Monday, December 30, 2019

#SpaceWatchGL Op’ed: My 2019 in a review – Great Power Politics and Global Governance - SpaceWatch Global, 30 December 2019

I contributed an OpEd to SpaceWatch Global - My 2019 in a review – Great Power Politics and Global Governance, where I focused on two major developments - the Indian ASAT test and the end of the INF Treaty. SpaceWatch.Global had reached out to its staff and contributors to review 2019 and provide an outlook into 2020.

This has been an exciting year for me in a number of ways but also an increasingly worrying one, especially when we consider the growing threats to peace and the difficulties in getting the world’s nations to deal with them cooperatively.
Developments in the space domain and in the broader strategic realm have kept me engaged through the year. The latter provided the setting, in many ways, for many of the developments in the former, but has also been important by itself.

For the full OpEd, click here.



The developments in the broader strategic setting essentially refers to developments in the Indo-Pacific region, especially politics between the US, China, Japan and India. The region is also home to some of the fastest growing economies, which has translated to acquisition of major hard power capabilities. Competition with China has continued to tick upwards. Sino-Indian competition, in particular, is picking up. Two rounds of informal summits have not been helpful in mitigating the competition and tension in the relationship. China’s growing influence and penetration in southern Asia and Indian Ocean has led to a pushback, including the quadrilateral (Quad) arrangement, which gained further traction in 2019. Bilateral relations — such as the India-Japan, India-Australia, and India-US — and trilaterals including the India-US-Japan have become stronger for the same reason.

But one of my main focus has been on Sino-Indian competition, which is picking up, including in outer space.
The Indian anti-satellite (ASAT) in March 2019 was one consequence, a clear deterrence signal to China, which had already tested its ASAT a decade earlier. The test did raise some concern about debris in outer space. On the flip side, there were fears in India that it would yet again sit on the fence and miss an opportunity to develop a critical defense technology, as it had done in the nuclear arena. The debate on an Indian ASAT had become loud after the first successful Chinese ASAT test in January 2007. There has been consensus among all the different Indian stakeholders – the civilian, scientific and military bureaucracies – on the need to demonstrate India’s capability.

India’s newly-acquired capability has raised many questions but Prime Minister Modi argued that the test was a “defensive” move to protect India’s own space assets. Like India, most countries use space for a number of civilian applications including in areas like agriculture, disaster management, weather forecasting and communication, and there is a strong global interest to preserve outer space as a public good. Now that India has acquired an ASAT capability, New Delhi must take earnest efforts at preventing trends towards space weaponisation.

Another important issue has been the end of the INF Treaty and what it means for global security. The treaty led Washington and Moscow to destroy a total of 2,692 short-, medium-, and intermediate-range missiles by 1991. The treaty was seen as particularly important as it is the only nuclear arms control measure that abolished an entire class of weapons. Important questions have been raised as to whether the end of the INF would have strategic implications in the Indo-Pacific. Many in the US Congress as well as arms control advocates have lamented that walking out of a treaty without an alternative one in place as a recipe for an arms race.

Now that the treaty has ended, Russia could possibly build develop a series of INF-category missiles but the real concerns have been about China. Both the Obama and Trump administrations had accused Russia of violating its INF commitments, one of the reasons for the US to end the treaty. In addition to the Russian breaches, the Trump Administration was particularly worried about the Chinese inventory of around 2,000-odd ballistic and cruise missiles, a significant majority of which would be in violation of the INF if China was a party to the treaty. But now that the shackles of the INF are gone, Beijing argues that Washington could deploy conventional ground-launched missiles in East Asia that could possibly tilt the military balance in the region. This could of course legitimize all of the missiles that China has already deployed, which are threatening to its neighbours as well as the US. There has been talk about a possible multilateral arrangement as a successor to the INF but China has remained categorically opposed to such ideas.

Unfortunately, global governance mechanisms are not keeping up with the increasing threats that international peace and stability are facing. The failure was most evident at the 2018-2019 United Nations Group of Governmental Experts (GGE)
on PAROS (Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space). The failure in developing consensus among great powers has been an issue for more than two decades now. The state of the play within the Conference on Disarmament (CD) is illustrative of this paralysed nature of inter-state relations, especially among the great powers. I was associated with the UN GGE on PAROS as a Technical Advisor to the Group, which deliberated on PAROS over two two-week long sessions but at the end, the divisions within the Group was so stark that it could not agree upon a commonly-agreed upon text to be released as a consensus report.

As the year ends, therefore, it is clear that there is a lot of work to be done if we have to maintain a stable international order. But there is also growing worry that we are running out of time.

China’s Second Aircraft Carrier: A Sign of PLA Naval Muscle? - The Diplomat, 26 December 2019

In my column for The Diplomat last week, I looked at China's commissioning of its second aircraft carrier and what it means for the overall PLA Navy.


On December 17, China commissioned into service its first home-built aircraft carrier, Shandong, at the Sanya naval base in Hainan, with President Xi Jinping presiding over the commissioning ceremony.

The commissioning of the aircraft carrier is significant. This is China’s second aircraft carrier, and an important addition to China’s power projection capabilities. It is also noteworthy because it displays China’s capability to develop aircraft carriers indigenously.

For the full essay, click here.



Military analysts argue that the layout of the warships “limits her military potential” as also its power projection capabilities since it is simply a copy of its first carrier, Liaoning, which itself is a refurbished ship bought from Ukraine. The J-15s that it operates also imposes limitations on the kind of operations it can undertake. Nevertheless, PLA Navy is clearly on the way to becoming a more credible blue water navy and it warrants close attention from key Indo-Pacific nations including, India, the United States, Japan and Australia.

China’s Navy has traditionally remained weak on account of the excessive focus on China’s ground force. As such, it did not have an aircraft carrier and even lacked amphibious operations capabilities. But all this is changing. China has strengthened its ability to project sea power significantly in the last few years. The building of the naval base, Sanya, in Hainan was one such indicator. Sanya has the capacity to maintain a large fleet of surface warships, and as an underground base for submarines. The Sanya base gives China significant advantages because of its proximity to the South China Sea as well as the Malacca Straits.

China has given great importance to building its aircraft carriers. It sees the utility of a carrier both for achieving sea control and for sea denial goals. The PLA Navy acknowledges the importance of maintaining air superiority in future naval conflicts, for which large aircraft carrier are important. The best pilots are being selected for the air wing, and they are also expected to eventually command these ships.

The construction of the Shandong, displacing around 50,000 tons, and with a conventional propulsion system, appears to have begun in 2013. The carrier can reportedly “carry up to 24 Shenyang J-15 multirole fighter jets and a variant of the fourth-generation Sukhoi Su-33 twin-engines air superiority fighter, as well as around ten rotary wing aircraft including Changshe Z-18, Ka-31, or Harbin Z-9 helicopters.” Unlike the U.S. aircraft carriers that can carry up to 100 fighter jets, Shandong will be able to carry a total of only 32 aircrafts, as per senior PLAN officers.

China had procured its first aircraft carrier, Liaoning (originally the Varyag, and built for the Soviet navy) from Ukraine as scrap for $20 million, but it was eventually restored and entered service in 2012. A senior colonel and spokesman for the Ministry of National Defense, Geng Yansheng, said the carrier was to be “used for scientific research and training.” But the colonel also clearly outlined the necessity of an aircraft to protect China’s varied interests, giving some clue to future Chinese plans.

In November, on its ninth sea trial (since May 2018) to undertake equipment tests and personnel training, it sailed through the Taiwan Straits. Both of China’s aircraft carriers have a ramp to launch J-15 fighter aircraft, which is seen as the primary combat jet for the Chinese carrier battle group.

The exact composition of a Chinese carrier battle group is unknown, but some have suggested that a future Chinese Carrier Strike Group (CSG) could include Jiangkai-II-class (Type 054A) frigates, Luyang-III-class (Type 052D) destroyers, Renhai-class Type 055 destroyers, and a couple of Yuan-class (Type 039A) or Song-class (Type 039) submarines along with additional support vessels. There are also reports that both of China’s carriers could operate together, along with others (two Type 055 guided-missile destroyers; four Type 054 frigates; six guided-missile frigates, as well as one supply ship and three Type 093B nuclear submarines), to prevent u.s. or Japanese military assistance to Taiwan in case of a war.

The PLAN’s operational tempo is also increasing. A PLA naval formation led by its first carrier, Liaoning entered the Miyako Strait for the second time in June this year; the first such passage was in December 2016. Japan had then sent its surveillance vessels although an article by Xiakedao, the official WeChat account operated by the overseas edition of People’s Daily, called the Japanese action an overreaction and unnecessary, adding that “China’s aircraft carriers will routinely pass the Miyako Strait.” In addition to a possible Taiwan Straits scenario, experts foresee the use of the aircraft carriers “to stop US long-range bombers from taking off from a naval base in Guam.”

While the induction of China’s second aircraft carrier is a significant development, there are still issues that China will need to resolve in terms of training and operational experience in operating an aircraft carrier. There will also be issues of jointness to be sorted out with other combat units such as the amphibious troops, rocket forces and other service legs.

A more significant issue would be its ability to take on other traditional naval powers such as the United States and Japan. China’s two carrier battle group together would have only 30 J-15 fighter jets to take on U.S. forces in the area. And unlike the American aircraft carriers that use catapults, Shandong’s ski-jump configuration adds additional burdens, including how fast aircraft could be launched. China plans to address this issue in the next two aircraft carriers that it will build in the coming years. The U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency in a January 2019 report on China’s military power had noted other limitations of the ski-jump configuration including its ability to “operate large, specialized support aircraft, such as an AEW [airborne early warning] aircraft.”

There are other weaknesses as well that China needs to address before it can take on more capable navies in the Indo-Pacific. But the fact remains that China’s progress so far has been impressive, and that point ought not to be lost even as we remain cognizant of Beijing’s limitations.

What’s in the Growing Russia-China-Iran Trilateral Convergence? - The Diplomat, 23 December 2019

Once again, I am lagging behind in posting my articles. I will try and rectify this in the new year.

On December 23, I published a short essay in The Diplomat on the recent Russia-China-Iran joint naval drills in the Indian Ocean. Potential security engagements among the three have spotlighted their increasing convergence.


While much of the focus in terms of minilateral alignments in the Asian region tends to be on those involving U.S. allies and partners, be it the Quad or U.S.-Japan-ROK trilateral dynamics, there are other arrangements beyond this as well. Of particular note are the arrangements that have been forged by China and Russia over the past few years.

One of these is the China-Russia-Iran relationship. Like many other arrangements, this represents the outgrowth of the combination of existing links between the three countries and recent convergences due to various trends and developments, including growing opposition to the United States that has risen further under President Donald Trump. And it continues to attract headlines about other countries that could join as well, including Pakistan.

For the full essay, click here.



Spotlight on the arrangement has been growing in recent weeks with the three countries scheduled to hold their first joint naval drill in the Indian Ocean later this month. Iran’s semi-official Fars news agency reported that the commander of the Iranian Navy, Rear Admiral Hossein Khanzadi, has said that Iran will engage in a trilateral exercise called Marine Security Belt beginning on December 27. Khanzadi revealed that this is part of a broader naval collaboration between Iran and China, which includes also production of destroyers and submarines.

Details have been rather scarce on the engagement. Last week, while speaking to IRNA, Iran’s official news agency, Khanzadi had mentioned that the naval drill will take place in the northern Indian Ocean, although he did not then announce the date. And reports also suggest that both Tehran and Beijing are considering a “long term blueprint of military collaboration.” Confirming Russian participation, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said, “We, the People’s Republic of China, and Iran are preparing naval drills for fighting terrorists and pirates in this part of the Indian Ocean.” Commenting on the trilateral exercise, Lavrov stated on October 2 that the exercise will be undertaken to train their forces in anti-piracy and anti-terrorism efforts.

Irrespective of what is being said and not said publicly, the geopolitical underpinnings of the trilateral group are quite evident: all the three maintain a rather hostile relationship with the United States and have proven increasingly willing to take cooperative actions in the security realm to illustrate their own capabilities. While speaking to the Iranian Mehr News Agency earlier, Rear Admiral Khanzadi had hinted at the fact that a “joint wargame between several countries, whether on land, at sea or in the air, indicates a remarkable expansion of cooperation among them.”

But the strategic significance of this ought to be understood more broadly too. This is a region that has witnessed increasing military activity. The United States conducted a naval operation in Bahrain in November to safeguard shipping in the Persian Gulf waters, which has seen increasing tensions in recent times, and Washington also plans to initiate and lead an International Maritime Security Construct in the Gulf, with the participation of Australia, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the U.K. Other actors are also stepping in, with French Defense Minister Florence Parly saying in November that a European-led maritime surveillance initiative, stationed at the French naval base in Abu Dhabi, UAE, will be engaged in maintaining a watch on the Gulf waters.

The activities of Russia, China, and Iran on their own terms have also attracted interest. Russia has its own initiative, the Collective Security in the Persian Gulf, which is also backed by China. Meanwhile, Iran has plans to pursue a “Hormuz Peace Endeavor” called HOPE, with the Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Shamkhani saying that its own initiative would not include any foreign powers and that it will be a coalition of regional states (while Iran’s naval prowess thus far has been limited to its use of fast boats to harass and chase foreign naval vessels, which has been undertaken by the IRGC and not the actual navy, the Iranian Navy is gaining teeth with acquisition of new drones and other technologies).

Seen from this perspective, China, Iran, and Russia all have an incentive to use the trilateral naval exercise to showcase their growing alignment. From Iran’s perspective, for instance, it has directly said that the trilateral naval exercise is to send a strategic message that the three participating countries have “reached a meaningful strategic point in their relations, with regard to their shared and non-shared interests, and by non-shared I mean the respect we have for one another’s national interests.” China has been more cautious about formal statements, partly because Chinese security analysts say Beijing would not want “to be drawn into Middle East conflicts.”

In the backdrop of these heightened maritime engagements by different coalitions of powers, the China-Iran-Russia trilateral naval exercise will be watched with some concern. As mentioned previously, it is occurring in an area that has seen increased military engagement. Beyond that, for countries like India, there are concerns about additional partners, notably Pakistan, whose potential invitation has been the source of headlines with Rear Admiral Khanzadi mentioning that Islamabad was welcome.

The coming together of China, Iran, and Russia itself is a major strategic development, and the addition of countries like Pakistan into the mix increases the stakes. Irrespective of how things play out, one can expect continued attention to trilateral and quadrilateral configurations such as these that go beyond the ones usually talked about involving U.S. allies and partners.

Saturday, December 7, 2019

What Does the New Counterterrorism Exercise Mean for the Quad? - The Diplomat, December 6, 2019

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I looked at the recently concluded counter-terrorism exercise of the Quad. Certainly, the recent development again put the minilateral arrangement in the headlines.


The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (“Quad”) between the U.S., Japan, India and Australia has often been questioned about its purpose and capacity. For critics, other than occasionally irritating Beijing, the Quad did not appear to have much purpose. And, at times, even these expressions of occasional irritation from China had been sufficient to send one or the other Quad countries into a funk.

But in the last two years, the Quad has slowly become somewhat sturdier, with the level of interaction between the countries improving, and the members themselves becoming less skittish when Beijing criticizes the venture. Now, the Quad countries have taken a new step, holding a table-top counter-terrorism exercise together. What can we make of this?

For the full post, click here.



Details are skimpy. India has hosted the first counter-terrorism table-top exercise (CT-TTX) among the Quad countries in New Delhi on November 21-22. India’s National Investigation Agency (NIA), which hosted the TTX, is reported to have said the exercise is meant to assess and validate counter-terror mechanisms against a range of existing and emerging terrorist threats at both the regional and global levels.

At the most basic level, the CT-TTX is not surprising considering India’s concern about the issue. India’s own insufficient military capabilities are well-known, and New Delhi has been open to cooperation in this regard. This is clearly an important reason why India has shown willingness to tie up with the Quad on counter-terrorism.

The exercise was also aimed at sharing best practices in terms of preparedness, mitigation strategies and in developing coordinated strategies, and to expand the areas for strengthened cooperation among the four Quad countries. Seen from that perspective, the exercise would help highlight the interagency coordination issues within each of the countries and also bolster the multi-agency coordination between security and counter-terror agencies among the four countries.

The exercise is significant because this was the first concrete joint security initiative by the four countries. The TTX also reflected the shared resolve among the Quad countries in addressing a major challenge they all face. Importantly, though this was a security exercise, it did not target China. But still, it is a step up from the usual HA/DR type of exercises that many of these countries, especially India, prefers. The fact that the Quad has been upgraded to foreign ministerial platform is also an important indicator of the significance the four participating countries attach to the Quad.

That said, one should not exaggerate the significance of this development. The Quad’s revival and the carrying out of the exercise reconfirms the fact that the original concerns that led to the Quad were valid and getting more serious. But the level of commitment of different countries within the Quad has been suspect, and their mutual trust is still a work in progress.

India is no exception to this. On the one hand, India has been open to the Quad as one of several mechanisms that allows it to build on partnerships without entering into alliances, and China’s behavior and its hostility (despite the Chennai informal summit) towards India has pushed New Delhi to be less reluctant about the Quad. But on the other hand, for the time-being, India’s willingness to participate in the Quad is limited to testing out non-military alliance initiatives such as the CT-TTX to assess the possibilities and limitations.

Monday, December 2, 2019

2+2 Dialogue Will Further Cement India-Japan Strategic Relations - The Diplomat, 29 November 2019

Last week, I had a second piece published in The Diplomat, which focused on the 2+2 Dialogue between India and Japan that took place on 30 November. I argue that the dialogue has wider strategic implications beyond the bilateral relationship itself.


India and Japan are holding their inaugural 2+2 defense and foreign minister level dialogue on November 30, ahead of the annual summit meeting between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in December. While the dialogue will be heralded as yet another step that advances India-Japan bilateral relations, it also has broader implications as well.

For the full post, click here.



The decision to hold a ministerial level 2+2 dialogue was taken this summer during a telephone call between India’s new foreign minister, Dr. S. Jaishankar, and his Japanese counterpart, Taro Kono. The inaugural US-India 2+2 dialogue was held in September 2018.

The mechanism itself is quite significant. Japan is only the second country (after the United States) with which India has such a dialogue format. The India-Japan 2+2 dialogue is an endorsement of the special strategic partnership between New Delhi and Tokyo.

More broadly, the dialogue has been driven by the mutual desire to frame an Asia that is not dominated by a single country and to see the emergence of a multipolar Indo-Pacific that is free, open, and inclusive. India and Japan have both approached the emerging Asian strategic framework with that goal in mind and both want an inclusive approach in the region. Both see China’s approach in the region as being exclusivist. There is a clear clash between these two visions of the region.

The idea of such a 2+2 meeting was initiated during the summit meeting between Modi and Abe in Tokyo in October 2018. The joint statement following the summit meeting recognized the need for such a dialogue. This would be in addition to existing strategic dialogue formats such as the Annual Defense Ministerial Dialogue, Defense Policy Dialogue, the National Security Advisers’ Dialogue. Most recently, the India-Japan defense ministerial level dialogue held in September also acknowledged the importance of a 2+2 ministerial level strategic dialogue.

Similar, but lower level, India and Japan dialogues have gone on for close to a decade now. The two have had a 2+2 foreign and defense dialogue led by secretary level officers from 2010. This dialogue was established as per the Action Plan to Advance Security Cooperation agreed between the two countries in December 2009. Discussions on global commons including maritime, outer space, and cyber space have been key themes in this dialogue.

While peace, prosperity and stability in the Indo-Pacific will be key themes in the upcoming 2+2 ministerial level dialogue, Japan will also be making a big push to convince India to join the RCEP, the mega regional trade agreement of which Japan is a part. In discussions with me, Japanese analysts say that Tokyo wants India in RCEP to more effectively push back against China. But it remains unclear if India is willing to change its stance on the RCEP. This was discussed during the last Japan-India Foreign Minister’s Strategic Dialogue held in June this year.

With an eye on China, India and Japan are also trying to finalize the military logistics agreement called the acquisition and cross-servicing agreement (ACSA) at the 2+2 dialogue so that it can be signed during Abe’s visit to India in December. Such an agreement could expand the strategic reach and influence of both the militaries: Japan could gain access to Indian facilities in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and India could have access to Japan’s naval facility in Djibouti. India took more than a decade to finalize such an agreement with the United States, but now that it has been done once, New Delhi has found it less problematic to do others. It has now concluded such deals also with France and South Korea; talks for a similar deal with Australia are at an advanced stage.

Some of these themes were also mentioned at the 5th India-Japan 2+2 Dialogue held at the vice-ministerial level. The last such dialogue was held in June 2018 and was co-chaired by Foreign Secretary Vijay Gokhale and Defense Secretary Shri Sanjay Mitra on the Indian side and Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, Takeo Mori and Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs, Ro Manabe on the Japanese side. At that meeting, the two sides also discussed strategic infrastructure projects in third countries such as Sri Lanka as well as in India’s northeast (except in Arunachal Pradesh).

Defense relations between the Indian military and the Japanese Self Defense Forces are quite intense with all the different wings of the militaries engaged in joint exercises. These include the Dharma Guardian land exercise, the Shinyu Maitr air exercise, and the Japan-India Maritime Exercise. Areas that require further attention are defense trade and technology transfer.

One of the much-talked about cases is that of the sale of the ShinMaywa US-2 amphibious aircraft for the Indian Navy, but an agreement is yet to be concluded. India’s purchase of the aircraft could see enhancement of India’s capability mix in the context of the humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) efforts, but it will also be a good addition to India’s recent maritime capability acquisitions including the P-8I maritime patrol aircraft and the potential acquisition of the Sea Guardian armed drone.

Incentivizing India to make progress on this acquisition, Japan has committed to manufacturing 30 percent of the aircraft in India and this could eventually help improve Indian defense manufacturing. Further, the two have established a working group to study the possibilities in Visual Simultaneous Localization and Mapping (SLAM) Based Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) Augmentation Technology for UGV/robotics.

Opportunities in the areas of technology collaboration is significant. Defense electronics is particularly important for India since New Delhi. India’s domestic defense electronic manufacturing segment is still at a nascent stage and it has to partner with its strategic partners in building a domestic capability base but also direct procurement of those capabilities in the interim.

Overall, the India-Japan ministerial level 2+2 strategic dialogue is an important initiative emphasizing the deep interest in both India and Japan to further strengthen their security and strategic engagements. The two countries have built a strong strategic partnership in the last decade. While China may have been a factor, building this relationship was easier because of the absence of any baggage, unlike, for instance, with the United States. But India and Japan also need to build a larger coalition if they are to balance China effectively.

What Will Rajapaksa’s Return Mean for India-Sri Lanka Relations? - The Diplomat, 27 November 2019

Last week, I wrote two pieces for the Diplomat. The first one, What Will Rajapaksa’s Return Mean for India-Sri Lanka Relations?, looked at how the new political leadership in Sri Lanka impact upon India-Sri Lanka relations.


The November 18 swearing in of Gotabaya Rajapaksa as the new president has brought the Rajapaksa family back into the political limelight in Sri Lanka. It has also spotlighted some of the potential security implications of their return to power.

As the defense secretary from November 2005 to January 2015, Rajapaksa was seen as a strong leader who put an end to the nearly 30-year-old civil war in the country. Once in office, Rajapaksa promptly chose his elder brother Mahinda Rajapaksa, former two-term president himself, as his prime minister.

For the full post, click here.



The return of the two Rajapaksas in the recent polls is not surprising against the backdrop of the bombings in Sri Lanka in April, which killed more than 250 people and injured more than 500. The Easter bombings in churches and luxury hotels in Colombo and elsewhere brought back fears of terrorism taking roots again in the island nation. The Easter bombings also brought a fresh wave of Sinhala nationalism and Islamophobia, which was evident in the recent elections.

India, the neighboring regional great power, is likely to be worried because the Rajapaksas are seen as being sympathetic to China. However, the new president has made repeated statements that his government would like Sri Lanka to be a “neutral country” and that “Sri Lanka won’t do anything that will harm India’s interests.” Gotabaya was also critical of the previous government giving Hambantota Port on a 99-year lease to China and said, “We have to renegotiate.” He went on to add that giving land as investment for developing a hotel or a commercial property was not a problem but “the strategically important, economically important harbor, giving that is not acceptable.”

While this rhetoric may be read as reassuring to some, it is too early to say with certainty how Gotabaya will balance India and China. As is the customary practice, the president will travel to New Delhi on November 29, making India his first foreign visit after assuming office. India has also been proactive on Sri Lanka, with India’s External Affairs Minister Dr. S. Jaishankar being sent to meet with Gotabaya, with a personal invitation from Prime Minister Narendra Modi to visit India.

The anxieties about the Rajapaksas come from how their past behavior toward China is perceived in New Delhi, and they will not be easily quelled. Despite his current criticism of the Hambantota deal, Mahinda was the one who initiated the deal for developing Hambantota port in 2007 when he was president. The port also happens to be in his parliamentary constituency. While it should be noted that the port development offer was initially made to India and then handed to China, that has not affected the extent of Indian concern. Chinese nuclear submarines also made port visits to Colombo port in 2014, which caused great consternation in India.

More broadly, China’s deep pockets are evident in the number of economic and infrastructure projects in Sri Lanka, including investments in the Colombo International Financial Center, Colombo-Kandy highway, oil refineries, and a $1.4 billion port city next to the Colombo port. India has its own list of pending Sri Lankan development projects that it wants to be part of, including an LNG terminal in Kerawalapitiya near Colombo, a 50-100 MW solar power plant and development of an oil tank farm in the eastern district Trincomalee and the East Container Terminal at the Colombo port.

These concerns notwithstanding, there clearly has been an effort by both India and Sri Lanka to patch up their ties. After Mahinda’s defeat in the 2015 elections, Modi visited Sri Lanka in 2015, 2017, and June 2019, and, each time, Modi made it a point to meet Mahinda. Similarly, Modi also met him in September 2018 when Mahinda and his son visited India. On the Rajapaksas’ side too, there appears to be earnest interest in improving relations, at the very least due to the fact that Mahinda wants to create the perception that he is moving away from an earlier China tilt to equidistance between India and China.

The China question is only part of the recalibration that will be needed to get India-Sri Lanka relations on the right track. Indian interests in Sri Lanka are also driven by other important factors, including post-war reconciliation and respect for the dignity of the Tamil minority in Sri Lanka and its cultivation of ties in its immediate neighborhood and the wider Indian Ocean. As a result, New Delhi will be watching carefully how the new Rajapaksa government’s tenure plays out both at home and abroad in Sri Lanka.

But beyond what Sri Lanka does, India will also need to do its part as well. Rather than focusing on building the case against China, New Delhi must step up its efforts to show what it is for. India can never match Beijing’s economic wherewithal to make a difference to Colombo’s developmental requirements. But it can carve out a niche role in some areas and also partner smartly with likeminded strategic partners like Japan to make an economic and strategic difference in Sri Lanka.

Monday, November 18, 2019

Tiger Triumph: US-India Military Relations Get More Complex - The Diplomat, 15 November 2019

In my column for The Diplomat last week, I wrote on how the maiden joint tri-services humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) exercise between the Indian and the US militaries will further deepen the ties between the two countries in general and the two militaries in particular.


The Indian and U.S. militaries are engaged in their maiden joint tri-services humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) exercise, which they are calling “Tiger Triumph,” in Visakhapatnam and Kakinada in the southern Indian state of Andhra Pradesh. This represents an improvement over the type of joint military exercises that the two countries have held to date, and is an indication that defense relations between the two sides are steadily deepening.

For the full post, click here.



The U.S. and Indian militaries have been engaged in a number of different military exercises since the early 1990s, including Yudh Abhyas and Vajra Prahar (army), Malabar and RIMPAC (multilateral, navy) and Red Flag (air force). This followed the big boost to U.S.-India defense relations with the Kicklighter proposals in 1991, which included service-to-service exchanges between India and the United States.

The first India-U.S. military exercise codenamed “Teak Iroquois” took place between the two armies in February 1992; the first naval exercise named Malabar-I in May 1992. In addition to generating interoperability, these exercises have been great familiarization opportunities for the two militaries to understand each other’s strategic and security perspectives. With each iteration, these exercises have grown in terms of the number of personnel and platforms involved, and the exercises themselves have become much more complex and useful.

This week, we saw another indication of the increasing complexity of U.S.-India exercises with the holding of Tiger Triumph, the maiden tri-service HADR exercise. The exercises, which started on November 13, should last a week. It is taking place on the India’s eastern seaboard with the participation of all three Indian services along with the U.S. Navy and Marines.

Indian naval ships Jalashwa, Airavat, and Sandhayak; Indian Army troops from 19 Madras and 7 Guards; and Indian Air Force MI-17 helicopters and Rapid Action Medical Team (IAF-RAMT) are participating in it from the Indian side. The United States has sent the USS Germantown and troops from the U.S. 3rd Marine Division. The U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific, is leading the efforts on the U.S. side. There are a total of 1,200 Indian and 500 U.S. men and women from different services participating in the first-ever U.S.-India tri-service exercise.

The exercise, focused on HADR aspects, is meant to be an annual event from now on, bolstering the already-strong military-to-military collaboration between India and the United States.

The exercise is aimed at building and nurturing better and more effective interoperability between the services of the two militaries. It is because the two militaries have held specific service-led military exercises for more than a decade that the Indian and the U.S. militaries were able to respond to the 2005 Indian Ocean tsunami in a prompt and coordinated fashion. Interoperability is the mantra, especially for a region that is characterized by a high number of natural disasters on a fairly periodic basis to which multiple countries respond.

According to an Indian government press release, the exercise will begin with a Harbor Phase at Vishakapatnam, which will be followed by a Sea Phase conducted in Kakinanda, where “the landing of Relief Forces would be undertaken to the Exercise scenario.” A Joint Command and Control Centre will be established by the Indian Army and U.S. Marines. The HADR area will also have a medical facility camp, established by the IAF-RAMT and the U.S. Navy Medical team, that will cater to the “victims” who would have been shifted to the facility by air and road. The exercise, with a goal of helping capacity-building for both the militaries, will simulate a full scenario involving field training and moving humanitarian assistance and disaster relief from ship to shore. The exercise will end with a closing ceremony on board the U.S. naval vessel Germantown on November 21.

Beyond Tiger Triumph itself, the trend of increasing complexity of U.S.-India exercises is rooted in broader strategic dynamics. These exercises are the result of the growing convergence between American and Indian strategic interests with the changing strategic dynamics in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. In this context, there is a recognition on both sides that more capable powers such as India and the United States have to join forces to prevent the possibility of a hegemonic Asia.

This has manifested itself in how both sides have been talking about each other within their broader strategic approaches. There have been repeated assertions from the United States on the importance of India in their Indo-Pacific strategy, and this is asserted in the U.S. National Security Strategy document as well as the U.S. Department of Defense’s 2019 Indo-Pacific Strategy Report. India does not bring out formal, official strategy papers, but statements by senior government officials and the upgrading of the Quad talks to ministerial level are a demonstration of similar sentiments on the Indian side too. And the idea of a free, open, and inclusive Indo-Pacific was reiterated by Prime Minister Narendra Modi at the Shangri La Dialogue in 2018.

Engagements such as Tiger Triumph are also a demonstration of the fact that despite the occasional irritants in the relationship, U.S.-India ties are still deepening amid these wider strategic dynamics.

Thursday, November 7, 2019

India Must Look Beyond ASEAN in Regional Security - The Diplomat, 8 November 2019

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I wrote on India's diplomatic outreach to ASEAN and the possible limits to that engagement. I argue that in recognition of ASEAN’s limitations, New Delhi must also continue to strengthen its ties with other institutions, frameworks, and countries as well.


Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi was in Thailand recently for three major summits – the India-ASEAN Summit, the East Asia Summit, and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) Summit. His visit was focused on a number of issues such as trade and connectivity, as well as security partnerships.

India’s diplomatic establishment was keen to highlight this aspect of India’s engagement of ASEAN. The Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), in a special press briefing on Modi’s visit, said “The ASEAN-related summits are an integral part of our diplomatic calendar,” highlighting the fact that this was Modi’s ASEAN-India summit and sixth East Asia Summit.”

With India’s renewed focus on Southeast Asia with the Act East Policy, this should not surprise anyone. But while India sees a central role for the ASEAN in its Indo-Pacific strategy, it also needs to be cognizant of the fact that ASEAN has its own limitations.

For the full post, click here.



India has been keen on warming up its ties to Southeast Asia since the end of the Cold War. It initially adopted what was called the “Look East” policy which emphasized trade and economic linkages, but over the last decade this relationship has evolved into one that is at least equally concerned with security and strategic considerations. The policy was rebranded as “Act East” under the Modi government, to emphasize greater activism and commitment on India’s part. In January 2018, India hosted the 25th anniversary of the India-ASEAN friendship and the 15th year of the India-ASEAN summit, in which all the ten ASEAN leaders participated.

Clearly, this new approach is dictated by India’s concern about China. But if that is so, it is not clear how far ASEAN will or can go in balancing China. ASEAN’s tepid reaction to the ‘Indo-Pacific’ concept is reflective of the ASEAN’s wariness in annoying China. Earlier in the year, ASEAN did release its “Outlook on the Indo-Pacific” document, which was appreciated by New Delhi, which saw this as converging with its own Act East policy. But managing China would require a more coherent strategy and ASEAN has not been able to present a unified front when it comes to China. This division within ASEAN will likely only get deeper as Beijing becomes more muscular.

Thus far, in the face of China’s extensive economic linkages with the region, ASEAN has found it harder to take strong positions against China. While it has been particularly hard for smaller countries like Cambodia and Laos, even bigger players such as Malaysia have said they cannot afford to confront China. Most recently, the Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad said that “Malaysia does not want to take a confrontational stance toward China over the disputed South China Sea and Beijing’s alleged mistreatment of its minority Uighur Muslims.”

In the face of a divided ASEAN, India needs to strengthen its engagement with the region through other but associated platforms such as the East Asia Summit which includes key Indo-Pacific powers such as Australia, Japan and the United States. Many analysts believe that despite East Asia Summit being a key leaders forum, it has never gained the kind of traction that APEC or the G-20 has. However, they argue that it has the potential to become a major platform because of the “broad remit” it enjoys and the “inclusive” nature of the institution.

Other initiatives proposed by India also bear careful watching. At this year’s East Asia Summit, Modi proposed a new initiative called the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative, which is a reiteration of India’s commitment towards a free, open and inclusive Indo-Pacific region based on a rules-based order. The new initiative enlarges the focus on the strategic maritime space in the Indo-Pacific and is also a clear indicator of India’s willingness to address China’s maritime aggressiveness in an emphatic manner. The proposal was reportedly welcomed by ASEAN’s outgoing chair, Thailand, as well as Australia. Vijay Thakur Singh, Secretary of the MEA, detailed Modi’s new initiative as “creating partnerships among interested States in several pillars ranging from enhancing maritime security to preserving and sustainably using marine resources, building capacity, disaster prevention and management as well as working together in trade and maritime transport.”

On the sidelines of these summits, there was also a consultative meeting of the Quad countries where the Quad members reiterated “their commitment towards a free, open, prosperous and inclusive Indo-Pacific Region based on shared values and principles and respect for international law” while reflecting on “ongoing and additional practical cooperation in the areas of connectivity and infrastructure development, and security matters, including counterterrorism, cyber and maritime security, with a view to promoting peace, security, stability, prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region.” This came in the backdrop of a status report on the Indo-Pacific strategy from the U.S. State Department which also highlighted a “critical role” for India in the Indo-Pacific.

New Delhi is likely to continue to engage in large regional meetings and summits, but is probably also likely to step up engagement at bilateral and trilateral levels as well as the Quad and other minilaterals. A thicket of overlapping partnerships with like-minded partners is a better bet than following just single-track partnership with ASEAN alone. In order to develop concrete ideas on the Indo-Pacific Oceans initiative, India’s efforts cannot be limited to a normative exercise alone. Strategic partnerships with other key (and financially more capable) Indo-Pacific powers such as Japan has also become crucial.

Friday, November 1, 2019

What Does ASEAN’s Evolving Approach to the South China Sea Issue Mean for Vietnam? - The Diplomat, 1 November 2019

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I write on the ASEAN Summit and what does it mean for Vietnam in terms of the South China Sea issue. Though the regional grouping continues to have difficulties on the issue, it nonetheless remains important to Hanoi’s calculations.


While a range of issues will be in discussion during this weekend’s summit of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the South China Sea will be among them. And for Vietnam in particular, how ASEAN manages the issue will be important for its own calculations and options in dealing with the South China Sea.

For the full post, click here.



ASEAN’s ability to speak in one common voice on important issues such as sovereignty and territorial issues has been under scrutiny in recent years, with the organization working on the basis of consensus and having to accommodate views of countries like Cambodia. The South China Sea issue is no exception to this. While Chinese behavior in the South China Sea has been concerning, there are worries that ASEAN will eventually settle for a code of conduct that will avoid maritime incidents. There are broader realities too: the economic dependency on China for many of the Southeast Asian countries is a reality that these countries cannot afford to ignore.

But the situation in the South China Sea will not wait for these realities to play out. Indeed, the South China Sea has been witnessing increasing tensions in the last year. Vietnam, Malaysia and the Philippines have all been pushing back against China, albeit to varying degrees and through different pathways. In June this year, a Filipino fishing boat was sunk by a Chinese ship in Bai Co Rong (Recto Bank). Earlier, Malaysia’s oil rig operation near Luconia Shoals off the coast of the Sarawak State was stopped by a Chinese Coast Guard vessel.

But Vietnam has been particularly affected by Chinese activities in the South China Sea, and Hanoi’s pushback has correspondingly been the strongest among the ASEAN claimant states. Since July this year, China has sent one survey vessel and at least four Chinese maritime vessels into Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone and continental shelf in the south of the East Sea (as Vietnam calls it). Vietnam responded with its own deployment of its Coast Guard vessels. Vietnam has called for greater support for its position but the response from all the big powers in the region and beyond has been fairly low-key. In a further assertion of its claims, China reportedly organized the seventh Sinan Cup Regatta in Duy Mong island, part of the Paracel (Hoang Sa) archipelago.

Vietnam has appeared to be pursuing multiple tracks to address the issues confronting its sovereignty. In the absence of concrete support to Vietnam from within the region and beyond, Vietnam is pursuing diplomatic tracks along with tough posturing. Last week, the Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc told the National Assembly (NA) that “What happened in the East Sea recently was getting very complicated, including serious violations in Vietnam’s sea recognized by international law… We will keep fighting in means in line with international law.” The Vietnamese Foreign Ministry also reiterated last week “that the Vanguard Bank lies completely within Vietnam’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and continental shelf, as delineated from the Vietnamese shore in accordance with the United Conventions on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS) 1982, and that the Vanguard Bank is not a disputed area or with overlapping claims.”

Vietnam has also tried the regional route to address its concerns. In late July, Vietnamese Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Pham Binh Minh took China’s latest survey vessel deployment issue to ASEAN, saying that the “Chinese geological survey vessel group Haiyang Dizhi 8’s activities [are] violating Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone and continental shelf in the waters…” and “seriously threaten legitimate rights of coastal countries, erode trust, and worsen tensions, thus hurting peace and stability in the region.” The response, however, was one of general reiteration of the need “to uphold and comply with international laws, including the UNCLOS 1982, the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the East Sea (DOC), toward perfecting an effective COC.”

Given their big focus on trade and investment, it is unlikely that the ASEAN will call out Chinese behavior that directly. And China will have no objections as long as the statements are neutral, calling on all parties to “building trust as well as ensuring peace, stability, safety and freedom of navigation and aviation in the waters.”

But for Vietnam, despite these limitations, the position ASEAN takes on issues like the South China Sea is nonetheless critical. Diplomacy continues to be among the paths Vietnam adopts to manage the South China Sea issue. And with Vietnam taking up the chairmanship of ASEAN next year, Hanoi itself will have to endeavor to find a balance between the economic and strategic interests of the ASEAN and its own disputes with China, alongside other challenges including doubts about the extent and shape of U.S. engagement under U.S. President Donald Trump.

Monday, October 28, 2019

Russia-China Strategic Alliance Gets a New Boost with Missile Early Warning System - The Diplomat, 25 October 2019

In my column for The Diplomat last week, I looked at as to how the growing Russia-China strategic alliance gets a new boost with missile early warning system.

The Russia-China alliance – as Russian President Vladimir Putin has described it more than once recently – is getting stronger. Even though an alliance of short-term convenience, brought about by their shared conflict with the U.S. and the West, it is deepening in ways that have implications not only for the West but also Asia. The latest indicator is Russian assistance to China to build a strategic missile early warning system.


In the beginning of October, Russian President Vladimir Putin said at an international affairs conference that Russia will be “helping China build an early warning system to spot intercontinental ballistic missile launches, something only Russia and the United States possess at the moment.” Speaking at a Moscow-based think tank, Valdai Club, Putin added that “This is a serious thing that will drastically increase the defense capabilities of the People’s Republic of China.” Kremlin spokesman did not give any specific details such as when the system would be operational but reportedly said this move “highlighted Russia’s close ties with China.” This clearly is an indication of the growing strategic partnership and the nature of the special relationship that Russia and China enjoy.

For the full post, click here.



In recent years, the Russia-China strategic partnership has assumed more importance than any other relationship for Russia. Russia has gone on to characterize this relationship as an “alliance” first in Vladivostok on September 6 2019, in Sochi October 3 2019 and later at the Valdai Club in Moscow on October 7 2019. In the first instance at Vladivostok, Putin had stated, “We have developed special relations over the past decade, truly allied, strategic.” Later at the Valdai Club, Putin is reported to have remarked, “We have an unprecedentedly high level of trust and cooperation. This is an allied relationship, a multifaceted strategic partnership.”

According to Russian media reports, an around $60 million worth contract has been already signed to develop the software for the PLA early-warning system (Systema Preduprezdenya o Raketnom Napadenii—SPRN) network. SPRN will include both ground (using powerful stationary radars) and space segments. The report stated that much of the work will be undertaken by IAC Vympel and the Central Research Institute Comet (part of the Almaz-Antey Concern for Aerospace Defense. – Vedomosti). China already possesses the Russian S-400 air defense system which can also partly serve the missile defense functions. Russia is in the process of developing a more advanced S-500 system and Moscow believes that if Beijing were to buy it, that would facilitate Russia setting up the full architecture of an integrated PLA SPRN and a missile defense network.

There is also some speculation that the system will allow the two countries to warn each other of third-country launches, but this clearly needs to be considered with some skepticism. For example, a military analyst based in Hong Kong, Song Zhongping opines that the Russian offer would facilitate the development of a joint early warning system between Russia and China. He added that “If the U.S. wants to attack China [with its ICBMs], their missiles are likely to be launched from the Arctic, and that will be covered by Russia’s early warning system, and that means Moscow will have the capability to alert Beijing.” But it is doubtful that this would come to pass. Strategic early warning systems are among the most closely guarded and vital national security establishments because they – literally – could decide the survival of the nation. It is unlikely that such systems will be operated jointly with another state, especially considering the history of past conflicts between Moscow and Beijing, as well as their current suspicions of each other.

China appears to be the beneficiary of the worsening Russia-West relations. After the Ukraine crisis and the sanctioning of Russia, Moscow has felt the need to cultivate its own strong partnerships in Asia and China has benefited immensely from this Russian outreach. But the reverse is also true: worsening U.S.-China relations is also making Beijing more receptive to Russian overtures. Irrespective of the reasons for this deepening alliance, it has implications for others, including Asian powers such as India, which have their own reasons for worrying about this relationship.

Saturday, October 19, 2019

Xi’s Visit Exposes the Limits of China-Nepal Strategic Convergence - The Diplomat, 17 October 2019

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I looked at the Chinese President Xi Jinping's visit to Nepal. It appears that despite the interests both sides have for better ties, there are real limits and challenges to this.


Last week, as expected, Chinese President Xi Jinping stopped in Kathmandu, the capital of Nepal, for a state visit on his way back to China after an informal summit with the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi.

Xi’s Nepal trip itself came as no surprise: China has been attempting to woo India’s smaller neighbors in South Asia, and there is clearly interest among some including Nepal to use the Sino-Indian competition for their own benefits. But Xi’s trip also showed the limits of these converging interests. Indeed, the lack of progress on issues, with an extradition agreement not signed being a case in point, reinforces the fact that any alignment has its limits despite the strategic interests that both Nepal and China see in the wider relationship.

For the full essay, click here.



The mutual attraction between Nepal and China is easy enough to understand. From Beijing’s perspective, Nepal is important for a few strategic reasons. For one, Nepal borders China’s Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR). Though Tibet is relatively quiet, China always worries about the possibility of a resurgence of Tibetan nationalism. Though the largest chunk of Tibetan refugees lives in India, Nepal also hosts about 20,000 Tibetan exiles. Any disturbance in Tibet will likely have some reverberations in Nepal too.

Thus, China is concerned about ensuring that the Tibetan exile population in Nepal does not become an issue of concern. This appears to have been the primary reason why China was pushing for an extradition treaty with Nepal. This also makes good relations with Nepal an important means of managing any future problems in Tibet itself.

In addition to this direct linkage, China also has more general and obvious balance of power considerations in befriending Nepal. As a small South Asian neighbor of India, Nepal affords the opportunity to balance India within the region itself. Nepal’s relations with India, which had its ups and downs, makes Kathmandu a potentially attractive partner for Beijing. There is nothing unusual in this because this is at least part of the reason for Beijing’s outreach to all of India’s smaller neighbors. And of course, India returns the favor, trying to partner with China’s own smaller neighbors such as Vietnam.

A third reason for China’s interests in Nepal is China’s drive to develop the Belt and Road scheme, both as a means of exporting Chinese capital and labor but also expanding its interests. China has discussed several BRI projects with Nepal, including a railroad that would link Lhasa and Kathmandu as well as a Parliament building, National Defence University, and other infrastructure projects.

Nepal also has some interest in developing this partnership with China. For one, a closer relationship with China makes India a lot more receptive to Nepali concerns. Nepal, like India’s other neighbors, has complaints about the lackadaisical manner in which New Delhi approaches development projects in Nepal. Chinese help with infrastructure kills two birds with one stone. It potentially helps Nepal develop economic infrastructure – China has been very efficient in completing such projects, especially in comparison to India – while also putting pressure on India to pay greater attention to Nepali connectivity requirements. Seen from this perspective, having two great powers competing for Nepal’s attention will not be entirely unwelcome in Kathmandu.

In addition, Nepal, a small, landlocked country, also feels vulnerable to Indian pressures. India has been known to impose blockades on Nepal because much of Nepal’s international trade either originates in India or passes through Indian territory. The most recent of these blockades was in 2015, when India imposed an unofficial blockade in an ill-advised move to pressure Kathmandu over what was perceived by India to be discrimination against the Madhesi population in the new Nepali constitution. Though it appears somewhat impractical, Nepal would like to reduce its dependence on India by building trade and transit linkages through China. At the very least, closer linkages with China might make India more careful antagonizing Nepal.

But the strategic interests both sides have for better ties does not mean that there are not limits and challenges for relations. Indeed, if anything, Xi’s visit to Nepal, which saw the relative lack of substantive outcomes despite the hype, reinforced this reality. Despite the seeming attractiveness of the China partnership, there appears to be some disquiet within sections of the Nepali elite about getting too close to China as well as other dangers such as the potential debt-trap by way of involvement in the BRI. India’s unwillingness is also possibly an issue, because as Constantino Xavier, a close observer of India’s relations with its neighbors, has pointed out, one of the projects was meant to be a Sino-Nepalese-Indian, which India is now reluctant to pursue.

All this suggests that mutual interests by itself may not be sufficient to power China-Nepal relations. Negotiating the terms of actual deals, domestic national concerns, as well as the fear of getting dragged into the Sino-Indian competition, are all likely to limit how close India’s neighbors such as Nepal will get to China.

Thursday, October 17, 2019

Shaping Space Diplomacy, my podcast with Carnegie India's Interpreting India - Carnegie India, 10 October 2019

Earlier in the month, I did a podcast with Carnegie India's new podcast series called, Interpreting India, where I discussed India's evolving space policy, global governance aspects and India's role in it. Of course, space diplomacy was a running theme despite the fact that competition is beginning to dominate this realm.

To listen to the podcast, titled, Shaping Space Diplomacy, click here.




Saturday, October 12, 2019

Modi-Xi Summit: A More Balanced China Policy? - ORF, 11 October 2019

I wrote a second piece on the second informal summit between Modi and Xi, and this was published by the Observer Research Foundation yesterday.


Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping are meeting for their second informal summit. Irrespective of the rhetoric of a Wuhan spirit, the relationship is facing difficulties, reflected in a number of disputes between the two countries. This is only a manifestation of the larger strategic problems that exists between India and China, which is rooted in the changing balance of power dynamics in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. While this is not new, the difference now is that India is also displaying greater willingness to respond to China’s pressure more firmly or at least to not let efforts to improve ties with China come in the way of stopping efforts to counter China.

For the full post, click here.



This has become evident in a number of different ways. While India has engaged China in informal summits and joined platforms such as the Russia-India-China (RIC), Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa (BRICS), and Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), India is also stepping up its diplomatic and security engagements with other countries and minilaterals. The recent upgradation of the quadrilateral (Quad) engagements between Australia, India, Japan and the US, suggest the seriousness within this grouping in giving more teeth to the initiative. India’s military engagements with a number of countries in the Indo-Pacific is again a testament to the fact that New Delhi will seek to improve its ties with Beijing but it will also build and nurture a network of strategic engagements that will go on to provide India with greater strategic maneuverability.

While the MEA statement said that the two leaders will discuss bilateral, regional and global issues and share ideas and perspectives for deepening India-China partnership, the two sides, have also tried to keep expectations low. The problems that face the bilateral relationship is not for lack of understanding or lack of high-level political attention, clearly, but because of intractable real differences of interest. This means that finding compromises and accommodation will be harder.

China is unlikely to give up on using Pakistan to balance India. Only a few days before the summit, the Chinese ambassador to Pakistan, Yao Jing endorsed Pakistan’s stand on the Kashmir dispute by stating that “We are also working for Kashmiris to help them get their fundamental rights and justice. There should be a justified solution to the issue of Kashmir and China will stand by Pakistan for regional peace and stability.” India, understandably, protested the statement and sought clarification on China’s changing position on Jammu and Kashmir. Beijing’s stated position so far had been that Kashmir was a bilateral issue that needs to be resolved between two concerned parties. Moreover, this comes in the backdrop of China taking India to the UN Security Council on behalf of Pakistan, which sought a meeting on the Jammu and Kashmir issue following India’s decision to remove the special status to the state of Jammu and Kashmir through Article 370. India maintained that this is purely an internal matter and other countries like China and Pakistan had no locus standi. China can be expected to continue to support Pakistan, and attempt to bolster its economic and military capability, and this will continue to provoke New Delhi.

Similarly, China has found other ways to undermine India, especially in multilateral forums. China has, for all practical purposes, opposed India’s efforts to reform and expand the UN Security Council and find a permanent seat on the body. China has also opposed India’s inclusion in the Nuclear Supplier’s Group (NSG). Though there are some areas of common interests – climate change, or trade, for example – there are sufficient disagreements even on these areas. And where there are disagreements, expect Beijing to undermine India. This is not so much because China has any particular dislike of India, but simply because of the nature of international politics, but New Delhi has long been dismissive of this.

It is possible that New Delhi’s attitude is changing. In the face of such stiffening positions by China, India has joined a web of networks including the Quad, trilateral groupings such as Japan, India and the US (JAI). India could also upgrade the track II trilateral engagements among countries like Japan, India and Australia, and India, Indonesia and Australia. Reluctantly, New Delhi seems to be coming around to the view that even as it tries to keep the relations with China steady, and do as much as possible to prevent serious downturn or tensions in ties, India will also have to expect that such efforts will not be sufficient or fully successful. Thus, India seems to be now unwilling to stop efforts at alternative arrangements to counter China, while seeking to improve ties with it.

Behind the Second Modi-Xi Informal Summit, the Wuhan Spirit Is Fraying - The Diplomat, 10 October 2019

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I write on the second Modi-Xi informal summit scheduled to begin later in Mamallapuram today and conclude by tomorrow.


The second informal summit between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping is set to take place in Mamallapuram, a coastal town in south India from October 11-12. The meeting between the leaders of the two Asian giants will be closely watched, with consequences not only for their countries but the wider Indo-Pacific region and the world as well.

The Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) made a formal announcement of the visit just a couple of days before the visit. The statement added that the agenda was discussing “issues of bilateral, regional and global importance and to exchange views on deepening India-China Closer Development Partnership.” The two sides appear to be setting expectations low, with good reason.

For the full essay, click here.



Prior to the announcement, the Indian media was full of speculation that the summit could even be cancelled. Despite the Wuhan Summit in 2017 and the so-called “Wuhan spirit,” India-China relations have been characterized by a growing number of disputes.

The most serious of these, at least from Delhi’s perspective, is the strengthening Chinese support for Pakistan. Just days before the summit, the Chinese ambassador in Pakistan, Yao Jing, expressed strong support for Pakistan’s position on the Kashmir dispute, saying, “We are also working for Kashmiris to help them get their fundamental rights and justice. There should be a justified solution to the issue of Kashmir and China will stand by Pakistan for regional peace and stability.” This was a red flag for India and led to India lodging a strong protest with China and seeking clarification on what appears to be a change in Beijing’s stated stand on Jammu and Kashmir.

Beijing’s official stand has always been that Kashmir was a bilateral issue between India and Pakistan, left over from history, that needs to be resolved directly by the two countries. So, the change in China’s position was surprising and was seen by official New Delhi as an effort to interfere in India’s internal affairs. Moreover, this came after the strong Chinese support for Pakistan on Article 370 issue, when Beijing forced a UN Security Council discussion on the issue. China also took an unusually strong position on India effectively removing Article 370 (which had ensured local autonomy for the Indian state of Jammu Kashmir) and creating a separate Union Territory (a province directly ruled from New Delhi) in Ladakh. This was despite India’s foreign minister S. Jaishankar travelling to Beijing to explain that the Indian actions in Kashmir had no additional or negative or implication for the Sino-Indian border dispute.

After several strong statements on India by Chinese officials, there was a thawing of the tensions with a Chinese Foreign Ministry statement on October 8. While responding to a question, the Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson said, “China’s position on the issue of Kashmir is consistent and clear. We call on India and Pakistan to step up dialogue on disputes including the Kashmir issue to enhance mutual trust and improve relations. It serves the common interests of both India and Pakistan and represents the shared expectation of regional countries and the international community.” Earlier references to UN resolutions, which irritated India, was missing from this statement.

But the thaw, to the extent that it existed, was short-lived. Not only did China host a visit by the Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan just days before the Xi-Modi summit, the joint China-Pakistan press release also brought back language in reference to Kashmir that India had objected to, asking that the dispute be “resolved based on the UN Charter, relevant UN Security Council resolutions and bilateral agreements.”

Beijing, of course, has its complaints too. China had raised objections to the Indian military exercise Him-Vijay in Arunachal Pradesh, executed by the Indian Army’s 17 Corps. The Indian government is reported to have clarified that the ongoing exercise is part of the routine familiarization and orientation exercises and has nothing to with Xi’s visit to India.

This is not the first time that China has objected to military exercises or movements in Arunachal Pradesh. China has continued to maintain that Arunachal Pradesh is “southern Tibet” but India has always countered such statements by saying that Arunachal Pradesh is an integral part of India. Moreover, India had also participated in an elevated foreign minister-level meeting of the Quad countries in the sidelines of the UN General Assembly annual meeting, despite China’s objections to all such Quad meetings.

Clearly, Modi and Xi have a lot to discuss. But with new issues piling up, it is unclear if such ‘informal’ summits can do much to improve ties. Personal reassurances are unlikely to overcome growing real disagreements between the two sides, especially considering that the two sides do not seem to care very much to even hide their disagreements anymore.

Friday, October 4, 2019

The Trouble with India’s Slow Naval Buildup - The Diplomat, 4 October 2019

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I examine the trouble with India's naval modernisation. I argue that though India is trying hard to enhance its naval capabilities, it continues to be slow work.

India has been trying hard to enhance its naval capabilities over the past few years, both in recognition of its own needs as well as an understanding of evolving trends in the strategic environment. But despite New Delhi’s best efforts, doing so continues to be slow work.


A case in point is India’s submarine program, which was in the spotlight again recently when the second of the Indian Navy’s six Scorpene submarines, INS Khanderi, was inducted into service on September 28. The first Scorpene submarine, called INS Kalvari, was commissioned in 2017. The third submarine, INS Karanj, launched in January 2018, is undertaking sea trials now. INS Khanderi was manufactured by Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders Limited at a cost of 187.98 billion rupees (about $2.6 billion) under an India-France bilateral agreement in 2005 to build six Scorpene class submarines in India. Not including the Scorpenes, India currently has two other older types of diesel-electric submarine types, the Sindhughosh (Kilo) class and the Shishumar (HDW 209/1500) class diesel-electric submarines, and the nuclear-powered Arihant class (as well as the leased Chakra class nuclear submarine).

But the induction of the new submarine belies the fact that the size of India’s submarine inventory has been declining for years. The Scorpene acquisition has undergone significant delays – more than six years – even though it remains an important addition to the Indian naval capability. Even though there have been triumphant comments from many senior Indian officials on the significance of this induction, it is far from sufficient given the growing naval and maritime challenges in the Indo-Pacific.

For the full essay, click here.



Commissioning the submarine into service, the Indian Defense minister Rajnath Singh talked of the importance of the submarine and Indo-French defense cooperation, though he framed the acquisition primarily as a message to Pakistan. But the Scorpene submarines still do not have a modern torpedo, making do with the older SUT torpedoes. India cancelled a deal for the heavy-weight Black Shark torpedoes, built by the Finmecannica subsidiary WASS, as a result of an unrelated corruption scandal that involved another subsidiary of Finmecannica, Augusta-Westland. In a makeshift arrangement, the Indian government approached the German defense company, Atlas Elektronik to upgrade 64 torpedoes, which were procured in the 1980s and 1990s for the Indian Navy’s four Shishumar-class submarines. The already-insufficient number of torpedoes in the Indian Navy’s arsenal is to be now also shared with the Scorpene submarines.

An additional issue comes from the slow development of the air independent propulsion (AIP) system. AIP allows submarines to stay under water for longer periods of time without being detected. However, the development of the indigenous AIP system by Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) has been delayed, which should not come as much of a surprise given the history of DRDO’s tendency to over-promise and under-deliver. The last two of the Scorpene submarines were to be equipped with the indigenously developed AIP systems but because of the delay by the DRDO, the plan is now to have them in the next six submarines that will be developed under Project 75-I.

But Project 75I has also been very slow. Under Project 75I, India plans to build six additional advanced conventional submarines in collaboration with a foreign manufacturer. But this has also run into difficulties. The Swedish defense firm SAAB, which was seen as one of the top foreign contenders, pulled out its bid because of onerous conditions the India has imposed regarding indigenous partnerships and instead South Korea’s Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering has entered the fray.

The South Korean decision possibly flows out of the visit of the Indian Defense minister Rajnath Singh to South Korea in September where defense industry cooperation was a major highlight. South Korea joins four other contenders: Naval Group (France), Navantia (Spain), Rosoboronexport (Russia) and TKMS (Germany) who are all bidding for the 450 billion rupee (about $6.32 billion) contract. During the recent visit of Prime Minister Modi to Russia, the Russian President Vladimir Putin agreed to undertake a “joint design and development of conventional submarines through an Inter-Governmental Agreement (IGA).” But it has been more than a decade since Project 75I started, and it will be years more before these submarines enter Indian Navy service.

The long, hard work of building up India’s naval capabilities is not just limited to its submarine program. On the same day as the INS Khanderi induction, there were two other developments that are critical to the Indian Navy: the launching of the first of the P-17A frigates, ‘Nilgiri’ and inauguration of a dry dock, located within the Naval Dockyard in Mumbai. According to Rakesh Anand, head of Mazagon Dock Limited, the new frigates come with “new design concepts for improved survivability, sea keeping, stealth and ship manoeuvrability.” The new dry dock will be the Indian Navy’s biggest one, capable of holding India’s aircraft carrier, INS Vikramaditya. It is state of the art, made of 1.5 meter-thick reinforced concrete and almost 300 meters into the sea. But it has taken more than a decade to complete the dock.

The slow nature of India’s naval buildup is the product of broader trends that are well-known. Much of the Indian budget is focused on the Army, with the air force being a distant second and the navy a poor third. And with naval capability building proving time-consuming and capital-intensive, that leaves New Delhi stuck with a continued slow pace of development of its naval capabilities relative to other actors, even as competitors such as China forge ahead more quickly.

The solutions are also well-known. Some of them involve process: for instance, India needs to change its decision-making processes and its complicated acquisitions process to halt the slide in its relative capabilities. Others relate to outlook, with India needing to focus on the right threats to its national security rather than leaving itself looking broad but being overextended as a result. Whether or not these solutions will be adopted or not remains to be seen. Until then, developing India’s naval capabilities will likely continue to prove to be slow work irrespective of the incremental gains that are seen in the headlines.

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