regard. The political leadership in both India and the US should recognise the importance of it and act accordingly before it is too late.

Recognising the spin-off benefits of space-based solar power, China recently unveiled a plan to build and orbit a solar power station for commercial use by 2040. The Chinese plan drawn by one of its space pioneers Wang Xiji is an ambitious one and aims to look at various aspects of space-based solar power applications, designs and key technologies that would make the option economically feasible in the first instance and sustainable by 2020. Detailing the research conducted by the China Academy of Sciences, Wang said at the fourth China Energy Environment Summit Forum: "The development of solar power station in space will fundamentally change the way in which people exploit and obtain power. Whoever takes the lead in the development and utilization of clean and renewable energy and the space and aviation industry will be the world leader."

Given China's rising energy requirements, it is imperative that Beijing look at alternate sources of energy to meet its enormous demand. By 2050, it is estimated that China would have an energy gap of approximately 10.5 percent which it would seek to fill in by exploring alternate sources of energy such as fusion and space power stations. Also, the greenhouse gas emissions and climate change considerations have become serious enough concerns for the international community. These factors have also pushed Beijing to invest more in low-carbon energy sources. SBSP is possibly on top of the options list for China given the safety concerns vis-à-vis nuclear energy, particularly after the Fukushima crisis. According to the China Academy of Space Technology (CAST), the Solar Power Satellites (SPS) and solar power applications will help China in sustaining its economic and social development, disaster prevention and mitigation and would also assist in retention of qualified personnel.

China has been working on this concept for several years with CAST spearheading its research work. After the initial feasibility report compiled by CAST, a concept design for the SPS was submitted to China's Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, which eventually gave the approval and funding for the design. According to CAST, the SPS development includes four parts - satellite launching, in-orbit construction/multi-agents, efficient conversion of solar energy and wireless transmission. Apart from the launch factor, an area where China has excelled significantly, other parts of the project will demand greater effort for development.

While China's lead in the SBSP could provide for a co-operative framework in Asia, the geopolitical realities and the inherent problems in Asia - competition, rivalry and mistrust - may hamper such collaboration in the near future.

Under such a scenario, there lies a strong imperative for India, the US and other like-minded democracies to come together and realise the SBSP utilisation dream. This will not only provide economic gains but also give a strategic advantage in the changing security environment in Asia. For India, such collaboration would meet its growing energy demand and provide other spinoff benefits like job creation and access to advanced technology, much-needed for sustaining India's growth story. It is estimated that India's energy requirements would double by 2030, making it imperative for it to explore other feasible options. Also, if India becomes a part of the process of realising the SBSP dream, it will augment India's position in Asia as well as the world as a responsible leader.

The political consensus for India and the US to collaborate in space already exists although it appears that each side has been leaving it to the other to take the initiative and materialise the potential. The US-India Agreement to establish an S&T Board and an endowment for research provides the apparatus needed for starting the SBSP research and development. This fund can finance a broad number of issues of mutual interest such as bio technology, advanced materials and nanotechnology science, clean energy technologies, basic space, atmospheric and earth science. SBSP easily fits into the sphere of issues supported by this fund. As far as other funding options are concerned, private sector companies on both sides have shown interest in exploring the SBSP option. US companies like Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman and Tata in India have shown positive signs. Other countries like Japan have also done considerable research in this field. Japan's Aerospace Exploration Agency has done decade-long research on SBSP in collaboration with high-end technological companies such as Mitsubishi. Collaboration among these countries would also facilitate funding for this ambitious project.

While China may not have developed the best model in terms of cost effectiveness, it will surely send out a strong message to the international community about China's capabilities in developing such technologies and its ambitions to become the global leader in space solar power harnessing. If China wins the race in developing SBSP as a feasible source of energy, which would meet the world's growing energy demand, it will result in huge economic and strategic gains for China.

It is now time for both India and the US to explore the opportunity seriously and not let prospects for cooperation remain only as prospects. Hopefully, the advent of China into the picture would give the much-needed push for both countries to actually start real-time development work on SBSP.

China's New Aircraft Carrier and How Does It Affect India?

2011-08-23T18:03:00.004+05:30

Here's the link to an article of mine on the new Chinese aircraft carrier published by ORF.

China's ability for air and sea power projection in its neighbourhood is significant and growing, and its first aircraft carrier is another indicator. The carrier would provide China the ability to project its power even farther.

Earlier this month, the PLA Navy (PLAN) began the sea trials of its first aircraft carrier, the refurbished Varyag. Senior Colonel Li Xiaoyan, a member of China's first warship academy class in 1987, is set to command the ship while three other officers have been appointed as Deputy Captains. Besides there are seven other senior officers who have reportedly undergone training at the Guangzhou Naval Academy since 2008 and dispatched to Varyag in December 2010. Li has been chosen as the commander given that he is one of the first who could both pilot aircraft and sail warships.

While details are still awaited, a picture
available of the aircraft carrier also does not reveal much. However, it seems in line with what Can Weidong of the PLA Navy's Academic Research Institute had said, that it will be a "conventionally powered medium-sized carrier that would be equipped with Chinese engines, aircraft, radar and other hardware."

What is likely to be the utility of aircraft carrier to China? Does it enhance Chinese security significantly? And, how does the Varyag impact upon Indian interests or the larger Asian security framework?

Varyag, a Soviet-era carrier not very old, relative to other carriers, was bought from Ukraine in 1998 and underwent serious rework and refitting at a shipyard in Dalian in Liaoning Province. While there was no doubt that China will have its own aircraft carrier, the world has gone wrong in their assessments as far as the timeline was concerned. Many of the western assessments had calculated that Beijing will have its first carrier by 2012 or so. However, today the aircraft carrier is only undergoing initial sea trials, possibly checking the engines (it is not clear yet whether it uses the gas turbine, steam turbine or marine diesel engine. China does not yet have indigenous gas or steam turbine production capabilities and it is not believed to have procured these engines from foreign sources.), navigation equipment, electronics fire control and maintenance operations. But they are a long way away from carrying fighter jets. It is no surprise because no aircraft carrier carries planes on such early trials. It will be years before they have a carrier battle group comprising a consolidated group of frigates, destroyers, submarines and other accessories.

What does an aircraft carrier mean for China? Aircraft carriers have significant utility in enforcing sea control and sea denial strategies given the importance of air power superiority in combat, especially for power projection purposes. Having an aircraft carrier in its armoury does not mean much as yet and China is years away from being capable of even effective sea denial strategy in the East Asian region. However, as a rising power, China will possess such capabilities and more in the future. If there are no serious hitches, the PLAN plans to induct the carrier into service by October 2012, though this sounds ambitious.

China's plans to induct an aircraft carrier is in perfect alignment with the assertive naval posturing that it has been displaying vis a vis its neighbours in the recent years - be it the East China Sea or the South China Sea. In fact, aircraft carrier would provide Beijing with what it apparently sees as the coercive means for enforcing its claims in these two seas. Reportedly, a Chinese defence ministry-run website made it clear to say that the carrier should handle territorial disputes as well. A PLA Daily article too noted that in a theatre like the South China Sea, the strategic manoeuvre that is possible with a carrier would provide them the ability to apply significant air-to-ground firepower during military missions, while not being affected by geographical restrictions. They in fact see the aircraft carrier as a "mobile maritime airport." Chinese strategists believe that such kind of "deterrent" abilities would be important in defending the high seas as well as the coastal waters.

The timing is curious too. They flight-tested their stealth fighter during the US Defence Secretary's visit; and this time they decided to conduct the aircraft carrier sea trials around the same time as US Vice President Joe Biden's visit. It is unclear if this is a coincidence or a signal to the US.

What does the Chinese aircraft carrier mean for India and other neighbours? In the first place, it would induce caution in other maritime powers in the region, particularly India, US and Japan. China's submarine force already has produced this effect on these powers; the aircraft carrier would compound it.

As for the Southeast Asian countries, the Chinese aircraft carrier would be a display of power and prestige. In fact, a PLA Daily article said that the aircraft carrier has far greater political significance than military significance. This is particularly important given that until a few years back, the PLAN was the weakest wing of the Chinese military. But this has changed now with greater attention in favour of the naval and air wing of the military. China believes that aircraft carriers are important if they want to be able to control the air and have effective presence in areas that may be away from its territorial limits. Display of power and prestige is important both for the internal and external audiences.

Analysts have talked about China's ability to conduct anti-submarine warfare against Indian nuclear submarines although it is too early to judge this yet. However, China's ability for air and sea power projection in its neighbourhood is significant and growing, and the aircraft carrier is another indicator. The carrier would provide China the ability to project its power even farther. China has already begun anti-piracy operations off the waters of Somalia and refuelling in the Karachi port. An aircraft carrier would provide them far greater options in the near future.

How to Deal with China -- A Viewpoint from India ... my OpEd in yesterday's Mainichi daily ....

2011-08-07T13:01:00.003+05:30

Here's my OpEd, "How to Deal with China-A View Point from India" in yesterday's morning edition of Mainichi Daily (Japanese).

Type rest of the post here

India and U.S. Talk About Space - But Not On The Right Frequency

2011-07-27T18:10:00.004+05:30

Here's an anaysis on the recent U.S.-India strategic dialogue from the space perspective ... citing me. The link is also available at Space Today.

U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton was welcomed warmly in India on
what may well be her final trip there as a senior U.S. government
official. From a space perspective, assuming a more productive outcome
was somehow achievable, this trip never reached its intended orbit. It
never even came close.

For example, in her lengthy column in The Pioneer - "India-US display
space blindness" - Dr. Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, a senior fellow
at the Observer Research Foundation, made her unhappiness about this
lost opportunity in this instance quite clear.

She lamented that no clear goal, no bilateral funding, and certainly,
no new public-private partnerships were forged. She identified several
"cutting edge areas" where cooperation could occur including "space
access, in-space maneuver, space logistics, space infrastructure, etc."
Any chance for job creation was lost in the process, she said.

And she concluded as well that what is needed is, "another big idea to
steer the relationship and take it to the next level." Space
cooperation never surfaced as a viable option, however.

See

http://www.dailypioneer.com/355193/India-US-display-space-blindness.html

A U.S. Department of State fact sheet entitled, "U.S.-India Science,
Technology and Innovation Cooperation" tried to put a positive spin on
the situation.

See-
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/07/168740.htm

"Space"

"Indian Space Research Organization: The United States and India are
committed to building closer ties in space exploration, space science
and earth observation. Both countries are dedicated to using their
space programs to expand the frontiers of scientific knowledge and
produce tangible benefits for their populations. The removal of Indian
Space Research Organization (ISRO) and subordinate agencies from the
Entities List in February 2011 marked a significant step in eliminating
remaining barriers to greater cooperation in space exploration and
research.

"Civil Space Working Group: By exchanging and utilizing satellite-based
scientific data about the Earth, its climate, weather, and geophysical
features, the United States and India are working together to share
information on tropical weather, monsoon forecasting and climate
change. At the July 13-14 Civil Space Working Group, the two countries
took steps towards their cooperation in this area by concluding
substantive discussion on Oceansat-II and Megha-Tropiques missions,
which will help the countries refine scientific models and improve
understanding of global weather patterns."

The India-US joint statement issued in New Delhi on July 19 mentioned
the session held by the US – India Joint Space Working Group on Civil
Space Cooperation in Bangalore.

"Building on the successful Chandrayan-1 lunar mission, NASA and ISRO
reviewed potential areas for future cooperation in earth observation,
space exploration, space sciences and satellite navigation. Both sides
agreed for early finalization three new implementing arrangements for
sharing satellite data on oceans and global weather patterns.
Recognising the research opportunities available on the International
Space Station, both sides agreed to explore the possibilities of joint
experiments. NASA reiterated its willingness to discuss potential
cooperation with ISRO on human spaceflight activities. The two sides
also agreed to expand upon previous work in the area of global
navigation satellite systems (GNSS) with the goal of promoting
compatibility and interoperability between the US Global Positioning
System, India’s Navigation systems, and those of other countries."

Keep in mind that during her speech at the Anna Centenary Library in
Chennai, Sec. Clinton knew full well that here reference to "deepening
our defense cooperation" could soon swing the door wide open as far as
the U.S. space connection to India's Defence Research and Development
Organisation (DRDO) is concerned, although someone has to unlock the
door first.

Was it merely a coincidence that at the start of the very same day,
India elected to test-fire one of its newest shorter range, tactical
missiles known as the `Prahaar', and that Defence Minister AK Antony
sent his congratulations to the DRDO before Sec. Clinton stepped to the
podium? Perhaps.

Otherwise, the overall timing of this trip was simply not right for any major announcements regarding U.S. - Indian space relations.

Was it because the ASEAN Regional Forum was looming? No, the U.S. and China were both navigating carefully already anyway, and aside from a few rhetorical salvos, no U.S. attempt to bolster India's standing in space would have proven too disruptive to those talks.

What about Sec. Clinton's mention of the inauguration of a trilateral
U.S.-India-Japan dialogue in Chennai? Sure, this could yield profound
consequences in space, but here again, the realities of the Indian
nuclear deals represent an enormous counterweight.

In the end, no pressing foreign policy concerns along with the latest U.S. attempts to outmaneuver the Chinese at sea are are not what probably caused the Obama administration to ease back on the throttle here. India's nuclear sector was not the determining factor either.

In fact, Indian commentators generally overlooked the state of disarray permeating the U.S. space sector as a whole. As thousands of U.S. space workers at NASA and major space contractors were being handed pink slips, President Obama in his quest for a second term no doubt did not think it to be a wise idea to be seen as someone who was crafting an aggressive space partnering campaign with India - placing even more American jobs in jeopardy. One might argue that so what given that President Obama has no supporters left in the U.S, space sector today, but that is simply not true.

So, did domestic political considerations shape the relatively sparse menu of space offerings in this instance? This cannot be dismissed altogether.

On the other hand, India might want to weigh the possible repercussions of what NASA was undertaking on the ISS as well. One of the best American commentators active in the "New Space" sector issued a cautionary note this past week, something that readers and space planners in India and elsewhere simply cannot ignore.

In his latest newsletter, Charles Lurio included a section on,
"Refueling Experiment and Issues of Commercialization"

See

http: www.thelurioreport.com

Lurio outlined how the “Robotic Refueling Mission” (RRM) which was
carried aloft by the last Shuttle flight earlier this month includes an
“activity board” designed for use by the Canadian-built “Dextre”
robotic system which is already aboard the ISS.

See -
http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/station/research/experiments/
RRM.html.

Lurio proceeds to highlight the RRM's testing of technology and
procedures required for refueling, “even [of] satellites not designed
to be serviced.”

So on top of everything else, as India emphasizes its heavy rockets,
and lays the groundwork for Indian launchers to be adorned with
countless new large payloads, NASA stands ready to extend the life of
the entire space infrastructure not just GEOs - we are only talking
about roughly 290 GEO satellites on station today - and restructuring
the entire satellite food chain in the process.

Sorry, but what went on during this trip - that is the last Shuttle
mission to the ISS with the RRM aboard - might end up exerting far more
influence on the Indian space sector in the years to come than Sec.
Clinton's final mission to India.

India's solution in the face of these and other variables could be to
react accordingly - forego partnerships promised but not secured while
innovating like crazy - adapting again to a new set of challenges.

Space remains an area of promises without an actionable agenda ....

2011-07-27T16:55:00.004+05:30

In a recent story in Space News, I was cited ... rather my argument as to why space has not gained traction between India and the United States as yet. This is one area with tremendous potential and least controversies although it has remained an area with lot of promises.

Space cooperation represents an enormous opportunity to strengthen ties between the United States and India, but neither side appears to recognize this potential, Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan writes in a July 22 op-ed in India’s Pioneer newspaper.

A joint statement at the conclusion of recent talks in Bangalore failed to produce what was needed, she writes: “a bilateral 21st century commercial space initiative or a Space Knowledge Initiative, thereby making space an attractive proposition for entrepreneurs.”

“India and the US need to be more innovative and visionary and identify cutting edge areas to cooperate,” writes Rajagopalan, a senior fellow at the Observer Research Foundation. “There are plenty of candidates: areas like space access, in-space maneuver, space logistics, space infrastructure, etc. This would have several spin-off effects in terms of creating a human resource pool well-versed in dealing with future challenges.”

Why is India Shy of Playing Geo-strategic Games?

2011-07-27T16:29:00.004+05:30

Here's an analysis of mine on the recent (Indian) MOD decision not to send Indian Army Chief for the Pacific meet of Army Chiefs in Singapore, published by ORF. Indian decision-makers appear to live in splendid isolation and do not recognise the importance of meetings like the Pacific Army Chiefs Conference. These meetings have become more institutionalised and are likely to gain greater momentum.

Indian Army Chief General VK Singh should have been in Singapore this week for a meeting of the Army Chiefs from all the Pacific countries. The meeting, the biennial Pacific Army Chiefs Conference sponsored by the U.S. Pacific Command (July 28-31, 2011), would have been an ideal platform for army chiefs in the region to start conversations outside of formal meetings. It is reported that Pakistan and China are represented by their respective army chiefs; so is the case with almost all other invited and participating countries. So far, there is a confirmed participation of around 23 Army Chiefs whereas India has decided to stick to its earlier policy of sending only Vice Chief to attend the Conference (the only exception was in 2009 when Army Chief Gen. Kapoor had attended). This also raises the protocol issue as to how and whether other army chiefs would meet and have meaningful meetings with the Indian Army Vice Chief.

Indian decision-makers appear to live in splendid isolation and do not recognise the importance of such meetings that have become more institutionalised and are likely to gain greater momentum over time. Intentionally or otherwise, India is clearly losing out on opportunities and opportunities don't come knocking every day.

Is India averse to accepting a leadership role in Asia and beyond? On the one hand, we cry hoarse for a UN Security Council seat, but on the other we are not even willing to be part of new forums and initiatives in Asia that are gaining strength year after year. In fact, the Indian leadership ought to recognize that traditional alliances and partnerships have almost entirely been replaced by the new floating partnerships, based on issues rather than any permanent interests. One good illustration is the role of China on the North Korean nuclear issue. China has become the "interlocutor" for the outside world to engage with Pyongyang. While there is no dearth of conflictual issues between China and the U.S., Washington has understood the game, as it deals with the North Korean imbroglio. Therefore, India has to recognise that it has to become part of these regional groupings and forums if it wants to play a meaningful role in Asia and beyond. A revamp of Indian thinking in dealing with the external world has become urgent if India wants to play a greater global role.

Why is the Singapore forum important? As mentioned earlier, it provides a platform for bilateral and multilateral engagements with a region that is of critical importance. Some of the Southeast Asian countries appear to be more keen today than India is in deepening its engagement with the region. The Vietnamese leadership, for instance, has been arguing for a closer partnership with India; in fact, members of the military or civilian defence bureaucracy have visited India, in an effort to bring New Delhi closer to Hanoi. They are reported to have offered India Vietnamese naval base for use although India is yet to take a decision on it.1 It appears that India is yet again willing to lose an opportunity. Take the case of Hambantota Port development project in Sri Lanka. It was first offered to India by Sri Lanka. After getting no positive response, Sri Lanka went ahead and offered it to China. However till date, India holds it against the Sri Lankan leadership as a hostile move on the part of Colombo. India has to recognize that it has to get its act together and become more responsive and responsible if it does not want to lose crucial strategic space in Asia.

Unless India is willing to come out of the cocoon and adapt itself to the changing geostrategic games, New Delhi can forget about taking a seat at the high table. Indian leadership should also be reminded that it will be forced to take hard decisions once they assume positions of power. As a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, India is already confronted with difficult choices. So, it may be good to check whether it would like to be in a such position or is it going to be happily contended staying just as another South Asian nation.

1 For the Vietnamese offer, see Malcolm Moore and Praveen Swami, "Vietnam Offers Navy Base to Foil China," The Telegraph (U.K.), November 08, 2010, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/vietnam/8116192/Vietnam-offers-navy-base-to-foil-China.html. As part of the deal, India is to assist Vietnamese Army in jungle warfare.

WPS on the US-India Strategic Dialogue, citing me ....

2011-07-25T11:36:00.007+05:30

Here's the OpEd written by Dr. WP Sidhu on the recently concluded second US-India Strategic Dialogue, citing me. Space is a relatively non-controversial area for the two countries to step up their cooperation .... However, despite the intent on both sides, space remains an area of promises and no hard decisions.

The recently concluded Indo-US dialogue—only the second—reflects both a deepening and widening of the bilateral engagement. What used to be rare high level visits have now become routine and, to a degree, predictable. At the same time the range of issues being discussed have enlarged to include cooperation on counterterrorism, cyber security, open government, space, peacekeeping, food security in Africa and even women’s empowerment.

Predictably, there has been a focus on the most contentious issues, notably over the differences related to the Indo-US nuclear cooperation and the troublesome state of Pakistan. However, it is important to note that in the absence of such a dialogue these difficult issues would have continued to fester; the regular meetings provides a forum to at least talk through these. Indeed, it is inevitable that even a strategic dialogue is likely to focus on immediate issues of concern partly because they are unavoidable and partly because they have strategic implications. To that extent, because the dialogue focused on the most immediate concerns it was to a degree successful at least at the tactical level.

At the strategic level, however, neither New Delhi nor Washington appears to be any closer to answering the critical question: where would they like to see this strategic partnership 50 years from now? Once the two sides have reached a common understanding a related question would be: how to get there? Given the ongoing internal, regional and international transformation these are difficult questions for either India or the US to answer, although Washington might have a better sense of its objective.

Clearly, to be truly effective a strategic dialogue must focus on at least one or two grand long-term ideas which are mutually beneficial, along with the other issues that now make up the agenda. The nuclear deal was the big idea of the previous decade. However, the growing obsession by both sides over the divergences on this issue has the potential to weaken if not derail the strategic dialogue.

Today, with the last flight of the US space shuttle, which coincided with the strategic dialogue, there is a real opportunity to develop an ambitious Indo-US civil space cooperation programme; an idea first floated by Indian and American scholars a few years ago and further developed by Indian expert Rajeshwari Pillai Rajagopalan recently. Although the space shuttle was a technical marvel —losing only two ships in its 30-year and 135-flight history—it was also incredibly expensive. According to one estimate, while each flight was advertised to cost around $10 million, in reality it worked out to about $1.2 billion per flight. In contrast, the Indian space programme despite being far more frugal has also notched up some incredible achievements. The discovery of water on the moon by the Indian spacecraft Chandrayaan-1 is one such accomplishment. It also underlines that unmanned missions are probably a more efficient (if less glamorous) way to explore and develop space. Interestingly, Hillary Clinton’s last stop in Chennai, where she exhorted India to be more ambitious and assertive, is also the source of some of Nasa’s best scientists and technicians. It would have provided the ideal setting to announce a commercial space initiative, similar to the agricultural knowledge initiative.

Indeed, of the various joint working groups that make up the Indo-US strategic dialogue, the joint space working group has probably been the least ambitious. Instead of a bold cooperative initiative it merely agreed to sharing satellite data on oceans and global weather patterns; explore the possibilities of joint experiments on the International Space Station; and discuss potential cooperation between Nasa and Isro on human spaceflight activities.

It is imperative for both sides to seize the opportunity to make the dialogue truly strategic and space may prove to be the final frontier.

W. Pal Sidhu is senior fellow, Centre on International Cooperation at New York University. He writes on strategic affairs every fortnight.

India-US display space blindness

2011-07-23T16:15:00.004+05:30

Here's the link to an article of mine on the US-India Strategic Dialogue, looking at a space angle, published in today's Pioneer.

Substantive issues were evidently avoided at the Clinton-Krishna talks, otherwise what could explain the lack of interest on both sides to take forward the old idea of cooperation in space? Wasn't it less controversial than the nuclear deal?

The US-India Joint Space Working Group (JWG) on civil space cooperation concluded their talks in Bangalore last week. In terms of concrete steps, the two sides have agreed to work together for sharing information on monsoon forecasting by exchanging and using satellite-based scientific data. This, along with other areas highlighted during the JWG meeting, has been included in the Joint Statement at the end of the second US-India Strategic Dialogue.

But, in most other respects, the US-India Strategic Dialogue, appears to have produced no big ideas for carrying forward the relationship. The joint statement issued at the end of the dialogue focuses on, among other things, the new US-India Dialogue on Central Asia, acknowledging particularly the importance of it in the context of better trade and transit linkages that might contribute to the long-term well-being of Afghanistan; strengthening of defence ties through transfer of technology, joint research, development and production of defence items; US' support for India's membership into the four technology export control regimes - Nuclear Suppliers Group, Missile Technology Control Regime, Australia Group and the Wassennaar Arrangement; and the bilateral initiatives on clean energy options including solar energy, energy-efficient buildings and advanced bio-fuels.

The Joint Statement also included a paragraph on space, with the two sides agreeing to cooperate on a number of areas such as sharing satellite data on oceans and global weather patterns, joint experiments, earth observation, space exploration and so on.

The statement has been along expected lines. Despite its huge potential and almost no controversy, Indo-US space cooperation has not moved to concrete actionable agenda yet. The need of the hour was to introduce a bilateral 21st century commercial space initiative or a Space Knowledge Initiative, thereby making space an attractive proposition for entrepreneurs. Such an initiative would have made space a commercially and strategically sustainable area in India-US relations. The two sides should have had a clear goal along with bilateral funding. Subsequently, it could have been made into a good case for public-private partnership. The Agricultural Knowledge Initiative is often cited as a good example of public-private partnership.

India and the US need to be more innovative and visionary and identify cutting edge areas to cooperate. There are plenty of candidates: areas like space access, in-space maneuver, space logistics, space infrastructure, etc. This would have several spin-off effects in terms of creating a human resource pool well-versed in dealing with future challenges. The spin-off benefits in terms of job creation would have become an attractive proposition for the two countries given the domestic pressure.

India and the US should have ideally produced a joint statement that would have laid out a long-term plan with near and mid-term milestones -- such as monitoring non-traditional security threats including human security issues by studying the environment and oceans, with a roadmap for constructing a space-based sensors constellation. They could have considered a technology demonstration programme for making space-based solar power a technologically viable option or endorsed the goals of the Kalam-NSS initiative and IAA study, calling for the establishment of a working group toward an on-orbit demo of an international space-solar power demonstrator satellite within 10 years, with both Delhi and Washington pledging $1bn over the next 10 years towards. Lastly, the two sides could have established a US-India Space Knowledge / Commercial Initiative. This would have required the two governments making an investment of about $40-50mn over a five-year period while identifying specific projects for this time span.

Lastly, Indo-US relations have been drifting along for sometime now and it is time that the two sides identified another big idea to steer the relationship and take it to the next level. Space cooperation clearly has the potential to play this role. But clearly, its potential has yet to be recognized on either side.

US-India Strategic Dialogue: Lack of Vision in Space

2011-07-21T20:56:00.006+05:30

Here's an analysis of mine, published by ORF, on the recent US-India Strategic Dialogue, more from a space point of view.

India and the US need to be more innovative and visionary, and identify cutting edge areas to cooperate. There are plenty of candidates: areas like space access, in-space maneuver, space logistics, space infrastructure, in addition to developing new markets such as space tourism, on-orbit construction and manufacture, terrestrial resource mapping, space resource and energy utilization, space traffic management and active debris mitigation, to name a few.

The US-India Joint Space Working Group (JWG) on civil space cooperation concluded their talks in Bangalore last week. In terms of concrete steps, the two sides have agreed to work together for sharing information on tropical weather, monsoon forecasting by exchanging and using satellite-based scientific data about the Earth, weather, geophysical features. These are by no means the most exciting areas of cooperation on space. This as well as other areas highlighted during the JWG meeting have been included in the Joint Statement at the end of the second US-India Strategic Dialogue which ended on Tuesday evening.

The Strategic Dialogue appears to have produced no big ideas for carrying forward the relationship. The Joint Statement focuses on, among other things, the new US-India Dialogue on Central Asia, acknowledging particularly the importance of it in the context of better trade and transit linkages that might contribute to the long-term well-being of Afghanistan; strengthening of defence ties through transfer of technology, joint research, development and production of defence items; US' support for India's membership into the four technology export control regimes - Nuclear Suppliers Group, Missile Technology Control Regime, Australia Group and the Wassennaar Arrangement; and the bilateral initiatives on clean energy options including solar energy, energy-efficient buildings and advanced bio-fuels.

The statement has been along expected lines. Despite huge potentiality and almost no controversy -- unlike in the nuclear area -- Indo-US space cooperation has not moved to concrete actionable agenda yet. The statement clearly lacks much vision. It included a paragraph on space, with the two sides agreeing to cooperate on a number of areas such as sharing satellite data on oceans and global weather patterns, joint experiments, earth observation, space exploration and so on.

The need of the hour was to introduce a US-India 21st Century Commercial Space Initiative or a Space Knowledge Initiative, along the lines of the US-India Agricultural Knowledge Initiative and the US-India Clean Energy Initiative, making space an attractive proposition for entrepreneurs besides the strategic entities on either sides. Such an initiative would have made space a commercially and strategically sustainable area in India-US relations. The two sides should have had a clear goal along with bilateral funding. Subsequently, it could have been made into a good case for public-private partnership. The Agricultural Knowledge Initiative is often cited as a good example of public-private partnership.

India and the US need to be more innovative and visionary, and identify cutting edge areas to cooperate. There are plenty of candidates: areas like space access, in-space maneuver, space logistics, space infrastructure, in addition to developing new markets such as space tourism, on-orbit construction and manufacture, terrestrial resource mapping, space resource and energy utilization, space traffic management and active debris mitigation, to name a few. The two sides ought to make this into an economically sustainable option, and create a strategic industry around space to make it sustainable in the long-term. This would have several spin-off effects in terms of creating a pool of human and scientific resources, well-versed in dealing with future challenges. The spin-off benefits in terms of job creation would have become an attractive proposition for the two countries, given the domestic pressure.

India and the US should have ideally produced a joint statement that would have laid out a long-term plan with near and mid-term milestones -- such as monitoring non-traditional security threats, including human security issues by studying the environment and oceans, with a roadmap for constructing a space-based sensors constellation. They could have considered a technology demonstration programme for making space-based solar power a technologically viable option or endorsed the goals of the Kalam-NSS initiative and IAA study, calling for the establishment of a working group toward an on-orbit demo of an international space-solar power demonstrator satellite within 10 years, with both Delhi and Washington pledging $1bn over the next 10 years towards such a programme. Lastly, the two sides could have established a US-India Space Knowledge/Commercial Initiative. This would have required the two governments making an investment of about $40-50mn for a five-year period, while identifying specific projects for this time span.

Lastly, Indo-US relations have been drifting along for sometime now and it is time that the two sides identified another big idea to steer the relationship and take it to the next level. Space cooperation clearly has the potential to play this role. But clearly, its potential is yet to be recognized by either side.

Debates on Space Code of Conduct

2011-07-18T17:33:00.004+05:30

Here's an article by Michael Listner on space Code of Conduct issues published in Defense Policy. Dr. Listner cites me in the context of Asian debate on the Code.

TCBMs: A New Definition and New Role for Outer Space Security
July 7, 2011 by Michael Listner

Frank A. Rose, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance for the United States Department of State, recently participated as a panelist in “Defining Space Security for the 21st Century.” The panel, which convened on June 13, 2011, was part of the Space Security Through the Transatlantic Partnership Conference sponsored by the European Space Policy Institute and Prague Security Studies Institute, held June 12-14.

In his remarks, Mr. Rose discussed the diplomatic activities being pursued by the United States to enhance stability in outer space and as result its security. Specifically, Mr. Rose limited his remarks to the policy tools that the United States is considering, if not already using, to advance and to promote security and stability in outer space with an emphasis on the use of transparency and confidence-building measures (TCBMs). Mr. Rose noted the United States’ use of TCBMs through USSTRATCOM’s Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC) and its provision of notifications to the Russian Federation and the Peoples’ Republic of China regarding close approaches between satellites.

Mr. Rose also remarked that the United States is considering signing on to the European Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities (CoC) as part of its policy to strengthen stability and security in outer space. Mr. Rose further commented that the United States will be participating in the Group of Government Experts on Outer Space TCBMs in 2012. The Group of Government Experts, which was established by Resolutions 65/68 during the 65th session of the United Nations General Assembly, is anticipated by the United States to serve as a positive mechanism to examine voluntary and pragmatic TCBMs in space to remedy concrete problems presented in space stability and security. Ironically, or perhaps by design, Mr. Rose’s remarks concerning the use of TCBMs come one week after Huang Huikang, director of the Department of Treaty and Law in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the Peoples’ Republic of China addressed the 54th session of United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) on June 5th, where he spoke about China’s space policy. In his address, he noted the importance of space law as an important instrument for safeguarding the peaceful use of outer space.

While not mentioning the PRC’s defense policy or the PPWT in particular, Huang also noted that space law is important for the prevention of the weaponization of space, thus intimating that space stability and security can be achieved only through an expansion of the current legal regime for outer space. The approach of the United States policy and that of the PRC towards space stability are diametrically opposite and should provide an interesting dichotomy when the Group of Government Experts meets next year to consider the role of TCBMs should play in space activities.

Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures
Transparency and confidence-building measures (TCBMs) are part of the legal and institutional framework supporting military threat reductions and confidence-building among nations. They have been recognized by the United Nations as mechanisms that offer transparency, assurances and mutual understanding amongst states and they are intended to reduce misunderstandings and tensions. They also promote a favorable climate for effective and mutually acceptable paths to arms reductions and non-proliferation. The General Assembly at its 73rd plenary meeting on December 7, 1988 endorsed the guidelines for TCBMs decided upon by the Commission on Disarmament on December 12, 1984.

TCBMs have been used extensively for the purpose of arms control and specifically in the arena of nuclear weapons. However, when applied to space activities TCBMs can address other space activities outside of those performed for by the military or for those performed for national security reasons. While TCBMs promote transparency and assurance between states, they do not have the legal force of treaties and states entering into them are bound only by a code of honor to abide by the terms of the instrument. By their nature TCBMs are considered a “top-down” approach to addressing issues. They are not intended to supplant disarmament accords but rather to be a stepping stone to legally enforceable instruments.

Redefining TCBMs for outer space activities
TCBMs as envisioned by the United States provide the Obama Administration with a diplomatic and policy tool that it can utilize to unilaterally project its foreign policy agenda without interference from Congress and in particular the Senate. With the loss of the majority in the House of Representatives and a greatly diminished majority in the Senate, the Obama Administration is faced with a less than favorable political environment to propose a treaty such as the PPWT. TCBMs give the Administration an alternative to side-step political impediments to pursue its foreign policy objectives in place of an actual treaty in regards to outer space stability and security.The position set forth by the United States regarding the use of TCBMs does not coincide with the traditional view and use of TCBMs. Per the National Space Policy, the United States is seeking to enter into TCBMs to define space activity and conduct as an alternative to entering into legally binding treaties.

This approach to TCBMs was articulated by Paula Desutter when discussing the implications of the United States signing onto the CoC. Ms. Desutter remarked that the CoC was preferable to the draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects (PPWT) proposed by the Russian Federation and the Peoples’ Republic of China. She noted that the CoC could provide an alternative approach and vehicle to ensuring space security and stability that could undermine or ultimately lead to the demise of the PPWT. If this is the tack that the United States intends to take at next year’s meeting of the Group of Government Experts, then it will meet opposition from several constituencies.

The PRC and the Russian Federation will certainly oppose as they have in the past any form of TCBMs that are not linked to some sort of arms control agreement such as the proposed PPWT. The Russian Federation in particular has noted that TCBMs have been used in the past to address issues relating to space activities, and that it has used unilateral TCBMs itself in regards to notifications of launches and the pledge not to be the first to deploy space weapons. The Russian Federation has stated it will likely continue to support the use of TCBMs to lay the ground work for adoption of the PPWT and that the adoption of the PPWT would be the most important confidence-building measure in outer space.

If reaction by Asia-Pacific nations to the proposed CoC is any indicator, the United States could also find opposition from other space-faring nations in that region. Open-source material criticizing the CoC suggests that India might object to the United States’ approach to space security and stability. Dr. Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan’s, a Senior Fellow in Security Studies at the Observer Research Foundation remarked on whether India should endorse the CoC. Dr. Rajagopalan notes in her critique of the CoC that the European Council did not consult Asian nations while drafting the instrument, and that while the Coc is voluntary, its mandate for states to establish national policies and procedures to mitigate the potential for accidents in space could be seen as intrusive. She further critiqued that the voluntary nature of the CoC would preclude any penalty on states violating the norms within. Similarly, some of the concerns voiced by Dr. Rajagopalan could be expressed by India and other nations within the Asia-Pacific region concerning the use of TCBMs with the most prominent being their lack of enforceability and verification.
The United States will also find opposition from the non-space faring nations. The United States is portrayed as the neighborhood bully when it comes to matters of international security, especially in the realm of outer space security, and the realities of soft politics will ensure that will not change anytime soon. Attempts to address the issue of space security and stability via TCBMs as proposed by the United States will be met with suspicion by non-space faring nations and the delegation from the PRC and Russian Federation will likely stoke that dissension.

Conclusion
The use of TCBMs in place of treaties may not be the ideal diplomatic solution to deal with the issue of space security and stability. However, until such time that a reliably verifiable and workable treaty is introduced that can pass Congressional muster, the use of TCBMs are a prudent course for the United States to take to address the issue of stability and security in outer space while simultaneously preserving its national security interests in that realm. Only time will tell whether this approach will ultimately be embraced or rejected by space faring and non-space faring nations alike.

REFERENCES
Defining Space Security for the 21st Century, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance Remarks, United States Department of State, June 13, 2001.Stephen Clark, “Nearly 400 satellite crash notices sent to Russia, China”, Space Flight Now, June 15, 2011.Jeff Foust, “Debating a code of conduct for space”, The Space Review, March 7, 2011.
Liu Gang, “Building harmonious outer space to achieve inclusive development: Chinese diplomat”, Xinhua, June 5, 2011.
Andrey Makarov, Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures: Their Place and Role in Space Security, Security in Space: The Next Generation-Conference Report, 31, March-1 April 2008, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), 2008.
U.N. General Assembly, 43rd Session, 1988, Guidelines for confidence-building measures (A/43/78H).
George C. Marshall Institute, “Codes of Conduct in Space: Considering the Impact of the EU Code of Conduct on U.S. Security in Space”, February 4, 2011.
The Value of Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures – Next Steps, Statement by V.L.Vasiliev, Deputy Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation, at the UNIDIR Conference on Space Security 2010, Geneva, 29 March 2010.
Dr. Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, “Establishing Rules of the Road in Space: Issues and Challenges”, Observer Research Foundation, May 6, 2011.

U.S.-India Strategic Dialogue: "Sky's No Limit" for Space

2011-07-18T16:36:00.005+05:30

Here's an article of mine published by ORF on US-India space cooperation.

With the nuclear deal over, New Delhi and Washington need another big idea to power the relationship over the next several years. Space cooperation has the potential for being that next big idea.

US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton will be arriving in Delhi on Monday (July 18) for the second U.S.-India Strategic Dialogue. This strategic dialogue is crucial because there is an increasing concern that the U.S.-India partnership is beginning to lose its way. In Washington, there is significant disappointment on a number of issues including India’s nuclear liabilities bill, which for all practical purposes prevents the US nuclear industry from participating in India’s civilian nuclear sector; and the Indian decision to reject two American competitors from the Indian Air Force’s lucrative Medium Multi Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) deal. In Delhi, on the other hand, there is unhappiness at what is seen as American pressure for greater defence cooperation. These issues suggest that all is not well with US-India relations.

With the nuclear deal over, New Delhi and Washington need another big idea to power the relationship over the next several years. Without such a political initiative at the highest levels, U.S.-India relations threaten once again to wallow in bureaucratic inertia. Space cooperation has the potential for being that next big idea.

Nearly two years back, Karl F. Inderfurth, former U.S. Assistant Secretary of Statefor South Asia Affairs, and C. Raja Mohan, prominent Indian foreign policy analyst, proposed in the pages of the Financial Times, London that space cooperation be kept at the heart of U.S.-India relations.

But though space cooperation has been an important item in the agenda between the two countries with almost all important bilateral documents proposing such cooperation, there has been little tangible movement on the issue. With the removal of most U.S. high-technology sanctions on Indian agencies, particularly on the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO), there are few obstacles to serious cooperation in this area.

Nevertheless, bland sentiments about cooperation are unlikely to bear fruit without tangible proposals. To begin with, the two governments should consider establishing a US-India 21st Century Commercial Space Initiative or a Space Knowledge Initiative, along the lines of the US-India Agricultural Knowledge Initiative and the US-India Clean Energy Initiative.

Space cooperation between the two countries has even greater potential. Space cooperation is likely to be much more visible than either energy or agriculture cooperation. And unlike the US-India nuclear deal, space cooperation is likely to garner domestic support in both countries and is likely to be less controversial internationally.

India’s Minister of Commerce and Industry, Anand Sharma, recently highlighted the successful US-India partnership in the area of clean energy. The initiative was also a successful model of public-private sector partnership, with the two governments investing $25 million each and the private sector investing $50 million.

There are a number of areas of space cooperation that Washington and Delhi can explore. While space exploration purely for the sake of science might be important, it is likely to be more sustainable when linked to building a strategic industry. US and India should focus building the underlying knowledge and skill base which can address many areas: space access, in-space maneuver, space logistics, space infrastructure, on-orbit servicing, developing new markets such as space tourism, on-orbit construction and manufacture, terrestrial resource mapping, space resource and energy utilization, space traffic management and active debris mitigation, among others.

India-U.S. space cooperation also has a potential for being much more broad-based than other areas such as nuclear or defense cooperation. Space cooperation can generate stakeholders across a wide-spectrum, from the national space agencies on both sides (NASA and ISRO), education and science and technology departments to universities as well as private commercial enterprises in both countries. In fact, space cooperation has the potential to go far beyond entities like ISRO and catalyse new strategic industries in space.

The two countries can elevate three strategic objectives through the space cooperation initiative: first, it provides an exciting investment area of space in the Indo-U.S. strategic partnership for Indian and American leaders to work on, which addresses STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics), jobs and high-tech cooperation in space. Second, it can catapult space-industrialisation and commercial space from the edge of the Indian and American national space paradigm to its forefront. Third, garner further resources for our own STEM in developing a future strategic industry.

Such an initiative could generate active participation and cooperation from public and private entities such as ANTRIX Corporation (India’s commercial wing of ISRO), the Chamber of Indian Industries (CII), Indo-U.S. S&T Fund, FICCI, USIBC, educational institutions such as IIT, IIM, IISc and on the U.S. side, FAA/SAT universities, USRA, NIRA, NASA/OCT Commercial, Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Space Enterprise Institute among others.

U.S.-India partnership has never been short of promise, but realising the potential needs grand vision. Much of the progress over the last decade has been the result of precisely such a vision in the form of the nuclear deal. The need now is for another grand vision that would ensure that the progress made so far is not jeopardised.

I thank Lt. Col. Peter Garretson of the US Air Force for collaborating and formulating many of the ideas in this analysis.

US' National Military Strategy 2011

2011-06-11T16:37:00.005+05:30

I should have got this post earlier ... better late than never. The US released its National Military Strategy (NMS) on February 08, 2011. The document, released by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, an update in seven years, has a lot of focus on Asia. This is no surprise given that this century is acknowledged as the Asian century. Asia is also at the centre for a variety of reasons -- economic growth, terrorism, proliferation of dangerous technologies or resource crunch or climate change woes.

Looking at Asia, detailed assessments and strategies are provided particularly for the war against terror in Afghanistan, the ongoing war in Iraq and China.

Asia has clearly overtaken Europe as the US priority area. The NMS states, "The Nation’s strategic priorities and interests will increasingly emanate from the Asia-Pacific region. The region's share of global wealth is growing, enabling increased military capabilities. This is causing the region’s security architecture to change rapidly, creating new challenges and opportunities for our national security and leadership. Though still underpinned by the US bilateral alliance system, Asia's security architecture is becoming a more complex mix of formal and informal multilateral relationships and expanded bilateral security ties among states."

The challenges faced in the domain of global commons -- air, sea, cyberspace -- is another area that has been paid sufficient attention in the NMS. It states, "Assured access to and freedom of maneuver within the global commons – shared areas of sea, air, and space – and globally connected domains such as cyberspace are being increasingly challenged by both state and non-state actors. States are developing anti-access and area-denial capabilities and strategies to constrain US and international freedom of action. These states are rapidly acquiring technologies, such as missiles and autonomous and remotely-piloted platforms that challenge our ability to project power from the global commons and increase our operational risk. Meanwhile, enabling and war-fighting domains of space and cyberspace are simultaneously more critical for our operations, yet more vulnerable to malicious actions. The space environment is becoming more congested, contested, and competitive. Some states are conducting or condoning cyber intrusions that foreshadow the growing threat in this globally connected domain." At the other end of it, "Non-state actors such as criminal organizations, traffickers, and terrorist groups find a nexus of interests in exploiting the commons."

As for the war against terror in Afghanistan, the NMS states, "The Nation’s strategic objective in this campaign is to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaida and its affiliates in Afghanistan and Pakistan and prevent their return to either country. Success requires the Joint Force to closely work with NATO, our coalition partners, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. We will continue to erode Taliban influence, work with the Afghan government to facilitate reintegration and reconciliation of former insurgents, continue to strengthen the capacity of Afghan security forces, and enable Pakistan to ultimately defeat al Qaida and its extremist allies." The document also notes that "The threat of violent extremism is not limited to South Central Asia. Groups such as Al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, al-Shabaab, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, and others emanate from Somalia, Yemen, and elsewhere around the globe. Terrorists’ abilities to remotely plan and coordinate attacks is growing, sometimes facilitated by global illicit trafficking routes, extending their operational reach while rendering targeting of their sanctuaries more difficult."

The NMS also notes while military strategy can be decisive, there has to be long-term viable strategies wherein "Military power complements economic development, governance, and rule of law – the true bedrocks of counterterrorism efforts. In the long run, violent ideologies are ultimately discredited and defeated when a secure population chooses to reject extremism and violence in favor of more peaceful pursuits."

On China, the NMS states the US objectives thus: "Our Nation seeks a positive, cooperative, and comprehensive relationship with China that welcomes it to take on a responsible leadership role. To support this, the Joint Force seeks a deeper military-to-military relationship with China to expand areas of mutual interest and benefit, improve understanding, reduce misperception, and prevent miscalculation. We will promote common interests through China’s cooperation in countering piracy and proliferation of WMD, and using its influence with North Korea to preserve stability on the Korean peninsula." Having said that, there are issues of concern such as the military modernisation and some of the evolving strategies which are not conducive for a stable Asia. The NMS details to say, "We will continue to monitor carefully China’s military developments and the implications those developments have on the military balance in the Taiwan Strait. We remain concerned about the extent and strategic intent of China’s military modernization, and its assertiveness in space, cyberspace, in the Yellow Sea, East China Sea, and South China Sea. To safeguard U.S. and partner nation interests, we will be prepared to demonstrate the will and commit the resources needed to oppose any nation’s actions that jeopardize access to and use of the global commons and cyberspace, or that threaten the security of our allies."

Move away from seeking technological solutions to geopolitical issues

2011-06-09T06:55:00.010+05:30

Here's the link to the ORF report on the recent Nuclear Dialogue in Beijing, where I had a paper on Missile Defence & Strategic Stability.

Noting that one of the emerging issues in Asian security is missile defence and its impact on nuclear deterrence and strategic stability, Dr. Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan has suggested that States should move away from the trend of seeking technological solutions to geopolitical issues in order to strengthen regional stability.

Anyone interested in the full paper, I will be happy to mail you separately. For the full report, click here.

"Technologies and weapon systems can inadvertently contribute to accidents and misperceptions and thereby lead to unintended crises," Dr. Rajagopalan said in a paper
titled "Missile Defence and Strategic Stability" presented at an international conference on ’China and India Nuclear Doctrine and Dynamics’, organised by the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy in Beijing on June 2 & 3.

Dr. Rajagopalan, a Senior Fellow at Observer Research Foundation, also suggested establishing certain ground rules in the area of missile defence that will help in reining the regional BMD programmes.

Dr. Rajagopalan said missile defence systems are not very effective. "There are serious limitations to how effectively BMD can protect its cities. For instance, in the case of India, BMD provide limited protection - to a few target locations. Protection against multiple missile attacks is something that India is still grappling with."

She said while "India’s BMD programme has been by and large an indigenous effort, there has been some foreign collaboration. More importantly, a potential collaboration between India and the US /Israel can fuel suspicion in the region contributing to the insecurity and instability dynamics in the region. China and Pakistan may not take kindly to such developments.

"China could potentially strengthen their nuclear, ICBM programmes, both in quantitative and qualitative terms, adding to the security-insecurity dilemma in the region. A strengthened China-Pakistan strengthened partnership could be a direct fall-out of this," Dr. Rajagopalan said in the paper, noting that analysts have cautioned that an Indian missile defence system would lead to China and Pakistan augmenting "their missile strike capabilities to maintain the strategic deterrence."

She said that in fact, an ineffective system or a system that is not fully developed will worsen and increases India’s vulnerabilities than strengthen its security.

Dr. Rajagopalan cautioned that a potential arms race in Asia is well within the realm of possibilities. "An Indian reaction to the Chinese test will touch off a response in Pakistan and a potential collaboration between China and Pakistan on nuclear, missile, and space matters is something that is likely to intensify the regional competition significantly. One has to look into the history to understand the China-Pakistan nuclear and missile cooperation. Outer space is the new domain for cooperation. China has agreed to strengthen their work on Pakistan’s satellite, which is currently being built in China, to be launched into orbit on August 14, 2011."

This conference was the second meeting wherein the Chinese were engaged in a bilateral with India on the nuclear subject. The first dialogue was organised by S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, earlier this year.

Gilani's Visit to China: Further Consolidation of Ties?

2011-05-21T22:26:00.005+05:30

Here's the link to an article of mine on Pakistan President Gilani's visit to China published by ORF.

The Chinese objectives are in perfect congruence with those of Pakistan. Pakistan is also mindful of the fact that an enhanced Chinese presence will keep India away (at least Pakistan is hopeful of), thereby ensuring Pakistan the strategic depth that it has been seeking to achieve in Afghanistan.

Pakistani Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani has just concluded his four-day visit to China - the "all weather friend" whose friendship he described as "taller than the Himalayas and deeper than oceans." Some have suggested that there are limits to China-Pakistan relationship and that Beijing may no more be willing to stick its head out for Islamabad. However, the statement from China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) does not suggest so; neither does the statement by the Chinese Foreign Minister who spoke at last week's US-China strategic dialogue and economic talks. He is reported to have said that "any attack on Pakistan would be construed as an attack on China" though this has been reported only in the Pakistani press and not been confirmed by any Chinese sources. While there is understandable scepticism about such strong assurances, the New York Times reported a signed commentary in the People's Daily, the official newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party, that "urged Americans to critically examine the unilateral nature of its raid and infringement of Pakistan's territorial rights."

When the whole world was critical of Pakistan's role in sheltering Osama Bin Laden, China extended full backing to Pakistan, saying Islamabad was a victim of terror and that the sacrifices that it had made in the global war against terror should not go unnoticed. The MOFA spokesperson Jiang Yu also noted that Beijing looks forward to "further consolidating and developing friendship and cooperation" as it is in the interests of both the countries to have a "stable" Pakistan.

The Pakistan-China relations are based on a bedrock of mutually beneficial strategic requirements. Both Pakistan and China have strong reasons for continuing these ties. Thus, there is little likelihood that these ties will wither in the near future.

There are several strategic interests that keep China involved in the AfPak region. Whether China has acknowledged it or not, India has been a significant factor in its South Asia policy. Beijing's foreign and security policies in respect to South Asia have been shaped with an objective to balance New Delhi in its own backyard. Of all the countries in South Asia, the interests of China and Pakistan coincide the most and that has been the foundation for this strong partnership.

While China may have had its calculations, Gilani's visit to Beijing at this juncture is not without strategic reasons from Pakistan's point of view. The visit comes at a critical time when its relations with the US and even India are yet again on a downward spiral. Additionally, a post-Osama situation throws open several important questions for South Asia in general and Pakistan, Afghanistan in particular. In the face of the harsh and rampant criticism, particularly from the US, Pakistan is trying to reach out to and consolidate its ties with "friends" - Russia and China - countries that are wary of the US and its presence in Asia.

In fact, by playing the Beijing card, Pakistan is sending an important message for the United States. In one of the first statements in the floor of the Parliament after the Osama killing, Prime Minister Gilani appreciated China's gesture as Pakistan's all-weather friend, which commended the Pakistani sacrifices in the war against terror. The Pakistani government is also trying to shore updomestic support by suggesting that even if the US were to punish or discard them, they have a reliable friend in China. In a rebuff to the US, Gilani is reported to have stated in an interview to the Xinhua news agency that "we are proud to have China as our best and most trusted friend and China will always find Pakistan standing beside it at all times."1

In addition, now that Osama is dead, the US could possibly look out for an early exit option, which would mean that Afghanistan will go back to the dark ages with Pakistan controlling the Taliban and the Taliban taking over Afghanistan. Along with Pakistan, China will make a quick entry into Afghanistan.

China's interests in Afghanistan are both strategic and resource-based. China's increasing role and influence in Kabul will be a factor that India will have to consider. Chinese policy towards Kabul will be driven by three objectives - rich mineral resources, strategic gateway to Central Asia (a region rich in resources) and the Xinjiang Uighur problem. Managing all the three successfully (in the typical Chinese way) dictate closer relationship with Pakistan and Afghanistan (and even Saudi Arabia).

China is already the largest investor in resource-rich Afghanistan. It already has a $3.5 billion investment in the Aynak copper mine project and Beijing plans to make additional investments in tapping the oil, gas and iron mine sectors in Afghanistan. Therefore, the Chinese interests in Afghanistan are long-term and the role of Pakistan in aiding those interests is critical.

Second, the role of Pakistan and Afghanistan in keeping the Uighur problem under wraps is equally important an imperative that drives the Chinese AfPak policy. At one level, China has been careful not to openly criticise the Pakistan-based terror groups that may bring about wrath of these groups in Xinjiang. At another level, China does not want a weakened Islamic country taken over by terror groups that may fuel trouble among the Uighurs in the Xinjiang Province.

A third strategic imperative that dictates the Chinese AfPak policy is the potential for Pakistan and Afghanistan to become gateways into Iran and Central Asia besides providing alternate routes for energy transportation, in the event of being choked in the crucial Malacca Straits. China's large-scale investments in infrastructural projects - Gwadar Port and overland routes - have been undertaken keeping in mind this objective.

Given these three compulsions, it is unlikely that Pakistan's importance to China is going to be diminishing in the near future. On the contrary, the relationship will be consolidated even further and broad-based to include some of the non-traditional areas of cooperation such as outer space.2

The Chinese objectives are in perfect congruence with those of Pakistan. Pakistan is also mindful of the fact that an enhanced Chinese presence will keep India away (at least Pakistan is hopeful of), thereby ensuring Pakistan the strategic depth that it has been seeking to achieve in Afghanistan.

There are other imperatives too that drive the partnership. From its historical experience in dealing with the US, Pakistan has been rather circumspect, characterising the US as an unreliable partner, who will discard Pakistan "like a used Kleenex" once its purpose is over. On the other hand, China has always stood by Pakistan, extending support at critical times when the entire world turns its back on Pakistan. Even in the recent past, the manner in which China went out of the way to save Pakistan on its role in the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks is not forgotten. Pakistan, in return, will ascertain safety and security of the Chinese who may be involved in various mining projects in Afghanistan. From a resource point of view as well as keeping the Uighur problem under control, China will accept some sort of accommodation while dealing with Taliban and other terrorist groups.

The role of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia in this issue cannot be minimised. A renewed relationship between China and Pakistan/Saudi Arabia may not be in the best interests of India. Will this become the new bloc of non-democracies under the Chinese leadership against the democratic world of US, India and other countries such as Japan and Australia?3 The possibility of China reaching out to these medium-sized countries, resulting in a reduced US role and influence in the coming decades, cannot be ruled out.

Given these factors, the US options such as cutting off aid to Pakistan or minimising its military presence in Afghanistan may not be quite feasible. Additionally, given that about 40 per cent of the US-ISAF logistics are transported through Pakistan makes it difficult for the US to cut off the aid. Meanwhile, Pakistan too has benefitted from the US operations in Afghanistan, and therefore while Pakistan will try different manoeuvres to get the best bargain out of Washington, it is unlikely that Islamabad will close its doors to the US.

1 "Pakistan PM Hails China Ties Amid Strains with US," AFP, Dawn, May 17, 2011, available at http://www.dawn.com/2011/05/17/pakistan-pm-hails-china-ties-amid-strains-with-us.html.
2 China has agreed to strengthen their work on Pakistan's satellite, which is currently being built in China, to be launched into orbit on August 14, 2011. Other agreements in the military-security arena include: agreement to provide Pakistan 50 new JF-17 Thunder multi-role fighter planes (the Block-58 planes would be produced in Pakistan under a co-production agreement; the production likely to start in June 2012); the supply of 50 JF-17 planes (agreement signed earlier); discussing the supply of J-20 Stealth and Xiaolong/FC-1 multi-purpose light fighter aircraft to Pakistan (the mode of payment and the number of planes to be provided to Pakistan are being discussed). See Mohammad SalehZaffir, "Respect Pak Sovereignty, China Tells US," The News, May 19, 2011, available at http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=6094&Cat=13&dt=5%2F19%2F2011.
3 Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, "India, US and the Afghanistan Quagmire," Analysis, Observer Research Foundation, November 09, 2009, available at http://www.orfonline.org/cms/sites/orfonline/modules/analysis/AnalysisDetail.html?cmaid=17585&mmacmaid=17586.

Establishing the Rules of the Road in Space: Issues & Challenges

2011-05-06T19:24:00.005+05:30

Here's the link to an article of mine on the Code of Conduct on Space published by ORF.

Should India endorse the CoC? Does it advance India’s interests? An arrangement that focuses on a broad set of principles, without any concrete action plans, without any in-built verification mechanism and no legal obligations, helps India little. The EU Code remains a highly idealistic one with no practical utility in tackling three important concerns ? space debris, space overcrowding and avoidance of collision. For instance, it is highly ambitious to assume that the US or China are going to do prior notifications of an ASAT test. Similarly, States reporting on their national policies, including the intent for defensive uses of space assets, can be interpreted in an adverse manner. These are concerns that cannot be pushed under the carpet.

Establishing the rules of the road on space seems to be gaining a "top-down" push and momentum as though acceptance of these rules will amount to solving all the concerns about outer space activities. Currently, there are two Code of Conduct (CoC) that are doing the rounds for universalisation of certain norms that might strengthen the legitimacy and credibility of the Code. The two codes are the EU Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities (hereafter EU Code) and the Model Code of Conduct, prepared by the Stimson Center. Here, I look only at the EU Code: can it become a universal space code of conduct?

Some of the salient provisions of the EU Code are:

• The Code will codify new best practices while contributing to transparency and confidence-building measures and will be complimentary to the existing arrangements on outer space activities.

• The Code is a voluntary measure open to all States.

• The "inherent right or collective self-defense in accordance with the United Nations Charter" will be observed.

• States becoming parties to the Code will also be guided by the existing legal framework while "making programme towards adherence to, and implementation of:" among other treaties, the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (1967); the Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space (1968), the Constitution and Convention of the International Telecommunications Union and its Radio Regulations (2002).

• States that become party to the Code "will establish and implement national policies and procedures to minimise the possibility of accidents in space, collisions between space objects or any form of harmful interference with other States’ right to the peaceful exploration and use of outer space."

• States that become parties are also obliged to provide "information on national space policies and strategies, including basic objectives for security and defence related activities."

• State parties engaged "in the consultations shall seek solutions based on an equitable balance of interests."

Safety and security of space assets have so far been ensured through bilateral and regional agreements. But three incidents in the recent past ? the Chinese ASAT test of January 2007, the US shooting down of a satellite in February 2008 and the collision of a US Iridium satellite with a defunct Russian satellite in 2009 ? have triggered concerns of new dangers in space that is becoming crowded, raising the potentials for accidents. These concerns have fuelled the developments of these CoC.

On the surface of it, the EU Code appears to be an innocuous document. But not many non-EU States have accepted the EU code. Why?

For States to be party to global mechanisms, few questions need to be answered. What does the Code seek to do that is not achievable through other bilateral or regional means? Does the Code enhance a state’s security significantly or will it be an obstacle to carrying out some of its legitimate activities in space? Lastly, is the Code an inclusive framework?

The EU Code has already generated official reservations around the world, particularly in Asia. Europe has to make genuine efforts to reach across to Asia and facilitate a consensus with Asian powers if the Code has to be endorsed and universalised.

To start with, some of the simpler objections: the fact that the European governments have formulated the Code without consulting any of the Asian space powers is an issue. It is in Asia that one is going to witness heightened space activities and potentially the challenges are also going to come from Asia. Therefore this was not a smart move on the part of the EU.

However, fresh efforts can be made to limit the damage if the EU is open to understanding what the Indian and broader Asian concerns are, how they can be accommodated. Alternatively, more problematically, the Asian countries might insist on developing a space CoC on their own. Europe has to consider the impact of changing geopolitics and the increasing importance of Asia, particularly in the space domain.

Clearly, space is once again becoming the sphere of rivalry and potential conflicts and the EU has admirably taken the lead in establishing the rules of the road to avoid intended or unintended consequences of any action in space. However, the CoC does not move towards a legally binding mechanism that has been the demand from the Asian countries at various multilateral forums. In the absence of the fact that it does not meet this basic demand, it is unclear if Asian powers will become party to it. India has consistently pointed out the need for a legally binding mechanism to be put in place to prevent weaponization of outer space. India as part of the Group of 21 (Non-Aligned Nations in the Conference on Disarmament)has argued that global and inclusive transparency and confidence-building measures (TCBMs), which are supported by the West, could be important complementary measures but there is need for legally binding measures.

Though the EU CoC is voluntary, it expects States to "establish and implement national policies and procedures" to tackle issues such as the increasing traffic in space and thereafter the potential for accidents up in the orbit. This may be seen as binding the States and "intrusive" although in an indirect manner. On the other hand, the CoC being voluntary means it defeats its purpose as it would imply that there is no penalty on States / entities violating certain norms that might get institutionalised with the adoption of the CoC.

Therefore, why should States adopt, institutionalise and internationalise a CoC? The general set of principles enumerated in the EU CoC already exist in different forms in various countries ? in the national space policies of countries like the US or policy statements by various leaders in the Parliament and at multilateral fora the case of countries like India which does not articulate policies in one single policy document.

Similarly, the loose and vague manner in which the CoC is worded could lead to misinterpretations. Operationalising the CoC will become that much more difficult. Phrases like "to promoting the common and precise understandings" and "shall seek solutions based on an equitable balance of interests" are cases in point. These objectives are idealistic but vague and can be quite subjective. And then there’s ’equitable balance of interests’ ? whose interests are we talking about? Therefore the more difficult issue will be that different countries will interpret this differently, affecting the Asian interests adversely. This has fuelled more suspicion than confidence.

Next, who will enforce the CoC? The CoC is enforceable when the enforcing power has significant amount of hard power and clout. The credibility of the EU in this regard is questionable. Take for instance the Hague Code of Conduct on Ballistic Missile Proliferation (H-COC). While 128 countries have accepted H-COC, the Code is yet to have many of the Asian countries ? China, Pakistan, Iran, North Korea ? as endorsed parties, which makes it an unsuccessful attempt at tackling missile proliferation.

Should India endorse the CoC? Does it advance India’s interests? An arrangement that focuses on a broad set of principles, without any concrete action plans, without any in-built verification mechanism and no legal obligations, helps India little. The EU Code remains a highly idealistic one with no practical utility in tackling three important concerns ? space debris, space overcrowding and avoidance of collision. For instance, it is highly ambitious to assume that the US or China are going to do prior notifications of an ASAT test. Similarly, States reporting on their national policies, including the intent for defensive uses of space assets, can be interpreted in an adverse manner. These are concerns that cannot be pushed under the carpet.

Lastly, codes cannot establish responsible conduct. In fact, geopolitics will facilitate or block the implementation of the CoC. The more powerful will dictate the terms. Even if the US as the most powerful country on earth decides to become a party to the CoC, the numerical superiority of Asian countries could push the wind in the other direction. The fact that the code does not provide an inclusive framework makes it even harder to implement. European States have established a set of ideals without consultation of Asian countries, without the understanding the Asian ground realities and such a mechanism is not going to be accepted that easily in Asia. For Europe to unilaterally decide what is good for the world does not augur well. It appears like they are making yet another mistake like the H-COC.

Dhruv choppers to be equipped with HELINA missiles

2011-05-01T19:06:00.004+05:30

Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) Chief Dr. VK Saraswat in an interview to the PTI stated, "For the first time, we are developing indigenously a missile called HELINA for being deployed on the weaponised version of the ALH Dhruv helicopter."

HELINA, a guided air-to-ground missile, is reported to be an upgraded version of Nag anti-tank missile. This is being developed indigenously by the DRDO and will be ready for trials by 2013. The propulsion systems of the NAG missile, reportedly, have been strengthened and can take out enemy tanks from a range of seven to eight kms.

For the original Times of India report, click here.

Type rest of the post here

GoI's Decision on MMRCA: A Strategic Blunder?

2011-05-01T18:54:00.003+05:30

Here's a link to an article of mine published yesterday on the GoI decision on MMRCA.

A strategic blunder of sorts, this is how India's selection on medium multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA) will be characterised as. The MMRCA deal worth Rs. 42,000 crores (about $ 11 bn) was not a deal that India could have made such errors on. India had to be naïve if it based its decision purely on the technical parameters. Even on technical parameters, the decision is questionable. However, the underlying factor is that through this deal, India was buying a strategic partnership.2 This was a deal with huge political message to its friends and foes, alike.

This article lists out some of the issues that India clearly ignored in making its decision which are going to hurt India in politico-strategic terms than any significant gains that India may have had by going for the European option. This paper argues that not just numerical superiority and costs but more importantly the strategic benefits should have been the guiding factors in making the decision on MMRCA.

First of all, let's look at the number issue. India's dwindling Air Force strength along with the cost factor should have been an important consideration. Air power strategists argue that in ensuring air superiority, quality, including range, payload and precision are important parameters. But even more important is the numerical superiority which should have guided India towards an American or a Russian option, which are better value for money options. India's current strength of approximately 630 fighter aircraft is fast depleting. Therefore, the need to beef up the fighter force numbers is significant given the security environment in India's neighbourhood.

Acquisition, lifecycle and maintenance costs are another set of considerations. Once again, when the acquisition costs and costs of spare parts are considered, the European options are going to be very expensive to the Indian exchequer. The cost per unit and the spare parts costs are said to be high in the case of the European ones. An American option – the F-18 – that came fourth in the technical evaluation3 would have proved to be far better an option. An F-16 with AESA radar would have been a good platform except that India will be using the F-16s against Pakistan whose Air Force has been using this platform for decades.4 However, both the F-16s and the F-18s do come with second generation AESA radars and they provide far greater gains in terms of reliability.

While the costs are important considerations, more critical is the strategic benefit an American option would have accrued for India. As argued earlier, the MMRCA decision is a strategic decision – a decision that would reflect India's strategic priorities and commitments. In this regard, analysts have argued that American ambiguity on India's geopolitical concerns having had a major role. Whether the US comes to Indian aid or not, one can be certain that the Europeans are not going to burn their fingers. With India having gone with the European option, it can only be hoped that this was not a strategic decision and that it does not reflect a particular (anti-US) sentiment within the Indian establishment. If India had assumed that Europe was going to come to India's aid in the case of an India-Pakistan or India-China conflict, it is far from being realistic. A deal with the Russians may have been somewhat more understandable, but the geopolitical clout of Europe, particularly in Asia, is almost nil.

Additionally, strategic messaging should have been a vital imperative. US fighter aircraft in the Indian inventory would have a huge strategic message. Therefore, the argument that India has done several deals with the US through the FMS (Foreign Military Sales) does not hold much weight. An American option would make India's adversary think twice before venturing into a conflict with India, be it Pakistan or China. The deal would have had a huge deterrence value.

Lastly, India opting for one of the most expensive single engines with no proven operational AESA radar is imprudent, to say the least.5 Dassault Rafalealmost with no customers (except for Brazil that plans for major procurement), India may provide the largest order to the day. Whether this huge deal will have corresponding positive spin-offs for India need to be seen. India might experience a long hard summer with the European Union beginning to put pressure on India, through various channels, to endorse and accept the EU Code of Conduct on space. India should also prepare itself for EU dictat on space vs. growth debates in the coming years.
1 As a strategic decision, it was not good enough that India looked at the technical specifications and the best in the technical evaluation. As some analyses have pointed out, the technical superiority argument is not valid as all of these are of the same class and are marginally up or down depending on certain parameters. But this decision should have been based on technical, operational / tactical and most important strategic considerations. India had to look at beefing up the overall security assurance that it would be gaining instead of merely looking at the technical specifications. Technology alone does not guarantee security for any nation. Four factors should have prevailed upon the decision-maker: security through partnerships; freedom of action; national competitiveness; and regional influence. For an excellent perspective on strategic decision-making, see Peter A Garretson, "MMRCA Selection: A Strategist's Point of View," Unpublished Paper, available with the author.

2 Admiral Raja Menon, commenting on NDTV on April 28, argued that India had taken a bad decision, questioning whether India was investing in a strategic partnership with a European consortium. Additionally, he argued that any of the six companies would have provided the 126 aircrafts that India was looking for but the decision-makers should have looked for what more could we get out of the deal.

3 The gradation following the technical evaluation is not clear yet. Different reports have provided contradictory assessments.

4 F-16 is a platform that has remained in the Indian neighbourhood for a considerable time and the operational superiority of the PAF on F-16 platforms may have been an important enough consideration for India, although the version on offer to India was far superior. The longer standoff range of AESA radars also provide the pilots with more time for persistent target observation, information sharing, tactical analysis and commander assessment before taking critical decisions. In addition, these radars can also be used for non-traditional ISR and electronic attacks. They have been battle-proven and they provide the best bet in any tactical operation that India may be engaged on its eastern or western borders.

5 Neither Rafale nor Eurofighter has proven AESA radar.

China Issues White Paper on Foreign Aid

2011-04-29T23:47:00.004+05:30

Now China issues a White Paper on its foreign aid policy as well. What next? Are they trying to ridicule the whole campaign for openness and transparency?

Here's the link to the Chinese White Paper on foreign aid titled, "China's Foreign Aid," released on April 21, 2011.

The Preface says, "Adhering to equality and mutual benefit, stressing substantial results, and keeping pace with the times without imposing any political conditions on recipient countries, China's foreign aid has emerged as a model with its own characteristics."

For the full report, click here.

Post-Japan, the hunt for the safest option

2011-04-23T05:32:00.006+05:30

Here's the link to an article of mine that appeared in today's Pioneer about the space based solar power option.

The nuclear meltdown in northern Japan has confirmed our worst fears about nuclear energy. Tragically, India continues to blindly follow the discarded notions of yesterday, ignoring viable possibilities like solar power

With the nuclear crisis still unfolding in Japan, there is fresh thinking around the world about the safety of the nuclear energy option. While India has examined several alternative energy options, no single option is likely to be a magic bullet. It will probably be wise to look at other options including ones that have not yet been seriously considered as yet.

Under such a scenario, it may be a good time for India to explore the option of space-based solar power (SBSP) — a possibility that has not caught the popular or government attention very much, for a variety of reasons. Unlike the ground-based solar power option, SBSP does not have problems like cloud cover or availability of sunlight and so on.

The SBSP option is likely to be costly. While cost may have been the most serious impediment in making the SBSP option a reality so far, there has been lack of direction and commitment from the political leadership that has also contributed to this. Exploiting space for solar power is not a new idea although it has remained a theoretical exercise for a number of reasons, including because of the lobbying by other alternate energy groups.

SBSP involves using extremely large satellites made up of a large number of solar cells to collect the sun’s energy, convert it to radio waves to be beamed to antenna farms on the ground where it is reconverted to energy.

The scale of such a project will be large but the SBSP is comparable to several mega projects undertaken in the past by both India and the US — the US National Highway project or the Indian rural electrification programme are two cases in point. On cost, experts opine that developing a prototype or putting a 10 MW demonstrator in GEO (geosynchronous Earth orbit), using exiting launch vehicles, will be to the tune of around $10 billion over 10 years. Collaboration with other space-faring nations will bring down the cost to make it a cheaper, safer and cleaner option. More important is the need to calculate the cost on the basis of both direct and indirect cost of climate change and environmental issues. Also, this will be a huge effort in strengthening international hi-tech cooperation, creating several spin-off benefits, including job creation and gaining access to advanced technology.

In the recent past, former President APJ Abdul Kalam promoted the idea of SBSP at the Aeronautical Society of India (AeSI) and later at a NSS (US-based National Space Society) press conference in Washington DC last year. This initiative as of now remains an India-US initiative although it needs to be broadened, may be at a later stage, to set up a larger consortium to make SBSP into a viable proposition.

Why SBSP? Speaking in November last year, Dr Kalam highlighted the huge energy shortage that India and the world would be facing in the next few decades. Kalam estimated that by 2050, even if one were to use all possible sources of energy, there will be a global shortage to the tune of 66 per cent. On the other hand, if one were to use the SBSP option, the world would move from an energy deficit to an energy surplus situation. Additionally, the clean and safe energy option will go a long way in solving the world’s climate change woes.

At the India-US level, this initiative is associated with some key technocrats such as Dr Kalam, Mark Hopkins, CEO of the NSS, John Mankins from the Space Power Association and a veteran of NASA and also Dr TK Alex from the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) Satellite Centre, Bangalore who is also heading the Chandrayaan Project. Participation of TK Alex in a sense gives an official colour to the project.

On the Indian side, some preliminary studies were done in 1987 on advanced space transportation system at a conceptual level to make SBSP a cheaper option, but there has been no follow up. In the recent past, the ISRO has been engaged in getting some additional technical studies on the feasibility of this option, looking at three specific configurations. While continuing with the technical feasibility studies, ISRO has also made it clear that it can proceed only if they get suitable proposals/funding from foreign governments. While the technical studies are one aspect of it, more important is the need for a clear directive from the government. A clear political mandate calling upon the technocrats and scientific community to develop the necessary technologies is one way to take this option forward. The government can thereafter be a facilitator if it seeks foreign collaboration, for instance. But the initiative has to come from the political leadership.

What are India’s options to make SBSP a real viable option given the cost factor and technology? Can the governments and the private sectors of both India and the US make serious commitments to take the first step towards R&D investment on SBSP? It might be worth the effort to place the SBSP initiative within the US-India S&T Endowment and Board. The Indo-US S&T Fund finances projects on an entire range of issues from biotechnology, advanced materials and nanotechnology science to clean energy technologies, basic space and atmospheric and earth science. Other countries making significant investment in this area include Japan that has made an investment of $21 bn for the next few years. India and the US can take the lead to establish an international consortium based on cost sharing and more importantly on international technology cooperation.

Countries like India and the US need to take up initiatives to do major technological demonstrations and milestone projects, which will have far reaching consequences across political, strategic and technological spheres. Cooperation on SBSP will convey a major strategic message.

Navigating the Near: Non-Traditional Security Threats to India, 2022 -- the book is out and am one of the authors ...

2011-04-22T13:07:00.005+05:30

A study titled, Navigating the Near: Non-Traditional Security Threats to India, 2022, done for the Ministry of Defence, is now published as a book, for wider dissemination. The study was authored by me and four other colleagues of mine from ORF.

National Security is most often thought of in terms of political and military threats to the State-either from other States or geo-strategic alliances. Given such a framework, both the challenges as well as the responses have for long been viewed in terms of military force or coercive ability of the adversary.

Events unfolding in today's highly networked and globalised economies show the futility, and danger, of relying on such a simplistic template. Threats to national security are today multi-dimensional and call for a deeper study and understanding of a wide variety of factors to create a credible and deterrent response mechanism.

Navigating the Near seeks to bridge this paradigm shift by studying non-traditional threats facing contemporary India. The study, with its sight on the next decade, evaluates how traditional threats confronting India are likely to be influenced in large measure by a range of factors and trends, both external and internal, that have, till now, remained on the fringes of security studies.

Type rest of the post here

More Economic BRICS in the Development Wall

2011-04-19T08:13:00.004+05:30

Here's the link to a news story by Ranjit Devraj of the IPS on the recent BRICS Summit, quoting me.

As BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) leaders prepare for Thursday’s summit in the resort town of Sanya in China’s southern Hainan province, experts here say there are limits to how ‘political’ the grouping can get.

For the full story, continue reading.

Leading China analyst Prof.Sujit Dutta told IPS that while it is true that BRICS countries are no longer "marginal players" in international politics, they are rooted in their own economic and geographical realities.

"While South Africa, the latest entrant into the BRICS grouping, did vote with the West on military intervention in Libya, it could not easily ignore the fact that it was also an Africa issue," said Dutta, who currently teaches at the Nelson Mandela Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution, Jamia Millia Islamia University in New Delhi.

"And if the other BRICS countries abstained from voting at the U.N. Security Council on Libya, that must have been the result of their own assessments," Dutta said. "When it comes to taking political positions, everybody is cautious, and that will be the trend in the foreseeable future."

Dutta said while BRICS is bound to increase its clout, its power as a grouping will depend on its ability to shape constructive change by bringing to the table modes of thought that lie outside the traditional East-West pattern.

"In a sense Libya was a test case for BRICS and threw up many disturbing questions," Dutta said. "The Libyan regime may have been authoritarian, but was it genocidal? Did it pose a threat to international security? Aren’t authoritarian Arab regimes being propped up by the West?"

Ultimately, Dutta said, BRICS will increase in value simply because of the fact that the world is rapidly becoming more diversified and also more integrated, throwing up new issues. "For example, how will the world deal with China’s aggressive state capitalism and the complex issues that will get thrown up because of it?"

Speaking to journalists before his departure for Sanya on Tuesday, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh dwelt on the "huge potential" of BRICS, provided they improve coordination on major issues of common concern to the five-member grouping.

But Singh was careful to say that such coordination should focus on the world economy, a democratic and equitable world order, and global governance reform.

Singh noted the fact that all BRICS countries are currently in the U.N. Security Council.

"If we can coordinate our positions on some key area such as sustainable development, balanced growth, energy and food security, reform of international financial institutions and balanced trade, that will be to our advantage," he said.

The Hindu newspaper’s foreign affairs correspondent Sandeep Dikshit wrote in a lead story datelined Sanya that (Indian) officials had "cautioned against reading too much into the accent on political discussions at the BRICS summit because this is more of a negotiating group with other world powers, than a coordinating one."

In his statement Singh said he looked forward to Wednesday’s bilateral meeting, including the one with Chinese President Hu Jintao. The India-China relationship is a critical one, and has now acquired global significance."

Rajeswari Rajagopalan, senior fellow at the independent and influential Organiser Research Foundation (ORF) based in New Delhi said India’s thorny relationship with China represented the sort of difficulties that BRICS will have to overcome or steer around to become truly effective as group.

"There is a trust deficit when it comes to Beijing’s relations with New Delhi, or even its relations with Moscow, that cannot be easily swept under the carpet," Rajagopalan told IPS.

"On the other hand," she said, "China needs India’s large markets and, during his visit to India in December, Chinese premier Wen Jiabao generously said that the long-standing border dispute between them could be left to future generations to resolve."

Currently, India has reason to worry about a military and infrastructural buildup along the ‘Line of Actual Control’ that serves as part of the border and about China’s nuclear cooperation with Pakistan.

Such niggling issues have, however, not stood in the way of bilateral trade between Asia’s two major Asian economies growing from 2 billion dollars in 1999 to nearly 60 billion dollars in 2010.

Rajagopalan said that the balance of trade was hugely in favour of China, and that Indian enterprise was being kept out of certain areas of the Chinese market. This includes possible ventures in information technology, pharmaceuticals and agriculture, where India has acknowledged strengths.

"These are issues that the Indian side can be expected to bring up in any bilateral with China," Rajagopalan said.

BRICS, said Rajagopalan, has by and large remained a forum that has debated or taken positions on "soft issues" such as climate change and trade, and has glaringly lacked strategic content to be able to effect significant changes in global politics.

Although three of the BRICS countries are active and credible nuclear and space powers, the group has not managed to initiate a dialogue on non- proliferation or outer space issues, Rajgopal pointed out.

The Sanya summit, she said, can be expected not to stray too far beyond the theme of "Broad Vision and Shared Prosperity" for the five BRICS countries, which account for nearly 30 percent of the world’s land area, 42 percent of the global population, and make up 18 percent of the world GDP.

China’s ambassador to India, Zhan Yan, in an article published on the editorial page of the Hindu on Wednesday emphasised that BRICS cooperation has provided "a valuable platform for the five countries to share development experiences and work together on development problems.

"BRICS countries are amongst the fastest growing economies in the world with tremendous potential. The cooperation among BRICS members reflects the development of international situation as well as the desire and choice of emerging economies," the ambassador writes.

"The issues discussed by BRICS members mainly focus on the economic, financial and development issues. In a sense, BRICS countries act as advocates and practitioners in forging a global partnership for development."

PM's China Visit: BRICS and the Bilateral Dynamics

2011-04-13T14:04:00.003+05:30

Here's the link to an article of mine on the PM's visit to China, published by ORF. Indian Prime Minister has left for China for the third BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and now South Africa) Summit, but one of the key questions is as to what such coalitions mean for India-China bilateral relations.

For the full article, click here.

Besides the BRICS Summit in Sanya, on Hainan Island, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Chinese President Hu Jintao are scheduled to hold separate bilateral meetings, discuss a range of issues from economic to political and strategic issues. However, the Chinese officials have clarified to the Indian side that only multilateral issues and trade (establishing a strategic economic dialogue at the BRICS level is one item on the agenda) be discussed and that bilateral controversial issues are off the table during the Summit meeting.

At the multilateral level, the BRICS grouping is expected to discuss the international situation in the economic, financial, political and security domain. Obviously Libya is an important issue for all the BRICS countries. Except for South Africa that voted in favour of the UN Security Council Resolution 1973, the other four countries - India, China, Brazil and Russia - had abstained from voting sending vague and ambiguous signals to Libya and the rest of the international community. However, it should be noted that the Libya vote was not the result of any collective decision taken by the BRICS. It was driven primarily by each country's individual foreign policy orientations than a common BRICS position. While China has justified its abstention by arguing that it does not interfere in another country's internal affairs, the Indian position has not been very clear. Some reports have argued that the open-ended nature of the Allied action is what got New Delhi worried. However, India's stand on the issue of use of military power against civilian population is contradictory. India stands aside while another government is using military power against unarmed civilians, even though India observes strict limitation on the use of military force in domestic rebellions. This contradiction will create problems to its standing in the coming years on the issue of UN's R2P (Responsibility to Protect) principle and willingness to take on greater responsibility in global affairs commensurate with its growing stature.

What does BRICS really mean? The fact that Goldman Sachs identified Brazil, Russia, India and China as the fastest growing economies and coined the term BRIC does not mean anything and cannot become effective glue to stitch the group together as a cohesive unit. The grouping has by and large remained a forum that has debated or taken positions on what may be termed as "soft" issues such as climate change, trade issues and so on. The lack of strategic content in the grouping has impeded the growth and development of BRICS as a forum that can effect significant changes in global politics.

Even on the climate change issue, there has been no common position. Russia's stance on climate change has been significantly different from that of India and China's. Despite the fact that China has become the largest emitter of green house gas, India has found it convenient to go under the Beijing shadow although India has taken important steps to curb green house gas emissions, thereby compromising India's position in the climate change debate. However, India and China coming together and taking common positions has often been cited as major breakthroughs in India-China relations.

How far is this claim valid? It can be argued that while the two countries may have cooperated at the multilateral fora, India-China bilateral relations have also witnessed worsening of the ties partly because of China's less than supportive role at the multilateral fora when it came to strategic issues affecting India (China's role at the NSG and its efforts to sabotage an ADB loan for India are examples).

From the Chinese side, it supports India when they perceive a potential benefit in improving ties, which by and large have remained in the economic arena or improving its own image as it holds major events. The two recent instances have been when China issued regular stamped visas to one singer who was travelling to China for performing at the closing ceremony of the Asian Games; and when four journalists hailing from J&K travelling with PM for the BRICS Summit, because they did not want the visa issue to become a dampener on either of the two occasions held by China on its soil.

For Beijing, the West (including the US and Europe) is no more the market for their products. Asia is the future market and in Asia, India provides the largest market for the Chinese products and services. This explains the Chinese rationale in emphasising economics as the biggest agenda in the bilateral ties (evident during Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao's visit to India with a 400-member economic delegation).

India is all for strengthening ties with China, including in the economic arena. The bilateral trade had touched nearly $62 bn in 2010 and the two countries are expected to take this to $100 bn by 2015, which is not an unrealistic target. However, India has to address a few issues even in this area, which is otherwise booming. While the trade touched $62 billion, China's exports had gone beyond $40 bn, further increasing the trade imbalance between the two. Another issue for India has been the lack of access to the Chinese markets for Indian products particularly in three sectors - agriculture, IT and pharmaceuticals.

Lastly, what is that India achieves through BRIC/S that it cannot or has not achieved through bilateral means?

Global governance is one issue through which India-China relations may be tested. Is China willing to live with an India that is more assertive and influential in Asian and global affairs? China has so far not exhibited such support as it deals with India. Its changing policy on Jammu & Kashmir (manifested through the issuance of stapled visas; circulation of internal documents in China indicating the deletion of 1500 square kilometres from LAC on the Ladakh sector) questioning the territorial integrity of India; its South Asia policy aimed at circumscribing India's manoeuvrability even within South Asia (China-Pakistan defence and nuclear weapons collaboration, China-Nepal, -Sri Lanka defence ties, and more recently utilising economic aid as an effective tool in furthering the Chinese interests are few examples) are some of the underlying issues that trouble India-China relations.

Three of the four BRIC countries are active and credible nuclear and space powers, yet the group has not managed to initiate a dialogue on non-proliferation or outer space issues. The lack of strategic depth and mutual trust among these countries come as major impediments in making this bloc a strategic one - one with teeth that can challenge the current policies on these issues or one that can institute a new mechanism to avert the dangers of proliferation or weaponization of outer space.

Each of the five BRICS countries has their own strengths in the S&T arena. While this area should have been an ideal candidate for strengthening cooperation among these five countries, the group has not been able to exploit this strength for a variety of reasons.

Therefore, India has to be realistic enough to understand that heightened engagement between India and China in BRICS or any other multilateral fora has serious limitations - limitations imposed by the underlying Chinese objective of keeping India bogged down in South Asia as a regional power.

SENIOR INDIAN RESEARCHER BACKS JOINT US - INDIA DEVELOPMENT OF SPACE SOLAR POWER – A MULTI-NATIONAL POWER SOURCE

2011-04-06T16:06:00.004+05:30

US-based National Space Society has issued a Press Release about my article on space-based solar power that appeared on the ORF website.

The release read: Dr. Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, a Senior Fellow at India's Institute of Security Studies, and Senior Fellow at India's Observer Research Foundation, is urging the United States and India to jointly develop an energy alternative that can take us beyond nuclear technology. Events like the recent earthquake in Japan are causing many to rethink traditional energy sources. The energy alternative suggested is Space Solar Power (SSP). In the online publication "Analysis" of the Indian Observer Research Foundation, Dr. Rajagopalan writes, "With the earthquake and the subsequent tsunami that hit Japan on March 11, isn’t it time for India and the US to make serious commitments to Space-Based Solar Power?"

For the full text of the release, continue reading.

Dr. Rajagopalan points out that the concept of space solar power is 40 years old. Much of its technology has been in use for close to sixty years. But space solar power has never been seriously pursued as a major energy option, even though there are supporters of space solar power in Japan, Russia, the European Union, and most of the world's leading nations.

The National Space Society (NSS) has recently teamed with a former president of India, Dr. A.P.J. Kalam, in the Kalam-NSS Energy Initiative, to drive home the potential of what Dr. Kalam calls "energy harvested in space." Kalam is famous for his accomplishments in the aerospace field. He is known as the "Missile Man of India" and currently serves as Chancellor of the Indian Institute of Space Science and Technology. Dr. Rajagopalan quotes Dr. Kalam: "By 2050, even if we use every available energy resource we have, clean and dirty, conventional and alternative, solar, wind, geothermal, nuclear, coal, oil, and gas, the world will fall short of the energy we need by 66%."

Space solar power involves placing large arrays of lightweight solar panels in high Earth orbit, where sunlight is 36 percent stronger than on Earth. Any equipment placed there is totally immune to earthquakes, floods, volcanoes, tsunamis, hurricanes, tornadoes, fires, local wars, rust, corrosion, hail, and other forms of destruction occurring on the ground. The solar power gathered by the arrays is beamed down to a receiver on the ground. Clean electrical energy would be efficiently and safely delivered night and day, 7 days a week. Space solar power could provide a large alternate supply of carbon-free electrical power to the whole Earth. For details see Dr. Rajagopalan's article.

Most importantly, the prestigious International Academy of Astronautics is expected to complete a study of SSP within weeks, which may set the stage for the first substantial steps towards making SSP a reality. The National Space Society plans to hold a press conference at the National Space Club in Washington DC concerning the study when it is released. NSS also plans to hold a SSP symposium as part of its annual convention, the International Space Development Conference, in Huntsville, Alabama, May 18-22, 2011.

Dr. Rajagopalan’s article can be found at: http://www.nss.org/orf-02April2011
A video of the November 4, 2011 NSS press conference announcing the Kalam-NSS Energy Initiative is available at: http://www.nss.org/news/releases/pc20101104.html
Information on Space Solar Power is at: www.nss.org/ssp
.

Media contact:
Gary Barnhard
Phone: (202) 429-1600
E-mail: nsshq@nss.org

About National Space Society

The National Space Society (NSS) is an independent, grassroots organization dedicated to the creation of a spacefaring civilization. Founded in 1974, NSS is widely acknowledged as the preeminent citizen's voice on space. NSS counts thousands of members and more than 50 chapters in the United States and around the world. The society also publishes Ad Astra magazine, an award-winning periodical chronicling the most important developments in space. For more information about NSS, visit www.nss.org.

India, CD and Space Security

2011-04-04T16:28:00.004+05:30

Here's the summary of my recent paper presentation on "India, Conference on Disarmament and Space Security" at the IDSA-MEA Conference on Space and International Security (March 30-31, 2011).

India has been active at the multilateral fora on disarmament as well as on narrower issues such as the prevention of weaponisation of outer space. Its active involvement in negotiations of treaties such as the Outer Space Treaty (OST) is testimony of its commitment to limiting the use of space for peaceful purposes. India, however, has been less than satisfied with the role of major powers in reaching a consensus on these critical issues and there is now a momentum toward weaponisation of outer space, which have serious implications for India’s security.

My paper looked at India’s experience at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in general and its views on PAROS (Prevention of An Arms Race in Outer Space) in particular. Divided into three sections – the first section of the paper looked at India’s general experience within the CD on a number of treaties; the second section looked at India’s growing challenges in the arena of space and the final section looks at developments relating to OST and PAROS and how these can tackle the challenges in space. In conclusion, the paper analyses the status and ability of arms control regimes to tackle the current challenges. Because this is a major crisis facing the multilateral regime, be it about the fissile materials or outer space weaponization. The paper finally made a few recommendations to improve the functioning of the CD as well as on the need for India to become proactive in shaping the regime that it may have to be part of.

If anyone is interested, I can send the full paper.

Chinese Defence White Paper: An Initial Assessment

2011-04-02T16:36:00.005+05:30

Here's the link to an article of mine published by ORF on the just released Chinese Defence White Paper.

China's defence White Paper, titled China's National Defense in 2010, the seventh in the series, was published on March 31, 2011. Does the White Paper bring out anything new? The answer may be a "No" given that it has continued reiterating the same positions on all of these issues. Because of criticism of lack of transparency on security issues, China has decided to come out with these white papers but unfortunately it sheds no new light on the PLA, its objectives or the military modernization. While it remains an important CBM measure, the suspicions about the long term intentions of Beijing can be hardly wished away with the publication of these white papers. The White Paper is essentially what the Chinese want the world to believe what they are doing. Therefore, if China is serious about reducing the regional suspicion about its rise, it has to do something more meaningful.

Underlying the fact that the momentum for economic globalization and multi-polar world are irreversible, the White Paper identifies a few challenges as it outlines its security environment. The "intermittent tension" on the Korean Peninsula and the unraveling security scenario in Afghanistan are seen as major concerns, and the White Paper argues that the Asia-Pacific security has become "more intricate and volatile." Occasional disputes and flare-ups over undemarcated territorial issues and maritime rights have been mentioned as issues contributing to the volatile situation in the Asia-Pacific though thereis no mention of the recent incidents at sea, fuelled by Chinese naval actions.2 The presence of external powers in China's extended neighbourhood - the US and its strengthened regional partnerships -is an issue for Beijing. However, China claims that it is still in "the period of important strategic opportunities for its development," and therefore the idea of cooperating with major traditional powers and new emerging powers, along with good neighbourly relationship, is seen as something Beijing must continue with for mutual benefits. While acknowledging relations with the United States as significant and as a stabilizing tool, Beijing does not mince its words in criticizing Washington for its alliance-kind of relationship, particularly the military sales to the region.

Describing its national defense policy as purely defensive, the White Paper sets out four critical tasks for its armed forces: safeguarding national sovereignty, security and interests of national development; maintaining social harmony and stability; accelerating the modernization of national defense and the armed forces; and maintaining world peace and stability. It further details its strategy as adhering to "the principles of independence and self-defense by the whole nation" and is essentially for maintaining the territorial integrity of its land border, territorial sea and air defenses. China has also begun to emphasize on MOOTW (Military Operations Other Than War), again a theme that began with the last defense White Paper. Beijing argues that there is an increased role for its armed forces on a range of missions, from disaster management missions to riot control to search and rescue operations given the penetrating nature of non-traditional security threats faced by Asia today.

On the modernization of national defense capabilities, the White Paper argues that the PLA is modernizing its forces and equipment "with mechanization as the foundation and informationization as the driving force, while making extensive use of its achievements in information technology, and stepping up the composite and integrated development of mechanization and informationization." Talking of PLA modernization, it emphasizes shifting from a "manpower-intensive to a technology-intensive model." The document mentions the formation of new types of combat forces,without divulging much detail. There is also the modernization of the artillery forces - with the introduction of new types of radar, command information systems, and medium- and high-altitude ground-to-air missiles- for undertaking important military maneuvers - "to carry out precision operations with integrated reconnaissance, control, strike and assessment capabilities." In addition, the PLA Army aviation wing has made significant changes to its role and function - moving away from being a support arm to being a main-battle assault force. Air power has been given a lot of emphasis evident from the upgradation undertaken in its armed helicopters, transport and service helicopters, thereby making marked differences in its ability to move and support infantry forces, force projection as well as extending support role in various missions.

There has been marked progress on the naval front as well. Introduction of new submarines, frigates, aircraft and large support vessels in support of China's offshore defense strategy or "Far Sea Defense Strategy" as stated by Rear Adm. Zhang Huachen, deputy commander of the East Sea Fleet in April last year.3 Accordingly, PLA Navy plans construction of new support bases in order to strengthen the shore-based support system while complementing the deployment of forces and development of weaponry and equipment. This suggests the future intentions of the Navy to project power beyond the immediate neighbourhood.

However, the most significant pronouncement has been regarding the role of the PLA Air Force - to meet "the strategic requirements of conducting both offensive and defensive operations." The Air Force is projected to have important roles in the coming years that emphasizes "air strikes, air and missile defense, and strategic projection," while improving its "leadership and command system for an informationized, networked base support system."Similarly, it has been training on various scenarios involving extensive electromagnetic environment, recognizing the importance of these in future warfare scenarios. Similarly, there has been major push for modernizing its Second Artillery Force with an objective of sharpening their capabilities for "rapid reaction, penetration, precision strike, damage infliction, protection, and survivability, while steadily enhancing its capabilities in strategic deterrence and defensive operations."

A great deal of emphasis has been placed on the need to accelerate the development of new and high-tech weaponry and equipment for undertaking the above-mentioned missions and goals. Accordingly, it has strengthened "the retrofitting and management of existing equipment, and promoting the composite development of mechanized and informationized weaponry and equipment."

Additionally, the White Paper discusses defence expenditure and bilateral and multilateral cooperation. Such cooperation involves a range of issues from joint military exercises and training to strengthening cooperation as a Confidence Building Measure (CBM). Confidence building measures are also discussed for maintaining social stability and non-proliferation and arms control issues.

Space Based Solar Power: Time to Put it on the New US-India S&T Endowment Fund?

2011-04-02T16:05:00.005+05:30

Here's the link to an article of mine on Space-Based Solar Power (SBSP) published by ORF. The article looks at the prospect of making SBSP a real and viable option for India.

With the earthquake and the subsequent tsunami that hit Japan on March 11, isn’t it time for India and the US to make serious commitments to Space-Based Solar Power (SBSP)? Japanese crisis has triggered worldwide re-thinking on the feasibility of pursuing nuclear energy to meet growing global energy demands. This has kick-started a debate also in India not only on the safety of nuclear plants but also on other energy options. It is time that India and the United States and the countries around the world looked at an often-overlooked option: SBSP.

The idea of harnessing SBSP as an option originated in the United States some 40 years ago. But it has not been pursued with vigour for a variety of reasons, including possibly the influence of nuclear lobbyists. In simple terms, SBSP is described thus by Lt. Col. Peter Garretson of the US Air Force: "In this concept, very large satellites, the largest ever constructed, made up of kilometers of solar cells, would collect the Sun’s energy where there is no night, and convert it to radio-waves to be beamed to special receiving antenna farms on the ground (called rectennas) about the size of a small airport. The energy is sent in the form of a low energy beam at about 1/6th the intensity of normal sunlight that falls on earth. But because it is a low-energy, non-ionizing wavelength, it is not as dangerous as sunlight with its high energy ultraviolet rays. At the rectenna, the energy is reconverted and sent via the existing electrical grid. Such satellites would necessitate a fleet of re-useable space planes, and as a consequence of economies of scale, reduce the cost of space access a hundred fold, enabling many other applications."2 It is estimated that one kilometre-wide band of geo-synchronous earth bit can produce solar flux to match as much as the total amount of energy produced from all the different recoverable oil reserves on Earth.

The idea was promoted by none other than Dr. APJ Abdul Kalam first at the Aeronautical Society of India (AeSI) and later again at a press conference in Washington DC last year. The initiative is now titled as the Kalam-NSS (National Space Society) Energy Initiative. The Kalam-NSS initiative is an India-US partnership taken up by individuals with long-term expertise in the space realm. Some of the key people involved are, in addition to Dr. Kalam, Mark Hopkins, CEO of the US-based National Space Society and John Mankins, President of the Space Power Association and a veteran of NASA. On the Indian side, there seems to be some official involvement due to the involvement of Dr. T.K. Alex, who is the Director of the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) Satellite Centre, Bangalore and leader of the Chandrayan-I project.

Speaking in New Delhi in November last year, Dr. Kalam said that "by 2050, even if we use every available energy resource we have, clean and dirty, conventional and alternative, solar, wind, geothermal, nuclear, coal, oil, and gas, the world will fall short of the energy we need by 66%. There is an answer. An answer for both the developed and developing countries. This is a solar energy source that is close to infinite, an energy source that produces no carbon emissions, an energy source that can reach the most distant villages of the world, and an energy source that can turn countries into net energy exporter."3 According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), the worldwide demand for primary energy increases by 55 per cent between 2005 and 2030 - 1.8 per cent hike per year on average; and for India, the demand is expected to more than double by 2030, growing at 3.6 per cent rate per year.4

With energy demand growing rapidly, the SBSP option offers huge opportunities. Such an option will also be reportedly a cleaner energy option. This option would also significantly augment India’s capabilities in the space domain, which will have far-reaching positive spin-offs in the ever-changing security environment in Asia. This will bring the much-desired focus on the question of technology transfer between India and the US, Japan and Israel.

India has looked at this option for quite sometime. In 1987, the first bit of work was undertaken looking at advanced space transportation system design concepts for cost-effective space solar power. Recently, ISRO is reported to have done some exercise looking at the feasibility of this option and examined three specific configurations. Thereafter, ISRO is believed to have welcomed an International Preliminary Feasibility Study.Unlike terrestrial solar and wind power plants, SBSP is available throughout the year, in huge quantities. It can also reportedly work irrespective of conditions that are a problem for other alternative energy sources such as cloud cover, availability of sunlight, or wind speed.

What has prevented the SBSP from becoming a real option? Is it the enormous cost involved in developing the option or is it an option that never got the popular attention due to the multiplicity of departments involved? Proponents argue that the cost of SBSP should not be compared to the direct costs involved. The cost-benefit analysis needs to be done on a different scale, including the direct and indirect cost of global warming and climate change. Otherwise, the costs of developing this technology may seem exorbitant.

What are the options to meet this cost? Are the Indian and American governments and private sectors willing to make significant investments on the R&D of this technology? The US-India Agreement to establish an S&T Board and an Endowment to carry out research (July 20, 2009) appears to be an ideal basis for new research and development on SBSP. SBSP seems like an ideal candidate because this fund seeks to finance projects on a broad spectrum of issues of mutual benefit such as biotechnology, health and infectious diseases, advanced materials and nanotechnology science, clean energy technologies, climate science, basic space and atmospheric and earth science among others. The US side of funding for the Endowment is reported to come from the US S&T "Rupee Funds" established in the 1980s to encourage and fund bilateral S&T projects.5 However, for the SBSP per se, there appears to be interest among the private sector companies like Boeing, Lockheed Martin, and Northrop Grumman and on the Indian side, Tatas have shown interest in exploring this option.

While this can potentially be an excellent case for public-private partnership, the initiative has to come from the government. India’s foray into space and its space policies have had strong civilian and developmental roots and accordingly the government needs to place the SBSP within its overall national space policy. India’s decision to pursue SBSP will have multiple impact -clean energy, clean environment, advancement in the space arena with technology transfer as a given between India, US and Japan.

2Peter A Garretson, "Power the Final Frontier: Could Satellites in Orbit be a Source of Energy for the Future? It’s Possible," Satkal Times, May 22, 2009. For a detailed study, see Peter A Garretson, "Sky’s No Limit: Space Based Solar Power, the Next Major Step in the Indo-US Strategic Partnership?," IDSA Occasional Paper No. 9, (Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, August 2010), p. 17.

3Announcement of the Kalam-NSS Energy Initiative, The NSS Conference Announcement, November 05, 2010, available at http://blog.nss.org/?cat=5.

4International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2007: China and India Insights, International Energy Agency, Paris, 2007, p. 42 and 46.

5Press Information Bureau, "US-India to Establish a Bi-National Science and Technology Endowment Fund and Joint Commission," India PR Wire, March 3, 2006.

Non-Proliferation Challenges in Asia: An Indian Perspective

2011-03-31T17:12:00.003+05:30

This was subject of my presentation at a recent bilateral dialogue between ORF and a Russian think-tank.

While nuclear non-proliferation has remained a major challenge for more than sixty years, the enormity of the challenge has grown manifold particularly since the end of the Cold War. In the past where there was one major nuclear threat – US-Soviet rivalry and the threat of nuclear war – today the world is faced with other challenges – WMD proliferation, terrorism, with a special emphasis on nuclear terrorism. Today, the number of countries pursuing nuclear weapons has gone up significantly. It is particularly in this context that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) along with their delivery systems has become a major issue of concern. The threat is particularly loud and clear in India’s neighbourhood. Issues of China-Pakistan nuclear and missile cooperation, nuclear and missile activities of North Korea and Iran are of specific concern from an Indian perspective. Chinese proliferation of nuclear weapons and technology, including delivery mechanisms to North Korea, Pakistan and Iran has altered military balance in South Asia and beyond.

The paper is divided into three broad aspects. The first section of the paper provided a contextualisation to the developments taking place in Asia, wherein there is a major emphasis on military power, conventional or otherwise. This in particular dealt with the changing security environment that is feeding into these developments. The second outlined three major non-proliferation challenges in Asia – China-Pakistan nuclear cooperation; North Korea; Iran. The last section examines the Indian approach to proliferation and to each of these particular cases.

Having listed out particular crises, it has to be acknowledged that the biggest challenge is the crisis of confidence among major powers. The lack of consensus among major powers on agreeing a particular course of action has stood in the way of taking any effective action against these individual challenges and more importantly it has contributed to the weakening of the regime itself.

If anyone is interested in reading the full paper, I will be happy to mail it.

First, unless the major powers are able to reach a consensus on the challenges, there are going to be many more countries and entities that will exploit the weakness of the regime.

Second, importance and insufficiency of non-proliferation efforts based largely on technological control; supply side of the issue needs to be addressed. Technological controls or export control regimes or sanctions only let the hard-core countries buy time and invest domestic, dedicated talent towards weaponisation. These measures do not and cannot halt the programmes of the hard-core countries.

Third, as long as the P-5 members are not able to agree on a timeframe for nuclear disarmament, countries around the world are going to pursue these weapons. Under such a scenario, global disarmament appears to remain a pipe dream for the near future.

Libya NFZ: An Opportunity for India

2011-03-19T17:54:00.006+05:30

Here's the link to an article of mine on the Libyan NFZ and analyzing whether there is an opportunity for India.

While India's abstention at the UN vote on Libya is debatable, is there an opportunity for India and the Indian Air Force in particular in the Libyan crisis?

Now that there is a UN resolution, India could really raise its political capital in the US, France, and UK if it participated in implementing the No Fly Zone (NFZ) over Libya. A legal UN way to showcase out of area ops and relevance seems like a perfect opportunity for the Indian Air Force (IAF). India may not be required to send fighters instead may get to 'practice compatible operations' on the new AWACS. India has been cooperating with several air forces from around the world on a bilateral basis but a multinational operation under the UN umbrella has far reaching consequences. IAF establishing connections with US Air Force, Royal Air Force, French Air Force, AFRICOM, EUCOM, TRANSCOM and TACC (Tanker Airlift Control Center), particularly important for future humanitarian ops, would widen India's number of points of influence and broadcast.

Even if the Air Force is looking for an opportunity to cooperate, the lead has to come from the political side. Indian forces have not traditionally got itself involved in conflict situations; it has been active only in situations such as disaster management like during the post-Tsunami humanitarian and recovery operations in 2005. India in fact has stretched itself to undertake Peace Keeping Operations (PKOs). Shouldn't India put on the gear to take on more responsibility as it assumes more clout and power in the international arena?

More specifically on the Libyan issue, the question is why not. It is to be noted that the NFZ was asked for by the Arab League and the Organisation of Islamic Conference. India could look responsive and attentive to the larger Muslim community and human rights. These are by no means risk-free options for India or even for other countries. If it were such easy, risk-free options, the world would not have pondered over and watched the Libyan regime threatening "rivers of blood." But India cannot afford to sit back and relax and expect to become a major power, without assuming any responsibility.

What can India offer to the coalition under the UN umbrella? At an operational tactical level, Indian tankers or airlift or CSAR (Combat Search and Rescue) might be valuable. More importantly, it is a perfect chance to gain operational experience. Additionally, India could consider offering satellite imagery support. Getting an Indian planner into the CAOC (Combined Air and Space Operations Center) would be major and would go a long way; they would learn so much and form valuable connections for the future.

Meanwhile, it appears that Qadafi has already called a ceasefire, so nobody may need to actually do anything.

However, even the public and enthusiastic offer to provide support by India's political leadership would be transformational, and yet another way to increase perceptions that India belongs in the club of UN Security Council, and nations to be courted for global governance and action and to differentiate us from strategic competitors that 'would not be invited to the party.'

The abstention is not a problem, although the political message was loud and clear. France abstained in the UN from various operations it later sent aircraft to. Looks like the same is happening with Germany now. If the Indian leadership now actually decides to extend support for enforcing NFZ, India gets the benefit of not calling for action, but responding to the legitimacy of the passed resolution.

Finally, for India it is not about Libya. This is an opportunity to buy influence at a very low cost that makes it a major shareholder in any similar operation closer to home. Because of years of close operations people are talking about being comfortable with a non-US general in charge of the operation. There could be several spin-off indirect benefits to India. Shouldn't India be laying the groundwork now to have the option in a similar future situation? Opportunities like this do not happen every day. An Indian entry onto the world stage now might really cause people to 'wake up.' This is an opportunity not just for the Air Force but it will be an important posturing by the new assertive India – an unusual opportunity for India, the IAF and India-US partnership.

North Korea Goes the Asymmetric Way -- Cyber Warfare Capabilities

2011-03-15T18:10:00.005+05:30

One often hears about the Chinese cyber warfare capabilities but not so much the North Korean capabilities. Here's one report that talks about Pyongyang's growing capabilities in this arena. In 2007, Pyongyang was estimated to have 30,000 electronic warfare specialists, including some 1,200 personnel under two electronic warfare brigades. Each Army corps is reported to operate an automation unit, or an electronic warfare unit.

Some reports published by the North Korean Army in 2005 stated as to how Kim Jong-il himself had emphasised on the importance of cyber warfare in any future warfare, saying "Modern war is electronic warfare. Victory or defeat of a modern war depends on how to carry out electronic warfare."

Concerns about North Korea's cyber warfare squads are resurfacing after Friday's cyber and GPS jamming attacks, which are being blamed on the North. Pyongyang began developing electronic warfare capabilities in 1986 when it founded Mirim University, the present-day Automation University, to train specialists.

A defector who graduated from the university recalled that 25 Russian professors were invited from the Frunze Military Academy in the former Soviet Union to give lectures, and some 100 to 110 hackers were trained there every year.

Mirim is a five-year college. The Amrokgang College of Military Engineering, the National Defense University, the Air Force Academy and the Naval Academy are also reportedly training electronic warfare specialists.

Jang Se-yul of North Korean People's Liberation Front, an organization of former North Korean military officers and servicemen,
recalled that when he fled the North in 2007, "I heard that the North Korean military has about 30,000 electronic warfare
specialists, including some 1,200 personnel under two electronic warfare brigades."

"Each Army corps operates an automation unit, or an electronic warfare unit. " Jang used to be an officer of a North Korean electronic warfare command. Staff monitor traffic flow at the Korea Internet and Security Agency in Seoul on July 8, 2009.
Material published by the North Korean Army in 2005 quotes leader Kim Jong-il as saying, "Modern war is electronic warfare. Victory or defeat of a modern war depends on how to carry out electronic warfare."

In a 2006 report, the South Korean military warned North Korean hackers could paralyze the command post of the U.S. Pacific Command and damage computer systems on the U.S. mainland.

Experts believe that the North's 600 or so special hackers are as good as their CIA counterparts. They attempted in August 2008 to hack the computer of a colonel in South Korean Field Army headquarters. In 1999, the U.S. Defense Department said the most frequent visitor to its website was traced to North Korea.

Due to economic difficulties since the 1990s, the North Korean regime had a hard time boosting its conventional military
capabilities and instead focused on strengthening so-called asymmetric capabilities that would allow it to achieve relatively large effects with small expenses. That includes not only nuclear and biochemical weapons and missiles but also special forces and hackers.

China, the most significant threat to the United States, says DNI James Clapper

2011-03-14T17:26:00.004+05:30

Director of US National Intelligence (DNI), James Clapper, making a testimony to the Senate Committee on Armed Services on worldwide threats (March 10, 2011) singled out China as the most significant threat, followed by Russia. He added saying that the Chinese nuclear weapons poses the most serious "mortal threat" to the United States among nation states. While Iran and North Korea have been highlighted by the Obama Administration as bigger threats, Clapper clarified by adding that Tehran and Pyongyang are not strategic threats like Beijing as they do not have forces or mechanisms yet to carry out a nuclear strike on the United States. In fact, to Senator Manchin's question as to ask which country was going to the US' greatest adversary, Clapper replied, "Probably China."

For the full testimony, click here.

Other important threats highlighted in his testimony included terrorism; WMD proliferation (Iran and North Korea), apart from regional challenges such as China and North Korea in East Asia; Pakistan and Afghanistan in South Asia; Iran and Iraq in the Middle East, among others. China again figured prominently as Clapper looked specifically at Intelligence Threats and Threats to US Technological and Economic Leadership.

Should India Conduct An ASAT Test?

2011-03-11T04:55:00.006+05:30

This was the question that the panel in DC (including me) was trying to answer .... The meeting was organised by the Secure World Foundation, and very well attended by the Pentagon, State Department, US Military .... The meeting was chaired by Peter Garretson of the US Air Force.

You can read a media report here.

India’s space program, managed by the Indian Space Research Organization, has very strong civil roots and has done much to improve the everyday lives of its citizens. However, India’s space efforts have taken on a more military tone with help from their own missile defense system.

India may actually conduct an ASAT test .... It doesn't want to miss the boat again, as it did in the nuclear arena ....

The Secure World Foundation (SWF) hosted a special panel discussion on Tuesday to examine India's military space efforts and how their plans could influence overall Asian security.

The event, held at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, was a follow-up from a SWF co-sponsored conference held in January in New Delhi intended to understand the primary forces behind India’s increasingly militarized space program.

India’s space program, managed by the Indian Space Research Organization, has very strong civil roots and has done much to improve the everyday lives of its citizens. However, India’s space efforts have taken on a more military tone with help from their own missile defense system.

India has been working on its own missile defense system and has held six test intercepts since November 2006; four were reported to be successful. The most recent test was performed on Sunday. Following that test, India’s Scientific Adviser to the Defence Minister, V.K. Saraswat, said India has “all the technologies and building blocks which can be used for anti-satellite (ASAT) missions” in the low-earth and polar orbits. ASAT weapons are launched into space to incapacitate or destroy satellites for strategic military purposes.

“A missile defense program can very easily be used as a technology demonstartor program for an ASAT capability,” said Victoria Samson, director of SWF’s Washington office.

The United States demonstrated this in 2008 when they fired a modified SM-3 missile from a Navy ship and destroyed a military satellite named USA 193 in orbit.

Space security is a growing interest in India.

“We know how important space has a role today, starting from your cell phones and other gadgets that you use,” Bharath Gopalaswamy told the audience at the event. Gopalaswamy is a researcher in the Arms Control and Non-proliferation Programme at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

In order to take out a 50-foot by 50-foot wall during World War II it would require 12,000 bombs, Gopalaswamy said. With today’s precision-guided munitions, that use Global Positioning System satellites to navigate, you just need one bomb.

“Every country values its space assets extremely highly,” Gopalaswamy said, “you want to protect them and you want to defend them. If I were the military, I would be saying I want all options on the table.”

India’s scientific community is open to having an ASAT test, according to Gopalaswamy. “They said test it, but be careful, about where you test it and how you test it.”

“India might do an ASAT test in the next five to 10 years,” said Rajeswari Rajagopalan, senior fellow at Observer Reseach Foundation, New Delhi.

But is ASAT development the biggest threat to satellites?

Increasing awareness of space debris and continued efforts to develop and implement international measures to tackle the problem is a major concern for all countries.

Significant on-orbit collisions, such as the collision of the French military satellite Cerise with a portion of an Ariane rocket in 1996, and Russia’s Cosmos 2251 crashing into Iridium 33 in 2009, have encouraged the recognition of space debris as a significant threat.

“As it stands today, in space, the probability of debris hitting a satellite is more than an adversary taking your satellite down,” Gopalaswamy said.

China's Stealth Fighter: Implications of the J-20

2011-02-06T08:41:00.007+05:30

Here's the link to an article of mine on the recent test flight of the Chinese fifth generation fighter aircraft, J-20. The article published by ORF can be found here.

The PLAAF (PLA Air Force) conducted the test flight of its new generation stealth fighter J-20 on January 11, 2011, just days before US Defence Secretary Robert Gates landed in Beijing on a mission to repair the bilateral defence ties. The timing of the test flight was curious. Was this itself a message for the US as also the rest of the world? Or is this another demonstration of the lack of coordination at the highest levels of the Chinese government?

J-20 will rival for the latest US stealth fighter - the F-22 Raptor. Russia is also in the process of developing one - the Sukhoi T-50 that made its flight test in January 2010 - although it is going to be another decade before it gets inducted into service. The fact that China has been able to develop the J-20 prototype demonstrates the ability of the PLA to make steady progress in an area where it is otherwise considered weak.

Having said that, it remains to be seen as to how good the new aircraft is. Comparing it with the F-22 or the Russian T-50 is going to be mere speculation. Whether it actually makes it into the fifth generation category or not is also an issue. It will depend on the kind of avionics & communication gear, sensor performance and low radar reflectivity, speed, how advanced it is in terms of the composite material used and a variety of other parameters. But it should be borne in mind that China has been encountering serious problems as far as developing jet engines are concerned. They have not been able to produce a good engine indigenously even for their fourth generation aircrafts.

Several unofficial Chinese and foreign defence-related websites have published pictures of the J-20 prototype doing high-speed taxi test, a step closer to being readied for actual flights. The J-20 has been presumably developed at the Chengdu Aircraft Design Institute,1 although there has been no concrete evidence of such a system being developed until these pictures popped up. While the Chinese authorities have not commented upon the new aircraft, General He Weirong, deputy head of PLAAF had stated in 2009 that China was readying to do the test flight of its first stealth fighter and that it would be operationalised in "eight or 10 years."2

Aviation experts and China watchers have said that the photos seem genuine. Gareth Jennings of the Jane's Defence Weekly noted that since "the nose wheel is off the ground in one picture suggest[ing] that this was a high-speed taxi test." He added that "all the talk we've heard is that this could happen some time the next few weeks".

There are also doubts about whether the technology has been developed indigenously and if not, where they got the technology from. Xu Yongling, one of the top test pilots stated that the J-20 "is a masterpiece of China's technological innovation."3 He added that the jet has advanced supersonic cruise capabilities.

There have been several reports suggesting that US technology that is the foundation for the new fighter. In January 2011, an Indian-American engineer (who worked at the Northrop Grumman, where he worked from 1968 to 1986) was sentenced 32 years imprisonment for selling military secrets to China. Noshir S Gowadia who called himself a father of the technology that protects the B-2 stealth bomber from heat-seeking missiles was originally arrested by the FBI in 2005.4

A second potential source would have been the US F-117 Nighthawk stealth fighter, the world's first operational stealth fighter, which was shot down by a Serbian anti-aircraft missile during the Kosovo War in 1999. The US hardly took any step to obtain the wreckage of the downed F-117 and several critical elements appear to have made its way into the Chinese hands. In fact, a RAND study titled, Friction and Operational Problems, notes that the US did not go about destroying the wreckage as the site attracted large number of people including government officials and journalists.. General John M Loh, a former commander of Tactical Air Command said, "I'm surprised we didn't bomb it, because the standing procedure has always been that when you lose something of real or perceived value - in this case real technology, stealth - you destroy it."5 The report stated that the initial thinking within the military was to destroy the wreckage but they were forced to reconsider "because they could not have located it quickly enough to attack it before it was surrounded by civilians and the media." It said, "For the record, it should be noted that USAF F-15Es were immediately put on alert to destroy the wreckage with AGM-130s after the F-117 downing was confirmed, but by the time the wreckage location could be positively determined, CNN was on the scene and collateral damage issues precluded the attack."6An Aviation Week and Space Technology report on September 27, 1999 noted that while Moscow obtained some parts from the wreckage, a significant size of the airframe found its way into China.7

Admiral Davor Domazet-Loso, who was the head of the Croatian military during the Kosovo War, stated, "At the time, our intelligence reports told of Chinese agents crisscrossing the region where the F-117 disintegrated, buying up parts of the plane from local farmers. We believe the Chinese used those materials to gain an insight into secret stealth technologies … and to reverse-engineer them."8

The US has played down the Chinese stealth achievement. The Pentagon spokesman Col. David Lapan suggested that while the Chinese are working on a fifth generation fighter, the progress has been uneven.9 Another spokesman Geoff Morrell was sceptical about the stealth capabilities of the new aircraft.10 Although the US has known of the Chinese stealth aircraft, they have given different estimates as to when such a system would be ready: from 2018 to 2025.

The new Chinese fighter appears to be modelled around the F-22, a heavy twin-engine fighter about the same size as that of Lockheed's F-22. F-35, which has currently gone into the production mode, is a single engine fighter aircraft, smaller in comparison to the F-22. There have been speculations as to which one the J-20 will be modelled around and the pictures now suggest that it is closer in appearance to that of the F-22. Some reports suggest that J-20 is possibly and larger and heavier than the Russia T-50 or the US F-22.11 The large size indicates the ability to carry heavy weapon load as well as the long range of the aircraft.

The US, which has stopped the production of the expensive F-22 Raptor, preferring the cheaper F-35, may now be confronted with a new rival. Given the size of the new stealth fighter, as mentioned before, it appears closer to the F-22 and therefore the Chinese test-flight of the J-20 will likely trigger some re-thinking within the US defence community. F-22 is far superior to the F-35 and the Pentagon may be forced to re-start the production, which was halted in 2009 after the originally produced 187 were given to the US Air Force. Although both are of the current generation, the F-22 is clearly a superior fighter that ensures air superiority whereas F-35 is intended primarily as a ground attack aircraft. One such analyst commented that there could be a new consensus developing for "the resurrection of the F-22."12

There are important implications for Asian countries that look at these developments with wariness. Japan, for one, has been arguing for an F-22 Raptor but had been asked by the US to settle for F-35. Analysts in Washington have argued that exporting F-22 stealth fighters could potentially impede the "strategically important Sino-US relations." Accordingly, Japan is believed to be developing its own stealth fighter, called Shinshin, meaning the heart of God. Japan had allocated about 8.5 billion yen in 2010 for the purpose. Japan plans to spend a total of a total of 39.4 billion yen for the fighter programme until the fiscal year 2015.13

It remains to be seen as to how India will respond to this latest development. New Delhi has already tied up with Moscow for the joint design and development of a fifth generation fighter aircraft and the Indian Air Force plans to induct into service 300 of them by 2017-18.14 Meanwhile, South Korea plans to speed up its procurement of an advanced fleet of stealth fighters, ready for induction anywhere between 2016 and 2020. The EADS Eurofighter jets, Lockheed F-35 and the Boeing F-15 are in the fray for the Korean order.15

Whether the J-20 matches the F-22 or not, the Chinese flight-test has spot-lighted the spiralling arms race in Asia and beyond.

(Dr. Rajeswari Rajagopalan is a Senior Fellow at the Institute of Security Studies, Observer Research Foundation)
________________________________________

1Reports in 2002 (Jane's Defence Weekly and New Scientist) talked about Shenyang Aircraft Corporation being selected for heading the R&D for the new fighter. An article later in Military Technology in 2006 brought out three designs - J-12 and J-14 by Shenyang Aircraft Corporation and J-13 by Chengdu Aircraft Corporation. For more details see, "China's 5th Generation Stealth Fighter Programme," Asian Defence News, October 12, 2010, available at http://asian-defence.blogspot.com/2010/10/chinas-5th-generation-stealth-fighter.html.
2Jeremy Page, "A Chinese Stealth Challenge," The Wall Street Journal, January 05, 2001, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703808704576061674166905408.html.
3Press Trust of India, "China Denies Stealing US Stealth Technology," Hindustan Times, January 26, 2011, available at http://www.hindustantimes.com/China-denies-stealing-US-stealth-technology/Article1-654833.aspx.
4The B-2 is a strategic, long-range stealth bomber capable of flying more than 6,000 miles without stopping for refuelling and has a carrying capacity of 40,000 pounds of conventional or nuclear weapons. For details on the espionage case, see Arun Kumar, "NRI Engineer of B-2 Bomber Gets 32 Years for Selling Secrets to China," NRI Internet, January 25, 2011, available at http://www.nriinternet.com/NRI_terrorist/USA/Noshir_Gowadia/Index.htm; and "Former B-2 Engineer Convicted of Selling US Secrets," New York Times, Associated Press, August 11, 2010, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C03EFDA1639F932A2575BC0A9669D8B63.
5Vago Muradian, "Stealth Compromised by Not Destroying F-117 Wreckage," Defense
6Daily, April 2, 1999, cited in Benjamin S Lambeth, NATO's Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment, (RAND: Santa Monica, 2001), p. 119.
7Benjamin S Lambeth, NATO's Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment, (RAND: Santa Monica, 2001), pp. 119-20.
8Cited in Peter Lee, "The Tearful Origins of China's Stealth," Asia Times Online, January 29, 2011, available at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/MA29Ad01.html. This account goes onto greater details as to how China took away critical components from the wreckage site. It said, "The navigation system, fuselage fragments with the Stealth coating, and high temperature nozzle components of the engine were spirited into the basement of the Chinese Embassy. Unfortunately, according to this story, there was a locator beacon inside the INU powered by a battery and, before the Chinese could discover and disable it, the US military was alerted to the location of the F-117 fragments and executed the [Chinese embassy] bombing."
9"Chinese Stealth Fighter Jet May Use US Technology," The Guardian (UK), Associated Press, January 23, 2011, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jan/23/china-stealth-fighter-us-technology.
10Jeremy Page, "A Chinese Stealth Challenge," The Wall Street Journal, January 05, 2001, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703808704576061674166905408.html.
11Tony Capaccio, "Pentagon Still Learning China Stealth Jet Details, Morrell Says," Bloomberg, January 26, 2011, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-01-26/pentagon-still-learning-china-stealth-jet-details-morrell-says.html.
12Reports suggest that the J-20 is about 75 ft long with a wingspan of 45 ft and weighs around 80,000 lb, without any external aid, indicating large size fuel tank. For details see, "China 'Leaks' Sneak Peek of its First Stealth Aircraft Going for A Test Run," Daily Mail, January 06, 2011, available at http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1344115/J-20-stealth-fighter-China-leaks-sneak-peek-latest-aircraft-test-run.html.
13Tony Capaccio, "Pentagon Still Learning China Stealth Jet Details, Morrell Says," Bloomberg, January 26, 2011, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-01-26/pentagon-still-learning-china-stealth-jet-details-morrell-says.html.
14For details see, Kosuke Takahashi, "Japan Frets over the US's F-22s," Asia Times, February 05, 2009, available at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/KB05Dh01.html; Dennis Sevakis, "Killing the F-22," American Thinker, April 11, 2009, available at http://www.americanthinker.com/2009/04/killing_the_f22.html.
15The idea of the joint production of the fifth generation fighter aircraft was reached in 2007 and the agreement was signed during the visit of President Dmitry Medvedev to New Delhi in December 2010. The fighter aircraft is jointly being developed by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited from India and the Sukhoi Design Bureau and Rosoboronexport from Russia.
16For details see, "S Korea to Speed Up Combat Fighter Purchase - Yonhap," Reuters, January 29, 2011, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/30/korea-defence-fighter-idUSTOE70T00720110130.

Drivers of India's ASAT POlicy

2011-02-04T17:55:00.005+05:30

Here is a paper that I had done recently on the drivers of India's ASAT policy and presented at an international conference on India's space programme. The conference was jointly organised by ORF, SIPRI, Secure World Foundation (USA) and JNU.

The paper argues that while India’s space policy itself does not appear to have changed yet: India continues to oppose militarization of space and – at least officially – has not yet launched an ASAT program, there have definitely been fluctuations in Indian policy, and though some of these were in evidence long before the Chinese test, that test could very well have increased Indian uncertainties about its traditional policies.

If anyone is interested in getting a word document of the same, I will be happy to send you one.

China’s anti-satellite (ASAT) test of January 2007 has brought renewed focus on space security. The Chinese test could also have forced a re-evaluation of India’s traditional policy against the militarization of space and more specifically created pressures for an Indian ASAT system. India’s policy itself does not appear to have changed yet: India continues to oppose militarization of space and – at least officially – has not yet launched an ASAT program. But there have definitely been fluctuations in Indian policy, and though some of these were in evidence long before the Chinese test, that test could very well have increased Indian uncertainties about its traditional policies.

India remains in S Asian bottle

2010-12-25T09:06:00.006+05:30

Here's the link to an article of mine on Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao's visit that appeared in today's Pioneer.

The biggest success for China insofar India is to derive maximum advantage from her emerging economy status while at the same time keeping India tied down in sub-continental squabbling. The Wen visit achieved just that.

Premier Wen Jiabao’s three-day visit has produced mixed results, with the business community somewhat satisfied with Wen’s promise to open Chinese market for Indian products, although there was no progress on major political issues that were of critical importance to India. On the other hand, this visit was not expected to result in major breakthroughs. Rather, it seems to have been designed to cool temperatures after a series of face-offs between the two countries. But it may not have achieved even this limited objective because the visit appears to have led to even greater wariness in Delhi about China.

From the Chinese perspective, the focus was almost exclusively on economic and trade issues, evident in the 400-member business delegation that accompanied Wen. But contrary to what many have argued, strengthened economics ties have not contributed to better relations on the political front. If the last few years have seen a dramatic increase in trade, so has been the increase in tension on a range of political issues.

India’s focus, on the other hand, was on several political issues, on which the Indian leadership wanted some resolution from Beijing: the changing Chinese policy on Jammu & Kashmir, China-Pakistan nuclear cooperation and terrorism.

From a neutral approach on J&K in the 1980s through 1990s, China has in recent years adopted a more aggressive and partisan role, questioning even the territorial integrity of India. China’s attempt to carve out areas out of the western sector of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) is reflective of the Chinese intent in rewriting history and redrawing geographical boundaries. How far back would China go into history to make new territorial claims is something to be watched out for. While the recent deletion of about 1,500 km from the boundary is a new phenomenon, the Chinese questioning of Indian territorial integrity has been evident in a series of recent Chinese actions. The issuance of stapled visas to people from J&K, denial of travel permits to senior military officers commanding the region are but two instances. Chinese unwillingness to exchange maps of the western sector at least for a decade is reflective of the Chinese intent to question India’s territorial integrity on J&K. While these may be tactical and minor pricks, India should not lose sight of the strategic thinking behind these tactics.

Second, China-Pakistan nuclear and missile cooperation of the 1980s and 1990s has had lasting geopolitical effects on India. The recent Chinese proposal to sell additional nuclear reactors, grandfathering the agreement as it were in total defiance of the international regime, is a dangerous development. This has implications not just for the India-Pakistan military balance but for the global community. Pakistan is on the threshold of being a failed state, and breeding a dangerous cocktail of terrorism and WMD proliferation. The global non-proliferation regime and the US seem unable or unwilling to put the necessary pressure on China not to go ahead with the proposal.

Third, terrorism should have ideally formed an issue of commonality between India and China given that both countries have been victims of terror. But the Chinese selective approach to fight terrorism places New Delhi and Beijing at two ends of the spectrum. More importantly, Beijing refuses to come on board in acknowledging and putting the onus on Pakistan when the Pak-based terror groups have been actively promoting terrorism in India. The best evidence was the post-Mumbai terror attacks, when China refused to be party to UN action against Pakistan-based terror groups like let for their role in the Mumbai attacks. Selectively fighting terrorism in Xinjiang alone will hurt China in the long-term.

It must be borne that these are rather tactical issues in the bilateral relations to keep India embroiled in the Indian neighborhood. The larger question is whether Beijing recognizes the fact that India is also a rising power that needs its strategic space.

The new policy approach towards India is part of a well-considered, clearly articulated and well-orchestrated policy to deny India the space and potential to move beyond South Asia. In 2005, the Chinese leadership had got an internal study done on India, written by the top South Asia specialists including Prof Ma Jiali, who used to frequent India in the late 1990s and early 2000s. The study recommended, among other things, that China take steps to maintain its strategic advantages over India and try to keep India bottled within South Asia. While the study may be a bit dated, the conclusion of the study appears to have been taken to heart by the Chinese policy elites.

India has been admirably careful and diplomatic in handling Chinese provocations so far. India has little need to open up a northern front while it continues to have trouble from Pakistan. But New Delhi also has limitations, especially in justifying its passive policies domestically. Thus, its forbearance may not last. Hopefully, Beijing will realize that its hardline policies towards Delhi will be counter-productive and that India and China have complementary goals that require cooperation rather than confrontation.

Wen Jiabao Visit -- Expectations and Deliverables

2010-12-19T08:56:00.002+05:30

Here's the link to an article of mine on the recent visit of Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, looking at the potential areas that the Indian leadership is likely to take up with the visiting leader. For the full article, click here.

Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao is on a three-day visit to India against the backdrop of both increasing rivalry between the two Asian giants as well as opportunities for greater cooperation. This is manifested from time to time as both tension and cooperation, both at the bilateral and multilateral levels. Whether tension or cooperation predominates this visit will reveal a lot about the long-term prospect of this important bilateral relationship.

The two sides have improved their relations to a great extent in the last few years, particularly in the economic domain. The trade ties have grown from just US $ 1.99 billion in 1999 to nearly US $ 60 billion this year, but without seeming to have any positive impact on the political relationship. This article outlines the major concerns that New Delhi has. How they are addressed by the two sides will decide how this visit is judged.

For the Indian side, there are four key issues that Prime Minister Manmohan Singh will likely take up with Wen Jiabao. These are the opening of Chinese market for Indian goods; Chinese policy approach on Jammu & Kashmir, including that of the issuance of stapled visas; nuclear cooperation with Pakistan; and terrorism.

Opening up of the Chinese Market

India-China economic and commercial relations have improved tremendously in the last few years. Even while there is imbalance in the trade, this is one area that has continued to flourish without major hurdles. The trade deficit is hugely in favour of China. Another area of concern is that India continues to export mostly raw materials while we import manufactured products. This imbalance is an issue that needs to be addressed.

One major demand from the Indian side has been the opening up of the Chinese market for India. India has demanded opening of the market in three key sectors – pharmaceuticals, IT and agriculture. In spite of efforts by the Indian government and the private sector, there has been hardly any movement. India has a sizeable R&D and technological base in the area of pharmaceuticals and India has produced a variety of cheap and effective drugs for a number of diseases including AIDS. However, India has not been allowed to operate in the Chinese market. Similar has been the case in the areas of IT and agricultural products. This is another issue that the Indian leadership has to take up with China.

Chinese Policy on Jammu & Kashmir

China’s policy on Jammu and Kashmir has oscillated from one end of the spectrum to the other. From a policy of neutrality in the 1980s and 1990s, China has adopted a more active and partisan role today. China’s policy on J&K today represents a mix of aggressiveness and determination, emboldened by the rising politico, economic and military might of the nation. This change in its stance is partly contributed to by the fact that the US is a declining power and there are other power centres in the making, including that of New Delhi and Beijing. The Obama Administration, particularly in the first year of its administration, followed an extremely pro-China policy, adding to the confidence of Beijing. Because of this, China began to sense that it was an important power to reckon with, not just in the region, but even in global terms. Such confidence on the part of Beijing led to more aggressive behaviour in China’s dealing with all of its neighbours and even the United States. The number of maritime issues between the PLAN (PLA Navy) and the US Navy and conflicts involving Vietnam and Indonesia, and India on the land border, are reflective of China’s growing muscle and its willingness to flex its muscles. This new more interventionist policy on J&K appears to be an outgrowth of the US-China joint plan of action vis-a-vis South Asia. It appears to be an after-effect of the US-China Joint Statement in November 2009 for the two countries to jointly manage South Asia. While the issuance of stapled visas may not be directly linked to the changed policy on J&K, China has begun to make serious assertions that the Indian-controlled part of Kashmir is a disputed territory.

Nuclear Cooperation with Pakistan

Nuclear and missile cooperation in India’s neighbourhood has had long-lasting impact in the geopolitics of South Asia. China’s proliferation of nuclear weapons/technology along with its delivery vehicles has clearly altered the India-Pakistan military balance. While some analysts suggest that this is a thing of the past, the recent Chinese proposal to build additional nuclear plants in Pakistan indicates otherwise, in addition to being a clear violation of the international agreements that China is party to. China is seeking to ‘grandfather’ the current agreement into an earlier agreement for the supply of the nuclear reactors. The international community, including the UN and its associated bodies, appears to be unable to persuade China to desist from supplying these reactors. The US appears unable or unwilling to put the kind of pressure needed to stop Beijing from carrying out this arrangement.

Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and the issue of nuclear proliferation have continued to be major issues of concern for US, India and the global community at large. Earlier revelations about AQ Khan having assisted Libya, North Korea and Iran with materials related to uranium enrichment is neither forgotten nor can it be ruled out in the future. The US’s overlooking of Pakistan’s nuclear activities in the 1980s to achieve its Cold War objectives has led to these dangers in Pakistan today. If the US is unwilling to take strong measures against the latest Chinese proposal, the effects could be much more damaging not only for India, but for Pakistan, China and the US.

Terrorism

While India and China are “victims” of terror, the two countries differ drastically on the definitional aspects of terror. For India, terror has originated and continues to originate from Pakistan while China has refused to put the responsibility on Pakistan. The best illustration was the post-Mumbai terror attacks when the UN was to take action against the Pakistan-based terror groups for their role in the Mumbai attacks. China refused to see India’s or even the larger global community’s point of view on fixing the responsibility on Pakistan. China has to recognise that it cannot selectively fight Islamic terrorism only in Xinjiang.

While these are some of the issues that India should take up with the Chinese leadership, it will be naive to expect that China will give in on any of these issues. Wen Jiabao’s visit to India is more of a good will visit or a CBM (Confidence Building Measures) measure to cool the temperatures after the recent tensions on the border as well as the J&K issues. This visit is not expected to be a foreign policy success for either of the governments, from that limited perspective. However, the two countries will continue to be on an “engage” mode, since engagement is the mantra.

As far as China is concerned, Wen Jiabao’s trip is almost singularly driven by economic objectives, evident from the 400-member business delegation that is accompanying Wen Jiabao. China, particularly after the global financial crisis, is on a look-out for markets in Asia, and India offers the largest market. Therefore, China’s singular focus on economic issues is understandable, but India should not give into the Chinese demands without a quid pro quo.

North Korean Crisis and China

2010-12-06T14:50:00.004+05:30

Here's an article of mine on the North Korean crisis, looking specifically at the role of China. The article was published on the ORF website and can be accessed here.

China has to recognise the pitfalls of its approach as it deals with North Korea. China has to recognise that North Korean actions are triggering several developments that are not necessarily in the interests of China. For instance, it has triggered major debates on defence in Japan about becoming proactive in defending themselves, including the option of nuclearisation. Can a nuclearised East Asia be ruled out in the next decade if Pyongyang is to continue on the same path?

North Korea appears to be in an aggressive mode with its second attack this year against South Korea, provoking the world at large, and certainly its neighbours, to respond. In March this year, Pyongyang had sunk the 1,200 ton South Korean corvette Cheonan in the Yellow Sea, which prompted the United Nations to issue a resolution condemning the incident, although it did not blame Pyongyang for the incident. This week Pyongyang shelled a South Korean fishing community and military base in Yeonpyeong, a disputed island, on Nov.23 with highly inflammable ammunition that killed four people, including two civilian construction workers, and blew the windows out of a school and torched houses. As of November 29, the US and South Korea had completed their third day of naval exercises off the Korean Peninsula’s west coast, although Seoul has cancelled the live firing drill at Yeonpyeong.

Meanwhile, Pyongyang has also clarified that it is pursuing its nuclear programme vigorously. It recently stated that it has a uranium-enrichment facility with thousands of centrifuges, to provide for a light water reactor, for “peaceful purpose of meeting electricity demand.” Quoting an editorial from the ruling communist party’s newspaper, Rodong Sinmun, media reports said, “Our nuclear energy development, which is for peaceful purposes and to solve the electricity demand, will be more active.” In fact, this was the first time that Pyongyang has openly talked about its nuclear programme. The existence of the modern enrichment facility was disclosed by Stanford University professor and scientist Siegfried S Hecker, who was given a tour of the site on November 12.1

What has prompted Pyongyang to adopt such hardline measures in the recent years? The “military-first politics” of Kim Jong Il, the expansion of DPRK military capabilities and its increasing defence budget continue to be an area of concern. Pyongyang has continued to argue that nuclear weapons and missiles along with their conventional capabilities are required as deterrents against possible South Korean, Japanese and American military aggression against North Korea. The North Korean leadership has also maintained that this is one possible way that it can get the international attention and that the world will engage it only under such conditions. This argument is difficult to sell anymore given that the international community, and the US in particular, have been engaged with Pyongyang on a bilateral basis as well as through the Six Party talks format.

Second, is there a message for the world that the new leadership in North Korea is as hardline as the old one? In fact, continuity can be visualised as far as Pyongyang’s future trajectory is concerned, given that Kim Jong Il chose the youngest son and not the older one (who is considered a peacenik) to carry on with the Kim Jong Il legacy in Asian affairs.

What has been the role of China in this regard? The Chinese interests, while they seem congruent on the surface with that of the US and other regional powers, are actually different and incongruent. For instance, the Chinese and American perspectives about the issue of North Korean stability are very different. For the regional powers as well as the US, what they want is a denuclearised North Korea at peace with its neighbours, and also a country that protects the human rights for its own people, whereas Chinese interests are to ensure that there is no crisis that might prompt the influx of large number of refugees into China and that there are no US troops on the Chinese borders, say if South Korea takes over the North after a collapse. Therefore, the Chinese interests are driven by narrower perceptions of North Korean stability.

Pyongyang has adopted a defiant attitude in its dealings with its neighbourhood, with the possible exception of Beijing. Beijing has become almost the only friend of the Kim Jong Il regime, extending the crucial economic, political and moral support. China remains North Korea’s largest trading partner as well as an important source of food, fuel and arms.2 Given that Pyongyang’s relations, particularly with Seoul, have declined drastically after the two nuclear tests, Beijing’s bargaining power with the North Korean leadership should have increased dramatically.

Some analysts argue that the US is dependent on China to put any serious pressure on North Korea. While this may be partly true, it is also possible that China has not put any serious pressure on North Korea because they see it as a buffer state between itself and the US allies in its neighbourhood. Second, with the US having been preoccupied with Iraq and Afghanistan, China has managed to create a vital strategic space in Asia, particularly as the US deals with problem cases like North Korea or Myanmar. In both of these cases, China has emerged as the conduit for any dealing, be it the democracy, human rights or the WMD proliferation issues. Therefore, China does not want to lose that privileged position where the West has to route itself through Beijing to achieve some of their foreign policy objectives.

However, some have argued that the West has overestimated the Chinese hold on North Korea and that Beijing is unable to exercise that kind of influence on Pyongyang. There are experts who note that China is beginning to reach a point of frustration with North Korea on three issues: its increasingly belligerent behaviour; growing economic crisis; and the leadership succession issues. The recently-released WikiLeaks too suggested that China may have been re-thinking its policy towards North Korea, although the Cheonan incident and the recent shelling incident have established that Beijing has not altered its policy towards North Korea. There have been undoubtedly subtle changes in the last few years in China’s approach towards Pyongyang, evident from the support lent by China in imposing sanctions on North Korea post-nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009.3 There were reports which noted that after the Cheonan incident, although China did not issue any action against North Korea despite strong evidence, President Hu Jintao is believed to have directed the leadership to be less provocative and avoid confrontations.4 Nonetheless, the subtle change that one witnessed is clearly reversible, which was evident in the recent crises.

Whether there is a change or not, China’s role in finding a solution to the North Korean crisis is critical. However, like any other country, China will get on board with an effective response only if it sees that its interests are affected or its interests can be served better by an active role. For China, there are three issues that could drive a more active role. As mentioned earlier, one of the major imperatives for China keeping Pyongyang as an ally is because it is a buffer state between the pro-west US-allies and Beijing. The Chinese have been paranoid about the US troops on its border. Second, in the case of any instability in North Korea or a serious conflict, there could be a huge refugee influx into China -- a nightmare scenario becoming a reality for Beijing. Lastly, any serious crisis on the Korean Peninsula can also weaken the Chinese standing and hurt its leadership, exposing its inability to deal with a problem successfully in its neighbourhood. This will seriously damage the image of the global leader-in-the-making.

In conclusion, China has to recognise the pitfalls of its approach as it deals with North Korea. China has to recognise that North Korean actions are triggering several developments that are not necessarily in the interests of China. For instance, it has triggered major debates on defence in Japan about becoming proactive in defending themselves, including the option of nuclearisation. Can a nuclearised East Asia be ruled out in the next decade if Pyongyang is to continue on the same path?

As India pushes east, so China worries ....

2010-11-04T20:27:00.003+05:30

Here's the link to a story on Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's Japan visit by Peter Brown. The story, quoting me, is appearing in tomorrow's Asia Times.

Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's trip to Japan in late October was a success, but not a complete success. Thanks to Japan's fundamentally pacifist worldview and rigid take on nuclear cooperation, the outcome was somewhat underwhelming.

For the full story, click here.

As India pushes east, so China worries
By Peter J Brown

Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's trip to Japan in late October was a success, but not a complete success. Thanks to Japan's fundamentally pacifist worldview and rigid take on nuclear cooperation, the outcome was somewhat underwhelming.

Real damage might have been done if Manmohan and Japanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan had decided to forego an annual summit they have held since 2005, rather than announce a comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) after making little headway in firming up strategic and civil nuclear cooperation issues during the annual cycle of discussions between the two countries.

"With a Strategic Partnership being declared - in 2006 - a Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation being issued, and an Action Plan related to the Joint Declaration thereafter being issued almost in successive years, expecting another deliverable of the magnitude of the previous ones to be pulled out of the hat - or turban - again this year is tantamount to placing an overly high threshold of expectation," said Sourabh Gupta, senior research associate at Samuels International Associates in Washington, DC.

Expectations matter, but above all else, this trip and its limited agenda might have been a strong indicator of the nature of a rapidly maturing relationship. There could be little doubt that, regardless of what other positive moves the meeting held for the bilateral relationship, the participants were pleased by the fact that approximately one quarter of the allotted time was devoted to the topic of how best to deal with China.

"Most of all, India wanted further Japanese foreign direct investment especially in infrastructure, and technological assistance on nuclear power plants, along with [some sign that they were] reaffirming their mistrust against China," said Yukie Yoshikawa, a senior research fellow at the Edwin O Reischauer Center for East Asian Studies in Washington DC.

In response to Japanese concerns that it has been slower than other countries to capitalize on the opportunities that India's rapidly growing economy presents, India was quite willing to make important concessions in the process.

"Japan fears it is already a late comer into the Indian market. Japan has been slow in signing a free-trade agreement with India, and some companies already investing in India, including Suzuki, were dying to have the EPA approved," said Yoshikawa. "The [Japanese government] should be very pleased by India's strategic decision to of drop agricultural products for Japan. India compromised with Japan to exclude rice, and wheat [as well as other products] from the EPA."

To Professor Kazuto Suzuki of Hokkaido University's School of Public Policy, the summit provided a positive reflection of the steady overall improvement in ties between the two nations.

"It was good meeting and there was a good advancement of the relationship - not the best though," Suzuki said.

Beijing was watching the proceedings closely because if both the establishment of an EPA and the conclusion of nuclear deal had taken place during Manmohan's visit, the impact on China would have been substantial. Especially so given that the heated showdown between Japan and China over the fishing boat seizure near disputed islands claimed by Japan, China and Taiwan is still simmering.

"From a Chinese point of view, these strengthening ties between Japan and India represent nothing less than an effort to contain China - something that has yet to be accomplished completely," said Suzuki, who added that the initiation of institutionalized military and security cooperation between India and Japan that has been underway since 2008 means that Japan and India have formed "a semi-alliance" which is reinforced "by regular 2+2 meetings and military cooperation at all levels".

Gupta poured some cold water on the notion that this series of bilateral discussions is gaining momentum at a rapid enough pace and in such a way that might cause Beijing to think seriously about taking decisive moves to counter this trend.

"Going forward, there might be grounds for creeping doubt as to how fast this bilateral relationship will proceed under the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) PMs, [former Japanese prime minister Yoshiro] Mori and [his successors], had been the decisive driving force behind Japan's new outreach to India - and each LDP PM's degree of emphasis on Indo-Japanese ties bore a relative correlation with his anti-China [or pro-China] inclinations. That dynamic is not readily apparent in the DPJ," said Gupta.

It is possible that the DPJ contains an invisible dividing line which seems generational when it comes to Japan's relations with India.
"The older generation including [former premier Yukio] Hatoyama, [former DPJ leader Ichiro] Ozawa particularly, and Kan - privately perhaps too - who take a more autonomist view of Japanese geopolitical strategy, had a place for India," said Gupta. "The younger generation including [Foreign Minister Seiji] Maehara .... [DPJ deputy secretary general Yukio] Edano .... even as they hold hawkish views on China, developed their worldviews at a time when India's image was at its poorest during the late 1970s to the early 1990s. Hence they are not altogether sold on the India strategic connection."

This younger group certainly does not dismiss its importance, but simply prefers to place more emphasis on building Japan's strategic ties with allies positioned closer to Japan.

"India is beneath the radar in their scheme of things. But this is all very tentative and preliminary, and time will tell how this dynamic within the DPJ plays out in terms of India-Japan relations in the coming years," said Gupta.

How India goes about cultivating its vital relationship with the 10 countries in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) will also affect its relationship with Japan.

"India's most common refrain on Asian security architecture issues is that it be 'open, balanced and inclusive'. For it to turn out to be such, India's obligation is to participate within its processes, engage actively with all stakeholders, carry its share of the burden, and not be an irritant in the mix,'' said Gupta, ''ASEAN is a key shareholder in this dynamic and for India, a gateway too to its East Asian destiny - hence the low key but utterly concentrated effort on New Delhi's part to get this relationship right."

Gupta described the signing of the ASEAN-India Free Trade Agreement last year as "a big deal", and the same is true of New Delhi's decision to invite President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono of Indonesia, Southeast Asia's biggest economy, to be the honored guest at India's forthcoming annual Republic Day parade.

As part of its Look East policy, India sees these relationships as an important bridge to East Asia. ''A more robust economic engagement with Malaysia, ASEAN and Japan will provide strategic ballast down the line," said Gupta.

South Korea will certainly play an important role here and both Japan and India agree that better coordination is in order. They also zeroed in on what to do about Japanese allegations (denied by Beijing) that China is holding back on exports of the rare earth minerals that are a crucial ingredient for their hi-tech industries.

"It was significant that the two PM's mentioned an India-Japan dialog on Africa on foreign policy and security issues. We all know what has prompted such a dialog. Rare earths supply problems were also discussed along with potential cooperation in developing technologies to mitigate the problem," said Subrata Ghoshroy, a research associate at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology's Program in Science, Technology, and Society.

However, China has nothing whatsoever to do with the chronic differences affecting Tokyo and New Delhi on the nuclear front, where India and the United Stated last year pledged closer civilian nuclear cooperation.

"Japan was not enthusiastic about the US-India nuclear deal and gave it grudging support toward the end. Japan is also concerned about the status of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) as can be surmised from the joint vision statement issued during the Indian PM's visit," said Ghoshroy. "Singh did not directly mention India's stance on the CTBT and reiterated India's 'unilateral moratorium' on nuclear testing."

In the end, the only thing really holding up completion of the nuclear deal was the nuclear test clause.

"If an Indian test yields a nuclear explosion, then Japan would halt all cooperation with India," said Suzuki. "PM Singh did not commit to a halt in nuclear testing, but he mentioned that there will be no planned test for a moment. This is good enough for Japan."

Regarding the India-Japan nuclear cooperation agreement, it appears that there are still outstanding issues.

"It is interesting to note that India has speedily concluded a nuclear agreement with South Korea, while the Japan deal is on a sticky wicket," said Ghoshroy. "Unlike South Korea, France, or Russia with which India has easily concluded such deals, Japan does not sell reactors. It does not have an overwhelming economic driver behind the nuclear trade."

India cannot be pleased that Japan has been so slow to come aboard as a willing supporter of its nuclear program.

"There have been three rounds of negotiations and while there is appreciation of the Japanese concerns - Japan being the only victim of nuclear weapons - India has made it clear that it cannot become party to Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear weapon state," said Rajeswari Rajagopalan, senior fellow in security studies at the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi. "There has been a slightly modified position on CTBT wherein the prime minister has stated India will consider signing the treaty provided the US and China ratify it. It appears that it will take several rounds of negotiations before the two sides can reach any compromise on this issue."

On the issue of nullifying the agreement if India carries out a nuclear test, New Delhi is not willing to make an exception in its terms and references for Japan alone.

"India has insisted that India will use the same terms and references as it did in its agreements with other countries - US, Russia, France and Canada," said Rajagopalan.

The national security dimension of this situation may not get overlooked entirely, but it is often downplayed by observers.

"The national security dimension will remain critical in India's negotiations not just with Washington, but with other capitals as well - Tokyo, Canberra, Paris or Moscow. It is indeed this national security dimension that has restrained India from accepting the conditions imposed by Tokyo," said Rajagopalan.

While these stubborn nuclear obstacles persist, there are strong imperatives for both India and Japan to cooperate not just economic and commercial issues, but more importantly on security issues, particularly those in the maritime realm, given the challenges that both New Delhi and Tokyo are facing.

"The Look East policy is an important component of India's foreign policy which is likely to acquire special significance in the coming years. Given the belligerent approach of China towards all of its neighbors including Japan, and Vietnam, India is likely to pursue the Look East policy with much more vigor to consolidate its ties with both Southeast Asian and Northeast Asian countries," said Rajagopalan.

The very fact that both India and Japan have kept up with the annual summit meetings is a testimony to the importance that each side attaches to the bilateral relationship despite the change in Japanese leadership along with the change in ruling parties.

"The inability to conclude the civil nuclear agreement may be a shortcoming, although these are issues that cannot be hammered out in one or two meetings. The fact that the two sides are still keen to continue negotiations to iron out their differences is a positive indicator," said Rajagopalan.

As Manmohan departed Tokyo and flew onto Malaysia and Vietnam, he could not have ignored Kan's declining approval ratings just as he cannot overlook or ignore the changing political winds which are now affecting United States President Barack Obama as Obama is about to show up on his doorstep.

In the case of Kan in particular, the situation surrounding Russia's activities on the islands due north of Japan was a topic that Manmohan would have avoided despite the fact that Russia and India are longtime partners.

Russia ignored Japan's protests much to Kan's displeasure. This did not help Kan's ratings at all.

And Kan cannot offer to sell India any Japanese weaponry, including submarines and electronic warfare gear, until the strict ban on the export of Japanese weapons is lifted. Besides, India and Russia are jointly building state-of-the-art missiles and new warplanes are appearing on the drawing board, while US defense contractors are eager to see their advanced aircraft parked aside India's runways. Perhaps painfully slow nuclear bargaining may be Kan's only option, hypothetically anyway.

While Kan and Obama have exerted their influence over India's future, Kan is not guaranteed at least two more years in office like Obama. And at the same time, Obama who has made a big deal out of his administration's endorsement of closer US ties to Asia and who has applied considerable energy to improved relations with India is no longer guaranteed a vote of confidence, nor is it a blank check from the US Congress.

And important members of his team including US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates who has held the line on US bases in Okinawa will soon be heading out the door. Some have already left.

As anti-Chinese sentiment in the halls of the US Congress is likely to intensify, and as it becomes more noticeable in the coming weeks, the challenge for Manmohan will be to harness this energy to India's and Japan's advantage - and at Pakistan's expense. Not doing so during Obama's upcoming state visit to India will simply be a matter of common sense and diplomatic courtesy.

That is, after all, a strategic plan that is sound and applicable only if Manmohan has concluded that stronger ties to the US under the current rules will benefit rather than hinder India over time.

Manmohan will soon sort this all out. In the meantime, he is signaling to China that Look East is alive and well.

Can Taiwan Ever Integrate with Mainland China in Political Terms?

2010-10-31T23:14:00.004+05:30

Can Taiwan ever integrate with Mainland China in political terms? Economic terms, yes, but in political terms, it is not going to happen. The social and political cultures of ROC and PRC are so different. One has a vibrant democracy, wherein freedom of the press and individual freedom are so vital and on the other hand, PRC remains a socialist, communist and most importantly an authoritarian government with severe curbs on several aspects ranging from the freedom of the press, freedom of the internet which in a way restrains severely the freedom of the individual, freedom of assembly, to freedom of religion and even reproductive rights.

In fact, I have just come back from a two-week trip to Taiwan where I had the opportunity to experience first hand what the country is all about and get the pulse of the common people, in addition to benefiting from the official line on a range of issues, through formal briefings. In the next couple of days, I will be putting across some of the recent surveys in Taiwan on the entire integration issue, particularly after the ECFA between ROC and PRC.

Type rest of the post here